U.S. Supreme Court
D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328
U.S. 108 (1946)
D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi
No. 517
Argued March 1, 1946
Decided April 29, 1946
328
U.S. 108
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Syllabus
1. An employer cannot be relieved from liability for liquidated
damages under § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act by a
compromise or settlement of a
bona fide dispute as to the
coverage of the Act. P.
328 U. S.
114.
2. The purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act -- to secure a
subsistence wage for low income workers -- requires that neither
wages nor the damages for withholding them be reducible by
compromise of controversies over coverage. Pp.
328 U. S.
116-118,
328 U. S.
121.
3. Maintenance employees of a building the occupants of which
receive, work on, and return in intrastate commerce goods belonging
to nonoccupants who subsequently, in the regular course of their
business, ship substantial proportions of the occupants' products
to other States
held covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act. P.
328 U. S.
120.
4. The burden of proof that rests upon employees to establish
that they are engaged in the production of goods for commerce
within the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act must be met by
evidence in the record. P.
328 U. S. 120.
5. In determining whether employees are engaged in the
"production of goods for commerce" within the meaning of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, it is sufficient that, from the circumstances
of production,
Page 328 U. S. 109
a trier of fact may reasonably infer that the employer has
reasonable grounds to anticipate that his products will move in
interstate commerce.
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,
317 U. S. 564,
distinguished. Pp.
328 U. S. 119,
328 U. S.
121.
6. Mere separation of the economic processes of production for
commerce between different industrial units, even without any
degree of common ownership, does not destroy the continuity of
production for commerce. P.
328 U. S.
121.
150 F.2d 694 affirmed.
Respondent, suing on behalf of himself and other employees
similarly situated, brought suit against his employer to recover
liquidated damages under § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The District Court held that the liability of the employer had been
validly released. 53 F. Supp. 844. The Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. 150 F.2d 694. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U.S.
712.
Affirmed, p.
328 U. S. 121.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issues brought to this Court by this proceeding arise from a
controversy concerning overtime pay and liquidated damages under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Under Section 7(a), the
employer is required to pay for
Page 328 U. S. 110
excess hours of work not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate. [
Footnote 1] An employer who
violates this subsection is liable to his injured employees in the
amount due and unpaid and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages. [
Footnote 2]
The primary issue presented by the petition for certiorari is
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act precludes a
bona fide
settlement of a
bona fide dispute over the coverage of the
Act on a claim for overtime compensation and liquidated damages
where the employees receive the overtime compensation in full. As
the conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals on this issue in
this case [
Footnote 3] conflicts with that of the
Fourth Circuit in
Guess v.
Page 328 U. S. 111
Montague, 140 F.2d 500, 504, 505, and the Fifth Circuit
in
Atlantic Co. v. Broughton, 146 F.2d 480, we granted
certiorari in order to determine the issue which was not passed
upon in
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.
S. 697,
324 U. S.
702-704,
324 U. S. 708.
[
Footnote 4]
Respondents were employed by petitioner as building service and
maintenance employees in its twenty-three story loft building in
the garment manufacturing district of New York City during the
period October 24, 1938, to February 5, 1942. Each put in varying
hours of overtime for which no payment had been made prior to our
decision in
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.
S. 517, on June 1, 1942, by which service and
maintenance employees in buildings tenanted by manufacturers
producing for interstate commerce were held to be covered by the
Wage-Hour Act. Shortly thereafter, respondents made claims for
overtime pay and liquidated damages which were refused by
petitioner on the ground, admittedly true, that its tenants did not
ship the products they produced directly in interstate commerce,
but delivered them to distributors or producers in the same state
who thereafter used the products of petitioner's tenants for
interstate commerce or the production of goods for that commerce.
Under threat of suit, petitioner paid the overtime compensation and
obtained a release under seal signed by the
Page 328 U. S. 112
several respondents. It is set out below. [
Footnote 5] Petitioner computed the amount of overtime,
and respondents raise no question as to its accuracy. Respondents
then brought this suit in the District Court to recover liquidated
damages due them under Section 16(b) of the Act. It was stipulated
that the liquidated damages, due if recoverable, were certain
stated amounts which corresponded to the overtime compensation
already paid. Petitioner denied that it was covered by the Act, and
pleaded affirmatively, as a defense, the releases which it asserted
were obtained in settlement of a
bona fide dispute as to
coverage.
The District Court held that there was a good accord and
satisfaction and release of all claims for liquidated damages,
because there was a
bona fide settlement of a
bona
fide dispute. It specifically refused to pass upon the defense
that the Act did not cover the respondents, except to indicate that
it presented a difficult issue. 53 F. Supp. 844. This judgment was
entered prior to our decision in the
O'Neil case. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. That court thought the
O'Neil case substantially determined that a
bona
fide compromise of a dispute as to coverage was invalid. Its
conclusion as to the invalidity of such compromises was in accord
with its prior comments that the liability of unpaid overtime
compensation and liquidated damages is single, and "is not
discharged
in toto by paying one-half of it."
Rigopoulos v. Kervan, 140 F.2d 506, 507;
Fleming v.
Post, 146 F.2d 441, 443.
Petitioner urges that the theory of a single liability of the
employer to the employee under Sec. 16(b) is unsound,
Page 328 U. S. 113
and that this Court should not find a lack of power in employers
and employees to settle amicably controversies over coverage and
amounts due for violations of the unpaid minimum wage or unpaid
overtime compensation under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. Petitioner
reasons on its first contention that there were two claims -- one
for overtime compensation and the other for an equal amount as
liquidated damages -- and that the payment for the first in full
was sufficient consideration for the release of the second. On its
second contention, petitioner advances the argument that, since the
Congressional intent to forbid compromises of such claims is not
clear, such a sharp departure from the traditional policy of
encouraging the adjustment, instead of the litigation, of disputes
cannot be inferred from the purposes of the Act. Petitioner points
out that a seaman may release his claims under statutes enacted for
his protection in a
bona fide settlement, [
Footnote 6] and that settlement of accrued claims is
permitted under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. [
Footnote 7] Petitioner adds that, in doubtful cases, it
may be advantageous to the employee to compromise, that to force
litigation may disrupt employer-employee relationships, and that
numerous compromise settlements have been made for less than full
liability. [
Footnote 8]
Page 328 U. S. 114
We do not find it necessary to determine whether the liability
for unpaid wages and liquidated damages that Section 16(b) creates
is unitary or divisible. [
Footnote 9] Whether the
liability is single or dual, we think the remedy of liquidated
damages cannot be bargained away by
bona fide settlements
of disputes over coverage. Nor do we need to consider here the
possibility of compromises in other situations
Page 328 U. S. 115
which may arise, such as a dispute over the number of hours
worked or the regular rate of employment. [
Footnote
10]
The reasons which lead us to conclude that compromises of real
disputes over coverage which do not require the payment in full of
unpaid wages and liquidated damages do not differ greatly from
those which led us to condemn the waivers of liquidated damages in
the
O'Neil case. We said there, 324 U.S. at
324 U. S.
708:
"The same policy which forbids waiver of the statutory minimum
as necessary to the free flow of commerce requires that reparations
to restore damage done by such failure to pay on time must be made
to accomplish Congressional purposes. Moreover, the same policy
which forbids employee waiver of the minimum statutory rate because
of inequality of bargaining power prohibits these same employees
from bargaining with their employer in determining whether so
little damage was suffered that waiver of liquidated damage is
called for."
In a
bona fide adjustment on coverage, there are the
same threats to the public purposes of the Wage-Hour Act that exist
when the liquidated damages are waived. The damages are, at the
same time, compensatory and an aid to enforcement. It is quite true
that the liquidated damage provision acts harshly upon employers
whose violations are not deliberate, but arise from uncertainties
or mistakes as to coverage. Since the possibility of violations
inheres in every instance of employment that is covered by the Act,
Congress evidently felt it should not provide for variable
compensation to fit the degree of blame in each infraction.
[
Footnote 11] Instead, Congress adopted a
mandatory requirement
Page 328 U. S. 116
that the employer pay a sum in liquidated damages equal to the
unpaid wages, so as to compensate the injured employee for the
retention of his pay. [
Footnote 12]
It is realized that this conclusion puts the employer and his
employees to an "
all or nothing' gamble," as Judge Chase
phrased the result in his dissent below. Theoretically, this means
each party gets his just deserts -- no more, no less. The
alternative is to find in the Act an intention of Congress to leave
the adjustments to bargaining, at the worst, between employers and
individual employees, or, at best, between employers and the
employees' chosen representatives, bargaining agent, or some other.
We think the purpose of the Act, which, we repeat, from the
O'Neil case, was to secure for the lowest paid segment of
the nation's workers a subsistence wage, leads to the conclusion
that neither wages nor the damages for withholding them is capable
of reduction by compromise of controversies over coverage.
[Footnote 13] Such a compromise thwarts the
public policy of minimum wages, promptly paid, embodied in the
Wage-Hour Act, by reducing the sum selected by Congress as proper
compensation for withholding wages. [Footnote
14]
The only other material question presented by this certiorari
[
Footnote 15] is whether the Wage-Hour Act
covers service and
Page 328 U. S. 117
maintenance employees of a building that is tenanted by
occupants who receive, work on, and return in intrastate commerce
goods belonging to nonoccupants who subsequently, in the regular
course of their business, ship substantial proportions of the
occupants' products to other states. [
Footnote
16] It is agreed by petitioner and respondents that, if certain
tenants are included as producers for interstate commerce, the
occupants of the building who are engaged in production for
interstate commerce are sufficiently numerous and productive to
bring the maintenance employees
Page 328 U. S. 118
of the building within the coverage of the Act.
Gangi v. D.
A. Schulte, Inc., 150 F.2d 694, note 5. That is, petitioner's
building then would be in the same classification, so far as the
coverage of its maintenance employees by the Wage-Hour Act is
concerned, as were the buildings in
Kirschbaum v. Walling,
316 U. S. 517, and
Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679. We
then would have no problem as to the business of the tenants --
that is, whether they were producers for interstate commerce, such
as was involved in
10 East 40th Street Bldg. Co. v.
Callus, 325 U. S. 578.
While the Wage-Hour Act covers employees engaged in the production
of goods for commerce, a maintenance employee working for a
building corporation which furnishes loft space to tenants can
hardly be so engaged unless an adequate proportion of the tenants
of that building are so engaged.
Kirschbaum v. Walling,
316 U.S. at
316 U. S. 524;
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.
S. 564,
317 U. S. 572.
Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to a determination of
whether or not these certain tenants of petitioner, twelve in
number, are producing goods for interstate commerce. These tenants
manufactured articles for nontenant New York City business
organizations, which organizations subsequently sold the articles
in interstate commerce. The Circuit Court of Appeals held as to
them, 150 F.2d 697: [
Footnote 17]
Page 328 U. S. 119
"And the testimony clearly shows that, at the time of
production, these tenants had, at the very least, reasonable
grounds to anticipate that their products would move in other
states. This is all that had to be shown to constitute them
interstate producers.
Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v.
Hall, 317 U. S. 88,
317 U. S.
92;
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.
100,
312 U. S. 118. . . ."
Petitioner asserts that, for four of the twelve, there was no
evidence that any of them knew, at the time of production or later,
that their products were to be shipped interstate, and that the
proper characterization of these four tenants, as producers or
nonproducers for interstate commerce, is decisive of the liability
of petitioner. Without detailing the factual situation which makes
the position of these four tenants decisive of liability, we assume
petitioner's conclusion that its liability depends upon the proper
characterization of the four tenants in respect to their position
as producers for interstate commerce. We assume that the other
eight are in the same category of tenants.
Petitioner relies upon
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper
Co., 317 U. S. 564,
317 U. S. 569,
as indicating that evidence of a preexisting understanding by a
manufacturer of the interstate destination of his products is
essential. But that case was concerned with whether a wholesaler's
employees who handled stock were in commerce, not whether they were
engaged in the production of goods for commerce. [
Footnote 18] On that basis, distinctions were made, as
to employees handling goods locally, between a wholesaler's stock
purchased
Page 328 U. S. 120
on prior order extra-state for delivery intrastate and other
stock purchased extra-state and warehoused for subsequent sale and
local handling. We find nothing in the case that lends any support
to the suggestion that a manufacturer's intrastate delivery to a
wholesaler or distributor or other manufacturer for further
processing for ultimate interstate distribution interrupts
production for interstate commerce.
The burden of proof that rests upon employees to establish that
they are engaged in the production of goods for commerce must be
met by evidence in the record.
Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v.
Hall, 317 U. S. 88,
317 U. S. 90.
The record shows this building is at 571-583 Eighth Avenue, Borough
of Manhattan, City of New York. The testimony of many witnesses
shows that the tenants were predominantly, if not entirely, engaged
in work for the garment trades. We will take judicial notice, as a
matter of common knowledge, that New York City produces more
garments for interstate shipment than any other city in the Nation.
Eleven of the twelve tenants were contractors who furnished labor
on goods sent in to them so as to produce clothing articles
eventually distributed in interstate commerce. The twelfth was a
manufacturer with offices, salesroom, and shipping rooms elsewhere
in New York. There was no specific evidence that the four
contractors upon whose status petitioner bases his argument ever
knew that their goods were intended to be or eventually were
shipped interstate. There is clear evidence that each business
organization for which these four tenants did produce these
clothing articles shipped a major proportion of the articles so
produced by these tenants in interstate commerce in the regular
course of their business. The production of these articles by the
tenants for nontenants was the regular business of the tenants. The
shortest occupancy of space by any of the four was five years and
eleven months.
Page 328 U. S. 121
From these facts, we think the conclusion of the Circuit Court
of Appeals that these tenants had reasonable grounds to anticipate
that material quantities of their production would move interstate
is well supported. It is not essential that individual products
should be traced. It is sufficient that, from the circumstances of
production, a trier of fact may reasonably infer that a producer
has grounds to anticipate that his products will move interstate.
[
Footnote 19] Certainly if these tenants had not
only manufactured but had also shipped their products interstate,
no one would doubt that they were producers for commerce. Mere
separation of the economic processes of production for commerce
between different industrial units, even without any degree of
common ownership, does not destroy the continuity of production for
commerce. Producers may be held to know the usual routes for
distribution of their products. All this is made plain by the
citations of the Court of Appeals to the
Darby and
Bradshaw cases.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
52 Stat. 1063:
"SEC. 7. (a) No employer shall . . . employ any of his employees
who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce -- [longer than the maximum workweek]"
"
* * * *"
"unless such employee receives compensation for his employment
in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed."
[
Footnote 2]
52 Stat. 1069:
"SEC. 16. (b) Any employer who violates the provisions of
section 6 or section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages,
or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in
an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover
such liability may be maintained in any court of competent
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or
such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative
to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees
similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to
any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a
reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of
the action."
[
Footnote 3]
Gangi v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 150 F.2d 694.
See
also Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 123 F.2d 622, 626.
[
Footnote 4]
In view of the number of settlements for violations, the issue
is of importance.
See Annual Report, Wage and Hour and
Public Contracts Divisions, U.S. Department of Labor, fiscal year
ending June 30, 1945, p. 2:
"In the six years and nine months that the Fair Labor Standards
Act had been in force through the end of the fiscal year, about
$85,000,000 in restitution of illegally withheld wages had been
agreed to or ordered paid to almost two and a half million workers
in more than 110,000 establishments, with more than two-fifths of
the cases involving failure to pay the minimum wage of 40 cents an
hour or less."
[
Footnote 5]
"The undersigned, an employee of D. A. Schulte, Inc., in
premises 575 Eighth Avenue, New York City, does hereby acknowledge
receipt of the sum of $___ as payment in full of all sums, if any,
which may be due to the undersigned by said D. A. Schulte, Inc. by
reason of the Federal Wage & Hour Act, and the undersigned does
hereby release said D. A. Schulte, Inc. of and from any other or
further obligations in connection therewith."
[
Footnote 6]
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.
S. 239.
[
Footnote 7]
Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335.
[
Footnote 8]
Attention is called by petitioner to the failure in this case of
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States
Department of Labor, as
Amicus Curiae, to take the
position that compromise payments in cases of disputed coverage are
invalid. The Administrator is charged with responsibility for the
administration of the Act. Petitioner cites from the
Administrator's brief (p. 20) in the
O'Neil case to show
the Government position the following excerpt:
"The factors which we have mentioned suggest to us the
difficulty, and perhaps the inadvisability from the standpoint of
the policy of the Act, of framing a sweeping generalization that
all releases of liquidated damages are either valid or
invalid."
That brief called attention also (pp. 19-20) to Government
practice upon violations of the Act by contractors with cost-plus
contracts with the War and Navy Departments:
"If it is decided by the contracting agency, the Administrator,
or, on appeal, by the Assistant Attorney General that the employee
should prevail, the United States Attorney handling the case is
directed to negotiate a tentative settlement with the employee's
counsel for submission to the contracting agency for acceptance or
rejection. The wages due are, of course, always paid, but the claim
for liquidated damages is the subject of bargaining, and, almost
invariably, the employee's counsel is willing to accept
considerably less than the total amount of liquidated damages.
After payment of the amount agreed on, a judgment is entered
dismissing the suit with prejudice, thereby preventing the employee
from seeking to recover more on the same claim."
Settlements of controversies under the Act by stipulated
judgments in this Court are also referred to by petitioner.
North Shore Corp. v. Barnett, 323 U.S. 679.
Petitioner draws the inference that
bona fide
stipulated judgments on alleged Wage-Hour violations for less than
the amounts actually due stand in no better position than
bona
fide settlements. Even though stipulated judgments may be
obtained, where settlements are proposed in controversies between
employers and employees over violations of the Act, by the simple
device of filing suits and entering agreed judgments, we think the
requirement of pleading the issues and submitting the judgment to
judicial scrutiny may differentiate stipulated judgments from
compromises by the parties. At any rate, the suggestion of
petitioner is argumentative only, as no judgment was entered in
this case.
[
Footnote 9]
See Dize v. Maddrix, 324 U. S. 697,
324 U. S.
701-702,
324 U. S.
713.
[
Footnote 10]
See Strand v. Garden Valley Telephone
Co., 51 F. Supp.
898, 904, 905.
[
Footnote 11]
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, supra, 324 U. S. 713;
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.
S. 379,
300 U. S. 397;
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.
S. 525,
261 U. S.
563.
[
Footnote 12]
Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.
S. 572,
316 U. S.
583-584;
Birbalas v. Cuneo Printing Industries,
140 F.2d 826, 828, 829.
[
Footnote 13]
Discussions of compromise of liability under the Wage-Hour Act
will be found in 45 Col.L.Rev. 798; 14 George Washington L.Rev. 385
and 57 Harv.L.Rev. 257.
[
Footnote 14]
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, supra, 324 U. S.
704-705 note 14.
[
Footnote 15]
The precise language of the question presented is as
follows:
"Whether building maintenance employees are within the
protection of the Act if the facts relied on to establish coverage
of the employees show only that some of the tenants in the building
receive, work on, and return in intrastate commerce goods belonging
to local owners who are not tenants of the building, and that,
subsequently, some of the said goods are sold and shipped by such
nontenant owners in interstate commerce, there being no proof
either that, at the time of production, such tenants had any
knowledge of the ultimate destination of the goods worked on by
them or that, at the time of production, the nontenant owners had
any prior orders or agreements to sell and ship any part of the
completed goods in interstate commerce."
[
Footnote 16]
No problem involving the soundness of the Wage-Hour standards to
guide its enforcement of the Act is involved. We express no opinion
on that question. As a working hypothesis, the Wage-Hour
Administration assumes that, when as much as twenty percent of a
building is occupied by firms substantially engaged in production
for commerce, then it is likely that maintenance employees will be
covered. Release PR-19 (rev.), Nov.19, 1943, Wage-Hour Division,
U.S. Depart. of Labor. The Circuit Court of Appeals applied this
rule, with the result that it decided none of the respondents was
covered by the Act prior to January 1, 1940. 150 F.2d 694, 696,
697. It decided that all the respondents were covered by the Act
beginning January 1, 1940, because more than twenty percent of the
tenants then were engaged in the production of goods for commerce.
No review of the first ruling is sought by respondents. Petitioner
did not question the soundness of the twenty percent standard in
its petition for certiorari or brief.
As no question is made in petition for certiorari or brief as to
the propriety of the action or the power of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in determining the kind of activity, state or interstate,
that the petitioner's tenants carried on, rather than returning the
case to the District Court for a finding of fact, we pass the
question without inquiry and without intimation of our
understanding of the proper procedure.
Compare the
majority and dissenting opinion in 150 F.2d 694.
[
Footnote 17]
Petitioner says as to this finding:
"The sole basis in the record for this finding is that the
manufacturers for whom the said twelve tenant-contractors worked
eventually disposed of some of their goods in interstate commerce.
No evidence was offered, and no attempt was made to prove, that, at
the time when any of the additional twelve tenants worked on goods
belonging to the manufacturers, such manufacturers had an order or
an agreement or contract for the shipment of the goods, when
completed, in interstate commerce. There was no testimony by any of
the twelve tenants that they knew or had reason to believe that the
goods worked on by them would be shipped in interstate commerce. In
fact, there was no evidence, in the case of four of the twelve
tenants, that any of them knew, either at the time of production or
at any time thereafter, or even upon the trial, that the goods
worked on by them were eventually shipped in interstate
commerce."
[
Footnote 18]
Compare McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.
S. 491.
[
Footnote 19]
Compare Dize v. Maddrix, 144 F.2d 584;
Culver v.
Bell & Loffland, 146 F.2d 29;
St. John v.
Brown, 38 F. Supp.
385, 388;
Fleming v. Enterprise Box
Co., 37 F. Supp.
331,
aff'd, 125 F.2d 897;
Bracey v. Luray,
138 F.2d 8.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BURTON concurs,
dissenting.
Substantially for the reasons given by Judge Rifkind, 53 F.
Supp. 844, I would restore his judgment in the District Court and
reverse that of the Circuit Court of Appeals. 150 F.2d 694. For
purposes of judicial enforcement, the "policy" of a statute should
be drawn out of its terms, as nourished by their proper
environment, and not, like nitrogen, out
Page 328 U. S. 122
of the air. Before a hitherto familiar and socially desirable
practice is outlawed, where overreaching or exploitation is not
inherent in the situation, the outlawry should come from Congress.
To that end, some responsibility, at least, for a broad hint to the
courts, if not for explicitness, should be left with Congress.
When, on other occasions, Congress has desired to forbid
arrangements made in good faith, it has known how to express its
will. When it has not said so in words, it has said so in effect by
the very thing it has required -- as, for instance, when it made
tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission the fixed
measure of transportation charges and forbade discrimination. 24
Stat. 379, 380, as amended; 49 U.S.C. § 6(7). Of course, that
precludes discrimination by contract.
E.g., Pittsburgh, C., C.
& St. L. R. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577. The
Fair Labor Standards Act affords no comparable basis for the
Court's decision in this case. Nothing is discernible in anything
that Congress has said or done to imply the prohibition of a
settlement made by parties in good faith, not for the minimum
wages, but a settlement affecting the penalizing double liability
where any liability was fairly in controversy when the settlement
was made. The severity of the penalties imposed and the legitimate
differences regarding the scope of the Act, inherent in its terms,
cf. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.
S. 517, 520, 523, only serve to underline the impolicy
of attributing to Congress a purpose reflected neither in any
specific provision of the statute nor in the scheme of legislation.
Strict enforcement of the policy which puts beyond the pale of
private arrangement minimum standards of wages and hours fixed by
law does not call for disregard of another policy, that of
encouraging amicable settlement of honest differences between men
dealing at arm's length with one another.