While an eviction suit by a landlord against a tenant was
pending in a state court, the Price Administrator sued in a Federal
District Court under § 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act to
enjoin the landlord from evicting that tenant "or any other tenant"
and from violating the Rent Regulation for Housing (promulgated
under the Emergency Price Control Act), which forbids the eviction
of tenants so long as they pay the rent to which the landlord is
entitled. The District Court dismissed the Administrator's
complaint for want of jurisdiction. While an appeal was pending,
the tenant was evicted. The Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal as moot.
Held:
1. The District Court had jurisdiction under § 205(c) of the
Emergency Price Control Act, which provides that
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal
proceedings for violations of section 4 of this Act, and,
concurrently with State and Territorial Courts, of all other
proceedings under section 205 of this Act."
P.
328 U. S.
249.
(a) The landlord's eviction proceeding in the state court was
not an enforcement proceeding authorized by the Act, and therefore
not within the "concurrent" jurisdiction contemplated by § 205. P.
328 U. S.
250.
(b) Over the enforcement proceedings contemplated by § 205, not
only did the District Court acquire jurisdiction first, but the
state court never acquired any jurisdiction at all. P.
328 U. S.
250.
2. The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding that the case
was moot. P.
328 U. S.
251.
(a) The mere fact that the tenant vacated the premises in
compliance with a writ of possession did not end the controversy,
since the court could have restored the
status quo by a
mandatory injunction. P.
328 U. S.
251.
(b) Moreover, the Administrator sought to restrain the eviction
of any other tenant of the landlord as well as other act in
violation of the regulation, and § 205(a) authorizes such a broad
injunction upon a finding that the landlord has engaged in
violations. P.
328 U. S.
251.
Reversed and remanded.
Page 328 U. S. 247
The Price Administrator sued to enjoin the eviction of a tenant
and other violations of the Rent Regulation for Housing promulgated
under the Emergency Price Control Act. The District Court dismissed
the suit for want of jurisdiction. 59 F. Supp. 639. The Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal as moot. This Court granted
certiorari. 328 U.S. 826.
Reversed and remanded to the
District Court for trial on the merits, p.
328 U. S. 252.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
October 24, 1944, Dr. Lee brought a forcible detainer suit in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Kenton County, Kentucky, to
recover possession of an apartment he had rented to R.C. and Sarah
Beever by reason of an alleged nonpayment of rent due on October
18, 1944. On December 4, 1944, before any judgment had been
rendered, the Price Administrator, under Section 205 of the
Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, sought an injunction in
the federal District Court to order respondents, Dr. and Mrs. Lee,
not to prosecute eviction proceedings against "Beever or any other
tenant" and to restrain them from violating the Rent Regulation for
Housing, 10 F.R. 3436, 13528, promulgated pursuant to the Emergency
Price Control Act. [
Footnote 1]
That
Page 328 U. S. 248
Regulation provides, among other things, that, so long as the
tenant continues to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled,
no tenant shall be removed or evicted by any landlord. The
Administrator's complaint in the injunction proceeding alleged that
Beever owed no rent; that tender of the rent due had been refused
by Dr. Lee; that this had been done not because there had been a
default in payment, but rather because Dr. Lee did not want
families with children, such as the Beevers, living on the
premises, and that the eviction proceeding thus violated the Rent
Regulation for Housing. The District Court issued a temporary
restraining order, but later, without passing on the disputed
factual issue of whether Beever had actually been delinquent in
paying his rent at the time of the commencement of the Justice of
the Peace Court proceedings, dismissed the Price Administrator's
complaint on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the
Lees from prosecuting eviction proceeding in the state court.
Bowles v. Lee, 59 F. Supp. 639. [
Footnote 2] The Justice of the Peace Court, on the
landlord's motion, then dismissed the forcible detainer action,
and, on June 25, 1945, a new action was brought in the same Justice
of the Peace Court asking for a writ of restitution to remove the
Beevers on the ground of nonpayment of rent. The Justice of the
Peace Court then entered a judgment directing the eviction of the
Beevers. The Price Administrator this time asked the federal
District Court to restrain enforcement and execution of the
judgment of eviction. This action by the Price
Page 328 U. S. 249
Administrator was again dismissed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The Price Administrator appealed from both District Court orders
dismissing his complaints, and made prompt application to the
Circuit Court of Appeals for an injunction pending appeal in the
first case. This motion was denied. The landlord moved to have the
case dismissed as moot, and, in support of that motion, filed an
affidavit setting forth that the premises had been vacated by the
Beevers. In response, the Price Administrator submitted an
affidavit by R. C. Beever stating that he had not vacated the
apartment as a matter of choice, but had moved to several basements
and into the home of his wife's parents because he was compelled to
do so by a writ of possession which had been served on him. The
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed both cases as moot. We granted
certiorari because of the obvious importance of the questions
raised by the federal District Court's dismissals for want of
jurisdiction and the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals that
the proceedings had become moot.
First. As to jurisdiction, the provisions of the Price
Control Act and the Rent Regulation for Housing, promulgated
pursuant thereto and not challenged here, make it clear that the
Price Administrator's allegations in his complaint before the
District Court stated an enjoinable violation over which the
District Court as an enforcement court ordinarily would have
jurisdiction under 205(a) and (c) of the Act. But the landlord
claims that, here, the District Court was without power to act
because the provisions of Section 205(c) permit actions in state
courts alone under the particular circumstances here. He relies on
that part of subsection (c) which provides that
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal
proceedings for violations of section 4 of this Act, and,
concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all other
proceedings under
Page 328 U. S. 250
section 205 of this Act."
The landlord's argument is as follows: the Administrator's
proceeding in the federal District Court was a proceeding under
Section 205 over which the state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction. The only issue in the federal proceeding would have
been whether the landlord had legally sought to evict the Beevers
because of nonpayment of rent or whether eviction was sought for
other reasons in violation of the applicable regulation. That
question could have been raised in the Justice of the Peace Court
in view of its "concurrent" jurisdiction under Section 205(c).
Since the Justice of the Peace Court action by the landlord was
commenced prior to the Administrator's injunction proceeding in the
federal court, the Justice of the Peace Court had acquired sole
power to decide the crucial issue, and the federal District Court
therefore lacked jurisdiction.
We think this contention is without merit. Section 205(c) gives
the state courts concurrent jurisdiction only over noncriminal
enforcement "proceedings under Section 205."
Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U. S. 503,
321 U. S.
511-512. Here, the landlord's eviction proceeding in the
Justice of the Peace Court clearly was not an enforcement
proceeding authorized by the Act. It was, rather, if the
allegations of the Administrator proved to be true, a violation of
the Act. The state court's jurisdiction was based on state law, and
not on Section 205 of the Price Control Act. It was therefore not
part of the "concurrent" jurisdiction contemplated by 205. Over the
enforcement proceedings contemplated by that section not only did
the District Court acquire jurisdiction first, but the state court
never acquired any jurisdiction at all. It was consequently within
the power of the federal District Court to grant the injunction
provided the Government succeeded in proving the merits of its
case.
To rule otherwise would require the Administrator to bring
enforcement proceedings in situations, such as the
Page 328 U. S. 251
one before us, always in the state courts. Such a requirement
would certainly not be in accord with the "concurrent" jurisdiction
provision of Section 205(c). Or the Administrator, in order to
protect the public interest, would always be forced to intervene in
state court proceedings brought by the landlord. This procedure
would be inadequate, because the speedy manner in which eviction
suits are handled will frequently make it too late to intervene
when the Administrator becomes aware of a violation. Furthermore,
justice of the peace courts do not, at least ordinarily, have
jurisdiction to grant injunctions to prevent future violations of
the Act. Since there is nothing in the Act that limits the
Administrator's action to intervention in the state courts, we see
no reason, nor are we authorized, to so restrict him. [
Footnote 3]
Second. We also think the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the case was moot. The mere fact that the Beevers, in
order to comply with the writ of possession, vacated the apartment
was not enough to end the controversy. It has long been established
that, where a defendant with notice in an injunction proceeding
completes the acts sought to be enjoined, the court may, by
mandatory injunction, restore the
status quo. Texas
& New Orieans R. Co. v. Northside Belt R. Co.,
276 U. S. 475,
276 U. S. 479.
The Administrator therefore was entitled to seek a restoration of
the
status quo in this case.
See Henderson v.
Fleckinger, 136 F.2d 381, 382. Moreover, here, the
Administrator sought to restrain not merely the eviction of Beever,
but also that of any other tenant of the landlord, as well as other
acts in violation of the Regulation. Section 205(a) authorizes the
district court, in its discretion, to grant such a broad injunction
upon a finding that the landlord has engaged in violations.
See
Page 328 U. S. 252
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321. If
the eviction proceeding actually was a violation of the Regulation,
then Beever's vacating the premises was merely the completion of
one violation. The issue as to whether future violations should be
enjoined was still before the Court, and was by no means moot.
The judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals are reversed, and
the cases are remanded to the District Court for trial of the
issues on the merits.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of these cases.
[
Footnote 1]
The part of the Regulation here in question (Section 6) was
promulgated pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Emergency Price Control
Act, 56 Stat. 23, which authorizes the Administrator, whenever such
action is necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes
of the Act, to
"regulate or prohibit . . . renting or leasing practices
(including practices relating to recovery of the possession) in
connection with any defense area housing accommodations, which in
his judgment are equivalent to or are likely to result in . . .
rent increases . . . inconsistent with the purposes of this
Act."
[
Footnote 2]
The original petition for injunction was filed by Chester Bowles
as Price Administrator. Petitioner Porter is his successor in
office, and, upon motion, he has been substituted as petitioner in
this Court.
[
Footnote 3]
And for the reasons stated in
Porter v. Dicken, post,
p.
328 U. S. 246, §
265 of the Judicial Code does not require a different result.