1. Petitioner, a Negro, was indicted for murder by an all-white
grand jury and convicted by an all-white petit jury,
notwithstanding a timely motion to quash the indictment. Although
there were 12,511 adult Negroes in the county out of a total adult
population of 34,821, and there were at least 25 Negro qualified
male electors eligible for jury service, the venires for the term
from which the grand and petit juries were selected did not contain
the name of a single Negro, and no Negro had served on a grand or
petit criminal court jury in the county for 30 years.
Held: the record sustains petitioner's claim of a
systematic, purposeful, administrative exclusion of Negroes from
jury duty contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings. Pp.
332 U. S.
465-469.
2. Whether there has been systematic racial discrimination by
administrative officials in the selection of jurors is a question
to be determined from the facts in each particular case. P.
332 U. S.
466.
3. The fact that no Negro had served on a criminal court grand
or petit jury for a period of 30 years created a strong presumption
that Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service because
of race, and it became the State's duty to justify such an
exclusion as having been brought about for some reason other than
racial discrimination. P.
332 U. S.
466.
4. Such a presumption was not overcome by an attempt to disprove
systematic racial discrimination in the selection of jurors by
percentage calculations applied to the composition of a single
venire. P.
332 U. S.
468.
5. When a jury selection plan operates in such a way as always
to result in the complete and long continued exclusion of any
representative at all from a large group of Negroes, or any other
racial group, indictments and verdicts returned against them by
juries thus selected cannot stand. P.
332 U. S. 469.
201 Miss. 410, 29 So. 2d 96, reversed.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed a state trial court's
denial of a motion to quash an indictment for
Page 332 U. S. 464
murder because of systematic racial discrimination in the
selection of jurors contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 201 Miss.
410, 29 So. 2d 96. This Court granted certiorari. 331 U.S. 804.
Reversed and remanded, p.
332 U. S. 469.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, a Negro, was indicted in the Circuit Court of
Lauderdale County, Mississippi, by an all-white grand jury, charged
with the murder of a white man. He was convicted by an all-white
petit jury and sentenced to death by electrocution. He had filed a
timely motion to quash the indictment alleging that, although there
were Negroes in the county qualified for jury service, the venires
for the term from which the grand and petit juries were selected
did not contain the name of a single negro. Failure to have any
Negroes on the venires, he alleged, was due to the fact that, for a
great number of years previously and during the then term of court,
there had been in the county a
"systematic, intentional, deliberate and invariable practice on
the part of administrative officers to exclude Negroes from the
jury lists, jury boxes, and jury service, and that such practice
has resulted and does now result in the denial of the equal
protection of the laws to this defendant as guaranteed by the 14th
amendment to the U.S. Constitution."
In support of his motion, petitioner introduced evidence which
showed without contradiction that no Negro had served on the grand
or petit criminal court juries for thirty years or more. There was
evidence that a single Negro had once been
Page 332 U. S. 465
summoned during that period, but, for some undisclosed reason,
he had not served, nor had he even appeared. And there was also
evidence from one jury supervisor that he had, at some indefinite
time, placed on the jury lists the names of "two or three"
unidentified Negroes. In 1940, the adult colored population of
Lauderdale County, according to the United States Census, was
12,511 out of a total adult population of 34,821.
In the face of the foregoing, the trial court overruled the
motion to quash. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed over
petitioner's renewed insistence that he had been denied the equal
protection of the laws by the deliberate exclusion of Negroes from
the grand jury that indicted and the petit jury that convicted him.
29 So. 2d 96. We granted certiorari to review this serious
contention. [
Footnote 1] 331
U.S. 804.
Sixty-seven years ago, this Court held that state exclusion of
Negroes from grand and petit juries solely because of their race
denied Negro defendants in criminal cases the equal protection of
the laws required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303. A
long and unbroken line of our decisions since then has reiterated
this principle, regardless of whether the discrimination was
embodied in statute [
Footnote
2] or was apparent from the administrative practices of state
jury selection officials, [
Footnote
3] and regardless of whether the system
Page 332 U. S. 466
for depriving defendants of their rights was "ingenious or
ingenuous." [
Footnote 4]
Whether there has been systematic racial discrimination by
administrative officials in the selection of jurors is a question
to be determined from the facts in each particular case. In this
case, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that petitioner had
failed to prove systematic racial discrimination in the selection
of jurors, but, in so concluding, it erroneously considered only
the fact that no Negroes were on the particular venire lists from
which the juries were drawn that indicted and convicted petitioner.
[
Footnote 5] It regarded as
irrelevant the key fact that, for thirty years or more, no Negro
had served on the grand and petit juries. This omission seriously
detracts from the weight and respect that we would otherwise give
to its conclusion in reviewing the facts, as we must in a
constitutional question like this. [
Footnote 6]
It is to be noted at once that the indisputable fact that no
Negro had served on a criminal court grand or petit jury for a
period of thirty years created a very strong showing that, during
that period, Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service
because of race. [
Footnote 7]
When such a showing was made, it became a duty of the State to try
to justify such an exclusion as having been brought about for some
reason other than racial discrimination. The Mississippi Supreme
Court did not conclude, the State did not offer any evidence, and,
in fact, did not make any claim, that its officials had abandoned
their old jury selection practices. The State Supreme Court's
conclusion
Page 332 U. S. 467
of justification rested upon the following reasoning. Section
1762 of the Mississippi Code enumerates the qualifications for jury
service, the most important of which apparently are that one must
be a male citizen and "a qualified elector." Sections 241, 242, 243
and 244 of the state constitution set forth the prerequisites for
qualified electors. Among other things, these provisions require
that each elector shall pay an annual poll tax, produce
satisfactory proof of such payment, and be able to read any section
of the state constitution, or to understand the same when read to
him, or to give a reasonable interpretation thereof. The evidence
showed that a very small number of Negro male citizens (the court
estimated about 25) as compared with white male citizens, had met
the requirements for qualified electors, and thereby become
eligible to be considered under additional tests for jury service.
On this subject, the State Supreme Court said:
"Of the 25 qualified negro male electors, there would be left,
therefore, as those not exempt, 12 or 13 available male negro
electors, as compared with 5,500 to 6,000 male white electors as to
whom, after deducting 500 to 1,000 exempt, would leave a proportion
of 5,000 nonexempt white jurors to 12 or 13 nonexempt negro jurors,
or about one-fourth of one percent negro jurors, -- 400 to 1. . . .
For the reasons already heretofore stated, there was only a chance
of 1 in 400 that a negro would appear on such a venire, and, as
this venire was of 100 jurors, the sheriff, had he brought in a
negro, would have had to discriminate against white jurors, not
against negroes -- he could not be expected to bring in one-fourth
of one negro. [
Footnote 8]
"
Page 332 U. S. 468
The above statement of the Mississippi Supreme Court illustrates
the unwisdom of attempting to disprove systematic racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors by percentage
calculations applied to the composition of a single venire.
[
Footnote 9]
The petitioner here points out certain legislative record
evidence [
Footnote 10] of
which it is claimed we can take judicial notice, and which it is
asserted establishes that the reason why there are so few qualified
Negro electors in Mississippi is because of discrimination against
them in making up the registration lists. But we need not consider
that question in this case. For it is clear from the evidence in
the record that there were some Negroes in Lauderdale County on the
registration list. In fact, in 1945, the circuit clerk of the
county, who is himself charged with duties in administering the
jury system, sent the names of eight Negroes to the jury
commissioner of the Federal District Court as citizens of
Lauderdale County qualified for federal jury service. Moreover,
there was evidence that the names of from thirty to several hundred
qualified Negro electors were on the registration lists. But,
whatever the precise number of qualified colored electors in the
county, there were some, and, if it can possibly be conceived that
all of them were disqualified for jury service by reason of the
commission of crime, habitual drunkenness, gambling, inability to
read and write, or to meet any other or all of the statutory tests
we do not doubt that the State could have proved it. [
Footnote 11]
We hold that the State wholly failed to meet the very strong
evidence of purposeful racial discrimination made out by the
petitioner upon the uncontradicted showing that, for thirty years
or more, no Negro had served as a juror
Page 332 U. S. 469
in the criminal courts of Lauderdale County. When a jury
selection plan, whatever it is, operates in such way as always to
result in the complete and long continued exclusion of any
representative at all from a large group of negroes, or any other
racial group, indictments and verdicts returned against them by
juries thus selected cannot stand. As we pointed out in
Hill v.
Texas, 316 U. S. 400,
316 U. S. 406,
our holding does not mean that a guilty defendant must go free. For
indictments can be returned, and convictions can be obtained, by
juries selected as the Constitution commands.
The judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is reversed, and
the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner also argued that his conviction was based solely on
an extorted confession, that use of this extorted confession denied
him due process of law, and that the case should be reversed for
that reason. The view we take as to the systematic exclusion of
negro jurors makes it unnecessary to pass on the alleged extorted
confession.
[
Footnote 2]
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110,
107 U. S.
122.
[
Footnote 3]
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339;
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370;
Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442;
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226;
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587;
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394;
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613;
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354;
Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128;
Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400.
[
Footnote 4]
Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128,
311 U. S. 132.
[
Footnote 5]
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398,
325 U. S.
403.
[
Footnote 6]
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587,
294 U. S. 590;
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354,
306 U. S. 358;
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398,
325 U. S. 402;
Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261,
332 U. S.
272.
[
Footnote 7]
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370,
103 U. S. 397;
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587,
294 U. S. 591;
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354,
306 U. S.
361.
[
Footnote 8]
Although this latter statement was made with particular
reference to the special venire from which the petit jury was
drawn, the reasoning of the court applied also to its grounds for
holding that there was no discrimination in excluding Negroes from
the grand jury.
[
Footnote 9]
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398,
325 U. S.
403.
[
Footnote 10]
Hearings before Special Committee to Investigate Senatorial
Campaign Expenditures, 1946, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1947).
[
Footnote 11]
Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400,
316 U. S.
404-405.