1. The Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, which provides that a
"libel
in personam in admiralty may be brought against the
United States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the
United States," authorizes a libel against the United States to
recover damages for death or personal injuries caused by a public
vessel of the United States. Pp.
330 U. S.
450-454,
330 U. S.
458-460.
2. Mere acceptance by an injured longshoreman of compensation
from his employer pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, without an award
by a deputy commissioner under § 19, does not preclude the
longshoreman from thereafter electing to sue a third-party
tortfeasor for injuries suffered while working on a vessel. Pp.
330 U. S.
454-456.
3. A stevedoring contract being a maritime contract, an
admiralty court has jurisdiction to grant indemnity under an
indemnity provision thereof. P.
330 U. S.
456.
4. A district court awarded indemnity to the extent of half of
the damages under an ambiguous indemnity provision of a stevedoring
contract without admitting evidence as to the intention of the
parties or making any clear finding as to the meaning of the
contract. On appeal, the circuit court of appeals held that the
stevedoring contractor should indemnify the owner completely. On
review in this Court, the case is remanded to the district court
for determination of the meaning of the contract, since the
district court may have the benefit of such evidence as there is
upon the intention of the parties. Pp.
330 U. S.
457-458.
153 F.2d 605, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
No. 69. A longshoreman injured while working on a public vessel
of the United States as an employee of a corporation engaged in
loading the vessel under a stevedoring contract with the United
States filed a libel to recover damages from the United States
under the Public
Page 330 U. S. 447
Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 781
et seq. The District Court
overruled the Government's exceptions to the libel. 53 F. Supp.
569. The Government then impleaded the stevedoring contractor
charging it with fault and setting forth an indemnity provision of
the contract. The contractor answered the libel, denying fault and
asserting as an affirmative defense that, by accepting compensation
payments under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950, the longshoreman had lost his right to sue a
third-party tortfeasor. The District Court held that the
longshoreman was not barred from maintaining the action, and that
both the United States and the contractor were negligent, awarded
damages from the United States, and awarded the United States
contribution from the contractor as a joint tortfeasor to the
extent of half the damages less the compensation payments received
by the longshoreman. On cross-appeals by the United States and the
contractor, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the contractor
was bound by the indemnity provision of the stevedoring contract to
make the United States completely whole, and affirmed the decree
with that modification. 153 F.2d 605. This Court granted
certiorari. 328 U.S. 827.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded, p.
330 U. S.
458.
No. 514. A District Court awarded damages against the United
States under the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 781
et
seq., for the death of a longshoreman resulting from injuries
sustained while working aboard a vessel owned by the United States.
63 F. Supp. 538. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals, 157 F.2d
416, certified to this Court a question which is answered as
follows:
"The word 'damages,' as used in 46 U.S.C. § 782, includes
damages under §§ 130-134 of the Decedent Estate Law of the State of
New York recoverable by a personal representative because of the
death of a human being."
P.
330 U. S.
460.
Page 330 U. S. 448
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
Porello, a longshoreman, was injured in 1942 while working in
the hold of the U.S.S.
Thomas Stone, a public vessel of
the United States. His employer, American Stevedores, Inc. (called
American hereinafter), was engaged in loading the vessel under a
stevedoring contract with the United States. Within two weeks of
the accident which caused the injuries, American's insurance
carrier, in compliance with § 14 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, [
Footnote 1] 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, and without the
compulsion of an award of compensation by a deputy commissioner
under § 19, began compensation payments to Porello, who negotiated
the checks he received. In March of 1943, Porello gave notice in
accordance with § 33(a) of election to sue the United States as a
third-party tortfeasor, rather than to receive compensation. In the
same month, he filed a libel, amended in November, 1943, to recover
damages from the United States under the Public Vessels Act of
1925, [
Footnote 2] 46
Page 330 U. S. 449
U.S.C. § 781
et seq., for the injuries to his person
sustained in the accident. Exceptions to the libel being overruled,
the United States answered, denying fault on its part and claiming
sovereign immunity from suit. Later, by a petition charging
American with fault and setting forth an indemnity provision of the
stevedoring contract, the United States impleaded American.
[
Footnote 3] American then
answered the libel, denying fault and asserting as an affirmative
defense that, by accepting compensation payments, Porello had lost
his right to sue a third party tortfeasor.
The District Court held that Porello was not barred from
maintaining the action. At trial, it appeared that a beam lying
athwart a hatch had fallen into he hold and struck Porello, causing
the injuries complained of. The court held that the United States
was negligent in not providing a locking device on the end of the
beam, and held that American was negligent through its foreman,
whose orders to the operator of a cargo boom caused the beam to be
dislodged. Porello was awarded damages from the United States, the
United States to receive contribution from American as a joint
tortfeasor to the extent of half the damage less the compensation
payments received by Porello. On cross-appeals by the United States
and American, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that American was
bound by the indemnity provision of the stevedoring contract to
make the United States completely whole. With that modification, it
affirmed the decree below. 153 F.2d 605. The important issue in
this proceeding is whether the Public Vessels Act makes the United
States liable for damages on account of personal injuries. The
Circuit Court of Appeals thought that this question was decided by
the
Canadian Aviator case, [
Footnote 4] but, since the
Page 330 U. S. 450
issue was not squarely posed in that case, we granted certiorari
in order to determine it at this time. 328 U.S. 827
The Public Vessels Act provides that a "libel
in
personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States
. . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States. .
. ." [
Footnote 5] Petitioner
argues that the Act only provides a remedy for damage to property.
"Damages," however, have historically been awarded both for injury
to property and injury to the person -- a fact too well known to
have been overlooked by the Congress in enacting this statute.
[
Footnote 6] Nor is it easy to
conceive any reason, absent intent to the contrary, not to have
inserted the word "property" in the statute, an obvious method of
imposing the limitation for which the petitioner here contends.
Petitioner nonetheless argues that the legislative history of the
statute conclusively shows that the congressional intent was to
limit redress to property damage.
The history of the Act may be briefly detailed. Starting in
1920, various bills were introduced which provided for liability of
the Government to suit for damages caused by its vessels. [
Footnote 7] We need only consider,
however, the bills that were pending in the 68th Congress by which
the present act was passed: H.R. 6989, H.R. 9075 and H.R. 9535. The
first provided for suits against the United States "for damages
caused by collision by a public vessel." The second, designed as an
amendment to the Suits in Admiralty
Page 330 U. S. 451
Act, and supported by the Maritime Law Association of the United
States, [
Footnote 8] would have
amended that act so that it would not be limited to vessels
operated by the Government as merchant vessels, and would thus have
made the United States unquestionably liable to suit for personal
injuries caused by public vessels. [
Footnote 9] This bill never reached the floor of Congress.
The third bill, H.R. 9535, was enacted and became the present
Public Vessels Act. Although "designed as a substitute for H.R.
6989," [
Footnote 10] it
omitted the words "by collision" which would have limited the
liability of the United States to damages resulting from collisions
by public vessels. The only discussion of any significance to the
present inquiry related to the last of these bills. It is true, as
petitioner points out, that the proponent of the bill in the House,
Mr. Underhill, said, when the bill was introduced:
"The bill I have introduced simply allows suits in admiralty to
be brought by owners of vessels whose property has been damaged by
collision or other fault of Government vessels
Page 330 U. S. 452
and Government agents. [
Footnote 11]"
Further, on inquiry as to whether suit could be brought only
where blame was charged to the Government, he answered: "Not
entirely; where a man's property is damaged, he can bring a suit."
[
Footnote 12] These
statements were not, however, answers to questions whether the Act
would provide a remedy for injury to the person as well as to
property, nor does it appear that the speaker was at the time
attentive to such possible distinctions. It is also true that the
Committee report said that
"the chief purpose of this bill is to grant private owners of
vessels and of merchandise a right of action when their vessels or
goods have been damaged as the result of a collision with any
Government-owned vessel. [
Footnote 13]"
However, in the same report, a letter from the Attorney General
was incorporated which, while it was addressed to the predecessor
bill, H.R. 6989, serves, in the absence of contradiction by the
report, as an indication of the Committee's opinion on the intended
effect of the act. That letter explicitly stated that
"he proposed bill intends to give the same relief against the
Government for damages . . . caused by its public vessels . . . as
is now given against the United States in the operation of its
merchant vessels, as provided by the suits in admiralty act of
March 9, 1920."
As the right to sue for personal injuries under the Suits in
Admiralty Act was clear, it may be inferred at least as strongly as
the opposite is implied by Mr. Underhill's remarks, that the
Committee understood
Page 330 U. S. 453
that the Act would provide a remedy to persons suffering
personal injuries, as well as property damage. [
Footnote 14] Moreover, when the bill
reached the floor of the Senate, there was not the least indication
that the members of that body believed that the Act limited relief
to owners of damaged property. [
Footnote 15]
The passage of the Suits in Admiralty Act, the Public Vessels
Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act [
Footnote 16] attests to the growing feeling of Congress
that the United States should put aside its sovereign armor in
cases where federal employees have tortiously caused personal
injury or property damage. To hold now that the Public Vessels
Page 330 U. S. 454
Act does not provide a remedy against the United States for
personal injuries would in the future only throw this form of
maritime action under the Federal Tort Claims Act; for that Act
excepts from its coverage "Any claim for which a remedy is provided
by the Act . . . of March 3, 1925 [The Public Vessels Act] (U.S.C.
title 46, secs. 781-790, inclusive). . . ." [
Footnote 17] We cannot believe that the Public
Vessels Act, read in the light of its legislative history, evinces
a Congressional intent only to provide a remedy to the owners of
damaged property.
This determination does not dispose of all the issues raised by
the
Porello case. When impleaded by the United States in
the trial court, American, the petitioner here, pleaded as an
affirmative defense that Porello, having accepted compensation
payments from American, lost whatever right of action he had
against the United States as a third party tortfeasor. The
petitioner admits that § 33(b) of the Longshoremen's Act was
amended in 1938 so that mere acceptance of compensation, without an
award, does not operate as an assignment to the employer of the
injured employee's cause of action against a third party
tortfeasor, a conclusion which courts had reached under the former
wording of the Act. [
Footnote
18] But it contends that the amendment did no more, and that
acceptance of compensation still operates as a conclusive
election
Page 330 U. S. 455
not to sue. It is quite clear that mere acceptance of
compensation is not the kind of election for which provision is
made by § 33(a) of the Act, which provides for notice of intention
to the deputy commissioner, [
Footnote 19] so the argument is technically imperfect.
But, in any event, election not to sue a third party and assignment
of the cause of action are two sides of the same coin. Surely the
Act was never intended, and has never been held, to provide that,
after acceptance of compensation and until an award, neither
employer nor employee could sue the third party tortfeasor. If so
held, an employer who was not responsible over to the third party
might lose his chance to recoup compensation payments from the
third party, while the third party might escape all liability.
American, in the unusual circumstances of this case, could have
protected itself by controverting the employee's right to receive
compensation. [
Footnote 20]
In this way, it could probably have forced an award and the
consequent assignment of the right of action to itself.
Congress has provided that, unless an employer controverts the
right of the employee to receive compensation,
Page 330 U. S. 456
he must begin payments within two weeks of the injury. [
Footnote 21] The employee thus
receives compensation payments quite soon after his injury by force
of the Act. Yet the Act does not put a time limitation upon the
period during which an employee must elect to receive compensation
or to sue, save the general limitation of one year upon the time to
make a claim for compensation. [
Footnote 22] The apparent purpose of the Act is to
provide payments during the period while the employee is unable to
earn, when they are sorely needed, without compelling him to give
up his right to sue a third party when he is least fit to make a
judgment of election. For these reasons, we think that mere
acceptance of compensation payments does not preclude an injured
employee from thereafter electing to sue a third-party
tortfeasor.
American further argues that the court below, as an admiralty
court, did not have jurisdiction of the indemnity provision of the
stevedoring contract, and that therefore the decree granting full
indemnity to the United States from American was beyond its power.
A stevedoring contract is maritime.
Atlantic Transport Co. v.
Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52,
234 U. S. 62;
The Muskegon, 275 F. 348. And although admiralty
jurisdiction over contracts partly maritime and partly nonmaritime
in nature is doubtful, the cases raising such doubts are concerned
only with contracts for the performance of partly nonmaritime
activities.
See The Richard Winslow, 71 F. 426;
Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v. Interlake S.S. Co., 40 F.2d
439. To sever a contract provision for indemnity for damages
arising out of the performance of wholly maritime activities would
only needlessly multiply litigation. Such a provision is a normal
clause in contracts to act for others, and no more determines the
nature of a contract than do conditions on the time and place of
payment.
Page 330 U. S. 457
Whether the indemnity provision was rightly construed by the
court below is a more difficult question. It was provided that:
"The Stevedore performing any service under this schedule shall
be responsible for any and all damage or injury to persons and
cargo while loading or otherwise handling or stowing the same, to
any ship, including its apparel and equipment, wharves, docks,
lighters, elevators, cars, and carfloats used in connection
therewith, through the negligence or fault of the Stevedore, his
employees, and servants."
The Stevedore, American, contends that it is liable to indemnify
the United States only if damages resulted from its negligence
alone. Respondent, United States, argues, and the court below held,
that such an interpretation would render the provision meaningless,
since the United States would "be liable only if itself at fault,"
and that the clear meaning of the provision is that the Stevedore
would be liable so long as the accident was caused in whole or in
part through its negligence.
American, however, insists that the clause merely stated
existing law. On this record, we cannot answer the contention of
either party. As it stands, the clause is ambiguous. Evidence might
well have been taken as to the intention of the parties, but was
not. [
Footnote 23] It may be
that the parties only meant American to indemnify the United States
should the Government be held liable for damages solely caused by
American's negligence. It may be that the intention was that
American should fully reimburse the United States for all damages
caused
Page 330 U. S. 458
in any part by American's negligence. Finally, the parties may
have intended that American, in case of the joint negligence of the
parties, should be responsible for that proportion of the damages
which its fault bore to the total fault. Although the usual rule in
admiralty, in the absence of contract, is for each joint tortfeasor
to pay the injured party a moiety of the damages,
The
Alabama, 92 U. S. 695;
The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302;
Barbarino v. Stanhope S.S. Co., 151 F.2d 553, we do not
believe that the last alternative, which provides for a measure of
comparative negligence, is necessarily beyond the intent of the
parties. Comparative negligence is not unknown to our maritime law.
The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1;
The
Henry S. Grove, 22 F.2d 444;
see Robinson on
Admiralty, p. 91. From the record, it is not clear whether the
District Court made any finding as to the meaning of the contract.
We believe its interpretation should be left in the first instance
to that court, which shall have the benefit of such evidence as
there is upon the intention of the parties. If the District Court
interprets the contract not to apply to the facts of this case, the
court would, of course, be free to adjudge the responsibility of
the parties to the contract under applicable rules of admiralty
law.
We therefore affirm the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals
as to Porello. We reverse so much of the decree as awards indemnity
to the United States under the contract, and remand the case to the
District Court for determination of the meaning of the
contract.
The case of
United States v. Lauro, No. 514, is here on
certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. The certificate is quoted in full in the note. [
Footnote 24] The only question posed
by the case is whether a suit for
Page 330 U. S. 459
damages for death by wrongful act will lie under the Public
Vessels Act. It is settled that, where death "results from a
maritime tort committed on navigable waters
Page 330 U. S. 460
within a State whose statutes give a right of action on account
of death," the admiralty will entertain a libel for damages
sustained by those to whom the right is given.
Western Fuel Co.
v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233.
See discussion in
Just v. Chambers, 312 U.
S. 383,
312 U. S.
388-391. Here, the death occurred on navigable waters of
New York, which has a statute granting a right of action for
damages on account of wrongful death. Nor can damages suffered on
account of death be distinguished from damages on account of
personal injuries. Death is the supreme personal injury. For the
reasons stated in the
Porello case, we conclude that the
word "damages" in the Public Vessels Act, § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 781,
means damages under §§ 130-134 of the New York Decedent Estate Law.
Accordingly, we answer the certificate as follows: the word
"damages" as used in 46 U.S.C. § 781, includes damages under §§
130-134 of the Decedent Estate Law of the New York recoverable by a
personal representative because of the death of a human being.
* Together with No. 514,
United States v. Lauro,
Administratrix, on certificate from the same Court.
[
Footnote 1]
44 Stat. 1424, as amended by 52 Stat. 1164.
[
Footnote 2]
43 Stat. 1112:
". . . a libel
in personam in admiralty may be brought
against the United States, or a petition impleading the United
States, for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States,
and for compensation for towage and salvage services, including
contract salvage, rendered to a public vessel of the United States.
. . ."
[
Footnote 3]
See Rule 56, Rules of Practice for U.S. Courts in
Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 4]
Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.
S. 215.
[
Footnote 5]
43 Stat. 1112, 46 U.S.C. § 781.
[
Footnote 6]
It might be noted here that there is a distinction between
damage and damages. Black's Law Dictionary cautions that the word
"damage," meaning "loss, injury, or deterioration," is "to be
distinguished from its plural, --
damages,' -- which means a
compensation in money for a loss or damage."
[
Footnote 7]
H.R. 15977, 66th Cong., 3d Sess.; H.R. 6256, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess.; H.R. 6989, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 9075, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess.; H.R. 9535, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 8]
See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives on H.R. 9075, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
May 21, 1924.
[
Footnote 9]
46 U.S.C. §§ 741, 742:
"No vessel owned by the United States . . . shall, in view of
the provision herein made for a libel
in personam, be
subject to arrest or seizure by judicial process in the United
States or its possessions. . . ."
"In cases where, if such vessel were privately owned or
operated, or if such cargo were privately owned and possessed, a
proceeding in admiralty could be maintained at the time of the
commencement of the action herein provided for, a libel
in
personam may be brought against the United States or against
any corporation mentioned in section 741 of this title, as the case
may be, provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel
or is a tugboat operated by such corporation. . . ."
Johnson v. Fleet Corporation, 280 U.
S. 320;
Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co.,
317 U. S. 575.
[
Footnote 10]
S.Rep. No. 941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess.
[
Footnote 11]
66 Cong.Rec. 2087.
[
Footnote 12]
66 Cong.Rec. 2088.
[
Footnote 13]
S.Rep. No. 941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1. Of course, the chief
purpose of the bill was to provide a remedy for those who chiefly
urged the bill -- the vessel owners. But the committee, in so
stating, cannot be taken to have made that purpose the only one. By
that token, the purpose would be to provide a remedy only for
collision damages -- a limitation clearly discarded by omitting the
words "by collision" from the Act.
Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v.
United States, supra, n
4.
[
Footnote 14]
See note 9
supra.
[
Footnote 15]
So the only pertinent comments follow, 66 Cong.Rec. 3560:
"MR. ROBINSON. I think the Senator from Delaware should state
briefly to the Senate the effect of the bill. It seems to be a
measure of considerable importance."
"MR. BAYARD. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas is quite
right; it is a measure of great importance. There are continuous
applications being made to the Claims Committee of both Houses for
the consideration of bills to reimburse people who have suffered
damage from maritime accidents in which United States vessels are
concerned, to enable them to present their suits in the various
district courts. In this last Congress, there were nearly 200 such
claim bills introduced in the two Houses."
". . . It would give a person aggrieved because of an accident
by reason of the shortcomings of a United States ship the right to
go into a district court and prosecute his action. It provides for
the appearance of the Attorney General of the United States, and
all maritime accidents of any kind resulting from collision, and so
on, are taken care of. A great deal of money would be saved to the
Government."
"Incidentally, the bill would accomplish something which should
have been done in this country a long time ago. It would give an
opportunity to do justice when Federal employees have committed an
offense against an individual. . . ."
"MR. ROBINSON. If enacted, it would relieve Congress of the
consideration of a great many measures in the nature of private
claims."
"MR. BAYARD. All claims of this nature."
[
Footnote 16]
Public Law No. 601, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 401-424.
[
Footnote 17]
Id., § 421.
[
Footnote 18]
The statute formerly provided, 44 Stat. 1440:
"Acceptance of such compensation shall operate as an assignment
to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation
to recover damages against such third person, whether or not the
person entitled to compensation has notified the deputy
commissioner of his election."
Under this form of the statute, courts had held that acceptance
of compensation precluded the employee from suing a third party
tortfeasor.
Sciortino v. Dimon S.S. Corp., 39 F.2d
210,
aff'd, 44 F.2d 1019;
Toomey v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 123 F.2d 718;
The Nako Maru, 101 F.2d 716;
Freader v. Cities Service Trans. Co., 14 F. Supp. 456.
Contra, Johnsen v. American-Hwaiian S.S. Co., 98 F.2d
847.
As amended, the statute provides, 52 Stat. 1168:
"Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a
compensation order filed by the deputy commissioner shall operate
as an assignment to the employer of all right of the person
entitled to compensation to recover damages against such third
person."
[
Footnote 19]
33 U.S.C. § 933(a):
"If, on account of a disability or death for which compensation
is payable under this chapter, the person entitled to such
compensation determines that some person other than the employer is
liable in damages, he may elect, by giving notice to the deputy
commissioner in such manner as the commission may provide, to
receive such compensation or to recover damages against such third
person."
[
Footnote 20]
See 33 U.S.C. § 914(d) and (h).
[
Footnote 21]
33 U.S.C. § 914(b), (e).
[
Footnote 22]
33 U.S.C. § 913(a).
[
Footnote 23]
American moved the Circuit Court of Appeals for an order
allowing the parties to take proof and to submit it to the court as
to the intent of the parties respecting the indemnity clause of the
contract, or, in the alternative, for an order remanding the
proceeding to the District Court for further hearing as to the
intent and meaning of the clause. The Circuit Court of Appeals
denied the motion.
[
Footnote 24]
"
Statement of facts"
"On May 27, 1943, Peter Lauro died as a result of injuries
suffered by him on May 26, 1943, while he was employed by Marra
Bros., contracting stevedores, on board respondent's vessel,
designated as No. 596, which vessel was docked at Pier 4, Staten
Island, New York. The death was caused by personal injuries
suffered by Lauro when he fell from a hatch cover on the vessel's
main deck into the hold. At the time of the accident, the vessel,
No. 596, was owned by the United States of America, respondent, and
had been allocated by the respondent to the United States Army. It
was being loaded with cargo which was owned by the United States,
and which consisted of Army and Navy property and Lend-Lease
material which was being shipped to North Africa. Marra Bros., the
employer of the deceased, was hired by the United States Army to
load the vessel."
"Thereafter, Lauro's widow filed a libel in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York against United
States of America to recover damages under the Public Vessels Act
of 1925; 46 U.S.C. Section 781, for wrongfully causing Lauro's
death. In this proceeding, the District Court rendered a decree
awarding damages to the libelant in the sum of $25,000. From this
decree, an appeal was taken to this court, and the cause came on
for argument on March 12, 1946. On this appeal, the
respondent-appellant contended that the said Public Vessels Act of
1925 provided a remedy against the United States for damage to
property only, but not for damage to a person or damage arising by
reason of the death of a human being. The question thus arising is
as follows:"
"
Question certified"
"Does the word 'damages,' as it appears in the following
sentence of the Public Vessels Act of 1925; 46 U.S.C. § 781:"
" A libel
in personam in admiralty may be brought
against the United States, or a petition impleading the United
States, for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States,
and for compensation for towage and salvage services, including
contract salvage, rendered to a public vessel of the United States:
Provided, That the cause of action arose after the 6th day of
April, 1920"
"mean damages to property only, or does it mean, as well,
damages under Sections 130 to 134 of the Decedent Estate Law of the
New York, recoverable by a personal representative because of the
death of a human being? Which question, arising from the facts
aforesaid, is hereby submitted to the Supreme Court."
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs,
dissenting.
Without disregarding the significance which we have heretofore
attached to legislative history, I cannot give the Public Vessels
Act [
Footnote 2/1] the scope given
it by the Court.
It can hardly be maintained that, in the setting of legal
history, the phrase "damages caused by a public vessel" must cover
personal injuries due to failure to provide proper working
conditions for a longshoreman. The
Page 330 U. S. 461
problem for construction is not whether the term "damages" may
be applied to money compensation for hurt to person or property.
What is to be construed is "damages caused by a public vessel."
Standing by itself, that phrase, spontaneously read, may well mean
damage inflicted by a public vessel, rather than "damages" incurred
in connection with its operation. All we held in
Canadian
Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.
S. 215, was that its personnel was part of the public
vessel for purposes of "causing" damage to another vessel.
The words do not stand alone. They are illuminated by the
legislative history of the Public Vessels Act. This history has
been so accurately summarized in the Government's brief that we
shall avail ourselves of it:
"On May 29, 1924, Mr. Underhill introduced H.R. 9535, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., which became the Public Vessels Act without
change so far as the present provision is concerned. At that time,
there were already pending two other bills, H.R. 6989 and H.R.
9075, both of which would also have authorized suit in case of
damage by a public vessel. H.R. 6989, likewise introduced by Mr.
Underhill, was the successor of a series of bills introduced at
each session of Congress since 1920. It provided for suit 'for
damages caused by collision by a public vessel,' and had the
approval of all interested Government departments. H.R. 9075, a new
measure, was designed to revise the Suits in Admiralty Act and, at
the same time, remove its existing limitation to only such vessels
as are operated by the Government as merchant vessels. It would
have resulted in making the United States liable for personal
injuries by all public vessels exactly as it was already for those
by its merchant vessels. H.R. 9075 had the powerful support of the
Maritime Law Association of the United States and of Judge Hough,
then the country's outstanding admiralty judge.
Page 330 U. S. 462
It did not have the unqualified approval of the interested
departments, which were insisting on important changes."
"The omission of H.R. 6989 and its predecessors to cover
personal injuries had been the subject of criticisms, some of which
are cited in the brief of respondent Porello. But protracted delays
were apparent if an attempt were made to rewrite H.R. 9075 so as to
meet the objections thereto. Instead of proceeding further with
either H.R. 6989 or H.R. 9075, Mr. Underhill, for the Committee,
introduced H.R. 9535, which, in place of limiting its grant of
jurisdiction to suits 'for damages caused by collision by a public
vessel,' covered all suits 'for damages caused by a public vessel.'
The purpose of this change is nowhere discussed. Mr. Underhill, in
explaining the intent of the proposed legislation, stated, however
(66 Cong.Rec. 2087):"
"The bill I have introduced simply allows suits in admiralty to
be brought by owners of vessels whose property has been damaged by
collision or other fault of Government vessels and Government
agents."
"Never at any time in the course of the debates in the House or
Senate was it expressly stated that the bill extended to suits for
personal injuries. Many statements in the course of the debates,
some of which are cited in petitioner's brief, seem to indicate
that only relief for property damage was intended. We accordingly
submit that, if decisive weight is to be given to the legislative
history, it would appear that the Public Vessels Act was not
intended to cover suits for personal injury."
In scores of cases in recent years, this Court has give
"decisive weight" to legislative history. It has done so even when
the mere words of an enactment carried a clear meaning. An
impressive course of decisions enjoins upon us not to disregard the
legislative history of the Public Vessels Act unless it is so
completely at war with the terms of the statute itself that we must
deny one
Page 330 U. S. 463
or the other. We can find such a conflict only by reading the
Act itself with dogmatic inhospitality to the usual illuminations
from without.
We cannot escape the conclusion that there was no jurisdiction
for this libel in the District Court. [
Footnote 2/2]
[
Footnote 2/1]
43 Stat. 1112, 46 U.S.C. § 781:
"That a libel
in personam in admiralty may be brought
against the United States, or a petition impleading the United
States, for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States,
and for compensation for towage and salvage services, including
contract salvage, rendered to a public vessel of the United States:
Provided, That the cause of action arose after the 6th day
of April, 1920."
[
Footnote 2/2]
This conclusion is reinforced by the Report of the Senate
Committee that
"The chief purpose of this bill is to grant private owners of
vessels and of merchandise a right of action when their vessels or
goods have been damaged as the result of a collision with any
Government-owned vessel."
S.Rep. No.941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1. The Court's opinion
finds overriding significance in a letter by the Attorney General
commenting on the Bill, in which he stated that it "intends to give
the same relief against the Government for damages caused . . . by
its public vessels" as was given by the Suits in Admiralty Act.
That Act did afford the right to sue for personal injuries. To
prefer the Attorney General's view to that expressed by those in
charge of a measure would, in itself, be not the normal choice. And
this letter of the Attorney General antedated the Report of the
Committee and the statement of Representative Underhill.
Compare United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, 306 U. S.
68,
306 U. S. 71,
where the Committee Report "stated that the purpose of the bill was
set out in a letter from the Attorney General which it quoted." To
reject the subsequent authoritative statements of the Congressional
proponents of the legislation and to accept the view of the
Attorney General to which the Government now does not even refer is
to discard in favor of dim remote light what heretofore has been
deemed controlling illumination.