Under § 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act, authorizing the
Price Administrator to bring injunction proceedings to enforce the
Act in either state or federal courts, a federal district court has
jurisdiction to grant an injunction sought by the Price
Administrator to restrain eviction of a tenant under an order of a
state court where the Administrator alleges that eviction would
violate the Act and regulations pursuant thereto -- notwithstanding
§ 265 of the Judicial Code, which forbids federal courts to grant
injunctions to stay proceedings in state courts except in
bankruptcy proceedings. Pp.
328 U. S.
254-255.
Reversed and remanded.
A writ of possession to evict a tenant having been issued by a
state court, the Price Administrator sued in a Federal District
Court for an injunction to restrain the eviction. The District
Court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. The Circuit
Court of Appeals denied an application for an injunction
prohibiting the
Page 328 U. S. 253
eviction pending an appeal to that Court. Before judgment of the
Circuit Court of Appeals on the merits, this Court granted
certiorari. 328 U.S. 827.
Reversed and remanded, p.
328 U. S.
255.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like
Porter v. Lee, ante, p.
328 U. S. 246,
this day decided, involves the jurisdiction of the federal District
Court to grant an injunction, sought by the Price Administrator
under Section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, to
restrain eviction of a tenant under an order of a state court where
the Administrator alleges that eviction would violate the Act and
valid regulations promulgated pursuant to it. Briefly stated, the
circumstances of the controversy are these: B. M. Murray, as
executor of an estate, pursuant to authority granted him by the
Probate Court of Franklin County, Ohio, sold a house located within
the Columbus Defense Rental Area. A writ of possession directing
the sheriff of the County to evict the tenant and to place the
respondent purchasers in possession was obtained in the Probate
Court. No certificate authorizing the eviction was sought or
obtained from the Price Administrator, as is required by Section 6
of the Rent Regulation for Housing. 10 F.R. 3436, 13528. Before the
sheriff executed the writ, the Price Administrator brought this
action for an injunction in the federal District Court. The
District Court issued a temporary restraining order, but later
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Section 265 of the
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 379, deprived the federal District Court
of jurisdiction to stay the proceedings in the state court.
Page 328 U. S. 252
This section provides that:
"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the
United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except
in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."
The District Court, in dismissing the cause, entered an order
restraining respondents from evicting the tenant pending
determination by the Circuit Court of Appeals for an application
for an injunction prohibiting the eviction pending an appeal to
that Court. The Administrator made this application in the Circuit
Court of Appeals, but it was denied, thus removing all obstacles to
eviction of the tenant. The Circuit Court of Appeals has not heard
this case. In order to prevent eviction of the tenant, the
Administrator sought and obtained from MR. JUSTICE REED an
injunction pending final disposition of this case in this Court,
and applied for certiorari directly to this Court under Section
240(a) of the Judicial Code, which authorizes us to grant
certiorari "either before or after the judgment or decree by such
lower court." We were prompted to bring the District Court's
judgment directly to this Court for review by reason of the close
relationship of the important question raised to the question
presented in
Porter v. Lee, ante, p.
328 U. S. 246.
The District Court was of the opinion that, since Section 205(c)
of the Act gave concurrent jurisdiction to state courts to grant
relief by injunction, the policy of Section 265 against federal
injunctions of state proceedings should not be considered impaired
by the Emergency Price Control Act. The District Court's conclusion
was that, if the Administrator wanted an injunction to restrain
eviction under state court procedure, he should have gone into some
state court that had jurisdiction of the cause. The District Court
erred in holding that the policy of Section 265 of the Judicial
Code should not be considered impaired by the Emergency Price
Control Act. While we realize that Section 265 embodies a
longstanding governmental policy to
Page 328 U. S. 255
prevent unnecessary friction between state and federal courts,
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U.
S. 118,
314 U. S. 126,
we still hold, as we held in
Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U. S. 503,
that Section 205 of the Price Control Act, which authorizes the
Price Administrator to seek injunctive reliefs in appropriate
courts, including federal district courts, is an implied
legislative amendment to Section 265, creating an exception to its
broad prohibition.
* This is true
because Section 205 authorizes the Price Administrator to bring
injunction proceedings to enforce the Act in either state or
federal courts, and this authority is broad enough to justify an
injunction to restrain state court evictions. But, if Section 265
controls, as the District Court held, the Administrator here could
not proceed in the federal court, since there is a proceeding
pending in a state court. Since the provisions of the Price Control
Act, enacted long after Section 265, do not compel the
Administrator to go into the state courts, but leave him free to
seek relief in the federal courts, he was not barred by Section 265
from seeking an injunction to restrain an unlawful eviction.
Cf. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.
S. 375.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that Court to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon
it by Section 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
* An alternative reason given for the decision in the
Willingham case was that, since the state court there was
attempting to enjoin the Administrator from performing his duties
under the Act, the District Court had power both under 205(a) of
the Act and Section 24(1) of the Judicial Code to protect the
exclusive federal jurisdiction which Congress had granted. But our
opinion did not, as the District Court thought, depend entirely on
this alternative ground.