This is a companion case to
Eagles v. U.S. ex rel. Samuels,
ante p.
329 U. S. 304, in
which most of the questions raised here were ruled upon. The
principal differences in the facts are that the advisory panel was
composed entirely of laymen, its report was marked "confidential,"
and respondent was enlarged upon a recognizance.
Held:
1. The case is not moot, for the reasons stated in the
Samuels case. P.
329 U. S.
318.
2. The fact that the panel was composed entirely of laymen does
not require a different result from that reached in the
Samuels case. Pp.
329 U. S. 322-323.
3. The fact that its report was marked "confidential" contrary
to the applicable regulations does not require a different result,
because the local board was not required to keep the report
confidential, and there is no showing that it did. P.
329 U. S.
323.
151 F.2d 801 reversed.
Page 329 U. S. 318
Respondent, having been inducted into the Army, was released on
a writ of habeas corpus after the Circuit Court of Appeals had
reversed, 151 F.2d 801, a decision by the District Court adverse to
him. This Court granted certiorari. 328 U.S. 830.
Reversed, p.
329 U. S.
323.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to
Eagles v. Samuels, No. 59,
decided this day,
ante, p.
329 U. S. 304.
Certiorari also brings it here from the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. That court followed the same procedure here as it did in
Samuels' case; it reversed the District Court which had
dismissed the writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of Horowitz,
and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to
discharge him from military custody.
United States ex rel.
Samuels v. Pearson, 151 F.2d 801.
It appears that, after the remand, Horowitz was enlarged upon a
recognizance as permitted under our rules. Rule 45. The suggestion
that the case is therefore moot is without merit for the reasons
stated in Samuels' case.
Horowitz registered pursuant to the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940, as amended, early in 1941, and filed a
questionnaire stating he was a college student preparing for a
career as a psychiatric social worker. At the time, he asked for a
deferment in induction until February, 1943, saying that "if you
take me now, you practically negate my possibilities to attain the
position I seek in life, namely, a psychiatric social worker."
Shortly after he was physically examined and found qualified for
military
Page 329 U. S. 319
service, he advised the local board that he had been enrolled in
the Rabbinical Seminary of America, a recognized theological
school. On July 1, 1941, he was classified I-A. The board of appeal
likewise gave him that classification in August, 1941.
Meanwhile, he claimed exemption under ยง 5(d) of the Act. The
basis of his claim was the representation that he was a student in
a recognized theological school for rabbis and was preparing for
the rabbinate. In an affidavit, he stated that he had not disclosed
his intention to become a rabbi because he had no "concrete facts"
to present, only "hopes." In November, 1941, the local board
classified him IV-D, which classification he retained until May,
1944. In 1942, he filed an occupational questionnaire with the
local board stating that he was taking a course in rabbinical
studies at the seminary and also a bachelor of social science
course at another institution which he hoped to complete in 1944.
He listed himself as a social worker.
In April, 1944, the city director of Selective Service reviewed
the file and requested Horowitz to appear before an advisory
theological panel. He appeared before a panel, and there was a
hearing. The panel stated that all students in this seminary were
not necessarily preparing for the ministry, and that each
individual case should be separately appraised.
* It concluded
that his attendance at the seminary had been motivated by a desire
to secure a basis for exemption under the Act. This was based on
his declared intention early in 1941 to be a social
Page 329 U. S. 320
worker, inconsistencies in his explanation of his failure to
refer to the rabbinate at that time, his indifferent and
unsystematic manner in preparing for that professed objective, and
an appraisal of his reliability and candor. The transcript of
proceedings before the panel and later the report were transmitted
to the local board by the office of the city director of Selective
Service with a request to the board to reopen and reconsider his
classification. The report made by the panel was not signed.
Moreover, the report was headed "Confidential Statement for the
Record." The local board was advised by the city director's office
that, while it should give careful consideration to the
recommendation of the panel, determination of the classification
must be made by the board itself or by an appeal agency.
Horowitz was immediately reclassified as I-A. He asked for a
hearing, which was granted. It appears that the panel which
interviewed him and rendered the report
Page 329 U. S. 321
was composed of three prominent Jewish laymen, but no rabbi.
Whether that was the cause does not appear, but the board, as a
result of the hearing, referred the file to a rabbi for another
advisory recommendation. The rabbi recommended that Horowitz be
classified IV-D. The local board gave him that classification in
June, 1944. In August, 1944, the local board held another hearing.
Horowitz was present, and was examined. The board concluded that he
should be in I-A, and so classified him, stating as its reason that
he became a student in the rabbinical school after he had
registered under the Act. He requested and was granted another
hearing, at which he submitted additional evidence. The local board
refused to change the classification. On appeal, the board of
appeal classified him as I-A.
On two subsequent occasions, Horowitz asked that his
classification be reopened, and submitted additional evidence. The
board was unpersuaded, and refused to reopen the classification.
The office of the city director advised the boards that the panel
which interviewed Horowitz had been composed solely of laymen, and
that if, by virtue of that fact, the board of appeal desired to
reconsider the case, to inform the office. Both the local board and
the board of appeal replied that there was no occasion for
reopening the classification. The board of appeal stated that it
had "once again unanimously agreed that the registrant's status
does not warrant a IV-D classification." Early in 1945, Horowitz
was inducted into the Army.
Horowitz relies upon affidavits and statements from various
people concerning the
bona fides of his professed desire
to become a rabbi, on a statement made when he graduated from the
public schools in 1932 that that was his ambition in life, on the
fact that he stated in 1936 that his first vocational choice was
the rabbinate, and on
Page 329 U. S. 322
all of his subsequent activities which, he asserted, fitted into
that pattern. On the other hand, it does appear that, in 1937, his
first vocational choice was teaching, his second the rabbinate.
Furthermore, as already noted, his professed objective, stated to
the local board early in 1941, was social work. And he in fact
entered the seminary shortly after he had passed his physical
examination and qualified for military service. These circumstances
alone make his claim to exemption colorable. Certainly we cannot
say that the action of the board of appeal in finally classifying
him as I-A was without any support in the evidence.
The question remains whether there was anything in the
administrative procedure which vitiated Horowitz' classification.
What we have said about the use of a theological panel and the
range of its inquiry in
Eagles v. Samuels, supra, need not
be repeated here. There is nothing in the present case which makes
for a different result. We can no more conclude here than in
Samuels' case that the board abdicated its function. It first
followed the panel's recommendation. But its mind was not closed,
as evidenced by the fact that it later sought the advice of a rabbi
and followed his recommendation. And when it returned to its
earlier position, it proceeded on the ground that the basic defect
in Horowitz' case was the shift in his position in 1941 after he
had registered. The record shows indecision by the board, but no
subservience to the panel. As respects the fact that the panel's
report was unsigned, only a word need be added. Horowitz, like
Samuels, appeared in person before the panel and saw its members
face to face. At no time does it appear that he sought the identity
of the members and was refused the information.
The essential procedural differences between this case and
Samuels' are two -- it appears that this panel was composed
entirely of laymen, and its report was not only
Page 329 U. S. 323
unsigned, but marked confidential for the file. The first
objection carries little weight. These laymen were prominent
citizens of the Jewish faith. There is no showing that they were of
a sect hostile to Horowitz. There is nothing to impeach their
integrity or to suggest that they were not qualified to serve in
the expert role assigned to them.
The fact that their report was marked confidential is given
great emphasis. It is argued that, although the use of a
theological panel may be authorized, there is no warrant for
clothing its action in such secrecy.
The regulations, indeed, prescribe that no information in a
registrant's file shall be confidential as to him or anyone having
written authority from him. Section 605.32(a), 8 Fed.Reg. 2641, 9
Fed.Reg. 9190. But the difficulty here is that it is not shown that
the panel's report was in fact treated as confidential by the local
board. It is not shown that Horowitz sought and was denied access
to the report. Nor is it shown that, when Horowitz examined the
file, the report was not made available to him. If those were the
facts, we do not doubt that Horowitz' counsel would have
established them at the habeas corpus hearing. We find no command
to the local board to keep the report confidential. We cannot
presume that the board violated the regulations. Yet that is, in
effect, what we are asked to hold. Horowitz, like Samuels, points
to possibilities of abuse in the use of the panel. But, like
Samuels, he fails to establish prejudice in his case. The judgment
below must therefore be
Reversed.
* The approach of the panel to the question is shown as follows
in its statement:
"Orthodox tradition has always encouraged advanced study of
talmudic literature, both privately and at academies instituted for
that purpose, irrespective of the specific occupational objective
of those engaged in such study, and all courses offered by these
academies are open to qualified students without regard to the
individual student's specific intention to prepare for a career of
service in the rabbinate."
"Thus, a student ultimately intending to enter business or a
profession, or some nonrabbinic activity in the field of religion,
may be enrolled in the same courses attended by other students who
are specifically concerned with preparation for the rabbinate. It
is therefore essential for purposes of Selective Service
classification to determine in each individual case the purpose
which the registrant has in mind in pursuing his course of
study."
"Moreover, the fact that the religious tradition in question
does not attempt to distinguish between the serious student of
talmudic literature and the student preparing for a professional
career in the rabbinate tends to make it extremely difficult for
school officials, ministers, and others identified with that
tradition to have and express an objective judgment in such
matters."
"To the extent that the distinction is understood, there is a
tendency to accept at face value assertions made by the registrant
and members of his family, and to resolve any doubt in his favor,
where it is at least apparent that he is a serious and pious
talmudic student."