1. Section 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act allows
"Any person not an enemy or ally of enemy . . . to whom any debt
may be owing from an enemy or ally of enemy whose property or any
part thereof shall have been conveyed, transferred, assigned,
delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian"
to sue the Custodian or the Treasurer of the United States in
the federal courts. Section 9(e) provides that no debt shall be
allowed under § 9 "unless it was owing to and owned by the claimant
prior to October 6, 1917," nor
"unless notice of the claim has been filed, or application
therefor has been made, prior to the date of the enactment of the
Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928."
Held:
(a) The Trading with the Enemy Act became effective again
automatically at the outbreak of World War II. P.
326 U. S.
407.
The Act was designed to operate not only in World War I, but
also, unless repealed or superseded, in any future war. P.
326 U. S.
409.
Page 326 U. S. 405
(b) The right to sue on a debt, granted by § 9(a), has not been
wholly withdrawn. P.
326 U. S.
412.
(c) The time limitations in § 9(e) relate to claim against
property seized during World War I. P.
326 U. S.
412.
(d) Allowance of suit on a debt as prescribed by § 9(a) is not
inconsistent with the power granted the Executive by the 1941
amendment of § 5(b) to vest the property of any foreign country or
national thereof and to make of seized property any use which the
national interest in wartime might require. P.
326 U. S.
412.
2. Resort to the policy of a law may be had to ameliorate its
seeming harshness or to qualify its apparent absolutes.
Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.
S. 457. P.
326 U. S.
409.
3. A less literal reading which effectuates a statute is
preferred to a strict reading which would render it ineffectual. P.
326 U. S.
409.
4. Where Congress amends only one section of a law, leaving
another untouched, the normal assumption is that the two were
designed to function as an integrated whole. P.
326 U. S.
411.
148 F.2d 737 affirmed.
Certiorari, 325 U.S. 847, to review the reversal of a judgment
dismissing the complaint in a suit under the Trading with the Enemy
Act.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, an American citizen, brought this suit against the
Alien Property Custodian and the Treasurer of the United States to
recover from the assets of the Assicurazioni Generali di Trieste e
Venezia, an Italian
Page 326 U. S. 406
insurance company, the unpaid portion of a claim for legal
services rendered that company. The assets of the company had
vested in the Alien Property Custodian in 1942, [
Footnote 1] and the vested assets had been
delivered to him. The suit was sought to be maintained under § 9(a)
of the Trading with the Enemy Act (40 Stat. 411, as amended 41
Stat. 977, 50 U.S.C.App. § 9(a)), which allows
"[a]ny person not an enemy or ally of enemy . . . to whom any
debt may be owing from an enemy or ally of enemy whose property or
any part thereof shall have conveyed, transferred, assigned,
delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian"
to sue the Custodian or the Treasurer of the United States in
the federal courts. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that
the claim did not qualify under § 9(e) of the Act. Sec. 9(e), which
was added to the Act in 1920 (41 Stat. 980) and amended in 1928 (45
Stat. 271), provides that no debt shall be allowed under § 9
"unless it was owing to and owned by the claimant prior to October
6, 1917," nor
"unless notice of the claim has been filed, or application
therefor has been made, prior to the date of the enactment of the
Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928."
In view of those provisions of § 9(e), the District Court
dismissed the complaint. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 148
F.2d 737. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari
which we granted because of the public importance of the question
presented.
If § 9(e) is applicable here, the suit may not be maintained,
since the debt was not in existence on October 6,
Page 326 U. S. 407
1917, nor had notice of the claim been filed or application
therefor been made prior to the date of the enactment of the
Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 254. We would have
quite a different case if § 9(a) and (e) had been enacted after the
outbreak of the recent war. For we may assume that Congress could
set up such barriers as it chose to the enforcement of the claims
of an alien's creditors against the seized property. But the doubt
as to the applicability of § 9(e) to the present situation arises
because that provision was part of the legislation enacted after
the outbreak of World War I to deal with the claims against
property seized during that period. That legislation was not
reenacted when the recent war broke out. It automatically went into
effect again at that time. [
Footnote 2] Hence, the argument that these provisions of §
9(e) are limited to claims against property seized during World War
I. Our conclusion is that they are so limited.
In the first place, § 9(e) disallows recovery
"to any person who is a citizen or subject of any nation which
was associated with the United States in the prosecution of the
war, unless such nation in like case extends reciprocal rights to
citizens of the United States."
When it is recalled that § 9(e) was first added to the act in
1920, it seems tolerably clear that the words "was associated with
the United States in the prosecution of the war" refer to World War
I. The use not only of the past tense, but
Page 326 U. S. 408
also of the concept of "associate" is significant. As Judge
Learned Hand, speaking for the Court below, said, the word
"associate" was used during World War I "in sedulous avoidance of
any implication" that we had "allies." In the second place, the
time limitations contained in § 9(e) point the same way. As the
United States says, some sections of the Act were explicitly
restricted to situations growing out of World War I, as, for
example, § 3(d). But it seems to us that the provisions of § 9(e)
with which we are now concerned carry almost as plain a hallmark.
For the restriction of suits to debts which were owing to and owned
by the claimant prior to October 6, 1917, and as respects which a
notice of claim had been filed prior to the date of the enactment
of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928, strongly suggests that
Congress was dealing exclusively with World War I claims, not with
claims which might arise in some future war. As of 1920 and 1928,
the time limitations written into § 9(e) had no other relevancy.
The Committee Reports, [
Footnote
3] accompanying the legislation by which § 9(e) was added to
the law, while not explicit on the precise point, show that
Congress was concerned solely with the handling of claims which
then existed. There is not the slightest suggestion that Congress
was drafting a statute of limitations likewise applicable to claims
which might be asserted in case the United States at some future
time again went to war. These considerations indicate to us that it
would be a
Page 326 U. S. 409
distortion to read § 9(e) as if Congress, in December, 1941,
decided that the statute of limitations applicable to World War I
claims should likewise be applicable to World War II claims. If we
gave § 9(e) that broad interpretation, we would, in the third
place, deprive § 9(a) of all meaning so far as World War II claims
were concerned. That we hesitate to do, for the Act was not only
designed to operate in the first World War; it was also to become
effective at the time of any future war, unless repealed or
superseded. Yet the remedy afforded by § 9(a) would be quite
illusory and ineffective so far as it applies to World War II
claims if § 9(e) were read literally without regard to its history.
It was for this reason particularly that the court below refused
"to make a fortress out of the dictionary" and to read § 9(e)
strictly and literally. The policy, as well as the letter, of the
law is a guide to decision. Resort to the policy of a law may be
had to ameliorate its seeming harshness or to qualify its apparent
absolutes, as
Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
143 U. S. 457,
illustrates. The process of interpretation also misses its high
function if a strict reading of a law results in the emasculation
or deletion of a provision which a less literal reading would
preserve.
The United States, however, contends that such a construction of
§ 9(e) would gravely interfere with the efficient administration of
alien property controls in accordance with policies adopted by
Congress in relation to World War II. It points out that, by virtue
of amendments to § 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act which
were made on December 18, 1941, by the First War Powers Act (55
Stat. 839, 50 U.S.C.App. Supp. IV, § 616), the Executive is now
armed with far more comprehensive power over alien property and the
property of other foreign interests than in World War I. Now there
is the "freezing" or "blocking" of foreign funds aimed at the
immobilization of foreign assets in the United States by
prohibiting,
Page 326 U. S. 410
without a license, any transactions involving them -- a program
initiated after the invasion by Germany of Denmark and Norway and
administered by the Treasury. [
Footnote 4] If the Treasury refuses a license permitting
payment of creditors out of blocked funds, neither the creditor nor
the owner has any remedy as a matter of right under the Act. It is
said that to allow creditors of certain aliens whose property has
been vested in the Alien Property Custodian to maintain suits, but
to disallow suits by creditors of aliens whose funds are merely
frozen, is to destroy consistency in the position of creditors
under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Moreover, § 9(a) permits
suits on debt claims only if the debt is one "owing from an enemy
or ally of enemy" whose property has been taken. By the 1941
amendment to § 5(b), the vesting power has not been so limited, but
extends to "any property or interest of any foreign country or
national." The argument is that to construe § 9(e) so as to permit
creditors of an enemy to sue is to discriminate without warrant
against creditors of nonenemy foreign nationals who are given no
such remedy. Moreover, it is said that, if § 9(e) is not a barrier
to suits, a race of diligence would be started with no guarantee of
any equitably ordered priority in the payment of the claims out of
the seized property. It is also argued that, if these suits are
allowed, the operations of the Custodian would be burdened with
litigation.
We have concluded that, however meritorious these considerations
are, they raise questions of policy for Congress. We are concerned
only with the right to sue on a debt under § 9. Congress granted
that right to some claimants and withheld it from others. Whether
its choice was wise or not is not for us to say. The right to sue,
explicitly granted by § 9(a), should not be read out of the law
Page 326 U. S. 411
unless it is clear that Congress, by what it later did, withdrew
its earlier permission. We can find no indication in the 1941
legislation that Congress, by amending § 5(b), desired to delete or
wholly nullify § 9(a). On the contrary, the normal assumption is
that, where Congress amends only one section of a law, leaving
another untouched, the two were designed to function as parts of an
integrated whole. We should give each as full a play as possible.
Moreover, we are able to find in the amendment to § 5(b) no
suggestion or indication that Congress was writing a different
statute of limitations than was then contained in § 9(e). The 1941
amendment is as silent on that score as it is on the right to sue
afforded by § 9(a).
It is true that § 5(b) gave a broader grant of authority to the
Executive than had existed under the original Act. [
Footnote 5] As respects the seizure of
property, it provides:
Page 326 U. S. 412
". . . any property or interest of any foreign country or
national thereof shall vest when, as, and upon the terms directed
by the President in such agency or person as may be designated from
time to time by the President, and upon such terms and conditions
as the President may prescribe
such interest or property shall
be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt
with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United
States, and such designated agency or person may perform any
and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these
purposes."
(Italics added)
It is said that the survival of the privilege of satisfying debt
claims as a matter of right out of vested property is inconsistent
with the new power granted the Executive by § 5(b) to make any
affirmative use of the property that the national interest in time
of war might require. But we are here concerned solely with the
right to sue on a debt, not with the right to sue to reclaim
property nor with any question concerning the satisfaction of any
judgment which may be obtained. We only hold that the right to sue
on a debt granted by § 9(a) has not been wholly withdrawn, and that
§ 9(e) is not applicable to this class of claims. We cannot see
that the allowance of
Page 326 U. S. 413
a suit on a debt as prescribed by § 9(a) collides with the
policy of § 5(b). That does not in any way cause interference with
the administration of the vested property pursuant to § 5(b). Sec.
9(a), to be sure, contains a provision which prescribes how any
judgment obtained in the suit against the Custodian or Treasurer
shall be satisfied, [
Footnote
6] and also allows suits to reclaim property. [
Footnote 7] Whether those provisions have
been superseded by § 5(b), or whether § 5(b) contains a grant of
authority which may be so exercised as to prevent the reclamation
of property or the payment of the judgment or to alter the
procedure for reclamation or payment as prescribed in § 9(a), are
distinct questions. Here, we are dealing solely with the right to
maintain a suit on a debt -- a right which is not shown to collide
with § 5(b). We reserve decision on the other questions.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
See Vesting Order 218, dated October 7, 1942, 7
Fed.Reg. 9466; Vesting Order 468, dated December 9, 1942, 8
Fed.Reg. 1038. For the establishment of the office of Alien
Property Custodian and the definition of his functions as respects
the vesting of alien property,
see Executive Order 9193,
dated July 6, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg. 5205, amending Executive Order 9095,
dated March 11, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg.1971.
[
Footnote 2]
As the Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, that followed from
several circumstances: (a) § 2 defined "the beginning of the war"
to mean "midnight ending the day on which Congress has declared or
shall declare war or the existence of a state of war;" (b) § 302 of
the First War Powers Act, approved December 18, 1941 (55 Stat. 838,
840), assumed that the Trading with the Enemy Act had not been in
force before December 8, 1941, and that it went into effect again
at that time, and (c) § 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act was
amended December 18, 1941, by the First War Powers Act without any
mention of the other parts of the earlier act. 55 Stat. 839.
[
Footnote 3]
See H.Rep. No.1089, 66th Cong., 2d Sess.; S.Rep.
No.273, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29; H.Rep. No.17, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 20. In S.Rep. No.273,
supra, it was stated:
"Under the existing law, a creditor of a person whose property
was seized by the Alien Property Custodian may file a claim and
institute proceedings for the payment of the debt, under certain
conditions. Inasmuch as these claimants have had more than 10 years
in which to file their claims, this provision is amended by
subsection (b) of section 12 of the proposed bill so as to permit
payment only where the claim was filed prior to the date of the
enactment of the bill."
[
Footnote 4]
This program, initiated by Executive Order 8389, dated April 10,
1940, 5 Fed.Reg. 1400, was ratified by Congress on May 7, 1940, by
Joint Resolution. 54 Stat. 179.
[
Footnote 5]
As stated in H.Rep. No.1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3:
"Section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act has been
continued down to the present time. The existing system of foreign
property control (commonly known as freezing control) is based on
that subdivision as last amended on May 7, 1940. That subdivision
of section 5, as it is now in effect, however, does not give the
broad powers to take, administer, control, use, liquidate, etc.,
such foreign-owned property that would be given by section 301 of
the bill."
"At present, the Government exercises supervision over
transactions in foreign property either by prohibiting such
transactions or by permitting them on condition and under license.
It is therefore a system which can prevent transactions in foreign
property prejudicial to the best interests of the United States,
but it is not a system which can affirmatively compel the use and
application of foreign property in those interests."
"Section 301 remedies that situation by adding to the existing
freezing control, in substance, the powers contained in the Trading
With the Enemy Act with respect to alien property, extending those
powers, and adding a flexibility of control which experience under
the original act and the recent experience under freezing control
have demonstrated to be advisable. The provisions of section 301
would permit the establishment of a complete system of alien
property treatment. It vests flexible powers in the President,
operating through such agency or agencies as he might choose, to
deal with the problems that surround alien property or its
ownership or control in the manner deemed most effective in each
particular case. In this respect, the bill avoids the rigidity and
inflexibility which characterized the alien property custodian law
enacted during the last war. The necessity for flexibility in
legislation on this subject is accentuated by the vastness of the
alien property problem confronting the Government today. At the
peak of his activity, the Alien Property Custodian of the last war
administered property valued at something over $500,000,000. Today,
there is over $7,000,000,000 worth of property already subject to
the existing control."
And see S.Rep. No.911, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.
[
Footnote 6]
"If suit shall be so instituted, then such money or property
shall be retained in the custody of the Alien Property Custodian,
or in the Treasury of the United States, as provided in this Act,
and until any final judgment or decree which shall be entered in
favor of the claimant shall be fully satisfied by payment or
conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery by the defendant, or
by the Alien Property Custodian, or Treasurer of the United States
on order of the court, or until final judgment or decree shall be
entered against the claimant or suit otherwise terminated."
[
Footnote 7]
Sec. 9(a) allows suits by
"[a]ny person not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any
interest, right, or title in any money or other property which may
have been conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to
the Alien Property Custodian or seized by him hereunder and held by
him or by the Treasurer of the United States,"
as well as suits by any such person to whom a debt may be owing
from any enemy or ally of enemy whose property has been seized.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON, concurring.
A review of the development of the Trading with the Enemy Act
from its inception in 1917, early in World War
Page 326 U. S. 414
I, further discloses its dual purposes in a way that throws
needed light upon its meaning at the time of this proceeding in
1944, late in World War II.
It originated as H.R. 4960, June 11, 1917, drafted in the form
of permanent legislation. Its purposes were explained by House and
Senate Committees in terms suited to permanent legislation.
[
Footnote 2/1] Before its passage,
several amendments were inserted which limited specific sections of
the Act to "the present war," [
Footnote
2/2] but none of these so limited § 9 or the act as a whole.
Other sections were limited by references made to specific nations,
and still others by references to specific dates. Later amendments
added other provisions confined to World War I. However, no general
limitation ever has confined the Act as a whole or its main
structural provisions to a specific war, specific nations, or
specific dates. In this way, the Act has met the immediate needs of
its time and also has stood ready to meet additional wars and
additional enemies. The beginning of World War II in 1941
accordingly found
Page 326 U. S. 415
many provisions of the Act, such as § 9(e), limited by
references to World War I, and others, such as § 9(a), not so
limited.
By its terms, its nature, and its history, § 9(e), [
Footnote 2/3] from its inception, has
related solely to World War I. Its relation to World War I is
apparent on its face. Its first clause refers to a restriction on
the allowance of a debt "to any person who is a citizen or a
subject of any nation
which was associated with the United
States in the prosecution of the war." These words, enacted in
1920 (41 Stat. 977, 980) and reenacted in 1923 (42 Stat. 1511,
1514), refer to any nation "associated" with us in World War I.
"Associated" was then a word of art. Its second clause reads,
"
nor, in any event, shall a debt be allowed under this section
unless it was owing to and owned by the claimant prior to October
6, 1917." This refers to the effective date of the original
Trading with the Enemy Act. This date provides a reasonable test
for debts to be allowed
Page 326 U. S. 416
against property seized by the Alien Property Custodian in
connection with World War I. It has no reasonable relation to a war
beginning in 1941. To require claims to be more than 24 years old
in order to be acceptable is beyond reason. The last clause
reads,
"
nor shall a debt be allowed under this section unless
notice of the claim has been filed, or application therefor has
been made, prior to the date of the enactment of the Settlement of
War Claims Act of 1928."
This clause means nothing when applied to a claim, like the
present one, which was not earned until 1935.
Section 9(e), as thus earmarked, prescribes a natural limitation
upon claims to be allowed against enemy property seized in World
War I. As such it is reasonable. It is not possible, however, that
Congress intentionally chose this indirect way of saying that
American creditors may assert just claims against assets of debtors
whose properties were seized in World War I, but not against assets
of debtors whose properties might be held in custody by the Alien
Property Custodian as a result of future wars.
The legislative history emphasizes this. The original Trading
with the Enemy Act, when enacted, October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 411),
contained two kinds of provisions. The general structure of the Act
was in terms of permanent legislation. Section 2, in defining
terms, refrained from reference to the war then in progress or to
specific nations or fixed dates. For example, it provided that:
"The words 'the beginning of the war,' as used herein, shall be
deemed to mean midnight ending the day on which Congress has
declared or shall declare war or the existence of a state of
war."
"The words 'end of the war,' as used herein, shall be deemed to
mean the date of proclamation of exchange of ratifications of the
treaty of peace, unless the President shall, by proclamation,
declare a prior date, in which case the date so proclaimed shall be
deemed to be the 'end of
Page 326 U. S. 417
the war' within the meaning of this Act."
(50 U.S.C. App. § 2(c)).
Sections 3(a), (b) and (c) dealt in like terms with general
procedure for trading under Presidential license in time of war.
Section 5(b) dealt with the regulation of foreign exchange, coin
export, transfers of credit, etc. Section 6 authorized the
President to appoint an official to be known as the Alien Property
Custodian. Section 9 provided for the assertion of property claims
and debt claims on behalf of any person not an enemy or ally of
enemy against certain assets in the possession of the
Custodian.
On the other hand, certain other provisions were, from the
beginning, earmarked as temporary provisions. For example, § 3(d)
referred to certain censorship to be established "during the
present war." Section 4(a) referred to certain German insurance
companies. Section 4(b) referred to "the present war." Similar
references to "the present war" occurred in §§ 11, 13, and 14.
Section 9 is typical. Originally it was all of a general and
permanent nature. It has been amended nine times. Its first
paragraph has been preserved, with slight changes, as § 9(a) in the
form of permanent legislation. On the other hand, many new
subsections of § 9, including § 9(e), contain provisions suited
only to transactions growing out of World War I. The first
amendment to § 9 was that of July 11, 1919 (41 Stat. 35). This
threatened to confuse the situation. It inserted in the first
paragraph a proviso referring to (41 Stat. 36) "all property
heretofore determined by the President to have been held .
. . for the benefit of a person who was an enemy or ally of enemy"
and to
"territory of any nation associated with the United States in
the prosecution of the war which was occupied by the military or
naval forces of
Germany or Austria-Hungary, or their
allies."
(Italics supplied.) On June 5, 1920, however, the second
amendment (41 Stat. 977)
Page 326 U. S. 418
corrected this and set the pattern which has since been
followed. It reenacted the whole of § 9 and, in doing so, removed
from its first paragraph the 1919 proviso. It restored that
paragraph to general terms and gave it the designation of § 9(a),
which it has retained. Congress, at the same time, added several
subsections, most of which contained express references to Germany
and Austria-Hungary. Section 9(e) first appeared at that time. From
the beginning, § 9(e) contained its present references to "any
nation which was associated with the United States in the
prosecution of the war" and to the requirement that a debt, in
order to be allowed under the section, must have been "owing to and
owned by the claimant prior to October 6, 1917." Later amendments
emphasized this restriction of § 9(e) to World War I, while
preserving the general and permanent character of § 9(a). [
Footnote 2/4] Distortion
Page 326 U. S. 419
of the meaning of statutory language would result not from
limiting § 9(e) to World War I, but from applying it to World War
II.
It is argued that to exclude the defense which is claimed to be
supplied by § 9(e) against debts payable out of property vested in
the Custodian during World War II, under § 5(b), as amended by the
First War Powers Act, December 18, 1941 (55 Stat. 839), will result
in inequities. For example, it is urged that § 5(b) was amended in
1941 to permit vesting in the Custodian of property of "any foreign
country or a national thereof." However, § 9(a) has not been
amended correspondingly to permit the assertion of claims to the
payment of debts out of the property of a foreign national, as
distinguished from that of an "enemy or ally of enemy." From this,
it is argued that Congress should not be regarded as having
intended to create such inequities, if there be such, between
creditors of "enemies" and those of other "foreign nationals"
through the passage of the First War Powers Act, and that therefore
Congress must be regarded as having intended that § 9(e) eliminate
all creditors' claims under § 9(a) against property of enemies and
of allies of enemies, unless filed or claimed before March 10,
1928.
This amounts to an argument that, because subsequent legislation
has produced inequitable results, therefore preexisting legislation
should be reinterpreted so as to
Page 326 U. S. 420
eliminate these subsequently created inequities. If the meaning
of § 9(e) was restricted to World War I prior to the enactment of
the First War Powers Act, the First War Powers Act cannot change
the meaning of § 9(e) without amending it, and it does not amend
it. A suggestion that amendatory legislation might now be helpful
is found in bills recently introduced in Congress with the support
of the Alien Property Custodian. The hearings emphasize that need.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Furthermore, the interpretation now urged to offset inequities
would create other inequities. For example, the proposed
interpretation would result in an inequity to the respondent in the
present case. He is an American citizen with an admittedly good
claim for about $7,000 earned in 1935, against an enemy
corporation, assets of which in the hands of the Alien Property
Custodian are ample to pay the claim. The claimant filed his claim
within the one year prescribed in the order vesting the assets of
the enemy company in the Custodian. [
Footnote 2/6] The claimant is now met with a defense
that he cannot recover, because he failed to file his claim before
March 10, 1928, which was seven years before it was earned and
fourteen years before the assets had been vested in the Custodian
with whom he is asked to file his notice. The decision as to the
existence of inequities under the 1941 amendment and as to the best
way to deal with them lay with Congress in 1941, and still lies
there.
The Act never has had a termination clause, and was expressly
excluded from the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1921 (41 Stat.
1359), which declared that certain acts of
Page 326 U. S. 421
Congress should be construed as if the war had ended and the
present or then existing emergency had expired. The Settlement of
War Claims Act of 1928 [
Footnote
2/7] was engrafted upon the Trading with the Enemy Act without
affecting its general structure or its life. In the natural course
of events, World War I claims ultimately would have been disposed
of, and yet the main structure of the Act would have remained on
the books ready for later use. That this was contemplated is
evidenced by Executive Order 6694, May 1, 1934. [
Footnote 2/8] This was issued under authority of
the Reorganization Act of March 3, 193 (47 Stat. 1489, 1517).
Section 1 expressly abolished the Office of the Alien Property
Custodian and transferred the
"authority, rights, privileges, powers, and duties conferred and
imposed on the Alien Property Custodian by law and/or Executive
Order . . . to the Department of Justice, to be administered under
the supervision of the Attorney General."
This incorporated the office of the Alien Property Custodian
into the permanent structure of the Government. Within the
Department of Justice, the rights, privileges, powers, and duties
conferred upon the Alien Property Custodian were placed under the
Attorney General, and were later exercised largely through him or
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Claims Division in
the Department of Justice. On May 15, 1939, by Executive Order
8136, 4 Fed.Reg. 2044, all power and authority conferred upon the
President by §§ 9, 12, 20 and 21 of the Trading with the Enemy Act
and all power and authority which the President under that Act had
theretofore ordered to be exercised through the Alien Property
Custodian were vested in and required to be exercised through the
Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Claims Division in the Department of Justice.
In this status, § 9(a) and other permanent portions of
Page 326 U. S. 422
the Trading with the Enemy Act awaited the next war. If left in
that form, there would have been no inequities other than those
which had existed in World War I. The Act would have been
administered much as it was in World War I, except that it would
have been administered through the Attorney General and the
Department of Justice instead of through an independent agency. In
1940, at the approach of World War II, the Act had much the same
structure in §§ 9(a), 9(e) and 5(b) as it had in 1928. The
inequities discussed in this proceeding arose later from the
substantial expansion of § 5(b). [
Footnote 2/9]
Page 326 U. S. 423
On December 18, 1941, came the First War Powers Act. 55 Stat.
839. No statutory or executive action was needed to make the
machinery of the Trading with the Enemy Act available. It was
already in effect with the full statutory powers of the Alien
Property Custodian vested in the Attorney General. Title III of the
First War Powers Act expressly recognized the Trading with the
Enemy Act by amending only § 5(b) of it. Congress also confirmed
all actions already taken "under the Trading with the Enemy Act"
which would have been authorized "if the provisions of this Act
[First War Powers Act] and the amendments made by it had been in
effect."
On March 11, 1942, the President issued Executive Order 9095, 7
Fed.Reg.1971, establishing in the Office for Emergency Management
of the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Alien
Property Custodian at the head of which there again would be an
Alien Property Custodian appointed by the President. By Executive
Order 9142, April 21, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg. 2985, expressly acting under
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and in particular
under Title I of the First War Powers Act, the President
transferred for "the continuance of the present war and for six
months after the termination thereof" to "the Alien Property
Custodian provided for by Executive Order No. 9095," everything
that had been transferred to the Attorney General by Executive
Order 6694 of May 1, 1934, or to the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Claims Division of the Department of Justice under
Executive Order 8136, May 15, 1939, 4 Fed.Reg. 2044.
On July 6, 1942, Executive Order 9095 was amended by Executive
Order 9193, 7 Fed.Reg. 5205. The Alien Property Custodian "provided
for by Executive Order No. 9095," as amended by Executive Order
9193, was thus given the powers of the Trading with the Enemy Act
as fully as in World War I, and also additional powers provided
Page 326 U. S. 424
through amendments including the expansion of powers under §
5(b). These authorizations carried power to issue regulations,
particularly in connection with the vesting of property as was done
by the vesting orders in this case. [
Footnote 2/10] The Alien Property Custodian in taking
over the administration of the Trading with the Enemy Acts, is
entitled to the full scope of its permanent provisions, whether
found in § 5(b) or § 9(a) or elsewhere.
For these reasons, § 9(e) does not present a ground for
dismissal of the complaint, which depends upon § 9(a), and the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, having concurred in the Court's
opinion, also joins in these views.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"The chief objects of this bill are (1) to recognize and apply
concretely, subject to definite modifications, the principle and
practice of international law interdicting trade in time of war,
and (2) to conserve and utilize upon a basis of practical justice
enemy property found within the jurisdiction of the United States.
. . . According to American law, one of the immediate consequences
of war is to put an end to all commercial relations between
citizens or subjects of belligerent nations."
H.R.Rep. No.85, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, June 21, 1917. "To
summarize, the purpose of the bill is not to create new
international rules or practices, but to define and mitigate them."
H.R.Rep. No.85,
supra, p. 2.
"The purpose of this bill is to mitigate the rules of law which
prohibit all intercourse between the citizens of warring nations,
and to permit, under careful safeguards and restrictions, certain
kinds of business to be carried on. It also provides for the care
and administration of the property and property rights of enemies
and their allies in this country pending the war."
Sen.Rep. No.113, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, Aug. 31, 1917.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The conference report inserted five such references. H.R.Rep.
No.155, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 6, September 21, 1917.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Section 9(e) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as last amended,
August 24, 1937 (50 U.S.C. App. 9(e)), is as follows:
"No money or other property shall be returned nor any debt
allowed under this section to any person who is a citizen or
subject of any nation which
was associated with the United
States in the prosecution of the war unless such nation in like
case extends reciprocal rights to citizens of the United States:
Provided, That any arrangement made by a foreign nation
for the release of money and other property of American citizens
and certified by the Secretary of State to the Attorney General as
fair and most advantageous arrangement obtainable shall be regarded
as meeting this requirement;
nor, in any event, shall a debt be
allowed under this section unless it was owing to and owned by the
claimant prior to October 6, 1917, and as to claimants other
than citizens of the United States unless it arose with reference
to the money or other property held by the Alien Property Custodian
or Treasurer of the United States hereunder;
nor shall a debt
be allowed under this section unless notice of the claim has been
filed, or application therefor has been made, prior to the date of
the enactment of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928 (Act
March 10, 1928, c. 167)."
(Italics supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/4]
The later amendments were those of February 27, 1921 (41 Stat.
1147), applying §§ 9(b)(2) and (3) to situations where a woman,
"prior to April 6, 1917, intermarried with a subject or citizen of
Germany or Austria-Hungary;"
December 21, 1921 (42 Stat. 351), amending § 9(a) to permit
suits to be brought eighteen months, instead of six months, after
the "end of the war." The amendment did not insert any calendar
date relating to World War I, although peace had been declared July
2, 1921. The words "end of the war" must therefore be given their
general meaning applicable to all wars as provided in the
definitions in § 2,
supra;
December 27, 1922 (42 Stat. 1065), amending § 9(a) to permit
suits to be brought 30 months, instead of 18 months, after the "end
of the war;"
March 4, 1923 (42 Stat. 1511), reenacting the whole § 9. In §
9(a), it omitted all limitation on the time within which suits
might be brought. It added new subsections especially adapted to
World War I claims, such as a restriction against claims on behalf
of citizens of the United States naturalized since November 11,
1918;
May 7, 1926 (44 Stat. 406), adding §§ 9(b)(3a) and (3b) as to
citizens of Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Austria-Hungary;
March 10, 1928 (45 Stat. 254-279). This was the "Settlement of
War Claims Act of 1928." It dealt expressly with World War I. It
was concerned with such subjects as the "Mixed Claims Commission"
and "The Tripartite Claims Commission." It amended the Trading with
the Enemy Act in many details as to World War I claims, and added
many new provisions as to those claims. It added subsections to §
9. In § 9(e), it inserted the clause which required that notices of
claims must have been filed or applications for claims must have
been made before the enactment of the Settlement of War Claims Act
of 1928;
August 24, 1937 (50 Stat. 748), amending § 9(e) by inserting the
proviso as to arrangements which will be regarded as meeting the
requirements of reciprocal rights.
[
Footnote 2/5]
S.1940, H.R. 4840 and H.R. 5031 were introduced in the 78th
Congress. H.R. 1530 was introduced in the 79th Congress, January
16, 1945.
See Hearings on H.R. 4840 before Subcommittee
No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary for the House of
Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 18, June 9-15,
1944.
[
Footnote 2/6]
See 326
U.S. 404fn2/10|>note 10
infra.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See 326
U.S. 404fn2/4|>note 4,
supra.
[
Footnote 2/8]
28 C.F.R. § 4.1.
[
Footnote 2/9]
The development of the law especially affecting § 5(b), which
took place during the national emergency prior to World War II, did
not change the situation, although it did emphasize the connection
of the Trading with the Enemy Act with the permanent structure of
the Federal Government.
For example, on March 9, 1933 (48 Stat. 1), § 5(b), relating to
foreign exchange, export or hoarding of coin, etc., was amended as
a part of the legislative program to meet the national emergency in
banking. The amendment thus applied the power of the President
under this Act to the internal conditions of the country, rather
than to its international relations. This was supplemented by
Executive Order 6560, January 15, 1934, 31 C.F.R. § 127.0.
Following the transfer of the office of the Alien Property
Custodian to the Department of Justice, § 9(e) received a slight
amendment on August 24, 1937 (50 Stat. 748).
See 326
U.S. 404fn2/4|>note 4,
supra. Additional
responsibility under the Act was placed upon the Attorney General
or the Assistant Attorney General in charge of Claims on May 15,
1939. Executive Order 8136, 4 Fed.Reg. 2044. On April 10, 1940, the
President issued Executive Order 8389, 5 Fed.Reg. 1400, which,
under authority of § 5(b), extended control over property in which
Norway or Denmark or any national thereof had an interest. This
action was confirmed and further supplemented by the Act of May 7,
1940 (54 Stat. 179). This was substantially extended to many other
nations by Executive Order 8785, June 14, 1941, 6 Fed.Reg. 2897;
Proclamation No. 2497, July 17, 1941, 55 Stat. 1657, 6 Fed.Reg.
3555; Executive Order 8832, July 26, 1941, 6 Fed.Reg. 3715;
Executive Order 8839, July 30, 1941, 6 Fed.Reg. 3823; Executive
Order 8900, September 15, 1941. 6 Fed.Reg. 4795; Executive Order
8963, December 9, 1941, 6 Fed.Reg. 6348.
[
Footnote 2/10]
"Without limitation as to any other powers or authority of the
Secretary of the Treasury or the Alien Property Custodian under any
other provision of this Executive Order, the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Alien Property Custodian are authorized and
empowered, either jointly or severally, to prescribe from time to
time, regulations, rulings, and instructions to carry out the
purposes of this Executive Order."
Sec. 4, Executive Order 9193, July 6, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg. 5205.
See also provisions of the Vesting Orders as to notice of
claims against the property involved in this proceeding.
Each of the Vesting Orders cited in the Court's opinion
provides:
"Any person, except a national of a designated enemy country,
asserting any claim arising as a result of this order may file with
the Alien Property Custodian a notice of his claim, together with a
request for a hearing thereon, on Form APC-1, within one year from
the date hereof, or within such further time as may be allowed by
the Alien Property Custodian. Nothing herein contained shall be
deemed to constitute an admission of the existence, validity or
right to allowance of any such claim."
The amended complaint in this case alleges,
"A notice of this claim dated and verified January 19th, 1943,
was filed with the Alien Property Custodian on or about that date
and by him assigned the number F-38-98-1. An amended and
supplemental notice of the claim dated and verified May 1st, 1944,
has, at the suggestion of the Alien Property Custodian, been
executed and filed and a new number, to-wit, 280 has been assigned
thereto."