1. The Act of August 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 751, confers power upon
this Court to review, on direct appeal, a ruling against the
constitutionality of an act of Congress which is made in the
application of a statute to a particular circumstance, even though
the statute is not challenged as a whole. Pp.
331 U. S.
102-104.
2. Under § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, as amended
by the Price Control Extension Act of July 25, 1946, injunctions to
prevent the future eviction of tenants in defense areas may be
granted by a federal district court at the instance of the Price
Administrator notwithstanding the fact that, between the expiration
of the Price Control Act on June 30, 1946, and the enactment of the
Price Control Extension Act on July 25, 1946, judgments for
restitution of the leased property had been obtained by the
landlords in state courts. Pp.
331 U. S.
104-107.
3. Federal regulation of future action based upon rights
previously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by
the Constitution, even though such rights were acquired by
judgments. P.
331 U. S.
107.
4. In a suit by the Price Administrator under § 205(a) of the
Emergency Price Control Act to prevent the eviction of tenants in a
defense area, § 265 of the Judicial Code does not bar an injunction
against state officials to prevent the execution of state judgments
of eviction. Pp.
331 U. S.
107-108.
Reversed.
Page 331 U. S. 101
In a suit brought by the Price Administrator under 205(a) of the
Emergency Price Control Act to prevent execution of judgments of
eviction rendered by state courts against tenants in a defense
area, a federal district court denied a preliminary injunction on
the ground that the provision of § 18 of the Price Control
Extension Act of July 25, 1946, making the Act effective
retroactively on June 30, 1946, is unconstitutional. On direct
appeal, this Court ordered substitution of the Temporary Controls
Administrator for the Price Administrator (329 U.S. 688) and
reversed the judgment, p.
331 U. S.
108.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal is from an interlocutory order of the District Court
of the United States for the Northern District of Texas denying
preliminary injunctions. Appellant's predecessor sued certain
landlord appellees and the Sheriff and a constable of Tarrant
County, Texas, in that United States district court for an
injunction to stop eviction of tenants under state judgments that
were recovered by the landlords in suits for restitution of leased
property. [
Footnote 1] The
state suits were filed by the landlords without the certificates
required by the Rent Regulations for Housing to maintain such
actions. 8 F.R. 7322; 10 F.R. 11666; 11 F.R. 5824, 8106. The state
judgments were entered
Page 331 U. S. 102
after June 30, 1946, the termination date of the Emergency Price
Control Act, and before July 25, 1946, the date of the approval by
the President of the Price Control Extension Act. As there was no
federal price control statute during this period, these judgments
will be treated as valid when granted.
The decision of the district court, denying the motion as to the
landlords and directing the entry of the order, was based on the
unconstitutionality, as applied to these state judgments, of that
portion of § 18 of the Price Control Extension Act of July 25,
1946, that declared, "The provisions of this Act shall take effect
as of June 30, 1946. . . ." [
Footnote 2] This provision the Court thought was
unconstitutional (1) because the words affected the state judgments
retroactively by bringing them under the Extension Act, [
Footnote 3] and (2) because the vested
rights, created by the prior judgments in the landlords to obtain
restitution of their leased properties, could not be destroyed by
subsequent legislation. Apparently it was felt that the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment forbade such regulation of the
incidents of judgments. The question is raised as to whether the
Act of August 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 751, confers power upon this Court
to review, on direct appeal, a ruling against the constitutionality
of an act of Congress when the ruling of unconstitutionality is
made in the application of the statute to a particular
circumstance, as in this appeal, rather than upon the challenged
statute as a
Page 331 U. S. 103
whole. A reading of the first three sections of the act
convinces us that Congress granted litigants in courts of the
United States a direct appeal to this Court from decisions against
the constitutionality of any act of Congress as applied in the
pending litigation.
The first section only authorizes the intervention of the United
States in private litigation "whenever the constitutionality of any
Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in
question." [
Footnote 4] It has
nothing to do with appeals. The second section allows an appeal to
this Court from a final or interlocutory order only when the United
States is a party, through the preceding § 1 or originally, and the
decision is against the constitutionality of the federal law. It
provides for expedition in our determination of the appeal. Section
three relates to the allowance or refusal of injunctions staying
acts of Congress in whole or in part on the ground of repugnancy to
the Constitution, and requires a three-judge court, expedition in
determination, and notice to the United States. The specific
provision for prompt review of judgments granting or denying "in
whole or in part" such an injunction is limited to applications for
stays of acts of Congress because of their unconstitutionality.
Thus, the constitutionality of federal acts comes to us by direct
appeal, under the Act of August 24, 1937, only when the United
States is a party to the litigation below or an injunction is
sought. This enables the United States to exercise large
discretion, by its determination as to whether or not to intervene,
as to what cases are reviewable directly
Page 331 U. S. 104
in this Court. [
Footnote 5]
The Congress intended prompt review of the constitutionality of
federal acts. [
Footnote 6]
Since § 1 allows intervention when the constitutionality of an act
is "drawn in question" and § 2 allows appeal after intervention, it
follows that there is an appeal from an order that invalidates, as
unconstitutional, a statute as applied. To limit the generality of
the language of § 2 of the Act of August 24, 1937, to cases that
involved only the constitutionality as a whole of the challenged
statutes might seriously impair prompt determinations of matters of
great public interest. Litigants may challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it affects them.
[
Footnote 7] We hold that
jurisdiction of the appeal from the challenged order is conferred
upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 349a.
The Court was also of the view that § 265 of the Judicial Code
barred any injunction against the state officials.
The appellant sought injunctions against future eviction of
these tenants through writs of restitution or other process by
which eviction might be consummated.
Page 331 U. S. 105
Sections 2(d), 4(a), and 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, as amended, and Rent Regulation § 6(a), set out below.
[
Footnote 8] Such an injunction
is in accord with the administrative Interpretations of
Page 331 U. S. 106
the Rent Regulation. [
Footnote
9] The properties involved in this litigation were defense area
housing accommodations. There is no suggestion that the heretofore
referred to sections of the price control acts and § 6 of the Rent
Regulations for Housing do not authorize these legal proceedings.
The constitutionality of the price control acts, generally
considered, is unquestioned.
Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U. S. 503. The
sole inquiry for us at this point is whether it was erroneous for
the district court to refuse to allow the temporary injunction
because to do so would invade the constitutional right of the
landlord appellees to retain the fruits of their "vested rights" in
the valid judgments.
As the appellant is undertaking to enjoin future eviction of the
tenants or lessees, our consideration is not affected by the
proviso of § 18 of the Extension Act, set out in the margin.
[
Footnote 10] The
retroactive provision of § 18, quoted above
Page 331 U. S. 107
at
note 2 is inapposite for
the same reason. It is immaterial whether the state judgments were
obtained before or after the effective date of the Extension Act.
The effort of the appellant is to enjoin future proceedings for
eviction after the acquisition by the landlord appellees through
valid judgments of what the district court characterized as "vested
rights." Federal regulation of future action based upon rights
previously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by
the Constitution. So long as the Constitution authorizes the
subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions
limit or interfere with previously acquired rights does not condemn
it. Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through
forehanded contracts. Were it otherwise, the paramount powers of
Congress could be nullified by "prophetic discernment." [
Footnote 11] The rights acquired by
judgments have no different standing. [
Footnote 12] The protection of housing accommodations
in defense areas through the price control acts may be accomplished
by the appellant notwithstanding these prior judgments. The
preliminary injunctions should have been granted.
Only a word need be said as to the contention that § 265 of the
Judicial Code forbids an injunction against the execution of state
judgments by state officers. [
Footnote 13] A contention
Page 331 U. S. 108
was made before this Court in similar cases last term that § 265
forbade a federal injunction to stay such proceedings in any court
of a state. The argument was not accepted. We thought that § 205(a)
of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 created an exception to
§ 265. [
Footnote 14] No
specific mention was made in these opinions as to whether state
officers who were parties in the case could be enjoined. However,
we do not see any ground, under § 265 of the Judicial Code, to
differentiate as to stays against a sheriff or a constable or says
against the parties to the litigation. We think the District Court
had power to stay the sheriff and constable.
Judgment reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Jurisdiction of suits for such injunctions is conferred upon the
district courts of the United States by § 205 of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632, 59 Stat. 306,
and the Price Control Extension Act of July 25, 1946, 60 Stat.
664.
[
Footnote 2]
Price Control Extension Act of July 25, 1946,
supra.
[
Footnote 3]
As this opinion relies upon the validity under the price control
acts of the prohibition of future eviction of tenants in § 6 of the
Rent Regulation for Housing, 8 F.R. 7322; 10 F.R. 11666; 11 F.R.
5824, 8106, it is unnecessary to consider further whether the mere
inclusion of these past judgments within the reach of the price
control legislation, by advancing the effective date of the act, is
constitutional.
Compare Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.
S. 142,
275 U. S. 146,
and
Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U.
S. 440,
276 U. S. 445,
with United States v. Hudson, 299 U.
S. 498.
[
Footnote 4]
The last three words were construed in
Dahnke-Walker Milling
Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282,
257 U. S. 288,
to allow appeals under Judicial Code § 237 to this Court from final
judgments of state courts of last resort upholding the validity of
state statutes against a challenge to their application to
particular circumstances because of their repugnance to federal
law. This was a settled construction for the words.
See Kepner
v. United States, 195 U. S. 100,
195 U. S.
124.
[
Footnote 5]
Garment Workers v. Donnelly Co., 304 U.
S. 243,
304 U. S.
249-250.
[
Footnote 6]
H.Rep. No.212, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2:
"The importance to the Nation of prompt determination by the
court of last resort of disputed questions of the constitutionality
of acts of the Congress requires no comment."
S.Rep. No.963, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3, 4:
"The United States is not excluded by the principle thus stated,
from drawing the judicial power to its proper assistance either as
an original party, or as an intervenor, when, in private
litigation, decision of the constitutional question may affect the
public at large, may be in respect of matters which by the
Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and
concerning which the Nation owes a duty to all the citizens of
securing to them their common rights."
[
Footnote 7]
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.
S. 421,
284 U. S. 442;
Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.
S. 515,
300 U. S. 558;
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.
S. 495,
301 U. S.
513.
[
Footnote 8]
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632,
59 Stat. 306:
Section 2(d).
"Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator such action is
necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes of this
Act, he may, . . . regulate or prohibit . . . renting or leasing
practices (including practices relating to recovery of the
possession) in connection with any defense area housing
accommodations, which in his judgment are equivalent to or are
likely to result in . . . rent increases, . . . inconsistent with
the purposes of this Act."
Section 4(a).
"It shall be unlawful, regardless of any contract, agreement,
lease, or other obligation heretofore or hereafter entered into,
for any person to . . . do or omit to do any act, in violation of
any regulation or order under section 2, . . . or to offer,
solicit, attempt, or agree to do any of the foregoing."
Section 205(a).
"Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has
engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which
constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of
section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate
court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an
order enforcing compliance with such provision, and, upon a showing
by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is about to
engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted
without bond."
Rent Regulation for Housing, 8 F.R. 7322, 10 F.R. 11666; 11 F.R.
5824, 8106:
Section 6.
"
Removal of tenant -- (a)
Restrictions on removal
of tenant. So long as the tenant continues to pay the rent to
which the landlord is entitled, no tenant shall be removed from any
housing accommodations, by action to evict or to recover
possession, by exclusion from possession, or otherwise, nor shall
any person attempt such removal or exclusion from possession,
notwithstanding that such tenant has no lease or that his lease or
other rental agreement has expired or otherwise terminated, and
regardless of any contract, lease, agreement or obligation
heretofore or hereafter entered into which provides for entry of
judgment upon the tenant's confession for breach of the covenants
thereof or which otherwise provides contrary hereto. . . ."
[
Footnote 9]
Pike & Fischer, OPA Service, Rent, Interpretations of the
Rent Regulation for Housing, § 6-VI, issued July 25, 1946:
"Interpretation 6-VI. Evictions Pending On July 25, 1946."
"The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, on July
25, 1946, was extended by striking out 'June 30, 1946' and
substituting 'June 30, 1947,' as the expiration date of the Act.
Section 18 provides that the provisions of the Act shall take
effect as of June 30, 1946. In this section, a savings clause was
inserted for the protection of persons who had acted contrary to
the regulation during the interim period between Jun 30, 1946, and
July 25, 1946. This savings clause provides that no act or
transaction occurring between said dates shall be deemed a
violation. As a result, any eviction which occurred during the
interim period was not a violation of the Act or regulation. By
reason of this, the tenant who has been in fact evicted during this
interim period receives no protection. If, however, he is in
possession on July 25, 1946, he is entitled to the protection of
the eviction provisions of the regulation, and it is a violation of
the regulation for the landlord on or after that date to attempt to
evict by court process or otherwise except in accordance with the
provisions of Section 6 of the regulation."
[
Footnote 10]
"
Provided further, That no act or transaction, or
omission or failure to act, occurring subsequent to June 30, 1946,
and prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall be deemed to
be a violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as
amended, or the Stabilization Act of 1942, as amended, or of any
regulation, order, price schedule, or requirement under either of
such Acts. . . ."
[
Footnote 11]
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374,
286 U. S. 391;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.
S. 467;
Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v.
Schubert, 224 U. S. 603;
Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U. S. 170;
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.
S. 240,
294 U. S.
303-311;
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood,
307 U. S. 247,
307 U. S.
259.
[
Footnote 12]
Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U.
S. 502,
304 U. S. 509;
Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.
S. 370.
[
Footnote 13]
Judicial Code § 265:
"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the
United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except
in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."
[
Footnote 14]
Porter v. Lee, 328 U. S. 246;
Porter v. Dicken, 328 U. S. 252;
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503,
321 U. S.
510.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
In considering the scope of our appellate jurisdiction, great
weight should be given to the strong policy of the Congress, ever
since the Judiciary Act of 1891, to keep the docket of this Court
within manageable proportions for the wise disposition of causes by
the ultimate judicial tribunal. That consideration applies also to
the few Acts, passed since the creation of the circuit courts of
appeals, which allow cases to come here directly from the district
court where issues of great public importance, such as the
constitutionality of legislation, are at stake.
In
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.
S. 282, this Court gave an expansive content to review,
as a matter of right, of State court judgments where is drawn in
question "the validity of a statute." Our jurisdiction was held to
cover review of a finding of unconstitutionality in the application
of a statute to a particular situation, though the statute is
otherwise left in full force and effect. While, for the reasons set
forth in the dissent of Mr. Justice
Page 331 U. S. 109
Brandeis, I have never been reconciled to the soundness of that
decision, I accept it. But I do not feel obliged to extend its
scope beyond its requirements.
There is an important difference between review of State court
decisions and decisions of the district courts. The latter are
subject to review as a matter of course by the circuit courts of
appeals. They are not dependent on review by grace through
certiorari, as would be comparable State decisions except for the
Dahnke-Walker doctrine. I do not feel myself required by
the Act of August 24, 1937, to hold that direct appeal lies to this
Court whenever a district court finds unconstitutional an
application of a statute to the circumstances of a particular case.
It is one thing not to allow final determination of the fate of a
federal statute to be delayed until a decision of a district court
can go through a circuit court of appeals and then reach this
Court. It is quite another thing to bring here directly from a
district court every decision indicating unconstitutionality in
application, no matter how restricted its incidence. Of course,
this does not mean that direct review of district court decisions
by this Court would be available only for cases that involve "the
constitutionality as a whole" of a challenged statute. The Act of
1937 refers explicitly to invalidation "in whole or in part."
Although this is made explicit in § 3 of the Act, the scope of
direct review here, on the score of unconstitutionality, ought not
to be different under different sections of this Act. A direct
appeal is called for only when a district court strikes down, in
whole or in part, that which Congress has unequivocally written. It
is unwarranted when all that is in issue is whether the allowable
scope of what Congress has written excludes a particular
situation.
The immediate case gives point to these general observations.
The incidents of a judgment are not the same
Page 331 U. S. 110
in all the States. The effect of this Act upon judgments in the
different States may thus involve consideration of the procedure of
a particular State. These are hardly questions of the kind which
led to the authorization, by the Act of August 24, 1937, of direct
review where a district court's decision "is against the
constitutionality of any Act of Congress." 50 Stat. 751, 752.
Nor should it be decisive of this Court's exceptional
jurisdiction on direct appeal from the district courts that the
Government is the litigant. Like other litigants the Government at
times attaches importance to a particular case out of all
proportion to the more comprehensive factors that should control
this Court's jurisdiction. We cannot be blind to the fact that
review here is sometimes pressed in response to commendable
administrative earnestness which fails, however, to take fully into
account the demands of this Court's business. Moreover, it was not
the interest of the Government as such which moved Congress to
grant direct appeals from the district courts. By the Judiciary Act
of 1925 Congress narrowly confined direct review here of district
court decisions regardless of the character of the litigant, and
the extension of such review by the Act of 1937 should be strictly
confined.
I would dismiss this appeal and remand the case to the Circuit
Court of Appeals.
See Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v.
Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U. S. 386,
292 U.S. 392, and
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.
S. 246,
312 U. S. 254.