In 1940, appellant constructed a lodging house in New York,
complying with all applicable laws then in force. In 1944, New York
amended its Multiple Dwelling Law so as to provide that lodging
houses of "nonfireproof construction existing prior to the
enactment" of the amendment should comply with certain new
requirements, including the installation of an automatic wet pipe
sprinkler system. Appellant asserted that its building did not
constitute a fire hazard or a danger to its occupants; that it had
a market value of $25,000; that the cost of complying with the 1944
law would be $7,500, and that the benefits to be obtained by the
changes were negligible.
Held:
1. The law does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, since it is within the police power of the
State and the owner of property does not acquire immunity against
the exercise of the police power by constructing it in full
compliance with existing laws. P.
328 U. S.
82.
2. In the absence of a showing that there are in existence other
lodging houses of the same category which will escape its
requirements, the law cannot be held to violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of its
failure to apply to lodging houses which might be erected
subsequently; since lack of equal protection is found in the actual
existence of an invidious discrimination, and not in the mere
possibility that there will be like or similar cases which will be
treated more leniently. Pp.
328 U. S.
83-85.
3. The wisdom of the legislation and the need for it are
questions for the legislature. P.
328 U. S.
82.
294 N.Y. 917, 63 N.E.2d 116, affirmed.
Appellant sued in the New York courts for a declaratory judgment
holding certain provisions of the New York Multiple Dwelling Law
(L.1929, c. 713) as amended in 1944 (L.1944, c. 553)
unconstitutional and restraining their enforcement. The Supreme
Court dismissed the
Page 328 U. S. 81
suit. The Appellate Division affirmed. 269 App.Div. 691, 54
N.Y.S.2d 394. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 294 N.Y. 917, 63
N.E.2d 116, certifying by its remittitur that questions involving
the Fourteenth Amendment were presented and necessarily passed
upon. 295 N.Y. 567, 64 N.E.2d 278.
Affirmed, p.
328 U. S. 85.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1940, appellant constructed a four-story building on the
Bowery in New York City, and, since that time, has operated it as a
lodging house. It was constructed so as to comply with all the laws
applicable to such lodging houses and in force at that time. New
York amended its Multiple Dwelling Law [
Footnote 1] in 1944, [
Footnote 2] providing,
inter alia, that lodging
houses "of nonfireproof construction existing prior to the
enactment of this subdivision" [
Footnote 3] should comply with certain new requirements.
[
Footnote 4] Among these was
the installation of an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system.
Appellant received notice to comply with the new requirements, and
thereupon instituted this suit in the New York courts for a
declaratory judgment holding these provisions of the 1944 law
unconstitutional and restraining their enforcement.
Page 328 U. S. 82
The bill alleged that the building was safe for occupancy as a
lodging house, and did not constitute a fire hazard or a danger to
the occupants; that it complied with all building laws and
regulations at the time of its construction; that part of it was
fireproof, and that the rest was so constructed as not to be
dangerous to occupants; that the regulations existing prior to 1944
were adequate and sufficient to prevent loss of life in lodging
houses of this particular type. It was further alleged that this
lodging house has a market value of about $25,000, that the cost of
complying with the 1944 law would be about $7,500, and that the
benefits to be obtained by the changes were negligible. By reason
of those circumstances, the 1944 law was alleged to violate the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was also alleged to
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
since it was applicable to lodging houses "existing" prior to the
1944 law, but not to identical structures erected thereafter.
Appellee answered, denying the material allegations of the bill,
and moved to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the motion. The
Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. 269 App.Div. 691, 54
N.Y.S.2d 394. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment was
likewise affirmed without opinion. 294 N.Y. 917, 63 N.E.2d 116. The
case is here on appeal, the Court of Appeals having certified by
its remittitur that questions involving the Fourteenth Amendment
were presented and necessarily passed upon. 295 N.Y. 567, 64 N.E.2d
278.
Little need be said on the due process question. We are not
concerned with the wisdom of this legislation or the need for it.
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236,
313 U. S. 246.
Protection of the safety of persons is one of the traditional uses
of the police power of the States. Experts may differ as to the
most appropriate way of dealing with fire hazards in lodging
houses. Appellant, indeed, says that its building,
Page 328 U. S. 83
far from being a fire-trap, is largely fireproof, and, to the
extent that any fire hazards exist, they are adequately safeguarded
by a fire alarm system, constant watchman service, and other safety
arrangements. But the legislature may choose not to take the chance
that human life will be lost in lodging house fires, and adopt the
most conservative course which science and engineering offer. It is
for the legislature to decide what regulations are needed to reduce
fire hazards to the minimum. Many types of social legislation
diminish the value of the property which is regulated. The extreme
cases are those where, in the interest of the public safety or
welfare, the owner is prohibited from using his property.
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171;
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394;
Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.
S. 498. We are dealing here with a less drastic measure.
But in no case does the owner of property acquire immunity against
exercise of the police power because he constructed it in full
compliance with the existing laws.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
supra, p.
239 U. S. 410.
And see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska,
170 U. S. 57;
Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U. S. 303. The
police power is one of the least limitable of governmental powers,
and, in its operation, often cuts down property rights.
Block
v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135,
256 U. S. 155.
And see Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.
S. 531. Appellant may have a lodging house far less
hazardous than the other existing structures regulated by the 1944
law. Yet a statute may be sustained through some of the objects
affected by it may be wholly innocent.
Purity Extract &
Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192,
226 U. S. 204.
The question of validity turns on the power of the legislature to
deal with the prescribed class. That power plainly exists here.
Appellant's claim of lack of equal protection is based on the
following argument: the 1944 law applies only to
Page 328 U. S. 84
existing lodging houses; if a new lodging house were erected or
if an existing building were converted into a lodging house, the
1944 law would be inapplicable. An exact duplicate of appellant's
building, if constructed today, would not be under the 1944 law,
and hence could be lawfully operated without the installation of a
wet pipe sprinkler system. That is said to be a denial of equal
protection of the laws.
The difficulty is that appellant has not shown that there are in
existence lodging houses of that category which will escape the
law. The argument is based on an anticipation that there may come
into existence a like or identical class of lodging houses which
will be treated less harshly. But, so long as that class is not in
existence, no showing of lack of equal protection can possibly be
made. For, under those circumstances, the burden which is on one
who challenges the constitutionality of a law could not be
satisfied.
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Brownell, 294 U. S. 580,
294 U. S. 584.
The legislature is entitled to hit the evil that exists.
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138,
232 U. S. 144;
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63;
Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.
S. 499. It need not take account of new and hypothetical
inequalities that may come into existence as time passes or as
conditions change. So far as we know, the 1944 law may have been
designed as a stop-gap measure to take care of a pressing need
until more comprehensive legislation could be prepared. It is
common knowledge that, due to war conditions, there has been little
construction in this field in recent years. By the time new lodging
houses appear, they too may be placed under the 1944 law; or
different legislation may be adopted to take care both of the old
and the new on the basis of parity. Or stricter standards for new
lodging houses may be adopted. In any such case, the asserted
discrimination would have turned out to be fanciful, not real. The
point is that lack
Page 328 U. S. 85
of equal protection is found in the actual existence of an
invidious discrimination (
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S.
33;
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.
S. 535), not in the mere possibility that there will be
like or similar cases which will be treated more leniently.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
L.1929, ch. 713, Cons.L. ch. 61-A.
[
Footnote 2]
L.1944, ch. 553.
[
Footnote 3]
Id. ยง 4.
[
Footnote 4]
This followed a disastrous fire in an old lodging house in New
York City in which there was a considerable loss of life.