1. In a suit by the Wage-Hour Administrator to enjoin alleged
violations of the overtime compensation requirement of § 7 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the evidence summarized in the opinion
held adequate to support a finding by the district court
that certain "operating engineers" who had charge of a power plant
in the absence of the chief engineer, supervised the work of
firemen and coal passers, received monthly salaries in excess of
$200, and enjoyed privileges usually reserved for supervisory
employees, were exempted by § 13(a) as employees employed in an
"executive" capacity. Pp.
330 U. S.
547-550.
2. Where findings of fact made by a district court on
conflicting evidence and inferences drawn therefrom are not clearly
wrong, they should not be rejected by a circuit court of appeals.
P.
330 U. S.
550.
3. Upon review of a judgment of a circuit court of appeals on
certiorari, the respondent, without filing a cross-petition for
certiorari, may seek to sustain the judgment on a ground which the
circuit court of appeals rejected as well as upon that which it
accepted. P. 547,
n 5.
155 F.2d 711 affirmed.
Page 330 U. S. 546
The Wage-Hour Administrator sued to enjoin alleged violations of
the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
District Court held that the employees in question were exempt
under § 13(a), and gave judgment for the employer. 60 F. Supp. 549.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the
employees in question, though not exempt, had been compensated in
accordance with the Act. 155 F.2d 711. This Court granted
certiorari. 329 U.S. 704.
Affirmed, p.
330 U. S.
550.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a complaint filed in the District Court, petitioner charged
that respondent was violating the Fair Labor Standards Act
[
Footnote 1] by failing to pay
some of its employees time and one-half for statutory overtime, as
required by § 7(a) of the Act, and asked an injunction against
continued violation. Respondent denied the charge, and separately
alleged that any of its employees not compensated in accordance
with the requirements of § 7(a) were exempt from the Act by §
13(a).
The Court, without a jury, heard witnesses for both parties with
respect to the compensation and status of three engineers in
respondent's power plant. It made special findings of fact,
concluded that these men were
Page 330 U. S. 547
exempt employees, and entered judgment for respondent. [
Footnote 2] The Circuit Court of
Appeals thought the evidence did not sustain the District Court's
findings relative to the engineers' exempt status. But it thought
that the District Court had also found the engineers' compensation
to be in accordance with the Act. It decided that the evidence was
adequate to this end, and affirmed the District Court's judgment.
[
Footnote 3] We granted
certiorari [
Footnote 4] to
determine whether the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals was
not inconsistent with this Court's decision on computation of
overtime in
Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.
S. 572. On argument here, however, respondent continued
to urge that the District Court was warranted in its findings as to
the engineers' exempt status. [
Footnote 5] Having heard the argument and examined the
record, we agree that it was. Therefore, we need not consider
further the question of computation of overtime, and proceed only
to state the considerations relevant to the particular ground of
our decision.
There is no dispute as to the applicable law. Section 13(a)
exempts from the overtime provisions of the Act any person employed
in an "executive capacity" as defined in regulations issued by the
Administrator. The Regulations prescribe six conjunctive conditions
to an executive capacity, which are set forth in the margin.
[
Footnote 6] Respondent
Page 330 U. S. 548
had the burden of proving the existence of these conditions, if
it would rely on its defense that the engineers were exempt
employees. [
Footnote 7]
There was evidence to the following effect. Respondent operates
at Elyria, Ohio, a plant engaged in the production of small motors
and plastic products. Part of this plant consists of a powerhouse
containing a boiler room and engine room. In the former are four
boilers. These supply the steam required to drive three large
electrical generators which are the source of power for the entire
plant, and to create the high steam pressures and air pressures
employed in molding plastics. In the engine room, besides the
generators, are compressors, engines, and other equipment. All this
machinery, in both rooms, constitutes an interrelated and
interdependent system. It must be carefully and skillfully tended
at all times in order to
Page 330 U. S. 549
maintain the power and pressure required for continuous 24-hour
operation of the plant, to avoid damage to the tremendous
investment in the machinery itself, and to guard against the
fearful consequences of an explosion.
During the period covered by the evidence, the powerhouse was
manned by the following personnel. At the top was the chief
engineer, who apparently adhered to no precise duty-hours, but was
customarily present most of the morning and afternoon and subject
to call, in the event of an emergency, twenty-fours a day. Directly
under and responsible to him were the three "operating engineers"
whose status is in issue. They worked consecutive eight or eight
and one-half hour shifts, one of them being present in the
powerhouse at all times. Finally, there were an unspecified number
of firemen and coal-passers, who, collectively, were also on
twenty-four hour duty.
The engineers in question were paid regular monthly salaries of
more than $200 per month, for which they regularly worked six-shift
weeks. They received sick leave, vacations with pay, bonuses,
insurance, and pension rights usually reserved for supervisory
employees.
The engineers were in charge of the powerhouse and performed the
duties generally incident to direct supervision of a highly
mechanized operation. Respondent's vice-president and factory
manager testified that they acted as foremen of the firemen and
coal-passers. This testimony was corroborated by other facts. In
July, 1944, two months before the complaint in this case was filed,
the engineers signed agreements with respondent stating their
desire "to be regarded as foremen, as in the past, with foremen
privileges and continue on a salary basis." Three weeks later, the
International Brotherhood of Firemen, Oilers, and Helpers abandoned
a long contested claim of right to represent the engineers, thereby
formally recognizing their supervisory status. Indeed, the nature
of the operations in the powerhouse
Page 330 U. S. 550
was such that the immediate and continuous supervision of
trained persons was indispensable, and there were concededly no
other employees to give such supervision. The engineers were
required to maintain constant observation of all machinery in the
powerhouse, and to make regular inspections and necessary repairs.
In addition, they were required to spend a small part of their time
in oiling and cleaning the engines.
The District Court, having made findings substantially as stated
above, proceeded to make additional findings of the existence of
each of the facts on which an executive status, as defined by the
Regulations, is made to depend.
We believe that the evidentiary facts afford an adequate basis
for the inferences drawn by the Court in making such additional
findings. At the least, we think that, in drawing such inferences,
the Court was not clearly wrong, and conclude that the findings
should therefore have been left undisturbed. [
Footnote 8] The Circuit Court of Appeals'
rejection of those findings cannot rest on the conflicting
testimony of petitioner's witnesses. The District Court heard the
witnesses, and was the proper judge of their credibility. [
Footnote 9]
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq.
[
Footnote 2]
Walling v. General Industries Co., 60 F. Supp. 549.
[
Footnote 3]
Walling v. General Industries Co., 155 F.2d 711.
[
Footnote 4]
329 U.S. 704.
[
Footnote 5]
Respondent was entitled to make this contention here without
filing a cross-petition for certiorari.
Langnes v. Green,
282 U. S. 531,
282 U. S. 538;
Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico v. Havemeyer,
296 U. S. 506,
296 U. S.
509.
[
Footnote 6]
29 Code Fed.Regs. § 541.1, 5 F.R. 4077 (Regulations of the
Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Oct.
24, 1940, amended Jan. 17, 1942) provides as follows:
"§ 541.1
Executive."
"The term 'employee employed in a
bona fide executive .
. . capacity' in section 13(a)(1) of the act shall mean any
employee --"
"(a) whose primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which he is employed or of a customarily
recognized department or subdivision thereof, and"
"(b) who customarily and regularly directs the work of other
employees therein, and"
"(c) who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or
whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring or firing
and as to the advancement and promotion or any other change of
status of other employees will be given particular weight, and"
"(d) who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary
powers, and"
"(e) who is compensated for his services on a salary basis at
not less than $30 per week (exclusive of board, lodging, or other
facilities), and"
"(f) whose hours of work of the same nature as that performed by
nonexempt employees do not exceed 20 percent of the number of hours
worked in the work-week by the nonexempt employees under his
direction; provided that this subsection (f) shall not apply in the
case of an employee who is in sole charge of an independent
establishment or a physically separated branch establishment."
[
Footnote 7]
See Helliwell v. Haberman, 140 F.2d 833, 834;
Fletcher v. Grinnell Brothers, 150 F.2d 337, 340, 341;
Smith v. Porter, 143 F.2d 292, 294.
[
Footnote 8]
Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
Lawson v.
United States Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1,
207 U. S. 12;
Butte & Superior Copper Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty
Co., 249 U. S. 12,
249 U. S. 30.
See District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U.
S. 698,
320 U. S.
701.
[
Footnote 9]
Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
Adamson v.
Gilliland, 242 U. S. 350;
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S.
32,
247 U. S. 37-38,
247 U. S.
41.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
In my opinion, the Circuit Court of Appeals correctly found that
the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the findings upon which
the District Court concluded that
Page 330 U. S. 551
the operating engineers are exempt under § 13(a)(1) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. It said, unanimously:
"The District Court found as a fact that Stegman, Page, and
Spooner were employed as foremen or supervisors of the department,
with power to supervise the work of firemen and coal-passers in the
boiler-room; that they customarily and regularly directed the work
of other employees in the department, and customarily exercised
discretionary powers. We think these findings are not sustained by
the evidence. The work done by the engineers was highly skilled
mechanical work. While the machinery was vital to the plant,
dangerous, and complicated, its operation involved no exercise of
discretion, but merely the proper application of the skilled
engineering training which these men had received. Although the
three engineers were responsible for the proper operation of the
machinery during their shifts, and, as the factory manager
testifies, 'in charge of management of the property,' none of them
could fire or hire or give orders to any man in the boiler-room.
Latteman, the chief engineer, who was present at the plant during
one shift and on call 24 hours a day and seven days a week, was in
full charge of the department. While Latteman might act on
information from Stegman, Page, or Spooner, during the period
involved, orders emanated only from him. It is not shown that
Stegman, Page, or Spooner ever made any recommendation concerning
the change in status of the boiler-men. It was essential to have
proper steam pressure in the boiler-room, but if the three
engineers desired in this connection to secure action from the
firemen and coal-passers, they had to secure an order from
Latteman. This evidence is not contradicted."
155 F.2d 711, 714.
Page 330 U. S. 552
An independent examination of the record confirms the Court of
Appeals' conclusions. It discloses that, on one or two occasions,
an operating engineer tried to give orders to firemen or coal
passers in the boiler room, but, in each instance, those men
refused to follow them, and took their orders solely from Latteman.
This falls far short at least of the regular and customary
supervision required by §§ 541.1(A) and (B) of the controlling
regulations to make the exemption operative.
Since the Court does not reach other questions presented on the
record, I express no opinion concerning them.