1. A judgment of the Supreme Court of California reversing a
judgment of a trial court without direction, which under California
law has only the effect of remanding the case for a new trial, and,
so far as appears, places the parties in the same position as if
the case had never been tried, is not a "final judgment" within the
meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code, and this Court does not have
jurisdiction of an appeal therefrom. Pp.
331 U. S.
546-548.
2.
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S.
69, distinguished upon the special circumstances
appearing in that case as rendering the California Supreme Court's
judgment "final" within the meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code.
Pp.
331 U. S.
547-548.
Page 331 U. S. 544
3. Although the modern rule is that, in determining whether a
state court's remand is for a new trial, this Court will examine
both the judgment and the opinion as well as other circumstances
that may be pertinent, this does not mean that, in the ordinary
case, this Court will disregard the effect of the judgment under
local law. P.
331 U. S.
548.
27 Cal. 2d
232, 163 P.2d 704, appeal dismissed.
An appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of California,
27 Cal. 2d
232, 163 P.2d 704, reversing a judgment of a trial court
without direction dismissed for want of jurisdiction under § 237 of
the Judicial Code. P.
331 U. S.
548.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court
of the City of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549,
decided today. Because we dismiss the appeal in this cause for
jurisdictional reasons, the facts may be shortly stated.
The Gospel Army is an incorporated religious organization. The
trial court found that it is
"engaged exclusively in the promulgation, by literature and word
of mouth, of its religious beliefs, by and through its auxiliaries
and in the procuring of donations in the form of money and articles
of value in the prosecution and furtherance of its religious
activities."
More particularly, its activities consist of conducting a
mission, distributing religious books without charge, giving aid to
the poor. It collects salvage which it either sells in a
second-hand goods store, [
Footnote
1]
Page 331 U. S. 545
distributes directly to the poor, or sends to a salvage mill.
[
Footnote 2]
The Gospel Army instituted this suit to enjoin the enforcement
of certain ordinances of the City of Los Angeles on the ground that
they violate its religious liberty under the Constitutions of
California and the United States. [
Footnote 3]
After trial the Superior Court of Los Angeles County broadly
concluded:
"That a permanent injunction should issue herein restraining and
enjoining the Defendants and each of them and any and all persons,
associations, departments under whom said Defendants or any of them
may be employed or acting, and any and all persons, associations,
or departments who may be acting or claiming by, through, or under
said Defendants, or any of them, from the further interference and
threatened acts which would in any way prevent the free exercise of
a religious liberty of said Plaintiff."
From this decision, an appeal was taken to the District Court of
Appeal of the Second Appellate Division, Division Two, and the
cause was then transferred to the Supreme Court of California. That
court held, three judges dissenting, that the Superior Court's
action in granting the injunction was erroneous.
27 Cal. 2d
232, 163 P.2d 704. Some, if not all, of the ordinances in suit
were sustained as constitutional. On appeal to this Court,
determination of jurisdiction was postponed to the merits.
Page 331 U. S. 546
The jurisdictional difficulties arise from the form of the
California Supreme Court's judgment. That court ended its opinion
with the statement, "The judgment is reversed." Its judgment was in
the same form:
"It is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed by the Court that the
Judgment of the Superior Court in and for the County of Los Angeles
in the above entitled cause be, and the same is hereby,
reversed."
In California, an unqualified reversal, "that is to say, without
direction to the trial court," is effective to remand the case "for
a new trial and places the parties in the same position as if the
case had never been tried."
Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 7 Cal. 2d 547,
549, 61 P.2d
756, 757;
Stearns v. Aguirre, 7 Cal. 443, 448;
Central
Sav. Bank of Oakland v. Lake, 201 Cal. 438, 443, 257 P. 521;
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization,
329 U. S. 69,
329 U. S.
72.
Under § 237 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344, only "final
judgments" of state courts may be appealed to this Court. And it
frequently has been said that, for a judgment of an appellate court
to be final and reviewable for this purpose, it must end the
litigation by fully determining the rights of the parties, so that
nothing remains to be done by the trial court "except the
ministerial act of entering the judgment which the appellate court
. . . directed."
Department of Banking v. Pink,
317 U. S. 264,
317 U. S. 267.
Thus, where the effect of the state court's direction is to grant a
new trial, the judgment will not be final.
Increasingly, this Court has become less formal in the matter of
final judgments. It is no longer the rule that the face of the
judgment is determinative of whether it is final. [
Footnote 4] Today,
"the test is not whether under local rules
Page 331 U. S. 547
of practice the judgment is denominated final . . . , but rather
whether the record shows that the order of the appellate court has,
in fact, fully adjudicated rights, and that that adjudication is
not subject to further review by a state court. . . ."
Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. at
317 U. S.
268.
Thus, this term, in
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of
Equalization, supra, despite the fact that the Supreme Court
of California had reversed a judgment without directions, we
determined on the entire record and upon an independent
investigation of California law that the judgment was final for the
purposes of § 237. In the first place, the facts had been
stipulated, and, so far as appeared, the stipulation would have
been available and controlling upon a second trial. In the second
place, the suit was one for a refund of a tax, and, under
California law, only those grounds presented in the prior claim for
refund could be urged in the suit. The opinion stated:
"Since the facts have been stipulated and the Supreme Court of
California has passed on the issues which control the litigation,
we take it that there is nothing more to be decided."
329 U.S. at
329 U. S.
73-74.
In this case, however, the facts have not been stipulated, nor
are there any special procedural restrictions. Thus, under
California law, the Gospel Army, on the second trial to which it is
entitled, may amend its complaint and present new facts.
"Such a reversal remands the case for a new trial, and places
the parties in the same position as if the case had never been
tried. . . . Of course, upon a retrial, the decision of the
appellate court becomes the law of the case upon the facts as
then
Page 331 U. S. 548
presented. But that law must be applied by the trial court to
the evidence presented upon the second trial. 'It is settled beyond
controversy that a decision of this Court on appeal, as [to] a
matter of fact, does not become the law of the case.'"
Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal. 2d at
549, 61 P.2d at 757.
We cannot assume that the Supreme Court of California would hold
the ordinances in question constitutional no matter what facts
might be presented upon a second trial. Indeed, experience
demonstrates that, particularly in constitutional cases, issues
turn upon factual presentation.
Accordingly, the case does not fall within the specific holding
of the
Richfield Oil case, for, although the modern rule
is that, in determining whether the state court's remand is for a
new trial, this Court will examine both the judgment and the
opinion, as well as other circumstances which may be pertinent,
Department of Banking v. Pink, supra; Richfield Oil Corp. v.
State Board of Equalization, supra, this does not mean that,
in the ordinary case, we will disregard the effect of the judgment
under the local law. In this case, for example, the effect of the
judgment under state practice is to remand the case for a new
trial. Nothing in the opinion of the court is to the contrary. We
cannot assume that the state court made an error in its judgment,
clerical or otherwise. If the parties had thought so, they could
have moved to have it amended. Indeed, that course may still be
open to them.
The appeal is dismissed.
[
Footnote 1]
The money received from the sales is used to meet the cost of
operating the store, including compensation paid to the manager and
to those who solicit contributions. Whatever remains goes into the
corporate treasury.
[
Footnote 2]
Ninety percent of the money received for the goods sent to the
salvage mill is paid to the drivers of trucks used by the Gospel
Army to collect the salvage. The other ten percent goes into the
treasury.
[
Footnote 3]
It is unnecessary to consider precisely what ordinances were
involved in this case or were sustained by the California Supreme
Court.
See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.
S. 549.
[
Footnote 4]
For cases incorporating the old "face of the judgment" rule,
see, e.g., Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S.
18;
Schlosser v. Hemphill, 198 U.
S. 173;
Haseltine v. Central National Bank,
183 U. S. 130.
There was strong dissent to the abandonment of the rule.
See the separate opinion of McReynolds, J., in
Clark
v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112,
292 U. S. 129.
And, for general discussion,
cf. Boskey, Finality of State
Court Judgments under the Federal Judicial Code (1943) 43
Col.L.Rev. 1002, 1003-1008; Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the United States (1936) 54-57.