For purposes of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which
provides that "[n]o action shall be maintained under this chapter
unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action
accrued," an action is "commenced" when instituted by service of
process issued out of a state court which is itself unable to
proceed to judgment but which, by the state law or practice, is
directed or permitted to transfer the proceeding, by change of
venue or otherwise, to a court which does have jurisdiction to hear
and determine the cause. P.
325 U. S.
78.
384 Ill. 237, 281, 51 N.E.2d 277, 282, reversed.
Certiorari, 321 U.S. 759, to review Judgments affirming
dismissals of two suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
An earlier opinion of this Court in this case is reported in
324 U. S. 117.
Page 325 U. S. 78
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases were heretofore considered and disposition was
deferred to enable petitioners to apply for clarification of the
grounds upon which the Supreme Court of Illinois intended to rest
its judgments.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.
S. 117.
That court, responding to petitioners' request, has made clear
that its judgment resulted solely from its interpretation of a
federal statute of limitations applicable to actions under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act which provided: "No action shall
be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within two years
from the day the cause of action accrued." 35 Stat. 66, amended to
three years, August 11, 1939, 53 Stat. 1404. That court said that
it
"did not pass upon any of the questions certified except to
apply the limitation of two years fixed in the last-mentioned
statute after deciding whether said cause had been commenced when
it was filed in the city court of Granite City, Illinois."
And it added:
"We observed that section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act required plaintiff to commence an action within two years from
the date of the injury; that the city court of Granite City had no
jurisdiction of the cause for the reasons set forth in the opinion,
and that, under Illinois law, commencing an action means starting
it in a court that has the power to decide the matter involved, to
issue process, to bring the parties to the particular cause before
it, and to render and enforce a judgment on the merits of said
cause."
64 N.E.2d 318.
We are unable to agree to an interpretation of the federal
statute by which a case is not "commenced" for its purposes unless
instituted in a court with power to proceed to final judgment. An
action is "commenced" for these purposes as a matter of federal law
when instituted by
Page 325 U. S. 79
service of process issued out of a state court, even if one
which itself is unable to proceed to judgment, if the state law or
practice directs or permits the transfer through change of venue or
otherwise to a court which does have jurisdiction to hear, try, and
otherwise determine that cause. Whether the action would be barred
if state law made new or supplemental process necessary is a
question not involved here and not decided. Clearly however, when
process has been adequate to bring in the parties and to start the
case on a course of judicial handling which may lead to final
judgment without issuance of new initial process, it is enough to
commence the action within the federal statute. As these cases were
dismissed solely because of a contrary view, the judgments are
reversed, and the causes remanded to the Supreme Court of Illinois
for further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinions
herein.
Reversed and remanded.
* Together with No. 25,
Belcher v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co., also on certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Illinois.