Petitioner, an Indian under a state court sentence of
imprisonment for one to seven years upon his plea of guilty to a
charge of burglary, petitioned a state court for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that he had been deprived of due process of law in
that the trial court failed to advise him of his constitutional
rights to counsel and to call witnesses; that he had not waived
those rights by word or action, and that the conviction was void
because the alleged crime was committed on an Indian Reservation
which was within exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Held:
1. The allegations of the petition showed a
prima facie
violation of petitioner's right to counsel, and he was entitled to
a hearing upon them. Pp. 788, 791.
2. By his plea of guilty, petitioner had not waived his
constitutional right to counsel. P.
324 U. S.
788.
3. The state court having placed its judgment of dismissal
squarely on the absence of merit in the petition, this Court cannot
conclude that the petition failed to satisfy procedural
requirements. P.
324 U. S.
792.
144 Neb. 547, 14 N.W.2d 850, reversed.
Certiorari, 323 U.S. 696, to review a judgment affirming the
dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, an Indian, without benefit of counsel pleaded guilty
to a charge of burglary in the District Court of Thurston County,
Nebraska, and was sentenced to from
Page 324 U. S. 787
one to seven years. He petitioned another state District Court
for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from the penitentiary
on the grounds, among others, [
Footnote 1] that he had been deprived of his
constitutional right of counsel, and that the state court lacked
jurisdiction. He alleged that he was ignorant of the law, and that,
in preparing his petition, he had no one to help him except a
fellow inmate. Petitioner did not challenge the facts stated in the
judgment entry,
i.e., that, in the burglary proceedings,
he was arraigned and pleaded guilty, that the burglary statute was
read to him, and that he then reiterated his plea. He challenged
the validity of the judgment, however, on the ground that, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he had been deprived of due
process of law in that the trial court failed to advise him of his
constitutional rights to counsel and to call witnesses. Petitioner
further alleged that he had not waived those rights by word or
action. Finally, the petition alleged that the conviction was void
because the alleged crime was committed on an Indian Reservation
which was exclusively within federal jurisdiction.
The petition was dismissed by the state District Court, for lack
of merit, without an answer and without a hearing. Petitioner then
moved to set aside the dismissal, repeating his allegations and
requesting the appointment of counsel to assist him. The motion was
denied, and petitioner, again acting in his own behalf, appealed to
the Supreme Court of Nebraska. That court, without requiring an
answer, affirmed the District Court. 144 Neb. 547, 14 N.W.2d 850.
Because important constitutional
Page 324 U. S. 788
rights are involved, we granted certiorari and appointed counsel
to represent petitioner. 323 U.S. 696.
In affirming, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that
"It is not necessary that there be a formal waiver, and a waiver
will ordinarily be implied where accused appears without counsel
and fails to request that counsel be assigned to him, particularly
where accused voluntarily pleads guilty."
It is apparent that the court's affirmance did not rest on its
statement that a plea of guilty "ordinarily implied" a waiver of
the right to counsel, but upon a holding that such a plea
"absolutely" and finally waives that right. [
Footnote 2] This is inconsistent with our
interpretation of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whatever inference of waiver could be drawn from the
petitioner's plea of guilty is adequately answered by the
uncontroverted statement in his petition that he did not waive the
right either by word or action. This denial of waiver squarely
raised a question of fact. The state Supreme Court resolved this
disputed fact by drawing a conclusive implication from the
petitioner's plea of guilty. This is the equivalent of a holding
that one who voluntarily pleads guilty without the benefit of
counsel has thereby competently waived his constitutional right to
counsel, even though he may have sorely needed and been unable to
obtain legal aid. A defendant who pleads guilty is entitled to the
benefit of counsel, and a request for counsel is not necessary. It
is enough that a defendant
Page 324 U. S. 789
charged with an offense of this character is incapable
adequately of making his defense, that he is unable to get counsel,
and that he does not intelligently and understandingly waive
counsel. [
Footnote 3] Whether
all these conditions exist is a matter which must be determined by
evidence where the facts are in dispute.
The petitioner's need for legal counsel in this case is
strikingly emphasized by the allegation in his habeas corpus
petition that the offense for which the state court convicted him
was committed on a government Indian Reservation "without and
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court." This raises an involved
question of federal jurisdiction, posing a problem that is
obviously beyond the capacity of even an intelligent and educated
layman, and which clearly demands the counsel of experience and
skill.
The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and
control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.
See Worcester
v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515. In the light of this
historical background, Congress, in 1885, passed a comprehensive
Act, 23 Stat. 362, 385, in order to fulfill "treaty stipulations
with various Indian tribes," specifically including the
Winnebagoes, of which tribe the petitioner alleges he is a member.
The last section of that Act subjects Indians who commit certain
crimes, including burglary, to trial and punishment. The language
there used to accomplish this purpose is that
"all such Indians committing any of the above crimes against the
person or property of another Indian or other person within the
boundaries of any the United States, and within the limits of any
Indian reservation, shall be subject to the same laws, tried in the
same courts and in the same manner, and subject to the same
penalties
Page 324 U. S. 790
as are all other persons committing any of the above crimes
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."
23 Stat. 385. This section now appears as Section 548 in Title
18, of the United States Code, and the state Supreme Court has
ruled that it gives Nebraska authority to try the petitioner. This
construction of the section is not in accord with that heretofore
given it by the courts of Nebraska and other courts. [
Footnote 4] In argument before us, Nebraska
does not rely on the state Supreme Court's construction of 18
U.S.C. ยง 548. Instead, it argues that petitioner's allegation that
the crime was committed on an Indian Reservation is false, and that
the state Supreme Court was required to take judicial knowledge of
its falsity. It admits, however, that Thurston County, where the
burglary was allegedly committed, is included within the original
statutory boundaries of a federally created Indian Reservation, 14
Stat. 675, 676, 14 Stat. 671, and that the village of Winnebago,
where the alleged offense was committed, is located within the
boundaries of the Winnebago Reservation. The village of Winnebago,
it insists, has ceased to be a part of the Reservation because all
the Indians have been given the full benefits of citizenship by
Nebraska and because Winnebago is incorporated under the laws of
Nebraska and is located entirely upon land which has been patented
in fee. The facts upon which this contention rests are said to be
those of which Nebraska Courts can take judicial knowledge. With
these facts thus established, it is said that jurisdiction of
Nebraska over this offense is conferred by Section 6 of the General
Allotment Act passed in 1887, 24 Stat. 390, as amended, 34 Stat.
182. Assuming that all the facts urged by the State are correct,
and that these Indian
Page 324 U. S. 791
lands have been disposed of under this latter statute, the State
finds support for its contention in this Court's interpretation of
that Act in
Matter of Heff, 197 U.
S. 488. But later cases have cast considerable doubt on
what was said in the
Heff decision.
United States v.
Celestine, 215 U. S. 278,
215 U. S.
290-291;
Hallowell v. United States,
221 U. S. 317,
221 U. S. 323;
Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.
S. 286,
221 U. S. 314;
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.
S. 243,
228 U. S.
269-272;
United States v. Chavez, 290 U.
S. 357;
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.
S. 535,
302 U. S.
539.
All of these questions concerning the power of the State Courts
to try this Indian petitioner for burglary indicate the
complexities of the problem he would have found had he attempted to
defend himself on this ground. And a decision by the State Court
that it had jurisdiction might or might not have finally determined
the issue.
Cf. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.
S. 542,
212 U. S. 549,
and
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19.
We conclude that the petitioner is entitled to a hearing on his
allegations that he did not, in the burglary proceedings, waive his
constitutional right to have the benefit of counsel.
It has been suggested that, even if the court below erred in
holding that a plea of guilty is a conclusive waiver of the right
to counsel, its judgment might be sustained on the ground that
habeas corpus was not the proper remedy, or because the allegations
of the petition lack sufficient definiteness. The very fact that
the court considered the petition on its merits gives rise to a
strong, if not conclusive, inference that the petition satisfied
the state's procedural requirements in all respects. By treating
this clumsily drawn petition with liberality, instead of dismissing
it because of a failure to comply with the precise niceties of
technical procedure, the state Supreme Court acted in accordance
with its traditional solicitude for the
Page 324 U. S. 792
writ. [
Footnote 5] And this
treatment is in line with federal practice.
"A petition for habeas corpus ought not to be scrutinized with
technical nicety. Even if it is insufficient in substance, it may
be amended in the interest of justice."
Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342,
313 U. S.
350-351. [
Footnote
6]
Since the State Court placed its judgment precisely on the
absence of merit in the petition, we could not, except by
speculation, conclude that the petition failed to measure up to its
procedural requirements. [
Footnote
7] For the reasons given, we hold that the allegations of the
petition showed a
prima facie violation of the
petitioner's right to counsel.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Allegations of the petition charging that the petitioner's
imprisonment was illegal under state laws need not be set out,
since those questions have been finally adjudicated by the state
Supreme Court, and are not subject to review here.
Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329,
312 U. S.
330.
[
Footnote 2]
In discussing allegations of the petition other than the one
relating to appointment of counsel, the state Supreme Court also
quoted with approval a statement that
"A plea of guilty admits all facts sufficiently pleaded, . . .
operates as a waiver of any defense, and . . . with it, of course,
the constitutional guarantees with the respect to the conduct of
criminal prosecutions."
The court therefore said that, since the record affirmatively
showed "that the defendant had pleaded guilty, this absolutely
waives this and all other preliminary steps in connection
therewith. . . ."
[
Footnote 3]
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471;
Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485;
House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42.
[
Footnote 4]
Ex parte Cross, 20 Neb. 417, 30 N.W. 428;
Kitto v.
State, 98 Neb. 164, 152 N.W. 380;
State v. Campbell,
53 Minn. 354, 55 N.W. 553;
People v. Daly, 212 N.Y. 183,
105 N.E. 1048;
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.
S. 375.
[
Footnote 5]
"It must be conceded that the petition is not a skillfully drawn
pleading, but, as it was not attacked in the district court, it
must receive a liberal construction here. . . . Crocker made no
appearance in the case, and the warrant was not set out in any of
the pleadings. When attacked after judgment, the petition, though
informal, must be held sufficient."
Urban v. Brailey, 85 Neb. 796, 798, 799, 124 N.W. 467,
468.
"It has been held that the proper method of attacking the
petition is by motion to quash the writ, and that insufficiency in
the petition is waived, unless that remedy be resorted to.
McGlennan v. Margowski, 90 Ind. 150."
Nebraska Children's Home Society v. State, 57 Neb. 765,
769, 78 N.W. 267, 269.
See also Chase v. State, 93 Fla.
963, 113 So. 103;
State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo.
429, 24 S.W.2d 111;
Stuart v. State, 36 Ariz. 28, 282 P.
276;
State ex rel. Davis v. Hardie, 108 Fla. 133, 146 So.
97;
Ex parte Tipton, 83 Cal. App. 742, 257 P. 445;
Deaver v. State, 24 Ala.App. 377, 135 So. 604;
McDowell v. Gould, 166 Ga. 670, 144 S.E. 206;
Ex parte
Tollison, 73 Okl.Cr. 38,
117
P.2d 549;
People v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 84
N.E. 875;
Willis v. Bayles, 105 Ind. 363, 5 N.E. 8.
[
Footnote 6]
See also Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.
S. 255;
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S.
19.
[
Footnote 7]
See Smith v. O'Grady, supra; cf. United States v. Ju
Toy, 198 U. S. 253,
198 U. S.
261.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
In view of the circumstances revealed by the record in this
case, and in the light of Nebraska's experience with
Page 324 U. S. 793
petitions for habeas corpus, as laid before this Court by the
Attorney General of Nebraska, the meager allegations of this
petition for habeas corpus should preclude our attributing to the
Supreme Court of Nebraska a disregard, in affirming a denial of the
petition, of rights under the Constitution of the United States,
rather than a denial on allowable state grounds. Accordingly, I
believe the judgment should be affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON join in this
view.