Mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against judges are
extraordinary remedies which should be reserved for really
extraordinary cases, and this Court will not countenance their use
as substitutes for an appeal. Pp.
332 U. S.
259-260.
Petition invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court and
asking leave to file petition for writ of mandamus, prohibition, or
injunction against a District Judge to vacate his order allowing
fees to counsel in
Fahey v. Mallonee, ante, p.
332 U. S. 245, to
prohibit any further allowance therein, and to enjoin any payments
heretofore allowed,
denied, p.
332 U. S.
260.
Page 332 U. S. 259
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This petition by John H. Fahey, individually and as Federal Home
Loan Bank Commissioner, and A. V. Amman, individually and as
Conservator for the Long Beach Federal Savings and Loan
Association, invokes the original jurisdiction of this Court. They
ask leave to file petition for a writ of "mandamus and/or
prohibition and/or injunction" against Judge Peirson M. Hall of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
California to vacate his order allowing fees to counsel in
Fahey v. Mallonee, decided today,
ante, p.
332 U. S. 245, to
prohibit any further allowance therein, and to enjoin any payments
heretofore allowed.
While an appeal in the principal case was pending in this Court,
application was made by various counsel for the plaintiffs and
associated interests therein for allowance of fees aggregating some
$125,000. The District Court allowed counsel for plaintiffs $50,000
as a partial payment on account of services, but withheld action on
other applications. Certain costs and expenses of the plaintiffs in
the amount of $17,295.13 were also ordered reimbursed.
The petition involves serious questions of law and of fact.
Whether, because of the pendency of the appeal and the stay order
granted therein, the District Court had power to entertain the
application, whether before the final outcome of the case could be
known an allowance was premature, whether the source of the fund on
deposit with the court was so related to the services as to be
subject to disbursement for their compensation, and whether one
judge can make allowances in a case before a three-judge court,
are, with other questions, much contested. We do not decide any
question as to the merits.
Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against judges are drastic
and extraordinary remedies. We do not doubt
Page 332 U. S. 260
power in a proper case to issue such writs. But they have the
unfortunate consequence of making the judge a litigant, obliged to
obtain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the
litigants before him. These remedies should be resorted to only
where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy. We are unwilling to
utilize them as a substitute for appeal. As extraordinary remedies,
they are reserved for really extraordinary causes.
We find nothing in this case to warrant their use. An allowance
of $50,000 will hardly destroy a twenty-six million dollar
association during the time it would take to prosecute an appeal.
The status of one of the applicants in the principal case is now
settled, so that he has standing to take all authorized appeals. We
hold that the applicants' grievance is one to be pursued by appeal
at the proper time and to the appropriate court, rather than by
resort to our original jurisdiction for extraordinary writs.
The petition is
Denied.