1. An employee is not entitled to interest on sum recovered in
an action for overtime compensation and liquidated damages under §
16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Arsenal Bldg. Corp. v.
Greenberg, ante, p.
324 U. S. 697. P.
324 U. S.
724.
2. The uncontested fact of record show that the employees in
question were engaged in repairing abutments and substructures of
bridges which were part of the line of an interstate railroad,
sustaining the conclusion that they were "engaged in [interstate]
commerce," and covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. P.
324 U. S.
724.
293 N.Y. 126, 56 N.E.2d 77, affirmed in part.
Certiorari, 323 U.S. 698, to review the affirmance of a judgment
for the plaintiffs in a suit for overtime compensation and
liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
The writ of certiorari in the instant case raises two questions
for consideration: the first, whether an employee who obtains a
judgment for unpaid overtime wages
Page 324 U. S. 721
and liquidated damages under Section 7(a) [
Footnote 1] and Section 16(b) [
Footnote 2] of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 is entitled to interest on such sums; the second, a narrow
question with respect to the interpretation of a judgment of this
Court, which was entered in its per curiam opinion on a prior writ
of certiorari, reversing a prior state court judgment in this same
case.
The proceedings leading to the first writ began when the
respondent, Pedersen, an employee of the petitioner, a construction
company, instituted an action in the Supreme Court of the New York,
in behalf of himself and
Page 324 U. S. 722
other employees, to recover overtime compensation and liquidated
damages alleged to be due by virtue of Sections 7 and 16(b) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The action was tried on an agreed
statement of facts which stated that the New York Central Railroad
Company operated interstate trains over four bridges located on its
right of way in the New York; that abutments supporting two bridges
were destroyed, and that the substructures of the two other bridges
were damaged by a flood. The stipulation also stated:
"Thereafter, the railroad company entered into a contract with
the defendant, an independent contractor engaged in general
construction work, for the construction of entirely new abutments
under the two bridges where the abutments had been washed out and
destroyed, as aforesaid, and for repairing the substructures of the
other two bridges which had been damaged, as aforesaid."
"
* * * *"
"Defendant employed plaintiffs, together with other individuals,
as its employees in doing work under said contract and paid them at
the rates per hour, as shown on Schedule 'A' annexed hereto."
After making findings of fact in conformity with the
stipulation, the trial court dismissed the respondents' complaint.
[
Footnote 3] The Appellate
Division [
Footnote 4] and Court
of Appeals [
Footnote 5]
affirmed the lower court decision on the theory that the nature of
the employer's general business activity -- not the activities of
employees on a particular job -- determined whether an employee was
"engaged in [interstate] commerce" within the meaning of Section
7(a) of the Act. Since the petitioner, an independent contractor
not itself engaged in interstate commerce, was employed by the
railroad
Page 324 U. S. 723
to perform work local in character, it was felt petitioner's
employees were not subject to the Act. On petition for certiorari,
this Court reversed [
Footnote
6] the judgment of the state courts dismissing the complaint,
on the authority of
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp.,
318 U. S. 125, in
which the Fair Labor Standards Act was held to apply to employees
engaged in the actual repair of a facility of interstate commerce.
On petition for rehearing by the petitioner in the instant case,
our judgment was amended by adding: "and without prejudice to a
determination of the nature of the employment of any members of the
class on whose behalf this suit has been brought." 318 U.S.
742.
This left open for trial the question of whether each member of
the class was engaged in interstate commerce as alleged in the
petition.
After remand to the state courts, the petitioner moved in the
trial court to dismiss the complaint on the record of the prior
proceedings, apparently on the theory that the agreed statement of
facts in the prior proceedings were insufficient to prove that the
respondents, employees, were "engaged in [interstate] commerce."
Petitioner did not attempt to introduce any evidence rebutting any
inference to the contrary that might be drawn from the stipulation
of facts in the record. Respondents thereupon moved for summary
judgment under Rule 113 of the New York Rules of Civil Practice.
The lower court entered judgment for the respondents, employees,
for statutory wages and liquidated damages, with interest on such
sums from April 1, 1939. [
Footnote
7] The Appellate Division [
Footnote 8] and Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.
[
Footnote 9] Because the
allowance of
Page 324 U. S. 724
interest by the Court of Appeals raised a federal question of
substance not heretofore determined by this Court, and in order to
clarify doubts as to the meaning of our previous judgment in this
case, we granted certiorari. [
Footnote 10] Jurisdiction of this Court rests on Section
237(b) of the Judicial Code.
In
Arsenal Building Corp. v. Greenberg, No. 421,
ante, p.
324 U. S. 697, we
held that an employee was not entitled to interest on sums
recovered in an action brought under Section 16(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. This question is discussed in that opinion,
and, for the reasons set forth therein, we hold that the New York
Court of Appeals erred in allowing interest on the sums recovered
by the respondents in the instant case.
Petitioner contends that the state courts erred in sustaining a
judgment for respondents. It is argued that the latter failed to
satisfy the burden of proof that the particular activities of the
respondents constituted engaging "in [interstate] commerce." We are
of a contrary opinion. The agreed statement of facts, which was
part of the record both for purposes of petitioner's motion to
dismiss and respondents' motion for summary judgment, constitutes
sufficient evidence to support the state courts' ruling in this
matter. [
Footnote 11] The
agreed statement of facts states that the petitioner entered into a
contract with the railroad "for the construction of entirely new
abutments under the two bridges . . . , and for repairing the
substructures of the other two bridges," all four of these bridges
being part of the railroad's interstate line. It was also
stipulated that the respondents were "doing work under said
contract." It is clear that employees who actually repair abutments
or substructures of bridges on which are laid tracks used in
interstate transportation are "engaged in [interstate] commerce."
Overstreet v. North
Shore
Page 324 U. S. 725
Corp., 318 U. S. 125,
318 U. S. 130;
McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491,
319 U. S. 494.
The stipulation of facts in this case recites specifically and
precisely that the contract was for such work, and also that the
respondents were engaged in doing work under said "contract." The
stipulation of facts would not seem to embrace activities not
essential and a part of the main work of repair. This
interpretation of the stipulation accords with that adopted by the
state trial court. [
Footnote
12] In amending our judgment on rehearing [
Footnote 13] when this case was previously
before us on writ of certiorari, the way was opened to petitioner
to contest the issue of whether each respondent was himself
actually engaged in interstate commerce. A doubt had arisen as to
whether this could be done, because our judgment of reversal was
based explicitly on the
Overstreet case, and, in that
decision, we conclusively determined that the particular employees
there involved were covered by the Act. On the remand to the state
courts, petitioner did not contest respondents' claim on this
issue, although it appears it could have done so when the
respondents moved for summary judgment. [
Footnote 14] Since the uncontested facts in the record
are to the effect that the respondents were actually engaged in
repairing the abutments and substructure, the
Page 324 U. S. 726
judgment of the state court must be sustained in this
respect.
The judgment of the state court is affirmed except insofar as it
provides for recovery of interest on the sums adjudged to be due
respondents under the Act; in this latter respect, the judgment is
reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 7(a), 52 Stat. 1063, provides:
"No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this
section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce --"
"(1) for a workeek longer than forty-four hours during the first
year from the effective date of this section,"
"(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the
second year from such date, or"
"(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration
of the second year from such date, unless such employee receives
compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above
specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 16(b), 52 Stat. 1069, provides:
"Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or
section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover
such liability may be maintained in any court of competent
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or
such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative
to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees
similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to
any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a
reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of
the action."
[
Footnote 3]
Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Const. Co., 173 Misc. 188,
18 N.Y.S.2d 920.
[
Footnote 4]
Ibid., 262 App.Div. 665, 30 N.Y.S.2d 989.
[
Footnote 5]
Ibid., 288 N.Y. 687, 43 N.E.2d 83,
affirming
without opinion.
[
Footnote 6]
Ibid., 318 U.S. 740, 742.
[
Footnote 7]
Opinion unreported.
[
Footnote 8]
Pedersen v. Fitzgerald Const. Co., 266 App.Div. 1032,
44 N.Y.S.2d 595.
[
Footnote 9]
Ibid., 293 N.Y. 126, 56 N.E.2d 77.
[
Footnote 10]
323 U.S. 807.
[
Footnote 11]
See supra, p.
324 U. S.
722.
[
Footnote 12]
The New York trial court stated in its opinion (unreported):
"The fair import of these conceded facts is that defendant was
engaged in certain work, and that plaintiff and his associates were
its employees, not generally, but in doing
this particular
work. . . . But, in any event, the conceded facts, in my
judgment, embrace no activities not essential to the main work of
repair.
Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.,
229 U. S.
146. Such, I think, was the fair import of the facts as
contemplated by the parties when the agreed statement was made. . .
."
[
Footnote 13]
318 U.S. 742.
[
Footnote 14]
The trial court stated in its opinion (unreported):
"It was no more a direction to the plaintiff than it was a
permission to the defendant to reopen the matter, if either so
desired, and could so do under our practice for the purpose of
getting further proof as to the precise activities of plaintiff and
his associates."