1. In a proceeding under § 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940 to
revoke an order admitting petitioner to citizenship and to cancel
his certificate of naturalization on the ground of fraud in their
procurement, there was solid, convincing evidence that, before the
date of his naturalization, at that time, and subsequently, he was
a thoroughgoing Nazi and a faithful follower of Adolph Hitler.
Held. the conclusion is irresistible that, when
petitioner forswore allegiance to the German Reich, he swore
falsely, and the revocation of the decree of naturalization is
sustained. Pp.
328 U. S.
660-669,
328 U. S.
674.
2. The standard of proof required in such proceedings is strict.
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.
S. 118;
Baumgartner v. United States,
322 U. S. 665. P.
328 U. S.
657.
3. In reviewing such a proceeding, this Court does not accept
even concurrent findings of the two lower courts as conclusive, but
reexamines the facts to determine whether the United States has
carried the burden of proving its case by "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing" evidence, which does not leave "the issue in doubt."
Id. Pp.
328 U. S.
657-658.
4. Citizenship obtained through naturalization is not a
second-class citizenship. P.
328 U. S.
658.
5. It carries with it the privileges of full participation in
the affairs of our society, including the right to speak freely, to
criticize officials and administrators, and to promote changes in
our laws, including the very Charter of our Government. P.
328 U. S.
658.
Page 328 U. S. 655
6. Great tolerance and caution are necessary lest good faith
exercise of the rights of citizenship be turned against the
naturalized citizen and used to deprive him of the cherished
status. P.
328 U. S.
658.
7. Ill-tempered expressions, extreme views, even the promotion
of ideas which run counter to our American ideals, are not to be
given disloyal connotations in the absence of solid, convincing
evidence that that is their significance. P.
328 U. S.
658.
g. Utterances made in years subsequent to the oath of allegiance
are not readily to be charged against the state of mind existing
when the oath was administered. P.
328 U. S.
659.
9. The fundamental question is whether the new citizen still
takes his orders from, or owes his allegiance to, a foreign
chancellory. P.
328 U. S.
659.
10. Membership in the German-American Bund is not, in itself,
sufficient to prove fraud which would warrant revocation of a
decree of naturalization. P.
328 U. S.
669.
11. The issue of fraud in the oath of allegiance taken by an
alien upon admission to citizenship cannot become
res
judicata in the order admitting him to citizenship, since it
was not in issue and neither was adjudicated nor could have been
adjudicated in the naturalization proceedings. P.
328 U. S.
671.
12. When an alien takes the oath of allegiance with reservations
or does not in good faith forswear loyalty and allegiance to the
old country, the decree of naturalization is obtained by a fraud on
the naturalization court, and this is a proper ground for
cancellation of the naturalization. Pp.
328 U. S.
671-673.
13. There can be no doubt of the power of Congress to provide
for the cancellation of certificates of naturalization on the
ground of fraud in their procurement. Pp.
328 U. S.
673-674.
149 F.2d 519, affirmed.
A District Court cancelled petitioner's certificate of
naturalization and revoked the order admitting him to citizenship
on the ground that they had been procured by fraud. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 149 F.2d 519. This Court granted
certiorari. 326 U.S. 714.
Affirmed, p.
328 U. S.
674.
Page 328 U. S. 656
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Knauer is a native of Germany. He arrived in this country in
1925, at the age of 30. He had served in the German army during
World War I, and was decorated. He had studied law and economics in
Germany. He settled in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and conducted an
insurance business there. He filed his declaration of intention to
become a citizen in 1929, and his petition for naturalization in
1936. He took his oath of allegiance and was admitted to
citizenship on April 13, 1937. In 1943, the United States
instituted proceedings under § 338(a) of the Nationality Act of
1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 1158, 8 U.S.C. § 738(a), to cancel his
certificate of naturalization [
Footnote 1] on the ground that it had been secured by
fraud in that (1) he had falsely and fraudulently represented in
his petition that he was attached to the principles of the
Constitution, and (2) he had taken a false oath of allegiance. The
District Court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Knauer
practiced fraud when he obtained his certificate of naturalization.
It found that he had not been and is not attached to the principles
of the Constitution, and that he took a false oath of allegiance.
It accordingly
Page 328 U. S. 657
entered an order cancelling his certificate and revoking the
order admitting him to citizenship. The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 149 F.2d 519. The case is here on a petition for a writ
of certiorari which we granted to examine that ruling in light of
our decisions in
Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U. S. 118, and
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.
S. 665.
I. In the oath of allegiance which Knauer took, he swore that he
would
"absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty,
and particularly to the German Reich,"
that he would "support and defend the Constitution and laws of
the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and
domestic;" that he would "bear true faith and allegiance to the
same," and that he took "this obligation freely without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion." [
Footnote 2] The first and crucial issue in the case is
whether Knauer swore falsely and committed a fraud when he promised
under oath to forswear allegiance to the German Reich and to
transfer his allegiance to this nation. Fraud connotes perjury,
falsification, concealment, misrepresentation. When
denaturalization is sought on this (
Baumgartner v. United
States, supra), as well as on other grounds (
Schneiderman
v. United States, supra), the standard of proof required is
strict. We do not accept even concurrent findings of two lower
courts as conclusive.
Baumgartner v. United States, supra,
pp.
322 U. S.
670-671. We reexamine the facts to determine whether the
United States has carried its burden of proving by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, which does not leave "the
issue in doubt," that the citizen
Page 328 U. S. 658
who is sought to be restored to the status of an alien obtained
his naturalization certificate illegally.
Schneiderman v.
United States, supra, p.
320 U. S.
158.
That strict test is necessary for several reasons. Citizenship
obtained through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship.
It has been said that citizenship carries with it all of the rights
and prerogatives of citizenship obtained by birth in this country
"save that of eligibility to the Presidency."
Luria v. United
States, 231 U. S. 9,
231 U. S. 22.
There are other exceptions of a limited character. [
Footnote 3] But it is plain that citizenship
obtained through naturalization carries with it the privilege of
full participation in the affairs of our society, including the
right to speak freely, to criticize officials and administrators,
and to promote changes in our laws, including the very Charter of
our Government. Great tolerance and caution are necessary lest good
faith exercise of the rights of citizenship be turned against the
naturalized citizen and be used to deprive him of the cherished
status. Ill-tempered expressions, extreme views, even the promotion
of ideas which run counter to our American ideals, are not to be
given disloyal connotations in absence of solid, convincing
evidence that that is their significance. Any other course would
run counter to our traditions, and make denaturalization
proceedings the ready instrument for political persecutions. As
stated in
Schneiderman v. United States, supra, p.
320 U. S.
159,
"Were the law otherwise, valuable rights would rest upon a
slender reed, and the security of the status of our naturalized
citizens might depend in
Page 328 U. S. 659
considerable degree upon the political temper of majority
thought and the stresses of the times."
These are extremely serious problems. They involve not only
fundamental principles of our political system designed for the
protection of minorities and majorities alike. They also involve
tremendously high stakes for the individual. For denaturalization,
like deportation, may result in the loss "of all that makes life
worth living."
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.
S. 276,
259 U. S. 284.
Hence, where the fate of a human being is at stake, we must not
leave the presence of his evil purpose to conjecture.
Cf.
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135,
326 U. S. 149.
Furthermore, we are dealing in cases of this kind with questions of
intent. Here, it is whether Knauer swore falsely on April 13, 1937.
Intent is a subjective state, illusory and difficult to establish
in absence of voluntary confession. What may appear objectively to
be false may still fall short of establishing an intentional
misrepresentation, which is necessary in order to prove that the
oath was perjurious. And, as
Baumgartner v. United States,
supra, indicates, utterances made in years subsequent to the
oath are not readily to be charged against the state of mind
existing when the oath was administered. 322 U.S. p.
322 U. S. 675.
Troubled times and the emotions of the hour may elicit expressions
of sympathy for old acquaintances and relatives across the
waters.
"Forswearing past political allegiance without reservation and
full assumption of the obligations of American citizenship are not
at all inconsistent with cultural feelings imbedded in childhood
and youth."
Baumgartner v. United States, supra, p.
322 U. S. 674.
Human ties are not easily broken. Old social or cultural loyalties
may still exist, though basic allegiance is transferred here. The
fundamental question is whether the new citizen still takes his
orders from, or owes his allegiance to, a foreign chancellory. Far
more is required to establish that fact
Page 328 U. S. 660
than a showing that social and cultural ties remain. And even
political utterances, which might be some evidence of a false oath
if they clustered around the date of naturalization, are more and
more unreliable as evidence of the perjurious falsity of the oath
the further they are removed from the date of naturalization.
We have read with care the voluminous record in this case. We
have considered the evidence which antedates Knauer's
naturalization (April 13, 1937), the evidence which clusters around
that date, and that which follows it. We have considered Knauer's
versions of the various episodes and the versions advanced by the
several witnesses for the United States. We have considered the
testimony and other evidence offered by each in corroboration or
impeachment of the other's case. We have considered the appraisal
of the veracity of the witnesses by the judge who saw and heard
them, and have given it that "due regard" required by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 52(a). We conclude with the District
Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals that there is solid,
convincing evidence that Knauer, before the date of his
naturalization, at that time, and subsequent, was a thorough-going
Nazi and a faithful follower of Adolph Hitler. The conclusion is
irresistible, therefore, that, when he forswore allegiance to the
German Reich, he swore falsely. The character of the evidence, the
veracity of the witnesses against Knauer as determined by the
District Court, the corroboration of challenged evidence presented
by the government, the consistent pattern of Knauer's conduct
before and after naturalization convince us that the two lower
courts were correct in their conclusions. The standard of proof,
not satisfied in either the
Schneiderman or Baumgartner
cases, is therefore plainly met here.
We will review briefly what we, as well as the two lower courts,
accept as the true version of the facts.
Page 328 U. S. 661
As early as 1931, Knauer told a newly arrived immigrant who came
from the same town in Germany that, in his opinion, the aim of
Hitler and the Nazi party was good, that it would progress, and
that it was necessary to have the same party in this country
because of the Jews and the Communists. During the same period, he
told another friend repeatedly that he was opposed to any
republican form of government, and that Jewish capital was to blame
for Germany's downfall. He visited Germany for about six months in
1934, and, while there, read Hitler's Mein Kampf. On his return, he
said with pride that he had met Hitler, and that he had been
offered a post with the German government at 600 marks per month,
that Hitler was the savior of Germany, that Hitler was solving the
unemployment problem while this country was suffering from Jewish
capitalism, that the Hitler youth organization was an excellent
influence on the children of Germany. On occasions in 1936 and
1937, he was explosive in his criticism of those who protested
against the practices and policies of Hitler.
The German Winter Relief Fund was an official agency of the
German government for which German consulates solicited money in
the United States. In the winter of 1934-1935, Knauer was active in
obtaining contributions to the Fund and forwarded the money
collected to the German consulate in Chicago.
The German-American Bund had a branch in Milwaukee. Its leader
was George Froboese -- midwestern gauleiter and later national
leader. The Bund taught and advocated the Nazi philosophy -- the
leadership principle, racial superiority of the Germans, the
principle of the totalitarian state, Pan-Germanism and of
Lebensraum (living space). It looked forward to the day when the
Nazi form of government would supplant our form of government. It
emphasized that allegiance and devotion to Hitler were superior to
any obligation to the United
Page 328 U. S. 662
States. [
Footnote 4] Knauer
denied that he was a member of the Bund. But the District Court
found to the contrary [
Footnote
5] on evidence which is solid and convincing.
Knauer participated in Bund meetings in 1936. In the summer of
1936, he and his family had a tent at the Bund camps. In the fall
of 1936, he enrolled his young daughter in the Youth Movement of
the Bund -- a group organized to instill the Nazi ideology in the
minds of children of German blood. They wore uniforms, used the
Nazi salute, and were taught songs of allegiance to Hitler. Knauer
attended meetings of this group.
The Federation of German-American Societies represented numerous
affiliated organizations consisting of Americans of German descent,
and sought to coordinate their work. It was the policy of the Bund
to infiltrate older German societies. This effort was made as
respects
Page 328 U. S. 663
the Federation. Knauer assisted Froboese and others between 1933
and 1936 in endeavoring to have the swastika displayed at
celebrations of the Federation. In 1935, Knauer reprimanded a
delegate to the Federation for passing out pamphlets opposing the
Nazi government in Germany. At a meeting of the Federation in 1935,
Knauer moved to have the Federation recognize the swastika as the
flag of the German Reich. The motion failed to carry. In 1936, the
swastika flag was raised at a German Day celebration without
approval of the Federation. A commotion ensued in which Bundists in
uniform participated, as a result of which the swastika flag was
torn down. At the next meeting of the Federation, Knauer proposed a
vote indicating approval of the showing of the swastika flag. The
motion failed, and a vote of censure of the chairman was passed.
The chairman resigned. Thereupon, Froboese and others proposed the
formation of the German-American Citizens Alliance to compete with
the Federation. It was organized early in 1937. The constitution
and articles of incorporation of the Alliance provided that all of
its assets on dissolution were to become the property of a German
government agency for the dissemination of propaganda in foreign
countries -- the Deusches Auslands-Institut. The Alliance was a
front organization for the Bund. It was designed to bring into its
ranks person who were sympathetic with the objectives of the Bund
but who did not wish to be known as Bund members.
On February 22, 1937 -- less than two months before Knauer took
his oath of naturalization-he was admitted to membership in the
Alliance and became a member of its executive committee. His first
action as a member was to volunteer the collection of newspaper
articles that attacked the Alliance, Germany, and German-Americans.
In 1937 and in the ensuing years Knauer wrote many letters and
telegrams to those who criticized the Bund
Page 328 U. S. 664
or the German government. In 1938, Knauer was elected
vice-president of the Alliance, and subsequently presided over most
of its meetings. He was the dominant figure in the Alliance. In
May, 1937, the German consul presented to the Alliance the swastika
flag which had been torn down at the Federation celebration the
year before. Not long after his naturalization, Knauer urged that
the Alliance sponsor a solstice ceremony, a solemn rite at which a
wooden swastika is burned to symbolize the unity of German people
everywhere. In August, 1937, the Alliance refused to participate in
an affair sponsored by a group which would not fly the swastika
flag. In May, 1938, Knauer at a meeting of the Alliance read a
leaflet entitled "America, the Garbage Can of the World." In 1939,
he arranged for public showings of films distributed by an official
German propaganda agency depicting the glories of Nazism. [
Footnote 6]
There was an intimate cooperation between the Alliance and the
Bund. The Bund camp was used for Alliance affairs, and it was
available to Alliance members. The Alliance supported various Bund
programs. It supported the Youth Group of the Bund and the Bund's
solstice celebration. In 1939, the Youth Group of the Bund held a
benefit performance for the Alliance. In 1940, it admitted
Page 328 U. S. 665
the Youth Group of the Bund at the request of Froboese. Knauer
consistently defended the Bund when it was criticized, when it was
denied the use of a park or a hall, when its members were arrested
or charged with offenses. In spite of the fact that Knauer knew the
real aims and purposes of the Bund and was aware of its connection
and Froboese's connection with the German government, he
consistently came to its defense. Thus, when a Wisconsin judge
freed disturbers of a Bund meeting, he wrote the judge saying that
the judge's remarks against the Bund were a "slander of a patriotic
American organization." He subscribed to the official Bund
newspaper and to a propaganda magazine issued and circulated by an
agency of the German government. He held shares in the holding
company of the Bund camp which was started in 1939. A photograph
taken at the dedication of the new Bund camp in 1939 shows Knauer
among a group of prominent Bund leaders with arms upraised in the
Nazi salute. He owned a cottage at the Bund camp. He used the Nazi
salute at the beginning and end of his speeches and at the Bund
meetings.
In May, 1938, Knauer and Froboese formed the American Protective
League, with a secret list of members. Knauer was elected a
director. A constitution and bylaws
Page 328 U. S. 666
were adopted and copies mailed by Knauer and Froboese to Hitler.
One Buerk was a German agent operating in this country and later
indicted for failing to register as such. In 1939, the German
consulate in Chicago supervised the recruiting of skilled workers
in that region for return to Germany for work in German industries.
The German consul, Buerk, Froboese, and Knauer conducted the
recruiting. Knauer participated actively in interviewing
candidates. At intervals, farewell parties were given by Knauer and
Froboese to the returning workers and their families.
Important evidence implicating Knauer in promoting the cause of
Hitler in this country was given by a Mrs. Merton. She testified
that, prompted solely by patriotic motives, she entered the employ
of Froboese in 1938 in order to obtain evidence against the Bund
and its members. The truth of her testimony was vigorously denied
by Knauer. But the District Court believed her version, as did the
Circuit Court of Appeals. And we are persuaded on a close reading
of the record not only that her testimony was strongly
corroborated, but also that Knauer's attempts to discredit her
testimony do not ring true. [
Footnote 7]
Her testimony may be summarized as follows: she acted as
secretary to Froboese in 1938. During the period of her employ,
Froboese and Knauer worked closely together
Page 328 U. S. 667
on Bund matters. He helped Froboese in the preparation of
articles for the Bund newspaper, of speeches, and of Bund
correspondence. He helped Froboese prepare resolutions to be
offered at the 1938 Bund convention calling for a white
gentile-ruled America. When Froboese left the city to attend the
convention, he told her to contact Knauer for advice concerning
Bund matters. Letters signed by Froboese and Knauer jointly were
sent to Hitler and other Nazi officials. One contained a list of
700 German nationals. One was the constitution and bylaws of the
American Protective League which we have already mentioned. One to
Hess said they had to lay low for awhile, that there was an
investigation on. A birthday greeting to Hitler from Froboese and
Knauer closed with the phrase, "In blind obedience I follow you."
Knauer told her never to reveal that the Alliance and the Bund were
linked together. One day, she asked Knauer what the Bund was. His
reply was that the Bund "was the Feuhrer's grip on American
democracy." She reminded Knauer that he was an American citizen. He
replied, "That is a good thing to hide behind."
We have given merely the highlights of the evidence. Much
corroborative detail could be added. But what we have related
presents the gist of the case against Knauer. If isolated parts of
the evidence against Knauer were separately considered, they might
well carry different inferences. His alertness to rise to the
defense of Germans or of Americans of German descent could well
reflect, if standing as isolated instances, attempts to protect a
minority against what he deemed oppressive practices. Social and
cultural ties might be complete and adequate explanations. Even
utterances of a political nature which reflected tolerance or
approval of the Nazi program in Germany might carry no sinister
connotation if they were considered by themselves. For many
native-borns in this country did not awaken to the full
implications of the
Page 328 U. S. 668
Nazi program until war came to us. And, as we stated in
Schneiderman v. United States, supra, p.
320 U. S.
139:
"Whatever attitude we may individually hold toward persons and
organizations that believe in or advocate extensive changes in our
existing order, it should be our desire and concern at all times to
uphold the right of free discussion and free thinking to which we
as a people claim primary attachment."
But we have here much more than political utterances, much more
than a crusade for the protection of minorities. This record
portrays a program of action to further Hitler's cause in this
nation -- a program of infiltration which conforms to the pattern
adopted by the Nazis in country after country. The ties with the
German Reich were too intimate, the pattern of conduct too
consistent, the overt acts too plain for us to conclude that Knauer
was merely exercising his right of free speech either to spread
tolerance in this country or to advocate changes here.
Moreover, the case against Knauer is not constructed solely from
his activities subsequent to April 13, 1937 -- the date of his
naturalization. The evidence prior to his naturalization, that
which clusters around that date, and that which follows in the next
few years is completely consistent. It conforms to the same
pattern. We do not have to guess whether, subsequent to
naturalization, he had a change of heart and threw himself
wholeheartedly into a new cause. We have clear, convincing, and
solid evidence that, at all relevant times, he was a thorough-going
Nazi bent on sponsoring Hitler's cause here. And this case, unlike
the
Baumgartner case, is not complicated by the fact that,
when the alien took his oath, Hitler was not in power. On April 13,
1937, Hitler was in full command. The evidence is most convincing
that, at that time as well as later, Knauer's loyalty ran to him,
not to this country.
Page 328 U. S. 669
The District Court properly ruled that membership in the Bund
was not, in itself, sufficient to prove fraud which would warrant
revocation of a decree of naturalization. Otherwise, guilt would
rest on implication, contrary to the rule of the
Schneiderman and
Baumgartner cases. But we have
here much more than that. We have a clear course of conduct, of
which membership in the Bund was a manifestation, designed to
promote the Nazi cause in this country. This is not a case of an
underling caught up in the enthusiasm of a movement, driven by ties
of blood and old associations to extreme attitudes, and perhaps
unaware of the conflict of allegiance implicit in his actions.
Knauer is an astute person. He is a leader -- the dominating figure
in the cause he sponsored, a leading voice in the councils of the
Bund, the spokesman in the program for systematic agitation of Nazi
views. His activities protray a shrewd, calculating, and vigilant
promotion of an alien cause. The conclusion seems to us plain that,
when Knauer forswore allegiance to Hitler and the German Reich, he
swore falsely. [
Footnote 8]
Page 328 U. S. 670
II. It is said, however, that the issue of fraud may not be
tried in this case. An analogy is sought to be drawn to those cases
where relief against a prior judgment, on the ground that perjured
testimony was introduced at the trial, was denied.
United
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61,
98 U. S. 66.
And see Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.,
261 U. S. 399,
261 U. S. 421.
But that rule goes no further than to say that the issue of fraud
can become
res judicata in the judgment sought to be set
aside. We need not consider the extent to which a decree of
naturalization may constitute a final determination of issues of
fact the establishment of which Congress has made conditions
precedent to naturalization. [
Footnote 9] Those facts relate
Page 328 U. S. 671
to the past -- to behavior and conduct. But the oath is in a
different category. It relates to a state of mind, and is a promise
of future conduct. It is the final act by which an alien acquires
the status of citizen. It requires forswearing of allegiance in
good faith, and with no mental reservations. The oath being the
final step, no evidence is heard at that time. It comes after the
matters in issue have been resolved in favor of the applicant for
citizenship. Hence, no opportunity exists for the examiner or the
judge to determine if what the new citizen swore was true was in
fact false. Hence, the issue of fraud in the oath cannot become
res judicata in the decree sought to be set aside. For
fraud in the oath was not in issue in the proceedings, and neither
was adjudicated nor could have been adjudicated.
Moreover, when an alien takes the oath with reservations or does
not in good faith forswear loyalty and allegiance to the old
country, the decree of naturalization is obtained by deceit. The
proceeding itself is then founded on fraud. A fraud is perpetrated
on the naturalization court. We have recently considered the broad
powers of equity to set aside a decree for fraud practiced on the
court which granted it.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238. The
present suit is an equity suit.
Luria v. United States,
supra, pp.
231 U. S. 27-28.
But we need not consider in this case what the historic powers of
equity might be in this situation. For Congress has provided that
fraud is a basis for cancellation of certificates of
naturalization
Page 328 U. S. 672
in proceedings instituted by the United States. [
Footnote 10] The legislative history of
that enactment shows that false swearing was one of the evils
included in the statutory grounds for denaturalization. [
Footnote 11] That power was
granted
Page 328 U. S. 673
to give added protection against fraud committed on the
naturalization courts.
United States v. Ness, 245 U.
S. 319,
245 U. S. 324,
245 U. S. 327.
Cancellation of a certificate on the grounds of fraud includes
cancellation for falsely swearing that the applicant forswore
allegiance to his native country. Though the making of a false oath
be called intrinsic fraud (
see United States v. Throckmorton,
supra), it is within the reach of the statute.
We have no doubt of the power of Congress to provide for
denaturalization on the grounds of fraud. The Constitution grants
Congress power "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."
Article I, Section 8. The power of denaturalization comes from that
provision and the "necessary and proper" Clause in Article I,
Section 8.
See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.
S. 568,
270 U. S. 578.
We do not have here a case where, after an alien has been
naturalized, Congress provides new grounds which are invoked for
cancellation of his certificate. Fraud -- the basis of revocation
with which we are now concerned -- was a statutory ground for
denaturalization when Knauer took his oath. Moreover, we are not
faced with the question of what limits there may be to conditions
for denaturalization which Congress may provide. A certificate
obtained by fraud is clearly within the reach of Congressional
power. As stated in
Johannessen v. United States,
225 U. S. 227,
225 U. S.
241:
"An alien has no moral nor constitutional right to retain the
privileges of citizenship if, by false evidence or the like, an
imposition has been practiced upon the court, without which the
certificate of citizenship could not and would not have been
issued."
And see Luria v. United States, supra, pp.
231 U. S. 23-24;
United States v. Ness, supra, p.
245 U. S. 327.
To hold otherwise would be an anomaly. It would, in effect, mean
that, where a person through concealment, misrepresentation, or
deceit perpetrated a fraud on the naturalization court, the United
States would be
Page 328 U. S. 674
remediless to correct the wrong. That would indeed put a premium
on the successful perpetration of frauds against the nation. We
cannot conclude that Congress, which may withhold the right of
naturalization (
Tutun v. United States, supra, p.
270 U. S.
578), is so powerless. We adhere to the prior rulings of
this Court that Congress may provide for the cancellation of
certificates of naturalization on the grounds of fraud in their
procurement, and thus protect the courts and the nation against
practices of aliens who, by deceitful methods, obtain the cherished
status of citizenship here, the better to serve a foreign
master.
Since fraud in the oath of allegiance which Knauer took is
sufficient to sustain the judgment below, we do not reach the other
questions which have been argued.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Sec. 338(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940 provides:
"It shall be the duty of the United States district attorneys
for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause
therefor, to institute proceedings in any court specified in
subsection (a) of section 301 in the judicial district in which the
naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for
the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such
person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of
naturalization on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such
order and certificate of naturalization were illegally
procured."
[
Footnote 2]
Since 1795, an alien seeking admission to citizenship in this
country has been required to swear that he renounced allegiance to
all foreign powers, including his native land. 1 Stat. 103, 414; 2
Stat. 153, 154; R.S. § 2165; 34 Stat. 596, 598; 54 Stat. 1137,
1157.
[
Footnote 3]
Thus, a naturalized citizen must wait seven years before he is
eligible to sit in the House (Article I, § 2), and nine years
before he can enter the Senate. Article I, § 3. Furthermore, a
naturalized citizen may lose his American citizenship by residing
abroad for stated periods. §§ 404-406. Nationality Act of 1940, 54
Stat. 1137, 1170, 8 U.S.C. §§ 804-806.
See Perkins v. Elg,
307 U. S. 325,
307 U. S.
329.
[
Footnote 4]
A number of denaturalization cases in the District Court raised
the question as to the nature of the Bund. All of them were
consolidated for trial on that single issue, including Knauer's
case. At the conclusion of the consolidated trial on that issue,
Knauer's case was separately tried. But the findings as to the
nature of the Bund were made on the basis of evidence in the
consolidated trial. The consolidation of the cases was challenged,
and upheld in the Circuit Court of Appeals. 149 F.2d at 520. No
such error is alleged here.
These findings by the District Court as to the nature of the
Bund are likewise not challenged here. For similar findings
respecting the nature of the Bund,
see United States v.
Schuchhardt, 49 F. Supp.
567, 569;
United States v. Ritzen, 50 F. Supp.
301, 302;
United States v. Haas, 51 F. Supp.
910, 911;
United States v. Wolter, 53 F. Supp.
417, 418-425;
United States v. Sautter, 54 F. Supp.
22;
United States v. Holtz, 54 F.
Supp. 63, 66-70;
United States v.
Baecker, 55 F. Supp.
403, 404-408;
United States v. Bregler, 55 F. Supp.
837, 839, 840;
United States v. Wilmovski, 56 F. Supp.
63, 64;
United States v. Claassen, 56 F. Supp. 71, 72.
[
Footnote 5]
"I find as a fact that the defendant was a member of the
Milwaukee unit of the Bund; that he was so considered by its
officers and members; that most of his interests and activities
were in behalf of the Bund, and that, though completely aware of
its aims and purposes, he deliberately vigorously promoted the
objects of the Bund."
[
Footnote 6]
In 1937, he said to one witness, an American of German
ancestry,
"Now, isn't that wonderful what Hitler did over there? Don't you
like it? When the American Government would take the same line,
then it goes in Germany like Hitler did, that will be fine."
Before and after his naturalization, he continuously preached
the Nazi concept of racial unity among those of German blood. In
1937, he addressed members of the Alliance on the subject of the
German
volk, saying "With the rise and fall of the German
nation we rise and fall."
In 1940, he said in conversation with another witness, in reply
to the witness' remark that he was an American citizen, "I am a
German-American." When told that there was no hyphen in the word,
he replied, "I lean toward and favor the Germans." When asked if he
would fight for America if the Germans invaded this country, he
refused to answer, saying, "I am a German-American."
In 1941, the Wisconsin Federation of German-American Societies
pledged itself to uphold the Constitution of the United States, to
maintain the democratic form of government, and to fight the
totalitarian form of government and everything it stood for. Knauer
issued an appeal to German-Americans, stating that that declaration
constituted open warfare against the then German government, and
was a plan to create discord among Germans and to induce those in
Germany to revolt against the German Reich.
[
Footnote 7]
The people whom Mrs. Merto at the time of her work for Froboes
told of her mission corroborated her. One of them on occasion took
her to the Froboese home and saw her enter. At the time of the
trial, Froboese was dead. Mrs. Froboese denied that Mrs. Merton had
ever worked for Froboese or that she had ever seen her. The
testimony of another witness, however, related a conversation with
Mrs. Froboese in which she said that a Mrs. Merton had worked for
Froboese. Knauer persistently denied that he ever saw or knew Mrs.
Merton. But Mrs. Merton's husband and a neighbor identified Knauer
as the man who called on Mrs. Merton at her home one day.
[
Footnote 8]
The following finding of the District Court is a fair conclusion
from this record:
"The attachment of the defendant Knauer in the year 1931 to the
aims and objects of Hitler's National Socialist movement, his
allegiance and attachment to the Third Reich as manifested by his
statements and his frequent use of the Nazi salute in public, his
devotion to and promotion of the display of the swastika flag and
ceremonies using it in symbolic pledge of fidelity to the Reich,
his fierce concern over the good name and honor of the German race,
his bitter and acrimonious denunciation of everything which
interfered with or stood in the way of the fortunes of the German
Reich, his belief in and advocacy of the German racial concept of
duty and obligation of all Germans to the fatherland regardless of
citizenship, his belief in and attachment to the principles and
concepts of National Socialism, his espousal of the aims and
objects of the German-American Bund and his active participation
therein for the promotion of its aims and objects, his promotion
and domination of the German-American Citizens Alliance to further
the aims and objects of the Bund, his uninterrupted effort by word
and deed to politically activate our German-American people in the
interests of the German Reich, his persistent efforts among
German-Americans, by means of charitable programs, speeches, and
movie films, to revive in them a feeling of fidelity and loyalty to
the German Reich, the assistance he rendered to the consular
representatives of the Reich in the attainment of matters advancing
German interests, his fervent devotion and blind attachment to the
Fuehrer at a time when the German Reich was hostile to the United
States, his lack of affection for or devotion to the United States,
his cynical evaluation of his own American citizenship, as well as
the evidence in its entirety, can be interpreted only as
establishing, and I so find, that the defendant, at the time he
filed his petition for naturalization, did not in good faith intend
to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
the German Reich, and, at the time of his naturalization and at all
times thereafter, the defendant did not in fact renounce and abjure
all allegiance and fidelity to the German Reich, but intended to
retain, and did retain, allegiance and fidelity to the German
government."
[
Footnote 9]
At the time of Knauer's naturalization, the Act provided:
"No alien shall be admitted to citizenship unless (1)
immediately preceding the date of his petition, the alien has
resided continuously within the United States for at least five
years, and within the county where the petitioner resided at the
time of filing his petition for at least six months, (2) he has
resided continuously within the United States from the date of his
petition up to the time of his admission to citizenship, and (3)
during all the periods referred to in this subdivision, he has
behaved as a person of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. At
the hearing of the petition, residence in the county where the
petitioner resides at the time of filing his petition, and the
other qualifications required by this subdivision during such
residence, shall be proved by the oral testimony of at least two
credible witnesses, citizens of the United States, in addition to
the affidavits required by this Act to be included in the
petition."
§ 6(b) of the Act of March 2, 1929, 45 Stat. 1512, 1513-1514,
which replaced § 4, subdivision Fourth, a similar provision of the
Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 598.
[
Footnote 10]
By § 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 601, it was
provided:
"That it shall be the duty of the United States district
attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good
cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court having
jurisdiction to naturalize aliens in the judicial district in which
the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing the
suit, for the purpose of setting aside and canceling the
certificate of citizenship on the ground of fraud or on the ground
that such certificate of citizenship was illegally procured. . .
."
It was held in
United States v. Ness, 245 U.
S. 319,
245 U. S. 325,
that this statutory power to cancel certificates of naturalization
is broader than that afforded in equity, independently of statute,
to set aside judgments.
[
Footnote 11]
H.Rep. No. 1789, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2:
"The conditions that have been revealed by special
investigations of the frauds committed against the naturalization
laws render wholly unnecessary any argument upon the necessity at
this time of fully exercising all the authority in naturalization
matters conferred by the Constitution upon Congress."
"
* * * *"
"The worst and most glaring frauds have consisted in perjury,
false impersonation, and the sale and use of false and counterfeit
certificates of naturalization."
As stated by a sponsor of the measure on the floor of the
House:
"The boon of American citizenship must not be cheapened by lax
and unconventional methods of courts and public officers who
administer the law, but, once granted, it should endure for all
time. It is conferred by the Federal Constitution and by laws
authorized by the Constitution. When citizenship is once legally
granted, of course, it cannot be invalidated, and it ought not to
be, but no one questions that it is within the power of the
Government to provide for the cancellation of certificates of
citizens that have been fraudulently obtained. A certificate
tainted with fraud is in the sense of the law no certificate at
all."
40 Cong.Rec. p. 7040.
The Court noted in
United States v. Ness, 245 U.
S. 319,
245 U. S. 324,
that "widespread frauds in naturalization," including "the
prevalence of perjured testimony in cases of this character," led
to the passage of this legislation.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurring.
I am satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt, from the testimony
and admissions of the petitioner himself, made in open court, that
he had never at any time, either before or after his
naturalization, deviated from his wholehearted allegiance to, and
constant service of, the German Nazi Government.
I realize, as the dissent in this case emphasizes, the dangers
inherent in denaturalizations. Had this judgment rested on the
petitioner's mere philosophical or political beliefs, expressed or
unexpressed, I should not concur in its affirmance. But
petitioner's admissions as to his own conduct leave me in no doubt
at all that he was, even in obtaining naturalization, serving the
German government with the same fanatical zeal which motivated
Page 328 U. S. 675
the saboteurs sent to the United States to wage war. I am unable
to say that Congress is without Constitutional power to authorize
courts, after fair trials like this one, to cancel citizenship
obtained by the methods and for the purposes shown by this
record.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE dissenting.
For reasons I have suggested elsewhere, [
Footnote 2/1] but which now are squarely involved, I
cannot bring myself to concur in this judgment.
My concern is not for Paul Knauer. The record discloses that he
has no conception of, much less attachment to, basic American
principles or institutions. He was a thorough-going Nazi, addicted
to philosophies altogether hostile to the democratic framework in
which we believe and live. Further, he was an active promoter of
movements directed to securing acceptance of those ideas here and
incorporating them in our institutions. And, in this case, by
contrast with those of
Schneiderman and
Baumgartner, [
Footnote
2/2] it would be hard to say that the evidence would not
sustain a finding that he falsely took the oath of allegiance, or
that he never in his heart renounced his prime fealty to Adolph
Hitler and Nazi Germany. Nor, in my opinion, can it be thought
unequal to supporting a conclusion that, from a time prior to his
admission to citizenship in 1935 until, at any rate, the assault on
Pearl Harbor, Knauer was in active service of the Nazi regime,
promoting its cause here, and also, for a short time in Germany, as
the object of his first loyalty.
If, therefore, in any case, a naturalized citizen's right and
status can be revoked, by the procedure followed here
Page 328 U. S. 676
or perhaps at all, it would be in such a case as this. But if
one man's citizenship can thus be taken away, so can that of any
other. And, even in this case, it would be in a large part for his
political convictions and acts done openly in espousal of them. Not
merely Knauer's rights, but those of millions of naturalized
citizens in their status, and all that it implies of security and
freedom, are affected by what is done in this case. By the outcome,
they are made either second-class citizens or citizens having equal
rights and equal security with others.
No native-born American's birthright could be stripped from him
for such a cause or by such a procedure as has been followed here.
Nor could he be punished with banishment. To suffer that great
loss, he must forfeit citizenship by some act of treason or felony
and be adjudged guilty by processes of law consistent with all the
great protections thrown around such trials. Not yet has attempt
been made to do this otherwise. Nor, in my opinion, could it be
done except for some such cause or by any less carefully
safeguarded procedure.
In no instance thus far has our system tolerated destruction of
that right of the native-born, except by voluntary surrender, on
account of convictions held, views expressed, or acts done in
promoting their acceptance falling short of treason as defined in
the Constitution [
Footnote 2/3] or
conviction for felony. Nor has it thus far brought about that
extinction by forms of trial other than those provided for such
offenses. Moreover, even in such cases, although the penalty may be
death or loss of the rights of citizenship, we have not yet imposed
those penalties altogether foreign to our institutions, namely,
deportation or exile. For one cause and one only have they been
provided, namely, the loss of the naturalized citizen's status.
Page 328 U. S. 677
I do not find warrant in the Constitution for believing that it
contemplates two classes of citizens, excepting only for two
purposes. One is to provide how citizenship shall be acquired,
Const., Art. I, § 8; Amend. XIV, § 1, the other to determine
eligibility for the presidency. Const., Art. II, § 1. The latter is
the only instance in which the charter expressly excludes the
naturalized citizen from any right or privilege the native-born
possesses. [
Footnote 2/4]
Luria
v. United States, 231 U. S. 9,
231 U. S. 22. I
do not think there is any other in which his status is, or can be
made, inferior.
Congress, it is true, is empowered to lay down the conditions
for admission of foreign-born persons to citizenship. In this
respect, it has wide authority. But it is not unlimited. Nor is
Congress given power to take away citizenship once it is conferred,
other than for some sufficient act of forfeiture taking place
afterward. Naturalized citizens are no more free to become traitors
or criminals than others, and may be punished as they are when they
commit the same offense. But any process which takes away their
citizenship for causes or by procedures not applicable to
native-born citizens places them in a separate and an inferior
class. That dilemma is inescapable, though it is one not heretofore
faced squarely. Unless it is the law that there are two classes of
citizens -- one superior, the other inferior -- the status of no
citizen can be annulled for causes or by procedures not applicable
to all others,
To say that Congress can disregard this fact and create
inequalities of status as between native and foreign-born citizens
by attaching conditions to their admission, to be applied
retroactively after that event, is only to say in
Page 328 U. S. 678
other words that Congress, by using that method, can create
different and inferior classes of citizens. I have heretofore
pointed out why citizens with strings attached to their citizenship
for its revocation can be neither free nor secure in their status.
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.
S. 118, and concurring opinion at
320 U. S. 165.
All that is said there, in that respect, applies here or to any
procedure by which citizenship may be annulled. In my opinion, the
power to naturalize is not the power to denaturalize. The act of
admission must be taken as final for any cause which may have
existed at that time. Otherwise, there cannot but be two classes of
citizens, one free and secure except for acts amounting to
forfeiture within our tradition; the other conditional, timorous
and insecure because blanketed with the threat that some act or
conduct, not amounting to forfeiture for others, will be taken
retroactively to show that some prescribed condition had not been
fulfilled and be so adjudged. I do not think such a difference was
contemplated when Congress was authorized to provide for
naturalization and the terms on which it should be granted.
But if I may be wrong in this, certainly so drastic a penalty as
denaturalization, with resulting deportation and exile and all the
attendant consequences, should not be imposed by any procedure less
protective of the citizen's most fundamental right, comprehending
all others, than must be employed to take away the native-born
citizen's status or the lesser rights of the foreign-born citizen.
If strings may be attached to citizenship and pulled retroactively
to annul it, at the least this should be done only by those forms
of proceeding most fully surrounded with the constitutional
securities for trial which are among the prized incidents of
citizenship. It is altogether anomalous that those safeguards are
thrown about the foreign-born
Page 328 U. S. 679
citizen when, for some offense, his liberty, even for brief
periods, is at stake, but are withdrawn from him when all that
gives substance to that freedom is put in jeopardy.
The right of citizenship is the most precious of all. The
penalty for denaturalization is always harsh. Often it is more
drastic than any other. It is also unique for this situation. For
the required measure of security, the native-born citizen can be
deprived of his status only by the rigidly safeguarded trial for
treason or for conviction of a criminal offense which brings loss
of rights as a citizen. To those procedures, with the same
penalties and for the same causes, the foreign-born citizen is
subject, but also by them he is protected. He should not be less
secure when it is sought to annul his citizenship than when the
effort is to bring about its forfeiture. Nor, in either event,
should his procedural safeguards be less than when the same
consequence, in substance, is inflicted upon the citizen native
born.
The procedure prescribed for and followed in this case was not
in accord with those standards. I think nothing less is adequate,
or consistent with the constitutional status of citizenship, for
the purpose of taking it away.
If this means that some or even many disloyal foreign-born
citizens cannot be deported, it is better so than to place so many
loyal ones in inferior status. And there are other effective
methods for dealing with those who are disloyal, just as there are
for such citizens by birth.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY joins in this dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.
S. 118, concurring opinion at
320 U. S.
165.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See 328
U.S. 654fn2/1|>note 1;
Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 U. S. 665.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Constitution, Art, III, § 3.
See Cramer v. United
States, 325 U. S. 1.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Cf. Constitution, Art, I § 2; Art. I, § 3, providing,
respectively, that no person shall be a Senator who shall not have
been nine years a citizen and, in the case of Representatives,
seven years.