The plaintiffs in error filed a petition for freedom in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the County of Washington,
and they proved that they were born in the State of Virginia as
slaves of Richard B. Lee, now deceased, who moved with his family
into the County of Washington in the District of Columbia about the
year 1816, leaving the petitioners residing in Virginia as his
slaves, until the year 1820, when the petitioner Barbara was
removed to the county of Alexandria in the District of Columbia,
where she was hired to Mrs. Muir, and continued with her thus hired
for the period of one year. That the petitioner Sam was in like
manner removed to the County of Alexandria and was hired to General
Walter Jones for a period of about five or six months. That after
the expiration of the said periods of hiring, the petitioners were
removed to the said County of Washington, where they continued to
reside as the slaves of the said Richard B. Lee until his death,
and since as the slaves of his widow, the defendant.
On the part of the defendant in error, a preliminary objection
was made to the jurisdiction of this Court growing out of the Act
of Congress of 2 April, 1816, which declares that no cause shall be
removed from the circuit court for the District of Columbia to the
Supreme Court by appeal or writ of error unless the matter in
dispute shall be of the value of one thousand dollars or
upwards.
By the Court:
"The matter in dispute in this case is the freedom of the
petitioners. The judgment of the court below is against their
claims to freedom; the matter in dispute is therefore, to the
plaintiffs in error, the value of their freedom,"
and this is not susceptible of a pecuniary valuation. Had the
judgment been in favor of the petitioners and the writ of error
brought by the party claiming to be the owner, the value of the
slaves as property would have been the matter in dispute, and
affidavits might be admitted to ascertain such value. But
affidavits estimating the value of freedom are entirely
inadmissible, and no doubt is entertained of the jurisdiction of
the Court.
The circuit court refused to instruct the jury that if it should
believe from the evidence that the bringing the petitioners from
Virginia to Alexandria, by their owner and hiring them there was
merely colorable, with intent to evade the law, that then the
petitioners are entitled to their freedom.
By the Maryland law of 1796, it is declared, that it shall not
be lawful to import or bring into this state by land or water, any
negro, mulatto, or other slave for sale or to reside within this
state. And any person brought into this state as a slave, contrary
to this act, if a slave before, shall thereupon cease to be the
property of the person so importing, and shall be free.
And by the Act of Congress of 27 February, 1801, it is provided
that the laws of the State of Maryland as they then existed should
be and continue in force in that part of the District, which was
ceded by that state to the United States.
Page 33 U. S. 45
The Maryland law of 1796 is therefore in force in the County of
Washington, and the petitioners, if brought directly from the State
of Virginia into the County of Washington, would, under the
provisions of that law, be entitled to their freedom.
By the Act of Congress of 24 June, 1812, it is declared
"That hereafter it shall be lawful for any inhabitant or
inhabitants in either of the said counties [Washington and
Alexandria] owning and possessing any slave or slaves therein to
remove the same from one county into the other, and to exercise
freely and fully all the rights of property in and over the said
slave or slaves therein which would be exercised over him, her, or
them in the county from whence the removal was made."
The court erred in refusing to give the fourth instruction
prayed on the part of the petitioners. All that was asked by this
instruction was to submit to the jury whether from the evidence the
bringing of the petitioners from Virginia to Alexandria and the
hiring them there was not merely colorable, with intent to evade
the law.
When the intention with which an act is done becomes the subject
of inquiry, it belongs exclusively to the jury to decide.
Whatever is done in fraud of law is done in violation of it.
The cases of
United States v.
Quincy, 6 Pet. 466, and
15 U.
S. 2 Wheat. 148,
15 U. S. 153,
cited.
In the opinion of the Court the facts are fully stated.
MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs in error presented their petition to the
Circuit
Page 33 U. S. 46
Court of the United States for the County of Washington in the
District of Columbia setting forth that they are persons of color
who are entitled to their freedom, and are now held in a state of
slavery by the defendant in error in the said County of Washington
contrary to law, and praying process, &c.
The defendant in the court below appeared and pleaded that the
petitioners are not entitled to their freedom as they have alleged,
and issue being thereupon joined, the cause was tried by a
jury.
Upon the trial, the petitioners proved that they were born in
the State of Virginia as slaves of Richard B. Lee, now deceased,
who moved with his family into the County of Washington in the
District of Columbia about the year 1816, leaving the petitioners
residing in Virginia as his slaves until the year 1820, when the
petitioner Barbara was removed to the County of Alexandria in the
District of Columbia, where she was hired to Mrs. Muir, and
continued with her thus hired for the period of one year. That the
petitioner Sam was in like manner removed to the County of
Alexandria and was hired to general Walter Jones for a period of
about five or six months. That after the expiration of the said
periods of hiring, the petitioners were removed to the said County
of Washington, where they continued to reside as the slaves of the
said Richard B. Lee until his death, and since as the slaves of his
widow, the defendant.
Upon which evidence the petitioners' counsel prayed the court to
give to the jury the following instructions.
"1. If the jury shall believe from the evidence aforesaid that
the said petitioners, or either of them, were slaves born in
Virginia, and that Mr. Lee, their master, removed from Virginia in
1817 with his family to the County of Washington, and left said
petitioners residing in Virginia, and subsequently to the year 1820
the petitioners, or either of them, were removed from Virginia
directly to the County of Washington, they would be entitled to
their freedom in the present suit."
"2. If the jury shall believe from the said evidence that the
petitioners, or either of them, were originally brought by their
master, an inhabitant and citizen of Washington County in this
District, from Virginia to Alexandria County, and thence to
Washington County, they are also entitled to their, his, or her
Page 33 U. S. 47
freedom unless the jury shall also believe from the evidence
aforesaid that the residence in Alexandria County was not merely
transitory but was
bona fide and permanent."
The court gave the first instruction as prayed, but refused to
give the second in the form asked, and in lieu thereof gave the
following.
"3. That if the petitioners were
bona fide hired to
persons residing in Alexandria and served their regular terms of
hire there, the petitioner Barbara for a year or more, and the
petitioner Sam from three to six months, and upon the expiration of
their respective terms of hire, were brought from Alexandria to
Washington, such hiring and residence in Alexandria constituted a
residence sufficiently permanent to authorize such removal. That
such removal from Alexandria to Washington upon the expiration of
such terms of hire does not infer such preconceived intent to bring
them from Virginia to Washington as to render their intermediate
residence in Alexandria merely transitory and
mala fide
and their subsequent removal thence to Washington equivalent to a
removal direct from Virginia to Washington."
The petitioners' counsel then prayed the court to instruct the
jury
"4. That if they shall believe from the evidence aforesaid that
the bringing the petitioners from Virginia to Alexandria by their
owner and hiring them there
was merely colorable, with
intent to evade the law, that then the petitioners are entitled to
their freedom."
The court refused to give this instruction, being of opinion
that there was no evidence in the case tending to prove that the
bringing of the petitioners from Virginia to Alexandria and hiring
them there was merely colorable and with intent to evade the law. A
further instruction was prayed by the petitioners' counsel and
refused by the court, but which it is unnecessary here particularly
to notice.
To these several refusals a bill of exceptions was duly taken. A
verdict and judgment were thereupon rendered for the defendant, and
the cause comes here upon a writ of error.
On the part of the defendant in error, a preliminary objection
has been made to the jurisdiction of this Court growing out of the
Act of Congress of 2 April, 1816 (Davis' Col. 305),
Page 33 U. S. 48
which declares that no cause shall be removed from the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia to the Supreme Court by appeal
or writ of error unless the matter in dispute shall be of the value
of $1,000 or upwards.
The matter in dispute in this case is the freedom of the
petitioners. The judgment of the court below is against their
claims to freedom; the matter in dispute is therefore to the
plaintiff in error the value of their freedom, and this is not
susceptible of a pecuniary valuation. Had the judgment been in
favor of the petitioners and the writ of error brought by the party
claiming to be the owner, the value of the slaves as property would
have been the matter in dispute and affidavits might be admitted to
ascertain such value. But affidavits estimating the value of
freedom are entirely inadmissible, and we entertain no doubt of the
jurisdiction of the court.
The questions on the merits of the case arise upon the refusal
of the court to give the instructions prayed on the part of the
petitioners.
By the Maryland law of 1796 (Herty's Dig. 384), it is declared
that it shall not be lawful to import or bring into this state by
land or water any negro, mulatto, or other slave for sale or to
reside within this state. And any person brought into this state as
a slave contrary to this act, if a slave before, shall thereupon
cease to be the property of the person so importing, and shall be
free.
And by the Act of Congress of 27 February, 1801 (Davis' Col.
123), it is provided that the laws of the State of Maryland as they
then existed should be and continue in force in that part of the
District which was ceded by that state to the United States.
The Maryland law of 1796 is therefore in force in the County of
Washington, and the petitioners, if brought directly from the State
of Virginia into the County of Washington would, under the
provisions of that law, be entitled to their freedom. This has not
been denied on the part of the defendant in error, and indeed is
fully recognized by the court below in the first instruction given
to the jury. And the question turns upon the refusal of the court
to give the instructions prayed in relation to the hiring of the
petitioners in the County of Alexandria before being brought into
the County of Washington.
Page 33 U. S. 49
By the Act of Congress of 24 June, 1812 (Davis' Col. 265, sec.
9), it is declared
"That hereafter it shall be lawful for any inhabitant or
inhabitants in either of the said counties [Washington and
Alexandria] owning and possessing any slave or slaves therein to
remove the same from one county into the other and to exercise
freely and fully all the rights of property in and over the said
slave or slaves therein which would be exercised over him, her, or
them in the county from whence the removal was made."
Upon the construction to be given to this act a difference of
opinion is entertained by the judges. Some are of opinion that to
bring a case within this act of 1812, the slave must continue in
the actual possession of the owner, being an inhabitant of one of
the counties, in order to make the removal into the other county
lawful. They give a limited and literal construction to the words
owning and possessing. And that the hiring in Alexandria did not so
change the situation of the petitioners as to prevent their removal
from Virginia being considered a direct removal into the County of
Washington, and which, of course, made them free under the act of
1796.
The other judges are of opinion that actual possession by the
owner in his own family is not necessary. But that a hiring out,
bona fide and without intention to evade the act of 1796,
would so interrupt the continuity of the removal as to take the
case out of the act and make the subsequent removal into the County
of Washington lawful. That this law (1812), for the purpose of
authorizing the removal of slaves from one county into the other,
considers the district composed of the two counties as entire, and
gives the owner the full exercise of all his rights of property
over his slave in each county in the same manner as if the district
was not divided into two counties.
We think, however, the court erred in refusing to give the
fourth instruction prayed on the part of the petitioners.
All that was asked by this instruction was to submit to the jury
whether from the evidence the bringing of the petitioners from
Virginia to Alexandria and the hiring them there was not merely
colorable, with intent to evade the law.
The court had instructed the jury that a removal of the
petitioners direct from Virginia to the County of Washington
Page 33 U. S. 50
would have entitled them to their freedom. The object and
purpose of the hiring in Alexandria would seem necessarily to have
been open to inquiry. And if open at all, it was matter of fact,
consisting of circumstances from which an inference was to be
drawn, and this properly belonged to the jury. The court was not
requested to instruct the jury as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify the conclusion sought to be drawn from it or to
express any opinion as to the weight of the evidence. If in the
opinion of the court the verdict of the jury should be found
against the evidence, the proper correction, if at all to be
applied by the court, would be by granting a new trial. But the
refusal to give the instruction prayed was taking from the jury the
right of judging upon the intent. If intention was at all open for
inquiry, it was certainly matter for the jury.
In the case of
United States v.
Quincy, 6 Pet. 466, this Court said that when the
intention with which an act is done becomes a subject of inquiry,
it belongs exclusively to the jury to decide. And in the case of
The William
King, 2 Wheat. 148, 4 Cond. 71, it is laid down as
a general rule that whatever is done in fraud of a law is done in
violation of it. That if a vessel, with an original intention to go
to a foreign port, complied with the requisition necessary to
obtain a clearance on a voyage coastwise, this is but the device by
which she eludes the force that would otherwise have prevented her
departure from the port.
These are principles which have a direct bearing upon the
present question. If the original intention of the owners of the
slaves was to bring them into the County of Washington, the hiring
of them in Alexandria might have been thought by the jury a device
to evade the law of 1796.
It can hardly be said that such a conclusion would have been
entirely without color. The owner of these slaves resided in the
County of Washington, and no reason is assigned for their remaining
a short time in Alexandria, or why they were not wanted in
Washington County as much before as after the hiring in Alexandria.
Suppose the hiring had been for one week or one day, would anyone
doubt that it would have been done with a view to take the case out
of the law of 1796, and would have been a fraud upon the law? And
who in
Page 33 U. S. 51
such a case would judge of the intention? The court or the jury?
The answer cannot admit of a doubt.
The time of hiring in the present case lessens the weight of the
evidence, but does not transfer the weight of deciding upon it from
the jury to the court.
The judgment of the court below is accordingly
Reversed and the cause sent back with directions to issue a
venire de novo.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia holden in and for the County of Washington, and was argued
by counsel, on consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged by
this Court that the judgment of the said circuit court in this
cause be and the same is hereby reversed, and that this cause be
and the same is hereby remanded to the said circuit court with
directions to award a
venire facias de novo.
