1. Under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, the Interstate
Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and
maximum hours of service with respect to drivers and mechanics
employed full time, as such, by a common carrier by motor vehicle,
when the services rendered through such employees by such carrier
in interstate commerce are distributed generally throughout the
year, constitute 3% to 4% of the carrier's total carrier services,
and the performance of such services is shared indiscriminately
among such employees and mingled with their performance of other
like services for such carrier not in interstate commerce. Pp.
332 U. S.
423-424,
332 U. S.
431-437.
2. It is the character of the employee's activities, rather than
the proportion of either his time or of his activities, that
determines the actual need for the Commission's power to establish
qualifications and maximum hours of service.
Levinson v.
Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649. Pp.
332 U. S.
431-432.
3. Section 13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act makes the
overtime requirements of § 7 inapplicable to such employees.
Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, supra. Pp.
332 U. S.
423-424,
332 U. S.
437-438.
155 F.2d 832, judgment vacated and cause remanded.
The District Court dismissed a suit by the Wage and Hour
Administrator to enjoin alleged violations of § 15(a)(1) and (2) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. 155 F.2d 832. This Court granted certiorari. 330 U.S.
817. Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals vacated, and cause
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, as here modified,
p.
332 U. S.
438.
Page 332 U. S. 423
MR. JUSTICE BURTON, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires further application of the principles stated
in
Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.
S. 649, and
Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v.
Ispass, 330 U. S. 695. The
first question is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has
the power, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, [
Footnote 1] to establish qualifications
and maximum hours of service with respect to drivers and mechanics
employed full time, as such, by a common carrier by motor vehicle
when the services rendered through such employees by such carrier
in interstate commerce are distributed generally throughout the
year, constitute 3% to 4% of the carrier's total carrier services,
and the performance of such services is shared indiscriminately
among such employees and mingled with their performance of other
like services for such carrier not in interstate commerce. The
other question is whether, if the Commission
Page 332 U. S. 424
has that power, the overtime requirements of § 7 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 [
Footnote 2] apply to such employees in view of the
exemption stated in § 13(b)(1) of that Act. [
Footnote 3] We hold that the Commission has the
power in question, and that the overtime requirements of § 7 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act therefore do not apply to such
employees.
This action was brought March 26, 1942, in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by the
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States
Department of Labor, under § 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
[
Footnote 4] to enjoin the
petitioner, James
Page 332 U. S. 425
F. Morris, from violating § 15(a)(1) and (2) of that Act
[
Footnote 5] through failure to
pay his employees compensation for overtime in accordance with § 7
of that Act. [
Footnote 6] After
a trial based on the pleadings and stipulated facts, the complaint
was dismissed September 26, 1945. In its unreported conclusions of
law, the court stated that neither the petitioner nor his employees
were engaged "in the production of goods for commerce" within the
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and that, to the extent
that they might be considered to be engaged "in commerce" within
the meaning of that Act, the requirements of its § 7, as to
compensation for overtime, did not apply to them. The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed this judgment May 29,
1946, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Walling v.
Morris, 155 F.2d 832. Because of its importance in
interpreting the Motor Carrier Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act
and because the question first stated above had not been passed
upon in our decisions in the
Levinson
Page 332 U. S. 426
and
Pyramid cases,
supra, we granted
certiorari,
Morris v. Walling, 330 U.S. 817, limited to
the following question:
"2. Where such employees [
i.e., those of a common
carrier for hire who conducts a general cartage business] during a
minority of their time are engaged in the transportation of
interstate traffic, are they exempt under the provisions of Section
13(b)(1) of the Act from the maximum hours provision of Section 7
of the Act as employees with respect to whom the Interstate
Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and
maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of Section 204
of the Motor Carrier Act 1935 (49 U.S.C. sec. 301,
et
seq.)?"
In response to our invitation, the Interstate Commerce
Commission filed a brief
amicus curiae.
The material facts are treated by the parties as being those
shown by the record to have been in effect when the complaint was
filed in 1942. They may be summarized as follows:
The petitioner then was, and for the past 12 years had been, the
sole owner and proprietor of the J. F. Morris Cartage Company,
which operated a general cartage business as a common carrier by
motor vehicle in and about the metropolitan area of Detroit,
Michigan, and all within three contiguous counties of that State.
His operations were centralized at Ecorse, Michigan, at his garage
and yard, used for a dispatching office, general maintenance and
repair garage, and storage space for equipment.
His principal business was the transportation of steel. In the
regular course of his business, in 1941, he generally employed
about 60 persons, 40 as truck drivers, 14 as mechanics, painters,
washers, and repairmen in the garage, three as dispatchers, and
three as general office workers. His equipment consisted of about
50 trucks or tractors and 60 trailers.
Page 332 U. S. 427
He was prepared to and did render general cartage service to the
general shipping public. In 1941, he rendered such service to 47
consigning firms, but about 97% of his revenue came from the Great
Lakes Steel Corporation and the Michigan Steel Corporation, both in
Ecorse. His general cartage services, in 1941, were made up of
three intermingled types of service, generally classifiable as
follows on the basis of the revenue derived from them: (1) 35%:
transportation of steel largely within steel plants. This was
transported for further processing in those plants and an
unsegregated portion of its was shipped ultimately in interstate
commerce. (2) 61%: transportation between steel mills and
industrial establishments. These shipments consisted principally of
bumper stock, fender stock, and other types of steel used in
connection with the manufacture of automobiles, a substantial
portion of which entered interstate commerce. (3) 4%:
transportation of miscellaneous freight directly in interstate
commerce, either as part of continuous interstate movements or of
interstate movements begun or terminated in metropolitan Detroit.
[
Footnote 7]
Page 332 U. S. 428
Ever since § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act took effect,
October 24, 1938, petitioner's employees, with the exception of his
office workers, consistently worked enough hours to entitle them to
additional compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their
regular wages if such Section were applicable to them. They were,
however, paid on the assumption that the Section did not apply to
them, and therefore, for the most part, received only their regular
rate of pay for such overtime. Accordingly, if it is found that § 7
is applicable to them, there is ground for an injunction against
its further violation. No issue is presented here as to the office
workers, because there is no proof of overtime services' having
been rendered by them or being now in prospect. No issue is
presented here as to the dispatchers. The Circuit Court of Appeals
held that § 7 applies to them as employees engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce, and that they are not
exempt as administrative employees. Those issues, however, are not
within the limited grant of certiorari. As to the garagemen and
laborers, including mechanics, painters, washers, and repairmen,
together with their superintendent of maintenance, there is no
issue presented here, except to the extent that such
classifications include mechanics doing the class of work defined
as that of "mechanics" in
Ex
Page 332 U. S. 429
Parte No. MC-2, 28 M.C.C. 125, 132, 133, [
Footnote 8] including the making of
mechanical repairs directly affecting the safe operation of motor
vehicles. All of the garagemen and laborers, except their
superintendent of maintenance,
Page 332 U. S. 430
were paid for their overtime work at "straight" or regular
hourly rates. He was paid a weekly wage, and received no overtime
pay, although he devoted approximately 25% of his time to the
performance of routine physical tasks of the same general character
as those of the employees working under his direction. The Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the superintendent of maintenance was
not exempt as an executive or administrative employee, and should
be classified in the same manner as the others in this group. There
is nothing in the record showing the extent to which the respective
garagemen and laborers devoted themselves to the several classes of
work above mentioned and, if this were an action to recover
overtime compensation for individual employees, it would be
necessary to determine that fact. However, as this is an action
only for an injunction relating to future practices, the situation
can be met by limiting the injunction to the appropriate
classifications of workers. On this basis, the injunction against
violation of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act may be issued as
to those garagemen and laborers who are not "mechanics" as defined
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the issue before us is
limited to the proper application of such an injunction to such
"mechanics."
The drivers are full-time drivers of motor vehicles well within
the definition of that class of work by the Commission if the work
is done in interstate commerce. [
Footnote 9] From October 24, 1938, to August 1, 1940, the
drivers received their "straight" or regular hourly rate of pay for
all overtime work. Since August 1, 1940, their overtime work has
been paid for in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement
in force as to union drivers, throughout metropolitan Detroit,
employed either in intrastate or interstate general cartage. From
August 1,
Page 332 U. S. 431
1940, to August 1, 1941, these agreements required payment of
overtime in excess of 52 hours a week at one and one-half times the
regular rate. After August 1, 1941, as a concession to wartime
conditions, this additional rate was applied only to overtime in
excess of 54 hours a week. The statutory workweek which would be
applicable under § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act at all times
has been substantially shorter than those just mentioned. [
Footnote 10]
As to these drivers and these "mechanics" whose work affects
safety of transportation, the first question here, as in the
Levinson case, is whether the Commission has the power,
under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, to establish qualifications
and maximum hours of service with respect to them. The special
situation presented is that, on the average, only about 4% of their
time and effort has been, or is likely to be, devoted to services
in interstate commerce. The issue would appear in its simplest form
if each driver were required, each day, to devote 24 minutes
(
i.e., 4% of his allowable daily aggregate of ten hours of
driving time) to driving in interstate commerce. The question then
would be whether the Commission has the power to establish his
qualifications and maximum hours of service in view of the relation
of this driving to safety of operation in interstate commerce.
Under the tests of the Commission's power, as approved in both the
majority and minority opinions in the
Levinson case, and
under the analysis of that power developed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and cited in that case, it is
"the character of the activities, rather than the proportion of
either the employee's time or of his activities, that determines
the actual need for the Commission's power to establish reasonable
requirements with respect to qualifications, maximum hours of
service, safety of
Page 332 U. S. 432
operation and equipment. [
Footnote 11]"
It is beyond question that, under such circumstances, §
204(a)(1) of the Motor Carrier Act [
Footnote 12] has authorized the Commission to establish
reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications and maximum
hours of service of such drivers. The Fair Labor Standards Act,
which was passed three years later, has recognized and does not
restrict the Commission's power over the safety of operation under
the Motor Carrier Act. What is thus true for the driver is true
also for the mechanic who repairs his truck.
In the record before us, instead of 4% of the driving time of
each driver being devoted each day to interstate commerce without
relation to what the driver does at other times, the parties
present the actual experience of the petitioner and his drivers
throughout 1941. The printed record, together with an unprinted
exhibit filed with the Clerk, classifies all of the 19,786 trips
taken in 1941 by the 43 drivers who respectively drove motor
vehicles for the petitioner during not less than eight weeks in
that year. Only the "Pickup Trips" and "Boat Dock Trips" are
counted as being in "interstate commerce." These involved movements
of goods to or from railroad freight houses, line haul motor
carrier depots, or the boat docks of the several steamship
companies in Detroit. It was stipulated that the petitioner was
"engaged as a common carrier for hire in the local transportation
of property by motor vehicle," was "engaged in a general cartage
business and . . . [was] prepared to render such services to
Page 332 U. S. 433
the general shipping public." Each driver appears to have been a
full-time driver during each week that he worked. The tables show
464 "Pickup Trips" and 260 "Boat Dock Trips," or a total of 724
made in interstate commerce, when and as required by petitioner's
consignors. These constituted 3.65% of the petitioner's total
trips. They were not distributed equally to each driver, nor on the
basis of 4% of his time each day. However, apparently, in the
normal operation of the business, these strictly interstate
commerce trips were distributed generally throughout the year, and
their performance was shared indiscriminately by the drivers and
was mingled with the performance of other like driving services
rendered by them otherwise than in interstate commerce. These trips
were thus a natural, integral, and apparently inseparable part of
the common carrier service of the petitioner and of his
drivers.
One or more such trips were taken by one or more drivers each
week. The average number of drivers making one or more such trips
in each week was nine drivers out of 37, or 24.4%. There were six
weeks in which more than half of the drivers thus engaged directly
in interstate commerce. The highest percentage of drivers making
such trips in one week was 78.1%, when 25 drivers out of the 32
then on duty, did so. As to the distribution of such trips,
throughout the year, among the total of 43 drivers, every driver,
except two, made at least one such trip with interstate freight.
Each of the two who failed to make any such trip was employed for
only about one-half the year, and that was during the months when
the trips in interstate commerce were the less frequent. On the
other hand, one driver made 97 such trips in interstate commerce.
Another made 52, and the average per driver was over 16. The
greatest number of such trips made by a single driver in a single
week was seven out of nine. In several other weeks, he made six
such trips out of a total of
Page 332 U. S. 434
seven in the week. The net result is a practical situation such
as may confront any common carrier engaged in a general cartage
business, and who is prepared and offering to serve the normal
transportation demands of the shipping public in an industrial
metropolitan center. From the point of view of safety in interstate
commerce, the hazards are not distinguishable from those which
would be presented if each driver drove 4% of his driving time each
day in interstate commerce. In both cases, there is the same
essential need for the establishment of reasonable requirements
with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service of
employees. If the common carrier is required, by virtue of that
status, to take this interstate business, he must perform the
required service in accordance with the requirements established by
the Commission. The Commission has made no exception in these
qualifications and maximum hours of service that would exempt the
drivers of the petitioner from them as a class. The applicability
of the Commission's present requirements as to specific drivers
during specific weeks is not the issue before us. We hold that the
Commission has the power to establish qualifications and maximum
hours of service, pursuant to the provisions of § 204 of the Motor
Carrier Act, for the entire classification of petitioner's drivers
and "mechanics," and it is the existence of that power (rather than
the precise terms of the requirements actually established by the
Commission in the exercise of that power) that Congress has made
the test as to whether or not § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act
is applicable to these employees. [
Footnote 13]
Page 332 U. S. 435
Congress has gone out of its way to make this purpose clear in
cases comparable to the one before us. It has done this by making
the power of the Commission, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act,
expressly applicable to motor vehicle pickup and delivery service
within terminal areas [
Footnote
14] to transportation in interstate commerce
Page 332 U. S. 436
wholly within a metropolitan area, [
Footnote 15] and to casual, occasional, or reciprocal
transportation of property in interstate commerce by any person not
engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a regular occupation
or business. [
Footnote 16]
It has made the Commission's power over safety requirements
expressly applicable to these operations, even though, at the same
time, Congress has exempted them from general regulatory
control.
Congress furthermore has provided a special procedure by which,
in an appropriate case, an intrastate motor carrier or any other
party in interstate, may secure the general exemption of such a
carrier from compliance with the Motor Carrier Act even though such
carrier does perform some interstate transportation. Congress,
however, expressly has authorized the Commission, and not the
courts, to decide when the case is an appropriate one
Page 332 U. S. 437
for such a general exemption. [
Footnote 17] It does not appear that any such certificate
of exemption has been obtained or sought as to this petitioner.
Having determined that the Commission has the power to establish
qualifications and maximum hours of service for these drivers and
"mechanics" under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, the question
recurs as to whether, in the face of the exemption stated in §
13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the requirements of § 7
of that Act nevertheless apply to these employees. This issue as to
the possible reconciliation of the language of these Acts so as to
provide for concurrent jurisdiction was considered
Page 332 U. S. 438
at length in the
Levinson case and the conclusion was
there reached that such a construction was not permissible.
This discussion has proceeded on the basis of the facts which
were stipulated to exist in 1942. This treatment, however, should
not be interpreted as necessity restricting the District Court to
the present record if, for good cause, that court finds it
advisable to consider additional evidence or to retry the case
de novo.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals, as here modified.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
"SEC. 204 (a) It shall be the duty of the Commission --"
"(1) To regulate common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in
this part, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable
requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service,
transportation of baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts,
records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and
maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and
equipment. . . ."
49 Stat. 546, 49 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1).
[
Footnote 2]
"SEC. 7. (a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in
this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce --"
" (1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the
first year from the effective date of this section,"
" (2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the
second year from such date, or"
" (3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the
expiration of the second year from such date, unless such employee
receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours
above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed. . . ."
52 Stat. 1063, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
[
Footnote 3]
"SEC. 13. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(b) The provisions of section 7 shall not apply with respect to
(1) any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce
Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours
of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor
Carrier Act, 1935. . . ."
52 Stat. 1068, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).
[
Footnote 4]
"SEC. 17. The district courts of the United States . . . shall
have jurisdiction, for cause shown, and subject to the provisions
of section 20 (relating to notice to opposite party) of the Act
entitled 'An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful
restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes,' approved
October 15, 1914, as amended (U.S.C.1934 edition, title 28, sec.
381), to restrain violations of section 15."
52 Stat. 1069, 29 U.S.C. § 217.
[
Footnote 5]
"SEC. 15. (a) . . . it shall be unlawful for any person --"
"(1) to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or
sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that
shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any
goods in the production of which any employee was employed in
violation of section 6 or section 7, or in violation of any
regulation or order of the Administrator issued under section 14,
except that no provision of this Act shall impose any liability
upon any common carrier for the transportation in commerce in the
regular course of its business of any goods not produced by such
common carrier, and no provision of this Act shall excuse any
common carrier from its obligation to accept any goods for
transportation;"
"(2) to violate any of the provisions of section 6 or section 7,
or any of the provisions of any regulation or order of the
Administrator issued under section 14. . . ."
52 Stat. 1068, 29 U.S.C. § 215.
[
Footnote 6]
See note 2
supra.
[
Footnote 7]
This activity is described as follows:
"C. Approximately three (3) percent of the defendant's
operations consists of the transportation of freight between the
plants of the Great Lakes Steel Corporation and the plants of the
Michigan Steel Corporation, on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, interchange points, such as boat docks, railroad depots,
freight terminals, and truck terminals lying in the Detroit
Metropolitan Area, wholly within the boundaries of the Michigan,
involving the picking up of freight from or the delivery of freight
to water carriers, railroad carriers and line haul motor carriers,
which freight either has moved across the Michigan State lines or
is about to move across the Michigan State lines in continuous
transportation through connection between the defendant and such
other interstate carriers. The defendant's compensation for his
portion of the through transportation service is in some instances
paid to him by the interstate carrier, the compensation
representing a division of the through rates on the transportation
movement, and other instances being compensated by the
shipper."
"
* * * *"
"E. Approximately one (1) percent of the defendant's operations
consists of the transportation of miscellaneous freight in general
cartage service for hire and for shippers other than Great Lakes
Steel Corporation or Michigan Steel Corporation. Cartage in this
category is of the same physical character as that described in
subparagraphs A, C, and D above, except that it is done on behalf
of and for the account of shippers other than Great Lakes Steel
Corporation and Michigan Steel Corporation."
[
Footnote 8]
"
(1) Mechanics and other garage workers. -- The
evidence is clear that carriers that do not operate approximately
10 motor vehicles or more cannot economically employ mechanics to
do repair work, and they do not do so. . . ."
"The larger carriers, however, do employ mechanics whose primary
duties are to keep the motor vehicles in a good and safe working
condition. They are required, for example, to keep the lights and
brakes in such condition. They perform many other duties, of
course, but these are sufficient to show clearly that the duties of
these employees do affect safety of operation directly, as it is
obvious that a large motor vehicle without the required lights or
adequate brakes is a great potential hazard to highway safety. All
witnesses testifying at the hearing agreed that the work of
mechanics has such a direct and intimate relation to safety of
operation, and no conflicting evidence was submitted."
"
* * * *"
"Our conclusion is that mechanics devote a large portion of
their time to activities which directly affect the safety of
operation of motor vehicles operated in interstate or foreign
commerce, and hence that we have power to establish qualifications
and maximum hours of service for such employees under said section
204(a)."
"There are other garage employees who do not perform work which
affects safety of operation directly. Some carriers employ men who
do nothing but paint vehicles. Others employ carpenters, and some
few employ tarpaulin tailors. We find that the work done by none of
these employees affects safety of operation."
"It is possible, although the record does not clearly establish
the fact, that some of the larger carriers employ men whose sole
duty is to see that the motor vehicles are properly supplied with
oil, gas, and grease, or to wash the vehicles. In the majority of
cases, undoubtedly, the mechanics perform this work. However, if
there be employees who do nothing but oil, gas, grease, or wash the
motor vehicles, we find that they do not perform duties which
directly affect the safety of operation, and are not subject to our
jurisdiction. To make our finding in this regard entirely clear, it
is that mechanics are the only garage workers we find subject to
our jurisdiction."
Ex Parte No. MC-2, 28 M.C.C. 125, 132, 133.
[
Footnote 9]
Safety Regulations (Carriers by Motor Vehicle), 49 CFR
Cum.Supp., Parts 190-193.
[
Footnote 10]
See note 2
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.
S. 649,
330 U. S.
674-675.
"For, factually speaking, not the amount of time an employee
spends in work affecting safety, but what he may do in the time
thus spent, whether it be large or small, determines the effect on
safety. Ten minutes of driving by an unqualified driver may do more
harm on the highway than a month or a year of constant driving by a
qualified one."
Id., dissenting opinion at p.
330 U. S.
687.
[
Footnote 12]
See note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 13]
"We recognize, as a practical matter, that private carriers
transport property both in interstate and intrastate commerce. The
same motor vehicle, operated by the same driver, on 1 or 2 days in
a week may be engaged in transporting property in interstate
commerce and the rest of the week may be engaged in intrastate
commerce. In our opinion, if a driver operates a motor vehicle in
the transportation of interstate or foreign commerce on any day of
a given week, such driver is subject to the weekly maximum herein
prescribed. Likewise if a driver employed by a private carrier of
property is engaged in interstate commerce during any one period of
24 consecutive hours, he is subject to the daily maximum herein
prescribed. If such a driver does not drive or operate a truck in
the transportation of property in interstate or foreign commerce
for an entire week, he is not subject to the regulations herein
prescribed during that week.
We express no opinion as to
whether or not, during that week, the driver is subject to the
provisions of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act."
(Italics supplied.) Ex parte No. MC-3, 23 M.C.C. 1, 39.
The above statement demonstrates the Commission's opinion as to
its power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service
in the field of mixed interstate and intrastate transportation. The
rules that it has prescribed have not extended to its full power to
make rules in this field. The fact that this statement was made in
1940, three years before the decision of this Court in
Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S.
44, explains the express reservation made as to the
Commission's opinion relating to the effect of the scope of its
unexercised powers under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act in relation
to § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. For the Commission's
regulations of Hours of Service (Carriers by Motor Vehicle),
see 49 CFR Cum.Supp., Part 191.
[
Footnote 14]
"SEC. 202. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this section or of section
203, the provisions of this part, except the provisions of section
204 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of
employees and safety of operation and equipment, shall not apply
"
"(1) to transportation by motor vehicle by a carrier by railroad
subject to part I, or by a water carrier subject to part III, or by
a freight forwarder subject to part IV, incidental to
transportation or service subject to such parts, in the performance
within terminal areas of transfer, collection, or delivery
services. . . ."
§ 202(c)(1), 49 Stat. 543, as amended by 56 Stat. 300, 49
U.S.C.Supp. V, § 302(c)(1).
[
Footnote 15]
"SEC. 203. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(b) Nothing in this part, except the provisions of section 204
relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of
employees and safety of operation or standards of equipment shall
be construed to include . . . (8) The transportation of passengers
or property in interstate or foreign commerce wholly within a
municipality or between contiguous municipalities or within a zone
adjacent to and commercially a part of any such municipality or
municipalities, except when such transportation is under a common
control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or
shipment to or from a point without such municipality,
municipalities, of zone, and provided that the motor carrier
engaged in such transportation of passengers over regular or
irregular route or routes in interstate commerce is also lawfully
engaged in the intrastate transportation of passengers over the
entire length of such interstate route or routes in accordance with
the laws of each State having jurisdiction; or (9) the casual,
occasional, or reciprocal transportation of passengers or property
by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation
by any person not engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a
regular occupation or business."
49 Stat. 545-546, 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(8) and (9).
[
Footnote 16]
See note 15
supra.
[
Footnote 17]
"SEC. 204(a) It shall be the duty of the Commission --"
"
* * * *"
"(4a) To determine, upon its own motion, or upon application by
a motor carrier, a State board, or any other party in interest,
whether the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce
performed by any motor carrier or class of motor carriers lawfully
engaged in operation solely within a single State is in fact of
such nature, character, or quantity as not substantially to affect
or impair uniform regulation by the Commission of transportation by
motor carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce in
effectuating the national transportation policy declared in this
Act. Upon so finding, the Commission shall issue a certificate of
exemption to such motor carrier or class of motor carriers which,
during the period such certificate shall remain effective and
unrevoked, shall exempt such carrier or class of motor carriers
from compliance with the provisions of this part, and shall attach
to such certificate such reasonable terms and conditions as the
public interstate may require. At any time after the issuance of
any such certificate of exemption, the Commission may by order
revoke all or any part thereof if it shall find that the
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce performed by the
carrier or class of carriers designated in such certificate shall
be, or shall have become, or is reasonably likely to become, of
such nature, character, or quantity as in fact substantially to
affect or impair uniform regulation by the Commission of interstate
or foreign transportation by motor carriers in effectuating the
national transportation policy declared in this Act. . . ."
49 Stat. 546, as amended by 54 Stat. 921, 49 U.S.C. §
304(a)(4a).
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS concur, dissenting.
Apart from § 13(b)(1), it is clear that petitioner's truck
drivers and mechanics are subject to the wage and hour provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. They spend virtually all of their
time in transportation activities which are an integral part of the
production of goods for interstate commerce.
Walling v. Comet
Carriers, 151 F.2d 107. The issue thus becomes one of
determining whether these employees are plainly and unmistakably
within the terms and spirit of the § 13(b)(1) exemption, giving due
regard to the rule that exemptions from the operation of
humanitarian legislation are to be narrowly construed.
Phillips
Co. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490,
324 U. S.
493.
By a pedantically literal reading of § 13(b)(1), it is possible
to say that these employees are among those as to whom the
Interstate Commerce Commission has "power" to establish
qualifications and maximum hours of service. A sporadic and minute
portion of their activities, approximating 3% to 4% of the total,
affects the
Page 332 U. S. 439
safety of operation of trucks in interstate commerce. The
Commission's power under § 204(a) of the Motor Carrier Act is
confined to regulation of transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce, and its jurisdiction over employees' activities is
limited to those which affect the safety of operation of motor
vehicles engaged in such transportation.
United States v.
American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534.
Hence, the potential scope of the Commission's "power" over
petitioner's employees is extremely narrow. Approximately 97% of
their activities are beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission. Yet
it is by the slender thread of this "power" that they fall within §
13(b)(1) and hence are deprived of the benefits of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
Due respect for the legislative purpose militates against such a
result. We are dealing here with a statute that is dedicated to the
proposition that laboring men are to be treated as something more
than chattels. And their statutory rights are not to be discarded
by adherence to formalistic dogmas of interpretation. Section
13(b)(1) is not just an exercise in grammar. It is part of the
living fiber embodying the rights of those who labor for others. It
must be read and interpreted in the light of reason and in the
light of the aims which Congress sought to achieve.
When that is done, it becomes clear that, when § 13(b)(1) speaks
of those over whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has "power"
it means those who perform at least a substantial amount of
activities within the Commission's jurisdiction. Congress was not
concerned with insignificant conflicts between Fair Labor Standards
Act regulations and Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. Nor
was it desirous of leaving unregulated nearly all of the working
time of those who are engaged in the production of goods for
commerce but who spend infinitesimal amounts of time directly in
interstate transportation. In other words, engaging in
Page 332 U. S. 440
an occasional and microscopic amount of activities affecting
safety of operation should no more exclude employees from the Act
than sporadically shipping insubstantial amounts of goods in
interstate commerce should bring those engaged in such shipments
within the purview of the Act.
See Mabee v. White Plains Pub.
Co., 327 U. S. 178,
327 U. S. 181.
That was implicitly recognized by the Court in
Pyramid Motor
Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U. S. 695,
330 U. S. 708,
and I had not supposed until now, that that case or
Levinson v.
Spector Motor Co., 330 U. S. 649,
justified any other result.
Interpreting § 13(b)(1) in disregard of reality only acts as an
open invitation to evade the Act and to destroy the statutory
rights of those trucking concern employees who now perform no
activities which affect the safety of operations. All that the
employer need do to withdraw the benefits of the Act from these
employees is to send them occasionally to a terminal to pick up or
deliver a piece of interstate freight. They then fall into the
"power" of the Interstate Commerce Commission and automatically
lose their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act. I accordingly
dissent.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
But for this Court's decisions in the
Levinson and
Ispass cases, my views in this case would be in
substantial accord with those expressed by MR. JUSTICE MURPHY.
See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.
S. 649, dissenting opinion at
330 U. S. 685;
Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.
S. 695. I thought the decisions in those cases
foreshadowed the extreme result here, which goes so far as to
exclude from the Fair Labor Standards Act's protection at least two
employees who made no trips in what petitioner regards as the
interstate phase of his business. While on the other hand one
driver made 97 such trips, there were others who made only very
occasional ones.
Page 332 U. S. 441
Although I regarded the
Levinson and
Ispass
decisions as foreshadowing and perhaps concluding any situation
where the employee's work would substantially affect safety in
interstate operations, and thus as going to the extent of exempting
from Fair Labor Standards Act coverage any employee whose work
substantially affects such safety, I did not understand that all
employees driving for a company engaged principally in intrastate
commerce but doing a very small amount of interstate commerce would
be lumped together, for purposes of the exclusion, on the basis of
the proportionate amounts of work done by the company in those
phases of its business. That, I think, is the effect of the present
decision. To that extent, I also think the ruling constitutes an
extension of the exemption beyond that sustained in the
Levinson and
Ispass cases.
On the basis of the decision last term in
United States v.
Yellow Cab Company, 332 U. S. 218, I
also have difficulty with the view that any of the carrier's
services here were rendered in interstate commerce. That decision
held that the transportation in Chicago of passengers and their
luggage from their homes, offices, hotels, etc. to railroad
stations for the purpose of boarding trains on interstate journeys,
and, conversely, the like use of taxicabs in the reverse direction
after leaving trains on arrival in Chicago following such journeys,
were "too unrelated to interstate commerce to constitute a part
thereof within the meaning of the Sherman Act." 332 U.S. at
332 U. S. 230.
While I was not in agreement with the
Yellow Cab decision,
the same ruling, if applied to the facts here, would make the
so-called "interstate commerce,"
i.e., the transportation
of freight from petitioner's customers' places of business to
shipping terminals, intrastate, rather than interstate, commerce.
*
I am unable to agree with the Court's opinion.
* I do not read the stipulation of facts in this case as showing
that petitioner engaged in transportation from terminal to
terminal.