1. A state court of New York has jurisdiction to try a
non-Indian for the murder of another non-Indian committed on the
Allegany Reservation of the Seneca Indians within that State.
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.
S. 621, followed. P.
326 U. S.
498.
2. Section 2145 of the Revised Statutes does not operate to
deprive States of jurisdiction of crimes committed on Indian
reservations by one non-Indian against another. P.
326 U. S.
499.
3. Exercise of jurisdiction by a state court of New York over
crimes
Page 326 U. S. 497
involving only non-Indians and committed on the Allegany
Reservation of the Seneca Indians within that State does not
violate the Treaty of 1794. P.
326 U. S.
500.
294 N.Y. 61, 60 N.E.2d 541, affirmed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 685, to review the affirmance of a
judgment dismissing a writ of habeas corpus.
See 26
App.Div. 218, 52 N.Y.S.2d 496; 181 Misc. 925, 47 N.Y.S.2d 883.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.
S. 621, this Court held that the State courts of
Colorado, not the Federal courts, had jurisdiction to prosecute a
murder of one non-Indian by another, committed on an Indian
reservation located within that State. The holding in that case was
that the Act of Congress, 18 Stat. 474, admitting Colorado into the
union overruled all prior inconsistent statutes and treaties and
placed it "on an equal footing with the original States . . . ,"
that this meant that Colorado had "criminal jurisdiction over its
own citizens and other white persons throughout the whole of the
territory within its limits, including the Ute Reservation," and
that, consequently,
Page 326 U. S. 498
the United States no longer had "sole and exclusive
jurisdiction" over the Reservation except to the extent necessary
to carry out such treaty provisions which remained in force. That
case has since been followed by this Court, [
Footnote 1] and its holding has not been modified
by any act of Congress. The question this case presents is whether
New York, which is one of the original States, has jurisdiction to
punish a murder of one non-Indian committed by another non-Indian
upon the Allegany Reservation of the Seneca Indians located within
the New York.
In 1939, the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment in a
New York State court for the murder of a man in the City of
Salamanca, which is within the Allegany Reservation but has only 8
Indian families living among its 9,000 inhabitants. He later
brought this habeas corpus proceeding in a county court of the
State. [
Footnote 2] He alleged
that, since the Indian reservation was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, the State courts lacked
jurisdiction to try and convict him. The County Court of Wyoming
County heard the case and ordered the writ dismissed. 181 Misc.
925, 47 N.Y.S.2d 883. Both the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court, 268 App.Div. 218, 52 N.Y.S.2d 496, and the Court of Appeals,
294 N.Y. 61, 60 N.E.2d 541, affirmed the dismissal. [
Footnote 3] We granted certiorari because of
the federal questions raised.
Page 326 U. S. 499
We think the rule announced in the
McBratney case
controlling, and that the New York Court therefore properly
exercised its jurisdiction. For that case and others which followed
it all held that, in the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or
Congressional enactment, each state had a right to exercise
jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its boundaries.
[
Footnote 4] Petitioner claims
that the
McBratney case differs from this proceeding in
several respects. First, he contends that Colorado could exercise
greater powers over its Indian reservations than New York can, by
virtue of the enabling act which admitted Colorado into the union,
a similar enactment being lacking here since New York is one of the
original states. As we have seen, the Colorado enabling act was
held in the
McBratney case to put Colorado "on an equal
footing with the original States," and to repeal earlier
legislation and treaties inconsistent with the enabling act. The
fact that Colorado was put on an equal footing with the original
states obviously did not give it any greater power than New York.
And no greater power can be inferred from the repealing function of
the enabling act, since, as we shall point out, the statutes and
treaties which petitioner claims deprive New York of jurisdiction
do not in fact do so.
This brings us to petitioner's further contention that certain
Federal statutes specifically grant the United States exclusive
jurisdiction over the Seneca Reservation. He points out that the
laws of the United States make murder a crime "if committed in any
place within the sole and
Page 326 U. S. 500
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . ;" 18 U.S.C. §
452; that Section 2145 of the Revised Statutes, 25 U.S.C. § 217,
makes this murder statute applicable to "Indian country;" and
contends that the Seneca Reservation is Indian country, and that,
consequently, New York has no jurisdiction to punish a murder
committed on that Reservation. The cases following the
McBratney case adequately answer petitioner's contentions
concerning Section 2145, even if we assume, what we need not
decide, that the Seneca Reservation is Indian country within the
meaning of the statute. While Section 2145 of the Revised Statutes
has been held applicable in territories to crimes between whites
and whites which do not affect Indians, [
Footnote 5] the
McBratney line of decisions
stands for the proposition that States, by virtue of their
statehood, have jurisdiction over such crimes notwithstanding
Section 2145. [
Footnote 6]
See also New York v.
Dibble, 21 How. 366.
Petitioner further contends that the
McBratney rule is
not applicable here because exercise of state jurisdiction over
non-Indians at Salamanca would violate the Treaty of 1794, 7 Stat.
44. We can find no language in that Treaty that lends itself to
such interpretation. The Treaty was one of peace and friendship
between the United States and the Indians. It provided against
private revenge or retaliation on account of injuries done by
individuals on either side. Such injuries were to be reported by
each nation to the other with a view of having the nation to which
the individual offender belonged take "such prudent measures
Page 326 U. S. 501
. . . as shall be necessary to preserve . . . peace and
friendship unbroken." Art. 7. This procedure was to be followed
until Congress made "other equitable provision for the purpose."
This latter language, upon which the petitioner most strongly
relies as imposing a duty upon the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over the whole Reservation to the exclusion of the
State, even as to offenses committed by whites against whites,
cannot properly be interpreted as the petitioner asks. The entire
emphasis in treaties and Congressional enactments dealing with
Indian affairs has always been focused upon the treatment of the
Indians themselves and their property. Generally no emphasis has
been placed on whether state or United States Courts should try
white offenders for conduct which happened to take place upon an
Indian reservation, but which did not directly affect the Indians.
Neither the 1794 Treaty nor any other requires a holding that
offenses by non-Indians against non-Indians disturbing the peace
and order of Salamanca are beyond New York's power to punish.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Draper v. United States, 164 U.
S. 240.
See also United States v. Ramsey,
271 U. S. 467,
271 U. S. 469;
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.
S. 243,
228 U. S. 271;
United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375,
118 U. S.
383.
[
Footnote 2]
A previous petition in the Federal courts had been denied
because relief had not first been sought in the New York State
courts.
Ex parte Ray, 54 F. Supp. 218; 141 F.2d 300.
[
Footnote 3]
The New York Court of Appeals held, and the State urges here,
that the State court had jurisdiction by virtue of Section 8 of the
Act of Congress passed in 1875, 18 Stat. 330, authorizing certain
parts of the Allegany Reservation to be surveyed for establishment
of a number of villages including Salamanca. Section 8 provided,
among other things, that "all municipal laws and regulations of
said State [New York] may extend over and be enforced within said
villages." Acting under what it conceived to be the authority
granted by this Section, New York passed a law, Chap. 188 of New
York Laws of 1881, extending its "general law" so as to apply to
Salamanca. Since we think the rule in the
McBratney case
controlling, we find it unnecessary in this case to pass on the
scope and validity of this Act.
[
Footnote 4]
This holding was in harmony with general principles governing
this subject.
Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.
S. 647,
281 U. S. 651;
Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.
S. 317,
221 U. S. 320;
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.
S. 535,
302 U. S.
539.
[
Footnote 5]
Ex parte Wilson, 140 U. S. 575;
Pickett v. United States, 216 U.
S. 456,
216 U. S.
458.
[
Footnote 6]
In
Donnelly v. United States, supra, 228 U.S. at
228 U. S. 270,
this Court pointed out that the provisions contained in Section
2145 of the Revised Statutes were first enacted as Section 25 of
the Indian Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, 733. This
means that the statute was in effect at the time of the
McBratney decision. Yet, significantly the Court did not
even find it necessary to mention it.