1. Under 28 U.S.C. 250(2), giving the Court of Claims
jurisdiction to hear and determine
"All set-offs, counterclaims . . . or other demands whatsoever
on the part of the Government . . . against any claimant against
the Government in said Court,"
it is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, in a suit
against the Government for a refund of taxes, to hear and determine
a counterclaim of the Government based upon a debt owed by claimant
to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. P.
327 U. S.
539.
2. That Congress chose to call the RFC a corporation does not
alter its characteristics so as to make it something other than
it
Page 327 U. S. 537
actually is, an agency selected by the Government to accomplish
purely governmental purposes, notwithstanding the fact that, in
other situations and with relation to other statutes, this Court
has applied the doctrine of governmental immunity or priority
rather strictly. P.
327 U. S.
539.
3. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine
counterclaims is in no way dependent upon the preliminary
intra-governmental steps which precede court action -- such as
directions issued by the General Accounting Office to the Treasury.
P.
327 U. S.
538.
103 Ct.Cls. 243, 59 F. Supp. 122, affirmed.
Petitioner sued the Government for a tax refund in the Court of
Claims. The Government filed a counterclaim for a debt owed by
petitioner to the RFC. The Court of Claims overruled a challenge of
its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 250(2) and rendered judgment for
the United States and against petitioner for the amount it owed the
RFC less the amount of the tax refund. 103 Ct.Cls. 243, 59 F. Supp.
122. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U.S. 705.
Affirmed, p.
327 U. S. 540.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1942, the Government owed the petitioner a $3,104.87 refund
of processing and floor taxes paid by the petitioner under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act. The petitioner owed the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation $5,963.51, balance on a note for borrowed
money. The General Accounting Office directed the Treasury not to
pay the tax refund to the petitioner, but to issue a check for the
refund payable to the RFC "to partially liquidate" petitioner's
indebtedness to that governmental agency. As
Page 327 U. S. 538
authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 250(1), the petitioner then brought
suit against the Government for the tax refund in the Court of
Claims. The Government filed a counterclaim for the $5,963.51,
asserting the right to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 250(2), which gives
the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine
"All set-offs, counterclaims, . . . or other demands whatsoever
on the part of the Government of the United States against any
claimant against the Government in said court."
The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims to hear and determine the counterclaim on these two grounds:
(1) the Comptroller exceeded his authority in directing the
Treasury to pay the tax refund to the RFC instead of to the
petitioner; (2) the RFC should be treated in the same way as a
privately owned corporation, and, when so treated, the petitioner's
admittedly valid indebtedness to RFC is not a claim "on the part of
the Government" entitling it to set up a counterclaim under 28
U.S.C. § 250(2). The Court of Claims rejecting both these
contentions, rendered judgment for the United States and against
the petitioner for the amount it owed the RFC less the amount of
the tax refund. We granted certiorari.
Little need be said as to the contention concerning the alleged
lack of authority of the General Accounting Office to direct the
Treasury not to pay the petitioner, since we agree with the Court
of Claims that its jurisdiction to hear and determine counterclaims
is in no way dependent upon the preliminary intergovernmental steps
which precede court action. For this reason, the petitioner's
argument based on our decision in
Skinner & Eddy Corp. v.
McCarl, 275 U. S. 1, where
we considered the power of the Comptroller General in relation to
wholly different legislation, has no bearing on the power of the
Court of Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 250(2).
Page 327 U. S. 539
Nor do we find any justification for giving to 250(2) the narrow
interpretation urged. Its purpose was to permit the government,
when sued in the Court of Claims, to have determined in a single
suit all questions which involved mutual obligations between the
government and a claimant against it. Legislation of this kind has
long been favored and encouraged because of a belief that it
accomplishes, among other things, such useful purposes as avoidance
of "circuity of action, inconvenience, expense, consumption of the
courts' time, and injustice."
Chicago & N.W. Railway v.
Lindell, 281 U. S. 14,
281 U. S. 17,
and cases cited.
We have no doubt but that the set-off and counterclaim
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was intended to permit the
Government to have adjudicated in one suit all controversies
between it and those granted permission to sue it, whether the
Government's interest had been entrusted to its agencies of one
kind or another. Every reason that could have prompted Congress to
authorize the Government to plead counterclaims for debts owed to
any of its other agencies applies with equal force to debts owed to
the RFC. Its Directors are appointed by the President and affirmed
by the Senate; its activities are all aimed at accomplishing a
public purpose; all of its money comes from the Government; its
profits, if any, go to the Government; its losses the Government
must bear. That the Congress chose to call it a corporation does
not alter its characteristics so as to make it something other than
what it actually is -- an agency selected by Government to
accomplish purely Governmental purposes.
Inland Waterways Corp.
v. Young, 309 U. S. 517,
309 U. S. 524.
Nor is this Congressionally granted power to plead a counterclaim
to be reduced because, in other situations and with relation to
other statutes, we have applied the doctrine of governmental
Page 327 U. S. 540
immunity or priority rather strictly.
* The Government
here sought neither immunity nor priority. Its right to
counterclaim rests on different principles, one of which was
graphically expressed by the sponsors of the Act of which Section
250(2) is a part: it is "as much the duty of the citizen to pay the
Government as it is the duty of the Government to pay the citizen."
59 Cong.Globe 1674, 37th Cong.2d Sess.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
*
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp.,
258 U. S. 549;
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,
306 U. S. 381;
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp.,
312 U. S. 81.
