1. A conspiracy of producers, wholesalers and retailers to fix
and maintain retail prices of alcoholic beverages shipped into a
State, by adoption of a single course in making contracts of sale
and boycotting others who would not conform,
held a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. P.
324 U. S.
296.
2. Neither the Miller-Tydings Amendment of the Sherman Act nor
the Colorado Fair Trade Act permits combinations of businessmen to
coerce others into making "fair trade" contracts. P.
324 U. S.
296.
Page 324 U. S. 294
3. The fact that the ultimate object of the conspiracy was the
fixing or maintenance of local retail prices did not render the
Sherman Act inapplicable. P.
324 U. S.
298.
4. The Twenty-First Amendment of the Constitution does not
preclude prosecution of the violation of the Sherman Act here
alleged. P.
324 U. S.
299.
5. The Twenty-First Amendment conferred upon the States broad
regulatory power over the liquor traffic within their boundaries,
but did not give the States plenary and exclusive power to regulate
the conduct of persons doing an interstate liquor business. P.
324 U. S.
299.
144 F.2d 824 reversed.
Certiorari, 323 U.S. 699, to review the reversal of a
conviction,
47 F.
Supp. 160, of violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents are producers, wholesalers, and retailers, of
alcoholic beverages who were indicted in a federal district court
for having conspired and combined to restrain commerce in violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act as amended. 26 Stat. 209, 50 Stat. 693.
Their demurrers and motion to quash having been overruled,
respondents pleaded
nolo contendere to one count of the
indictment. On these pleas, they were adjudged guilty by the
District Court and fined.
United States v. Colorado Wholesale
Wine and Liquor Dealers Assn., 47 F.
Supp. 160. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground
that the indictment failed to show that the conspiracy charged was
in restraint of
Page 324 U. S. 295
interstate commerce. 144 F.2d 824. The importance of the
questions involved prompted us to grant certiorari. [
Footnote 1]
The indictment alleged that 98% of the spirituous liquors and
80% of the wines consumed in Colorado were shipped there from other
states. The annual shipments into the state were 1,150,000 gallons
of liquors and 800,000 gallons of wine. Seventy-five percent of
these beverages were handled by the defendant wholesalers.
Respondents were charged with conspiring, in violation of the
Sherman Act, to raise, fix, and maintain the retail prices of all
these beverages by raising, fixing, and stabilizing retail markups
and margins of profit.
To accomplish the objects of the conspiracy, it is alleged that
they adopted the following course of action. All of the respondents
agreed amongst themselves to (1) discuss, agree upon, and adopt
arbitrary noncompetitive retail prices, markups, and margins of
profit; (2) defendant retailers and wholesalers agreed to persuade
and compel producers to enter into fair trade contracts on every
type and brand of alcoholic beverage shipped into the state,
thereby to establish arbitrarily high and noncompetitive retail
markups and margins of profit, agreed upon by defendants; (3) the
retailers were to prepare and adopt forms of fair trade contracts,
and agree with producers and wholesalers upon these forms; (4) a
boycott program was adopted by all of the defendants under which
retailers would refuse to buy any of the beverages sold by
wholesalers or producers who refused to enter into or enforce
compliance with the terms of the price-fixing agreements, and
noncomplying retailers would be denied an opportunity to buy the
goods of the defendant producers and wholesalers. Machinery was set
up to make the boycott program effective.
Page 324 U. S. 296
The facts alleged in the indictment, which stand admitted on
demurrer and on the plea of
nolo contendere, indicate a
pattern which bears all the earmarks of a traditional restraint of
trade. The participants are producers, middlemen, and retailers.
They have agreed among themselves to adopt a single course in
making contracts of sale, and to boycott all others who would not
adopt the same course.
The effect, and, if it were material, the purpose of the
combination charged was to fix prices at an artificial level. Such
combinations, affecting commerce among the states, tend to
eliminate competition, and violate the Sherman Act
per se.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.
S. 150,
310 U. S.
223-224. Price maintenance contracts fall under the same
ban,
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.
S. 436,
309 U. S. 458,
except as provided by the 1937 Miller-Tydings Amendment to the
Sherman Act. 50 Stat. 693. The combination charged against
respondents does not fall within this exception. It permits the
seller of an article which bears his trademark, brand, or name to
prescribe a minimum resale price by contract if such contracts are
lawful in the state where the resale is to be made and if the
trademarked article is in free and open competition with other
articles of the same commodity. This type of "Fair Trade" price
maintenance contract is lawful in Colorado. Session Laws of
Colorado, 1937, Chap. 146. But the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the
Sherman Act does not permit combinations of business men to coerce
others into making such contracts, and Colorado has not attempted
to grant such permission. Both the federal and state "Fair Trade"
Acts expressly provide that they shall not apply to price
maintenance contracts among producers, wholesalers, and
competitors. It follows that whatever may be the rights of an
individual producer under the Miller-Tydings Amendment to make
price maintenance contracts or to refuse to sell his goods to those
who
Page 324 U. S. 297
will not make such contracts, a combination to compel price
maintenance in commerce among the states violates the Sherman Act.
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.
S. 707,
321 U. S.
719-723;
United States v. Univis Lens Co.,
316 U. S. 241,
316 U. S.
252-253. Consequently, respondents were properly
convicted unless, as they argue, their conduct is not covered by
the Sherman Act either because the price-fixing applied only to
retail sales which were wholly intrastate or because the state's
power to control the liquor traffic within its boundaries makes the
Sherman Act inapplicable.
These two questions thus posed relate to the extent of the
Sherman Act's application to trade restraints resulting from
actions which take place within a state. In resolving them, there
is an obvious distinction to be drawn between a course of conduct
wholly within a state and conduct which is an inseparable element
of a larger program dependent for its success upon activity which
affects commerce between the states. It is true that this Court
has, on occasion, determined that local conduct could be insulated
from the operation of the Anti-Trust laws on the basis of the
purely local aims of a combination, insofar as those aims were not
motivated by the purpose of restraining commerce and where the
means used to achieve the purpose did not directly touch upon
interstate commerce. The cases relied upon by respondents [
Footnote 2] fall within this category.
All of them involved the application of the Anti-Trust laws to
combinations of businessmen or workers in labor disputes, and not
to interstate commercial transactions. On the other hand, the sole
ultimate object of respondents' combination in the instant
Page 324 U. S. 298
case was price-fixing or price maintenance. And, with reference
to commercial trade restraints such as these, Congress, in passing
the Sherman Act, left no area of its constitutional power
unoccupied; it "exercised
all the power it possessed.'"
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.
S. 469, 310 U. S.
495.
The fact that the ultimate object of the conspiracy charged was
the fixing or maintenance of local retail prices does, not of
itself, remove it from the scope of the Sherman Act; retail outlets
have ordinarily been the object of illegal price maintenance.
[
Footnote 3] Whatever was the
ultimate object of this conspiracy, the means adopted for its
accomplishment reached beyond the boundaries of Colorado. The
combination concerned itself with the type of contract used in
making interstate sales; its coercive power was used to compel the
producers of alcoholic beverages outside of Colorado to enter into
price maintenance contracts. Nor did the boycott used merely affect
local retail business. Local purchasing power was the weapon used
to force producers making interstate sales to fix prices against
their will. It may be true, as has been argued, that, under
Colorado law, retailers are prohibited from buying from
out-of-state producers, but this fact has no relevancy. The power
of retailers to coerce out-of-state producers can be just as
effectively exercised through pressure brought to bear upon
wholesalers as though the retailers brought such pressure to bear
directly upon the producers. And combinations to restrain, by a
boycott of those engaged in interstate commerce, through such
indirect coercion is prohibited by the Sherman Act. [
Footnote 4]
Page 324 U. S. 299
It is argued that the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution
bars this prosecution. That Amendment bestowed upon the states
broad regulatory power over the liquor traffic within their
territories. [
Footnote 5] It
has not given the states plenary and exclusive power to regulate
the conduct of persons doing an interstate liquor business outside
their boundaries. Granting the state's full authority to determine
the conditions upon which liquor can come into its territory and
what will be done with it after it gets there, it does not follow
from that fact that the United States is wholly without power to
regulate the conduct of those who engage in interstate trade
outside the jurisdiction of the Colorado.
The Sherman Act is not being enforced in this case in such
manner as to conflict with the law of Colorado. Those combinations
which the Sherman Act makes illegal as to producers, wholesalers,
and retailers are expressly exempted from the scope of the Fair
Trade Act of Colorado, and thus have no legal sanction under state
law either. [
Footnote 6] We
therefore do not have here a case in which the Sherman Act is
applied to defeat the policy of the state. That would raise
questions of moment which need not be decided until they are
presented. The judgment of the Circuit
Page 324 U. S. 300
Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the District Court is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
* Together with No. 524,
United States v. National
Distillers Products Corp.; No. 525,
United States v. Brown
Forman Distillers Corp.; No. 526,
United States v. Hiram
Walker, Inc.; No. 527,
United States v. Schenley
Distillers Corp.; No. 528,
United States v.
Seagram-Distillers Corp.; No. 529,
United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., and No. 530,
United States
v. Speegle, also on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
323 U.S. 699.
[
Footnote 2]
Industrial Association of San Francisco v. United
States, 268 U. S. 64;
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.
S. 103;
United Leather Workers v. Herkert &
Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457;
cf. Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.
S. 293,
291 U. S. 297,
and
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.
S. 219.
[
Footnote 3]
See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U. S. 373,
220 U. S. 404;
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.
S. 436;
United States v. Univis Lens Co.,
316 U. S. 241,
316 U. S. 244,
245.
[
Footnote 4]
Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission,
312 U. S. 457,
312 U. S. 465;
Loewe v.Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274.
[
Footnote 5]
Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131;
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132,
308 U. S. 138;
State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.,
299 U. S. 59.
[
Footnote 6]
The Colorado Fair Trade Act, 1937 Col. Session Laws, Ch. 146,
provides that, under certain conditions, sellers of commodities can
contract with buyers not to resell, and to require subsequent
purchasers not to resell at less than the minimum price stipulated
by the seller. But that Act specifically provides that it shall not
apply to horizontal agreements, "to any contract or agreement
between or among producers or between or among wholesalers or
between or among retailers as to sale or resale prices." The
Colorado Unfair Practices Act, 1941 Col.Session Laws, Ch. 227,
amending and reenacting 1937 Col.Session Laws, Ch. 261, makes it
unlawful to sell goods below cost to injure or destroy competition,
and states that the express purpose of the Act is "to safeguard the
public against . . . monopolies and to foster and encourage
competition."
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.
The Twenty-first Amendment made a fundamental change, as to
control of the liquor traffic, in the constitutional relations
between the States and national authority. Before that Amendment --
disregarding the interlude of the Eighteenth Amendment -- alcohol
was, for constitutional purposes, treated in the abstract as an
article of commerce, just like peanuts and potatoes. As a result,
the power of the States to control the liquor traffic was
subordinated to the right of free trade across state lines as
embodied in the Commerce Clause. The Twenty-first Amendment
reversed this legal situation by subordinating rights under the
Commerce Clause to the power of a State to control, and to control
effectively, the traffic in liquor within its borders. The course
of legal history which made necessary the Twenty-first Amendment in
order to permit the States to control the liquor traffic, according
to their notions of policy freed from the restrictions upon state
power which the Commerce Clause implies as to ordinary articles of
commerce, was summarized in my concurring opinion in
Carter v.
Virginia, 321 U. S. 131,
321 U. S.
139.
As a matter of constitutional law, the result of the
Twenty-first Amendment is that a State may erect any barrier it
pleases to the entry of intoxicating liquors. Its barrier may be
low, high, or insurmountable. Of course, if a State chooses not to
exercise the power given it by the Twenty-first Amendment and to
continue to treat intoxicating liquors like other articles, the
operation of the Commerce Clause continues. Since the Commerce
Clause
Page 324 U. S. 301
is subordinate to the exercise of state power under the
Twenty-first Amendment, the Sherman Law, deriving its authority
from the Commerce Clause, can have no greater potency than the
Commerce Clause itself. It must equally yield to state power drawn
from the Twenty-first Amendment. And so the validity of a charge
under the Sherman Law relating to intoxicating liquors depends upon
the utilization by a its constitutional power under the
Twenty-first Amendment. If a State, for its own sufficient reasons,
deems it a desirable policy to standardize the price of liquor
within its borders either by a direct price-fixing statute or by
permissive sanction of such price-fixing in order to discourage the
temptations of cheap liquor due to cutthroat competition, the
Twenty-first Amendment gives it that power, and the Commerce Clause
does not gainsay it. Such state policy cannot offend the Sherman
Law even though distillers or middlemen agree with local dealers to
respect this policy. If an agreement among local dealers not to buy
liquor through channels of interstate commerce does not offend the
Sherman Law, though a like agreement as to other commodities would,
an agreement among liquor dealers to abide by state policy for a
uniform price -- which is far less restrictive of interstate
commerce than a comprehensive boycott -- can hardly be a violation
of the Sherman Law.
Thus, the question in this case, as I see it, is whether, in
fact, the policy of Colorado sanctions such an arrangement as the
indictment charges. Such a policy may be expressed either formally
by legislation or by implied permission. Unless state policy is
voiced either by legislation or by state court decisions, it is
precarious business for an outsider to be confident about the legal
policy of a State. So far as our attention has been called to
materials relevant for ascertaining the policy of Colorado toward
such a price arrangement as is here charged, it would be
temerarious to suggest that Colorado does sanction it. Indeed, the
legislation
Page 324 U. S. 302
of Colorado looks in the opposite direction. And we have no
guidance from state decisions to suggest that the apparent
condemnation of such an arrangement under the Colorado Fair Trade
Act, § 2, Colo.Stat.Ann., ch. 165, § 20(2), does not condemn the
price arrangements before us. Although the Attorney General of
Colorado has filed a brief as
amicus curiae on the side of
the respondents, his argument is not based on the contention that
the policy of Colorado sanctions that which it is claimed the
Sherman Law forbids. In the view I take of the matter, if a State
authorized the transactions here complained of, the Sherman Law
could not override such exercise of state power. For, in any event,
if state policy did so authorize it, conformity with the state
policy could not be deemed an "unreasonable" restraint of
interstate commerce. But I do not find that Colorado has done
so.
The decision of the court below is not without support in what
has been said in the past in holding that, apart from the
Twenty-first Amendment, this was a restraint local in its nature,
and therefore outside the scope of the Sherman Law. But
price-fixing is such an immediate restraint upon trade that I do
not think that the reach of the consequences of such an obvious
restraint should be determined by drawing too nice lines as a
matter of pleading. The case is before us, in effect, on demurrer
to the indictment and judged abstractly, as a matter of pleading, I
cannot say that the indictment was demurrable.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS concurs in this opinion.