Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 34,
as amended, provides that a buyer of goods at above the ceiling
price may sue the seller "in any court of competent jurisdiction"
for three times the amount of the overcharge plus costs and a
reasonable attorney's fee, and § 205(c) provides that the federal
district courts shall have jurisdiction of such suits "concurrently
with" state courts. Having purchased an automobile at above the
ceiling price, the purchaser sued the seller under § 205(e) and
obtained judgment for damages and costs in a state court having
adequate general jurisdiction to enforce similar claims arising
under state law. On appeal, the State Supreme Court reversed the
judgment on the ground that the suit was for a penalty based on a
statute of a foreign sovereign, and could not be maintained in the
state courts.
Held: assuming, without deciding, that § 205(e) is a
penal statute, the state courts were not free under Article VI of
the Constitution to refuse enforcement of the claim.
Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U. S. 130;
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S.
1. Pp.
330 U. S.
389-394.
71 R.I. 472, 47 A.2d 312, reversed.
A state court of competent jurisdiction awarded the purchaser of
an automobile at above the ceiling price a judgment for damages and
costs under § 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat.
34, as amended. The State Supreme Court reversed and, pursuant to
local practice, remitted the case and record to the Superior Court.
71 R.I. 472, 47 A.2d 312. This Court granted certiorari. 329 U.S.
703.
Reversed and remanded, p.
330 U. S.
394.
Page 330 U. S. 387
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 205(e) [
Footnote 1]
of the Emergency Price Control Act provides that a buyer of goods
above the prescribed ceiling price may sue the seller "in any court
of competent jurisdiction" for not more than three times the amount
of the overcharge plus costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Section 205(c) [
Footnote 2]
provides that federal district courts shall have jurisdiction of
such suits "concurrently with State and Territorial courts." Such a
suit under § 205(e) must be brought "in the district or county in
which the defendant resides or has a place of business. . . ."
The respondent was in the automobile business in Providence,
Providence County, Rhode Island. In 1944, he sold an automobile to
petitioner Testa, who also resides
Page 330 U. S. 388
in Providence, for $1100, $210 above the ceiling price. The
petitioner later filed this suit against respondent in the State
District Court in Providence. Recovery was sought under § 205(e).
The court awarded a judgment of treble damages and costs to
petitioner. On appeal to the State Superior Court, where the trial
was
de novo, the petitioner was again awarded judgment,
but only for the amount of the overcharge plus attorney's fees.
Pending appeal from this judgment, the Price Administrator was
allowed to intervene. On appeal, the State Supreme Court reversed,
71 R.I. 472, 47 A.2d 312. It interpreted § 205(e) to be "a penal
statute in the international sense." It held that an action for
violation of § 205(e) could not be maintained in the courts of that
State. The State Supreme Court rested its holding on its earlier
decision in
Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467,
468, in which it had reasoned that a state need not enforce the
penal laws of a government which is "foreign in the international
sense;" § 205(e) is treated by Rhode Island as penal in that sense;
the United States is "foreign" to the State in the "private
international," as distinguished from the "public international,"
sense; hence, Rhode Island courts, though their jurisdiction is
adequate to enforce similar Rhode Island "penal" statutes, need not
enforce § 205(e). Whether state courts may decline to enforce
federal laws on these grounds is a question of great importance.
For this reason, and because the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
holding was alleged to conflict with this Court's previous holding
in
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S.
1, we granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 703. [
Footnote 3]
Page 330 U. S. 389
For the purposes of this case, we assume, without deciding, that
§ 205(e) is a penal statute in the "public international," "private
international," or any other sense. So far as the question of
whether the Rhode Island courts properly declined to try this
action, it makes no difference into which of these categories the
Rhode Island court chose to place the statute which Congress has
passed. For we cannot accept the basic premise on which the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that it has no more obligation to enforce
a valid penal law of the United States than it has to enforce a
penal law of another state or a foreign country. Such a broad
assumption flies in the face of the fact that the States of the
Union constitute a nation. It disregards the purpose and effect of
Article VI, § 2 of the Constitution, which provides:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."
It cannot be assumed, the supremacy clause considered, that the
responsibilities of a state to enforce the laws of a sister state
are identical with its responsibilities to enforce federal laws.
Such an assumption represents an erroneous evaluation of the
statutes of Congress and the prior decisions of this Court in their
historic setting. Those decisions establish that state courts do
not bear the same relation to the United States that they do to
foreign countries. The first Congress that convened after the
Constitution was adopted conferred jurisdiction upon the
Page 330 U. S. 390
state courts to enforce important federal civil laws, [
Footnote 4] and succeeding Congresses
conferred on the states jurisdiction over federal crimes and
actions for penalties and forfeitures. [
Footnote 5]
Enforcement of federal laws by state courts did not go
unchallenged. Violent public controversies existed throughout the
first part of the Nineteenth Century until the 1860's concerning
the extent of the constitutional supremacy of the Federal
Government. During that period, there were instances in which this
Court and state courts broadly questioned the power and duty of
state courts to exercise their jurisdiction to enforce United
States civil and penal statutes or the power of the Federal
Government to require them to do so. [
Footnote 6] But, after the fundamental issues over the
extent of federal supremacy had been resolved by war, this Court
took occasion in 1876 to review the phase of the controversy
concerning the relationship of state courts to the Federal
Government.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.
130. The opinion of a unanimous Court in that case was
strongly buttressed by historic references and persuasive
reasoning. It repudiated
Page 330 U. S. 391
the assumption that federal laws can be considered by the states
as though they were laws emanating from a foreign sovereign. Its
teaching is that the Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to
it are the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states,
courts, and the people, "anything in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding." [
Footnote 7] It asserted that the obligation of
states to enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason of
the form in which they are cast or the remedy which they provide.
And the Court stated that,
"If an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved,
without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason
why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some
act of Congress, by a proper action in a state court."
Id. at
93 U. S. 137.
And see United States v. Bank of New York, 296 U.
S. 463,
296 U. S.
479.
The
Claflin opinion thus answered most of the arguments
theretofore advanced against the power and duty of state courts to
enforce federal penal laws. And, since that decision, the remaining
areas of doubt have been steadily narrowed. [
Footnote 8] There have been statements in cases
concerned with the obligation of states to give full faith and
credit to the proceedings of sister states which suggested a theory
contrary to that pronounced in the
Claflin opinion.
[
Footnote 9] But when, in
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., supra, this
Court was presented with a case
Page 330 U. S. 392
testing the power and duty of states to enforce federal laws, it
found the solution in the broad principles announced in the
Claflin opinion.
The precise question in the
Mondou case was whether
rights arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 36 Stat.
291, could "be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states
when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate
to the occasion. . . ."
Id. at
223 U. S. 46. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut had decided that they could not.
Except for the penalty feature, the factors it considered and its
reasoning were strikingly similar to that on which the Rhode Island
Supreme Court declined to enforce the federal law here involved.
But this Court held that the Connecticut court could not decline to
entertain the action. The contention that enforcement of the
congressionally created right was contrary to Connecticut policy
was answered as follows:
"The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with
the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the state
are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it
presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When
Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the
Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all
the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy
is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated
from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in
the courts of the state."
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., supra, at
223 U. S. 57.
So here, the fact that Rhode Island has an established policy
against enforcement by its courts of statutes of other states and
the United States which it deems penal cannot be accepted as a
"valid excuse."
Cf. 297 U.
S.
Page 330 U. S. 393
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.
S. 377,
279 U. S. 388.
[
Footnote 10] For the policy
of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state. Thus,
in a case which chiefly relied upon the
Claflin and
Mondou precedents, this Court stated that a state court
cannot
"refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United
States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the
part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers."
Minneapolis & St.L. R. Co. v. Bombolis,
241 U. S. 211,
241 U. S.
222.
The Rhode Island court, in its
Robinson decision, on
which it relies, cites cases of this Court which have held that
states are not required by the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution to enforce judgments of the courts of other states
based on claims arising out of penal statutes. [
Footnote 11] But those holdings have no
relevance here, for this case raises no full faith and credit
question. Nor need we consider in this case prior decisions to the
effect that federal courts are not required to enforce state penal
laws.
Compare Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.
S. 265,
with Massachusetts v. Missouri,
308 U. S. 1,
308 U. S. 20.
Page 330 U. S. 394
For whatever consideration they may be entitled in the field in
which they are relevant, those decisions did not bring before us
our instant problem of the effect of the supremacy clause on the
relation of federal laws to state courts. Our question concerns
only the right of a state to deny enforcement to claims growing out
of a valid federal law.
It is conceded that this same type of claim arising under Rhode
Island law would be enforced by that State's courts. Its courts
have enforced claims for double damages growing out of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. [
Footnote
12] Thus, the Rhode Island courts have jurisdiction adequate
and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this
action. [
Footnote 13] Under
these circumstances, the State courts are not free to refuse
enforcement of petitioners' claim.
See McKnett v. St. Louis
& S.F. R. Co., 292 U. S. 230,
and compare Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.
S. 117;
325 U. S. 325 U.S.
77. The case is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
"(e) If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation,
order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum
prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption
other than in he course of trade or business may, within one year
from the date of the occurrence of the violation, except as
hereinafter provided, bring an action against the seller on account
of the overcharge. In such action, the seller shall be liable for
reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court,
plus whichever of the following sums is the greater: (1) such
amount not more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or
the overcharges, upon which the action is based as the court in its
discretion may determine, or (2) an amount not less than $25 nor
more than $50, as the court in its discretion may determine. . . .
Any action under this subsection by either the buyer or the
Administrator, as the case may be, may be brought in any court of
competent jurisdiction. . . ."
56 Stat. 34 as amended, 58 Stat. 632, 640, 50 U.S.C. App. Supp.
V, § 925(e).
[
Footnote 2]
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal
proceedings . . . and, concurrently with State and Territorial
courts, of all other proceedings under section 205 of this Act. . .
."
56 Stat. 32, as amended, 58 Stat. 632, 640, 50 U.S.C. App. Supp.
V, § 925(c).
[
Footnote 3]
Pursuant to Rhode Island practice, the State Supreme Court
remitted the case and the record to the Superior Court. That Court
then entered judgment in accordance with the Supreme Court's
opinion. It is the judgment of the Superior Court which petitioner
asked us to review on certiorari.
See Joslin Co. v.
Providence, 262 U. S. 668,
262 U. S.
673.
[
Footnote 4]
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (suits by aliens for torts
committed in violation of federal laws and treaties; suits by the
United States).
[
Footnote 5]
1 Stat. 376, 378 (1794) (fines, forfeitures and penalties for
violation of the License Tax on Wines and Spirits); 1 Stat. 373,
375 (1794) (the Carriage Tax Act); 1 Stat. 452 (penalty for
purchasing guns from Indians); 1 Stat. 733, 740 (1799) (criminal
and civil actions for violation of the postal laws).
See
Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv.L.Rev.
545; Barnett, The Delegation of Federal Jurisdiction to State
Courts, 3 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 1202 (1938).
[
Footnote 6]
See e.g., 14 U. S. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304,
14 U. S. 334-337;
United States v.
Bailey, 9 Pet. 238,
34 U. S. 259,
260;
Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539,
41 U. S. 615;
Fox v. Ohio, 5
How. 410,
46 U. S. 438;
United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) 4.
See
also Warren,
supra, 580-584.
[
Footnote 7]
U.S.Const. Art. VI, § 2.
See also Ex parte Siebold,
100 U. S. 371,
100 U. S.
392-394.
[
Footnote 8]
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257;
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S.
1;
Minneapolis & St.L. R. Co. v. Bombolis,
241 U. S. 211;
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. R. Co., 292 U.
S. 230;
Baltimore & O. R. v. Kepner,
314 U. S. 44;
Miles v. Illinois C. R. Co., 315 U.
S. 698;
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.
S. 117,
324 U. S.
121-123.
[
Footnote 9]
See n 10,
infra.
[
Footnote 10]
It has been observed that the historic origin of the concept
first expressed in this country by Chief Justice Marshall in
The Antelope,
10 Wheat. 66, that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another . . . " lies in an earlier English case,
Folliott v. Ogden, 1 H.Bl. 124 (1789),
aff'd., Ogden
v. Folliott, 3 T.R. 726 (1790), 4 Bro.P.C. 111. In that case,
the English courts refused to enforce an American Revolutionary
statute confiscating property of loyal British subjects on the
ground that English courts must refuse to enforce such penal
statutes of a foreign enemy. It has been observed of this case
that, "of course, they could as well have spoken of local public
policy, and have reached the same result as surely." Leflar
Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Government Claims, 46
Harv.L.Rev.193, 195 (1932).
See Griffin v. McCoach,
313 U. S. 498;
cf. Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U. S. 85.
[
Footnote 11]
See e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.
S. 657;
Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis
Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373;
Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411.
[
Footnote 12]
Newman v. George A. Fuller Co., R.I., 48 A.2d 345.
[
Footnote 13]
Gen.Laws R.I.1938, c. 500, § 28; c. 525, § 7; c. 631, § 4.