More than five years after he had entered the United States
legally, an alien shipped as a seaman on an American ship bound
from Los Angeles to New York. The ship was torpedoed, and he was
rescued and taken to Havana, whence he was returned to the United
States. He was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years thereafter, and was sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of one year to life. Proceedings were
instituted for his deportation.
Held: he is not subject to deportation, since his
return to the United States was not "the entry of the alien to the
United States" within the meaning of § 19.(a) of the Immigration
Act of February 5, 1917, as amended. Pp.
332 U. S.
389-391.
159 F.2d 130 reversed.
On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the District Court
discharged a resident alien who was being held for deportation
under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as
amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155(a). The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
159 F.2d 130. This
Page 332 U. S. 389
Court granted certiorari. 331 U.S. 801. William A Carmichael was
substituted for Albert Del Guercio as respondent.
332
U. S. 806.
Reversed, p.
332 U. S.
391.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is detained by respondent under a deportation order,
the validity of which is challenged by a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The District Court granted the petition and
discharged petitioner. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Del Guercio v. Delgadillo, 159 F.2d 130. The case is here
on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of
the seeming conflict between the decision below and
Di Pasquale
v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, from the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner is a Mexican citizen who made legal entry into this
country in 1923 and resided here continuously until 1942. In June
of that year, when this nation was engaged in hostilities with
Germany and Japan, he shipped out of Los Angeles on an intercoastal
voyage to New York City as a member of the crew of an American
merchant ship. The ship was torpedoed after passing through the
Panama Canal on its way to New York City. Petitioner was rescued
and taken to Havana, Cuba, where he was taken care of by the
American Consul for about one week. On July 19, 1942, he was
returned to the United States through Miami, Florida, and
thereafter continued to serve as a seaman in the merchant fleet of
this nation. In March, 1944, he was convicted in California of
second-degree
Page 332 U. S. 390
robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year to
life. While he was confined in the California prison, proceedings
for deportation were commenced against him under § 19(a) of the
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874, as amended 54
Stat. 671, 8 U.S.C. § 155(a).
That section provides in part:
". . . any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for
a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of
a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years
after the entry of the alien to the United States . . . shall, upon
the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and
deported. . . ."
Those requirements for deportation are satisfied if petitioner's
passage from Havana, Cuba, to Miami, Florida, on July 19, 1942, was
"the entry of the alien to the United States" within the meaning of
the Act.
In
United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.
S. 398;
United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi,
287 U. S. 129, and
United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.
S. 422, there is language which, taken from its context,
suggests that every return of an alien from a foreign country to
the United States constitutes an "entry" within the meaning of the
Act. Thus, in the
Smith case, it was stated, 289 U.S. at
289 U. S. 425,
that "any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United
States, whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one," is
such an "entry." But those were cases where the alien plainly
expected or planned to enter a foreign port or place. Here, he was
catapulted into the ocean, rescued, and taken to Cuba. He had no
part in selecting the foreign port as his destination. His
itinerary was forced on him by wholly fortuitous circumstances. If,
nonetheless, his return to this country was an "entry" into the
United States within the meaning of the Act, the
Page 332 U. S. 391
law has been given a capricious application, as
Di Pasquale
v. Karnuth, supra, suggests.
In that case, an alien traveled between Buffalo and Detroit on a
railroad which, unknown to him passed through Canada. He was asleep
during the time he was in transit through Canada, and was quite
unaware that he had left or returned to this country. The court
refused to hold that the alien had made an "entry," for to do so
would impute to Congress a purpose to subject aliens "to the sport
of chance." 158 F.2d at 879. In this case, petitioner, of course,
chose to return to this country, knowing he was in a foreign place.
But the exigencies of war, not his voluntary act, put him on
foreign soil.
* It would indeed
be harsh to read the statute so as to add the peril of deportation
to such perils of the sea. We might as well hold that, if he had
been kidnapped and taken to Cuba, he made a statutory "entry" on
his voluntary return. Respect for law does not thrive on captious
interpretations.
Deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile.
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135,
326 U. S. 147.
The stakes are indeed high and momentous for the alien who has
acquired his residence here. We will not attribute to Congress a
purpose to make his right to remain here dependent on circumstances
so fortuitous and capricious as those upon which the Immigration
Service has here seized. The hazards to which we are now asked to
subject the alien are too irrational to square with the statutory
scheme.
Other grounds are now sought to be advanced for the first time
in support of the deportation order. They are not open on the
record before us.
Reversed.
* If his intercoastal voyage had continued without interruption,
it is clear that he would not have made an "entry" when he landed
at its termination.
United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day,
supra, at p.
279 U. S. 401.