1. Those against whom the Postmaster General has issued a postal
fraud order may sue the local postmaster to enjoin him from
carrying out the order, and the Postmaster General is not an
indispensable party. Pp.
332 U. S.
492-494.
2. The superior officer is an indispensable party if a decree
granting the relief sought will require him to take action, either
by exercising directly a power lodged in him or by having a
subordinate exercise it for him. Pp.
332 U. S.
492-493.
3. The superior officer is not an indispensable party if the
decree which is entered would effectively grant the relief desired
by expending itself on the subordinate official who is before the
court. Pp.
332 U. S.
493-494.
158 F.2d 95 reversed.
Page 332 U. S. 491
The District Court dismissed a suit to enjoin a postmaster from
carrying out a fraud order issued by the Postmaster General. The
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 158 F.2d 95. This Court granted
certiorari. 3 31 U.S. 797.
Reversed, p.
332 U. S.
494.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, here on certiorari to resolve a conflict between the
circuits, [
Footnote 1] presents
the question whether those against whom the Postmaster General has
issued a postal fraud order may sue the local postmaster to enjoin
him from carrying out the order or whether the Postmaster General
is an indispensable party.
The Postmaster General, after a hearing in Washington, found
that petitioners' weight-reducing enterprise was fraudulent. He
accordingly issued a fraud order, R.S. §§ 3929, 4041, 39 U.S.C. §§
259, 732, directing respondent, postmaster at Los Angeles,
California (where petitioners do business) to refuse payment of any
money order drawn to the order of petitioners, to
Page 332 U. S. 492
advise the remitter of such money order that payment had been
forbidden, and to stamp "fraudulent" on all mail matter directed to
petitioners and to return it to the senders.
Petitioners thereupon brought this suit in the District Court
for the Southern District of California to enjoin respondent from
carrying out the order, [
Footnote
2] claiming that they had been deprived of the hearing to which
they were entitled and that the fraud order was without the support
of substantial evidence. On motion of respondent, the District
Court dismissed the complaint, holding in accord with the view of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [
Footnote 3] that the Postmaster General was an
indispensable party. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 158
F.2d 95.
It was long assumed that the Postmaster General was not an
indispensable party in these fraud order cases. Beginning at least
with
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
187 U. S. 94,
decided in 1902, the maintenance of the suit against the local
postmaster alone was not challenged. [
Footnote 4]
Meanwhile, another line of cases was emerging.
Warner Valley
Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U. S. 28, held
that a suit against the Secretary of the Interior to compel him to
issue patents to public lands abated on his resignation. As the
purpose of the bill was "to control the action of the Secretary of
the Interior" (165 U.S. p.
165 U. S. 34), he was held to be an indispensable party.
Next came
Gnerich v. Rutter, 265 U.
S. 388, which was a suit to enjoin a representative of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
Page 332 U. S. 493
enforcing a restriction embodied in a permit issued under the
National Prohibition Act. The subordinate official, acting for the
Commissioner, had refused to give plaintiffs the more liberal
permit which they desired, and he had no power to grant the desired
permit without revision of his delegated authority. The
Commissioner was held to be an indispensable party.
Webster v.
Fall, 266 U. S. 507,
followed. That was a suit brought by an Osage Indian to require
payment to him of funds under an act of Congress. The power and
responsibility of making the payments being in the Secretary of the
Interior, he was held to be an indispensable party.
These cases evolved the principle that the superior officer is
an indispensable party if the decree granting the relief sought
will require him to take action, either by exercising directly a
power lodged in him or by having a subordinate exercise it for
him.
That principle was brought into clearer relief by
Colorado
v. Toll, 268 U. S. 228.
There, the director of national parks had issued regulations
forbidding operation in the Rocky Mountain National Park of
automobiles for hire. Toll was the superintendent of the park who
was enforcing the regulation. A suit to enjoin him was allowed to
be maintained without joining his superior, the director, who had
promulgated the regulation. That result followed, 268 U.S. p.
268 U. S. 230,
by analogy to those cases which permit suit against a public
official who invades a private right either by exceeding his
authority or by carrying out a mandate of his superior.
United
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196;
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605,
223 U. S.
619-620. In those situations, relief against the
offending officer could be granted without risk that the judgment
awarded would "expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or
interfere with the public administration."
Land v. Dollar,
330 U. S. 731,
330 U. S.
738.
Page 332 U. S. 494
But the distinction we have noted between these two lines of
cases apparently was not as clear to others as it seems to us. For
a conflict among the circuits developed in these postal fraud
cases. [
Footnote 5]
National Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman, 85
F.2d 66, which held that the Postmaster General must be made a
party, suggested that, if he were not, the local postmaster would
be left under a command of his superior to do what the court has
forbidden. But that seems to us immaterial if the decree which is
entered will effectively grant the relief desired by expending
itself on the subordinate official who is before the court. It
seems plain in the present case that that will be the result even
though the local postmaster alone is sued. It is he who refuses to
pay money orders, who places the stamp "fraudulent" on the mail,
who returns the mail to the senders. If he desists in those acts,
the matter is at an end. That is all the relief which petitioners
seek. The decree, in order to be effective, need not require the
Postmaster General to do a single thing -- he need not be required
to take new action either directly, as in the
Smith and
Fall cases, or indirectly, through his subordinate, as in
the
Rutter case. No concurrence on his part is necessary
to make lawful the payment of the money orders and the release of
the mail unstamped. Yet that is all the court is asked to
command.
Reversed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BURTON dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
The Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case followed its
earlier decisions holding that the Postmaster General was an
indispensable party.
Neher v. Harwood, 128 F.2d 846;
Dolphin v. Starr, 130 F.2d 868.
Accord: National
Conference on Legalizing Lotteries v. Goldman, 85 F.2d 66.
Contra: Jarvis v. Shackelton Inhaler Co., 136 F.2d 116.
For collection and review of the cases,
see 158 A.L.R.
1126.
[
Footnote 2]
Jurisdiction was invoked under § 24(6) of the Judicial Code, 28
U.S.C. § 41(6).
[
Footnote 3]
See note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 4]
And see Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.
S. 497;
Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.
S. 138.
[
Footnote 5]
See note 1
supra.