1. The action of a circuit court of appeals in directing a
remand to a state court is reviewable here, and the jurisdiction of
this Court is not defeated by the fact that the mandate of the
circuit court of appeals has issued. Pp.
330 U. S.
466-467.
2. A suit for death benefits in the amount of $5,000 under the
Workmen's Compensation Law of Tennessee
held to involve
the sum of $3,000 requisite to the jurisdiction of a federal
district court on the ground of diversity of citizenship,
notwithstanding that, under the state law, an award would be
payable in installments and, by operation of conditions subsequent,
the payments might be terminated before totaling $3,000. Pp.
330 U. S.
467-468.
3. Since the other grounds relied on by the respondent to
sustain the judgment of the circuit court of appeals were not
passed upon by that court nor adequately presented here, the case
is remanded to the circuit court of appeals for consideration of
those questions. P.
330 U. S.
468.
154 F.2d 881, reversed.
Respondent's suit against petitioners in a state court, to
recover death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law of
Tennessee, was removed to a federal district court on the ground of
diversity of citizenship. The district court dismissed the action
for want of proper venue. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the requisite jurisdictional amount was not involved, and directed
remand to the state court. 154 F.2d 881. This Court granted
certiorari. 329 U.S. 699.
Reversed and remanded, p.
330 U. S.
468.
Page 330 U. S. 465
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation
Law of Tennessee (Tenn.Code Ann.1934, § 6851
et seq.) was
commenced in 1945 by plaintiff respondent in the Chancery Court of
Hawkins County, Tennessee. The defendants petitioners are the
former employer of her deceased husband and the employer's
insurance carrier. Service was had on the insurance carrier in
Hawkins County, and on the employer in Knox County. Respondent is a
citizen of Tennessee, the employer is a North Carolina corporation,
and the insurance carrier is a Connecticut corporation. The
complaint alleged that respondent's husband died as the result of
an accident occurring in the course of his employment. Burial
expenses plus benefits in the amount of $5,000, the maximum under
the Tennessee statute, [
Footnote
1] were sought on behalf of respondent and her two minor
children, aged twelve and fifteen.
On May 28, 1945, petitioners mailed a notice of intention to
file a petition for removal to a federal District Court which was
received by respondent's attorney on the morning of May 29. The
petition for removal was filed in the Chancery Court the same day,
and on June 5, the removal order issued. in the federal court the
petitioners moved for dismissal on the ground that venue was not
properly laid in the Hawkins County Court, so that,
Page 330 U. S. 466
under Tennessee law, that court had lacked jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 2] Respondent sought
a remand of the case to the state court, contending that the
requisites of diversity jurisdiction had not been met either as to
jurisdictional amount or as to proper notice of filing of the
removal petition, and that the suit was not removable, because not
one of civil nature in law or equity. The District Court concluded
that Hawkins County was not the proper venue. It thereupon
dismissed the action without reaching the questions raised by
respondent's motion for a remand.
The judgment was reversed on appeal. 154 F.2d 881. The Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the jurisdictional minimum of $3,000 in
controversy (Judicial Code § 24, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1)) was not
present, and therefore ordered the case remanded to the state
court. In this disposition, the Circuit Court of Appeals reached
neither the state venue question raised by petitioners nor
respondent's contention that the required notice of the filing of
the removal petition was lacking. We granted certiorari because of
an apparent conflict with
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v.
Pinkston, 293 U. S. 96, as to
the jurisdictional minimum requirement.
First. It is suggested that a decision of a Circuit
Court of Appeals ordering remand of a case to a state court is not
reviewable. And it is also said that we lack power to review the
action of the Circuit Court of Appeals, since the mandate of that
court has issued, and the District Court has remanded the cause to
the state court.
An order of a District Court remanding a cause to the state
court from whence it came is not appealable, and hence may not be
reviewed either in the Circuit Court
Page 330 U. S. 467
of Appeals or here. Judicial Code § 28, 28 U.S.C. § 71;
Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.
S. 199;
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Stevens, 312 U. S. 563;
United States v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742. But
no such limitation affects our authority to review an action of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, directing a remand to a state court.
Gay v. Ruff, 292 U. S. 25. Nor
does the fact that the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals has
issued defeat this Court's jurisdiction.
Carr v. Zaja,
283 U. S. 52, and
cases cited.
Second. We think that the jurisdictional amount of
$3,000 was involved in this suit. The contrary conclusion of the
Circuit Court of Appeals was based on the nature of the award under
the Tennessee statute. The award may be paid in installments at
regular intervals by the employer or by a trustee with whom the
amount of the award, reduced to present value, has been deposited.
Tenn.Code § 6893. Moreover, the death or remarriage of respondent,
plus the death or attainment of the age of eighteen by the
children, would terminate all payments. Tenn.Code § 6883. Since an
award to respondent would be payable in installments, and by
operation of conditions subsequent the total payments might never
reach $3,000, the Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
jurisdictional amount was lacking.
If this case were one where judgment could be entered only for
the installments due at the commencement of the suit (
cf. New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.
S. 672,
297 U. S.
678), future installments could not be considered in
determining whether the jurisdictional amount was involved, even
though the judgment would be determinative of liability for future
installments as they accrued.
Wright v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 19 F.2d 117,
aff'd, 276 U.S. 602.
Cf. Button
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp.
168. But this is not that type of case. For the Tennessee
statute which creates liability for the award contemplates a single
action for the determination of claimant's
Page 330 U. S. 468
right to benefits and a single judgment for the award granted.
See Tenn.Code §§ 6880, 6881, 6890, 6891, 6893;
Shockley v. Morristown Produce & Ice Co., 171 Tenn.
591, 106 S.W.2d 562.
Nor does the fact that it cannot be known as a matter of
absolute certainty that the amount which may ultimately be paid, if
respondent prevails, will exceed $3,000 mean that the
jurisdictional amount is lacking. This Court has rejected such a
restrictive interpretation of the statute creating diversity
jurisdiction. It has held that a possibility that payments will
terminate before the total reaches the jurisdictional minimum is
immaterial if the right to all the payments is in issue.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Pinkston, supra; Thompson
v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551.
Future payments are not in any proper sense contingent, although
they may be decreased or cut off altogether by the operation of
conditions subsequent.
Thompson v. Thompson, supra, p.
226 U. S. 560.
And there is no suggestion that, by reason of life expectancy or
law of averages, the maximum amount recoverable can be expected to
fall below the jurisdictional minimum.
Cf. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen v. Pinkston, supra, p.
293 U. S. 101.
Moreover, the computation of the maximum amount recoverable is not
complicated by the necessity of determining the life expectancy of
respondent. [
Footnote 3]
Cf. Thompson v. Thompson, supra, p.
226 U. S. 559;
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Pinkston, p.
293 U. S.
100.
Third. Respondent, as is her right,
United States
v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78,
322 U. S. 88,
and cases cited, seeks to support the action of the Circuit Court
of Appeals on other grounds. But those questions were not passed
upon by that court, nor adequately presented here. So we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals
so it may consider those questions.
United States v. Ballard,
supra.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Death benefits are provided in the amount of 60% of the average
weekly wages of the employee (as computed in accordance with
Tenn.Code § 6852(c)), but payments may not exceed $18 per week, nor
continue for more than 400 weeks. § 6880; § 6883(17). In addition,
there is a ceiling of $5,000 on total benefits exclusive of burial
and certain other expenses. § 6881.
See Haynes v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 178 Tenn. 648, 162 S.W.2d 383. The complaint
alleged that 60% of the average weekly wages for the statutory
period would exceed $5,000.
[
Footnote 2]
The contention was that proper venue lay only in Roane County,
where, it was alleged, the accident occurred and the business of
the employer is conducted. It was argued that service on the
insurer in Hawkins County did not give the Hawkins County Court
jurisdiction of the case.
[
Footnote 3]
See note 1
supra.