The state court decision of which review is here sought was
grounded upon the view that the appellant had not pursued the
remedy afforded by State law for the vindication of any
constitutional right claimed to have been violated, so the appeal
must be dismissed and certiorari denied. P.
324 U. S.
785.
143 Ohio St. 591, 55 N.E.2d 154, appeal dismissed; certiorari
denied.
Appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer in proceedings
challenging the validity of awards made to employees of the
appellant by the state commission.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant conducts a manufacturing plant at Warren, Ohio,
and is an employer as the term is defined by the workmen's
compensation law of the State. In an original
Page 324 U. S. 781
proceeding instituted in the Supreme Court, the State's highest
tribunal, it challenged awards made to certain of its employees,
alleging that the injuries suffered were not incurred in the course
of, and did not arise out of, the employment; that the awards were
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission
which entered them, and, unless they were abrogated, the appellant
would be deprived of its property without due process of law;
further, that, unless relief were afforded the appellant would be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
From a decision sustaining a demurrer and granting judgment for
the defendant, [
Footnote 1]
this appeal was taken. The appellee moved to dismiss. We postponed
consideration of the motion to the hearing on the merits, as we
were not satisfied that the appellant had properly presented in the
court below any issue as to the infirmity of the state law under
the federal Constitution, or that the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Ohio did not rest on an application of state law adequate to
support it.
The questions posed for our decision, the manner of their
presentation to the state court, and that court's disposition of
them will be understood only in the light of the provisions of the
workmen's compensation law, the commission's action under that law,
and the character of the relief sought by the appellant.
The compensation law is of the compulsory type. [
Footnote 2] It is administered by an
Industrial Commission, which classifies industries in respect of
hazards and fixes premiums to be paid by employers into a state
fund for the benefit of injured workmen and the dependents of those
killed. It
Page 324 U. S. 782
may adopt merit ratings which reduce the premiums of employers
having a low casualty rate.
Every employer subject to the Act is required either to pay
premiums into the fund or to qualify as a self-insurer. Payments of
compensation for injury or death are made from the state fund in
respect of employees of a contributing employer, and are paid
directly by a self-insuring employer. Employers of both classes are
relieved of common law liability for an employee's injury or death.
Those, however, who fail to comply in one of the permissible ways
remain liable at law, are denied certain defenses in an action by
the employee or his representative, and, with their officers, are
liable to criminal penalties for failure to comply with the Act.
Their employees may nevertheless elect to claim compensation, and
if it is awarded, an action to recover the amount may be maintained
against the employer. Such an action may also be maintained against
a self-insuring employer who fails to pay an award.
Should an employer who is subject to the Act fail to pay
premiums or otherwise omit to comply, means are provided to fix
civil liability upon him, even to the extent of the appointment of
a receiver of his business.
The Commission has authority to hear and decide all questions
within this jurisdiction. If it makes an award to a claimant, its
action is final. Neither the employer nor the claimant is given any
appeal or right of review. If the Commission refuses an award on
certain grounds specified in the Act, the claimant may appeal to a
court.
It is conceded by the appellee that, if a self-insuring or a
noncomplying employer is sued for the amount of an award, the
defense is open to him that the employee granted the award was not
injured in the course of his employment or that the injury did not
arise out of the employment. In the case of a complying employer
who pays premiums into the state fund, no such defense is open,
Page 324 U. S. 783
for the award is paid from the fund and he is not a party to the
transaction.
We turn now to the facts alleged in appellant's petition. So far
as material, they follow. The men who were injured or killed were
employees in appellant's plant. At the close of their work, they
left the plant in an automobile and chose one of several ways of
egress -- a public road which, at a short distance from the plant,
crossed the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad's track. While crossing
this track, the automobile was struck by a train. The Commission,
despite appellant's representation that the resulting injuries and
deaths were not compensable under the Act, entered awards. By its
amended petition, the appellant showed that, as a result of the
inclusion of the awards in its accident experience, its premiums
had been greatly increased.
On the first hearing, the Supreme Court overruled appellant's
contention that § 871-38 of the code authorized the institution of
proceedings in that court to set aside compensation awards.
Treating the petition as one for a writ of prohibition, the court
held that remedy unavailable to control the action of the
Commission in rendering awards. If considered as an application for
mandamus, the court found that the provisions of the workmen's
compensation law precluded the issuance of the writ. Construing the
prayer as one for injunction, the court held that the law of Ohio
invested it with no original jurisdiction in equity, and that
general equity jurisdiction is conferred on the Courts of Common
Pleas of the State. These are all rulings as to the law of Ohio,
and, as such, we are without power to review them.
In its amended petition, the appellant insisted that its purpose
was to raise questions of constitutionality, and that it was
without remedy against the loss of its merit rating and the
increase of its premiums unless the court should set aside the
awards.
Page 324 U. S. 784
In a second opinion, the court noticed these allegations. It
held that, as appellant was not a party to the compensation
proceeding and as the awards were payable not by the appellant, but
by the state fund, in which appellant had no property interest, it
could not be said that payment of the awards deprived appellant of
any property. It said that appellant's interests could be affected
only when it was called on to pay increased premiums as a result of
the awards, and adverted to the fact that appellant could refuse to
pay premiums, and defend a suit for them brought under § 1465-75 of
the Act. As to this, the appellant urges that the penalties, civil
and criminal, which would be imposed upon it and its officers if it
pursued such a course amount to a denial of all remedy. Of this,
more hereafter.
In respect of the denial of equal protection, the court below
seems not to have dealt with the argument as presented in this
court. It quoted decisions which sustained as reasonable
classifications of employers for imposition of varying rates of
premium adjusted to the risks incident to their enterprises. Except
as above noted, it had nothing to say to the appellant's contention
that, whereas self-insurers and noncompliers may make the defense
of excess of the Commission's jurisdiction when sued for the amount
of an award, it cannot assert such a defense when sued for
premiums. In our view, the answer to both of the constitutional
contentions, though not clearly expressed below, is that it does
not appear the appellant is without remedy, if entitled to redress.
For it is stated without contradiction that there are courts in the
state having general equity jurisdiction, and, if resort to a
defense at law involves the perils and penalties the appellant
asserts, we are not advised that equity will not consider an
application for relief. Certainly we can neither require the
Supreme Court to exercise a jurisdiction it finds is not conferred
upon it by law, nor express any view as to the relief to which the
appellant may be entitled, in advance of
Page 324 U. S. 785
its availing itself of a forum apparently not foreclosed to it
for the protection of its asserted constitutional rights.
What has been said assumes that we have jurisdiction of the
appeal. The assumption involves the answer to two questions. First,
were questions under the Fourteenth Amendment presented and decided
below? We think that the appellant disclosed, and the court below
understood, that the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
federal Constitution were invoked. Not only does the Ohio
Constitution embody no provisions in the words of that Article, but
it is doubtful that it contains any equivalent provisions. While
the appellant's petition did not mention the Amendment, it used the
exact phraseology in which it is couched. The pleadings and the
expressions found in the opinions lead us to conclude that
questions under the federal charter were presented and
considered.
Secondly, was the constitutional validity of the state statute
drawn in question? If not, we have no jurisdiction on appeal. But,
as violation of the federal Constitution by the decision of the
state Court is in any case involved, we have jurisdiction to review
the decision on certiorari. 28 U.S.C. 344(c). The question of the
propriety of entertaining the appeal need not be decided in the
view we take of the basis of the state court's judgment. Inasmuch
as we conclude that decision was grounded upon the view that the
appellant had not pursued the remedy afforded by state law for the
vindication of any constitutional right it claimed was violated, we
must dismiss the appeal and deny certiorari.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The petition was held demurrable (142 Ohio St. 439, 52 N.E.2d
735) was amended, demurred to, and judgment for defendant was
rendered on demurrer (143 Ohio St. 591, 56 N.E.2d 154).
[
Footnote 2]
The summary of the statutory provisions is drawn from the
General Code of Ohio, §§ 871-1 to 871-12; 871-38; 1465-37; 1465-53;
1465-54; 1465-60, 14 5-68, 1465-69, 1465-69a, 1465-70, 1465-72,
1465-73, 1465-74, 1465-75, 1465-90.