1. In a proceeding instituted by a petition in the District
Court for the condemnation of land under the War Purposes Act of
1917, a "judgment" entered upon a declaration of taking filed
pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act of 1931, and a subsequent
order denying the landowner's motion to vacate the judgment and to
dismiss the petition,
held not "final decisions" under §
128 of the Judicial Code, and therefore not appealable. P.
324 U. S.
232.
2. The right of the landowner to challenge the validity of the
taking for nonconformity with the prescribed statutory purposes was
not abrogated by the Declaration of Taking Act, but the right of
appeal in this relation may be exercised only when final judgment,
disposing of the cause in its entirety, has been rendered. P.
324 U. S.
240.
142 F.2d 781 affirmed.
Page 324 U. S. 230
Certiorari, 323 U.S. 696, to review the dismissal of an appeal
from a judgment and order of the District Court in a condemnation
proceeding.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The proceeding is for the condemnation of land in Madison
County, Illinois, under the War Purposes Act of 1917. [
Footnote 1] The question for review is
whether orders entered in the
Page 324 U. S. 231
course of the proceedings are appealable as "final decisions"
within the meaning of § 128 of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 225(a). [
Footnote
2]
The petition for condemnation was filed in the District Court
March 31, 1942. The same day, an order for immediate possession was
entered
ex parte. On November 12, 1942, pursuant to the
Declaration of Taking Act of February 26, 1931, [
Footnote 3] the Secretary of War filed a
declaration and deposited in court $43,579.00 as the estimated
compensation for Tract ED-7, to which petitioners assert ownership
as trustees. The court thereupon entered "judgment," likewise
ex parte, decreeing that title had vested in the United
States upon the filing of the declaration and making of the
deposit, also declaring the right of just compensation "now vested
in the persons entitled thereto," and holding the cause open for
further "orders, judgments and decrees."
Thereafter, on August 2, 1943, an order for service of process
by publication was entered, and, in October following, petitioners
moved to vacate the "judgment" and to dismiss the petition as to
Tract ED-7. After this, the Government amended its petition,
[
Footnote 4] and petitioners
filed
Page 324 U. S. 232
an amended motion to vacate and dismiss, [
Footnote 5] which the court denied. From this
order and the order entering the "judgment" on the declaration of
taking, petitioners appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals held the
orders not final decisions within § 128 and dismissed the appeal.
142 F.2d 781. We granted certiorari, 323 U.S. 696, in order to
resolve conflict upon this question among several Circuit Courts of
Appeals. [
Footnote 6]
We think the judgment was right. Petitioners' motions raised
issues grounded in contentions that the taking was not for a
purpose authorized by the War Purposes Act. [
Footnote 7]
Page 324 U. S. 233
Accordingly, they urged that neither petition stated a cause of
action, the court acquired no jurisdiction of the cause or to enter
the order relating to title, and it was error to deny the motion to
vacate and to dismiss. Since the issue here is whether the orders
are final, for purposes of appeal, we assume, though we do not
decide, that the substantive issues have sufficient merit to
warrant determination upon review. Even so, we think petitioners
have mistaken their remedy.
Their right to appeal rests upon § 128 of the Judicial Code.
This limits review to "final decisions" in the District Court. A
"final decision" generally is one which ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.
St. Louis I.M. & S. R. Co. v. Southern Express
Co., 108 U. S. 24,
108 U. S. 28.
Hence, ordinarily in condemnation proceedings, appellate review may
be had only upon an order or judgment disposing of the whole case,
and adjudicating all rights, including ownership and just
compensation, as well as the right to take the property. This has
been the repeated holding of decisions here. [
Footnote 8] The rule applies to review by this
Court of judgments of state courts, in advance of determination of
just compensation, although by local statute "judgments of
condemnation,"
i.e., of the right to condemn particular
property, are reviewable before compensation is found and awarded.
Wick v. Superior Court, 278 U.S. 574-575;
Public
Service Co. v. Lebanon, 305 U.S. 558, 671;
cf. Dieckmann
v. United States, 88 F.2d 902. The foundation of this policy
is not in merely technical conceptions of "finality." It is one
against piecemeal
Page 324 U. S. 234
litigation. "The case is not to be sent up in fragments. . . ."
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U.
S. 337,
147 U. S. 341.
Reasons other than conservation of judicial energy sustain the
limitation. One is elimination of delays caused by interlocutory
appeals.
The rule applies to proceedings under the War Purposes Act of
1917. [
Footnote 9] That act
does not purport to change or depart from the generally prevailing
rule concerning appeals in condemnation proceedings. It is an
amended version of the 1890 act, under which, from its enactment to
now, that rule has been applied, except in the three decisions of
Circuit Courts of Appeals reaching the contrary result, where,
however, the Declaration of Taking Act of 1931 also was involved.
[
Footnote 10] The 1917 act
purports to authorize no judgment except one "for the acquirement
by condemnation of any land," etc., for the purposes specified or,
necessarily, one finally denying this. The provision for the
proceedings "to be prosecuted in accordance with the laws relating
to suits for the condemnation of property of the States wherein the
proceedings may be instituted . . . " had no purpose to make the
right of appeal in such proceedings depend upon and vary with the
local procedure in this respect,
cf. Wick v. Superior Court,
supra; Public Service Co. v. Lebanon, supra, or to
incorporate
Page 324 U. S. 235
local ideas of "finality" in the application of § 128 to such
suits. The language may be applied in other ways without
introducing so much lack of uniformity into the application of §
128, if indeed the quoted provision has not been largely nullified
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in all respects concerning
appeals. [
Footnote 11]
Furthermore, the 1917 act contemplated emergency action to the
extent that, upon the filing of the petition immediate possession
might be taken and the lands occupied "for military purposes"
during war "or the imminence thereof." This purpose, it seems
clear, would be largely defeated if entry must be deferred until
specific challenges to jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the
petition are determined
seriatim, not only by ruling of
the trial court, but by separate appeals from each ruling which, if
sustained, [
Footnote 12]
would end the litigation, but, if lacking in merit, could only
prolong it. We find neither in the language nor in the purposes of
the 1917 act an intent to authorize departure from the general
course of applying § 128 in condemnation proceedings.
Indeed, we do not understand petitioners to urge that the 1917
act, without more, accomplishes the departure. They say, rather,
that it does so when used in conjunction with the Declaration of
Taking Act of 1931. It is the "judgment" upon "a declaration of
taking" and the subsequent order denying their motion to vacate
this "judgment" and to dismiss the proceedings which they contend
are "final decisions" within § 128, and therefore appealable. It is
"judgments" of this character which the decisions of Circuit Courts
of Appeals, upon which petitioners rely,
Page 324 U. S. 236
have involved. One of them relied expressly upon the 1931 act as
being intended
"to sever the taking of title and possession from controversies
as to valuation, and to provide a procedure whereby the United
States might be speedily and conclusively vested with title and
possession,"
and therefore as having a "final and immediate effect on
property rights" which "obviously should be reviewable at once,
without the necessity of awaiting the outcome of long drawn out
controversies as to valuation."
Puerto Rico R. Light &
Power Co. v. United States, 131 F.2d 491, 494. The reason
stated might afford ground for Congress to provide a special
appeal. However, we do not think the reason accords with the
statute's provisions or their effect. Consequently it gives no
ground for believing that Congress has provided a separate
appeal.
We dispose shortly of the motion, or that part of it, which was
directed at dismissal of the proceedings, insofar as it may require
treatment separately from the motion to vacate the "judgment," if
it does so at all. Had this motion been granted and judgment of
dismissal been entered, clearly there would have been an end of the
litigation, and appeal would lie within § 128.
United States v.
Carey, 143 F.2d 445;
United States v. Marin, 136 F.2d
388. But denial of a motion to dismiss, even when the motion is
based upon jurisdictional grounds, is not immediately reviewable.
Cf. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S.
21.
See also Dieckmann v. United States, 88
F.2d 902. Certainly this is true whenever the question may be saved
for disposition upon review of final judgment disposing of all
issues involved in the litigation or in some other adequate manner.
As will appear, we think such a remedy is available in this
case.
The "judgment" and the order denying the motion to vacate it
stand no better. The 1931 act, like that of 1917, contains no
language purporting to change the general rule relating to appeals
in condemnation proceedings.
Page 324 U. S. 237
§ 1, which is the basis section, makes no express reference to
appeals. [
Footnote 13] § 2
implies the contrary effect.
Page 324 U. S. 238
It provides:
"No appeal in any such cause nor any bond or undertaking given
therein shall operate to prevent or delay the vesting of title to
such lands in the United States."
While the section does not in terms deny the right of appeal
contended for, neither does it confer that right. The possibility
of delaying or preventing the vesting of title by appeals was
explicitly in the mind of Congress when it included this section.
If it had thought granting an earlier appeal than the existing
procedure allowed, upon the severed issue of the right to take the
property, would expedite the taking or the vesting of title or the
proceedings in any other manner, slight additional words would have
made provision for such an appeal. The omission, and the clear
import of the language used, are against the implication that
separate appeals were to be allowed.
This seems reinforced by § 4. It makes the right to take
possession and title "in advance of final judgment" additional to
other rights, powers or authority conferred by federal or local
law, and expressly states that this right "shall not be construed
as abrogating, limiting, or modifying any such right, power, or
authority." One of the rights of the Government under preexisting
federal law was the right not to have the proceeding, or the taking
of
Page 324 U. S. 239
possession, [
Footnote 14]
delayed by separate appeals over issues of title or taking.
[
Footnote 15] Its right was
rather to have these issues determined with others in the final
judgment dispositive of the whole cause. This right, we think, was
guarded by § 4 against being construed as having been abrogated,
limited, or modified by virtue of the
additional right
conferred "to take possession and title
in advance of final
judgment." (Emphasis added) Other provisions of the statute,
as will appear, support the same conclusion.
Moreover, the statute does not purport in terms to authorize
such a "judgment" as was entered in this cause or to make its entry
the event upon which title is changed, if so summary a procedure
could be valid. The "judgment" apparently was entered
ex
parte, prior to service of process or publication of notice.
Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714. By
the terms of § 1,
"Upon the filing said declaration of taking [in the condemnation
proceeding] and of the deposit in the court . . . , title . . .
shall vest in the United States . . . and said lands shall be
deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the United States,
and the right to just compensation for the same shall vest in the
persons entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be
ascertained and awarded in said proceeding and established by
judgment therein. . . . [
Footnote 16] "
Page 324 U. S. 240
The exact effect of these provisions is not entirely clear. But
we find nothing in the statute to indicate that Congress intended
to deprive the owner of all opportunity to challenge the validity
of the taking for departure from the statutory limits. Such a
purpose cannot be implied from the provision for transfer of title
itself and the fact that the specific references to the final
judgment in § 1 speak only concerning compensation. Those
references, we think, are counterbalanced by other provisions and
considerations, insofar as they may be thought to exclude matters
of title from the final adjudication.
We think the purpose was to leave intact the owner's remedy
existing before the statute was adopted. For one thing, the statute
is not an independent one for condemnation. It provides for no new
condemnation proceeding. It merely affords steps ancillary or
incidental to suits brought under other statutes, and was so used
in this case in conjunction with the suit brought under the Act of
1917. Its declared purpose is to expedite, in the cases to which it
applies, the construction of public buildings and works
"by enabling possession and title of sites to be taken
in
advance of final judgment in proceedings for the acquisition
thereof under the power of eminent domain"
(emphasis added), as the title states, and it applies to "any
proceeding . . . instituted . . . under the authority of the United
States for the acquisition of any land . . . for the public use. .
. ." § 1. The procedure clearly is ancillary to the main
condemnation proceeding,
cf. United States v. 17,280 Acres of
Land, 47 F. Supp. 267, 269, is intended to dovetail with it,
and, by § 4, is declared expressly to provide rights which are to
be "in addition to" preexisting rights and are not to "be construed
as abrogating, limiting, or modifying" them. This provision,
inserted primarily to safeguard the Government's interest, is not
expressly so limited, and we think it may be applied also to
safeguard
Page 324 U. S. 241
the owner's preexisting rights where doing this will not be in
essential conflict with the additional rights validly conferred on
the Government. This would be done by preserving his preexisting
right of appeal.
While the language and the wording of the act are not wholly
free from doubt, we see no necessary inconsistency between the
provisions for transfer of title upon filing of the declaration and
making of the deposit and at the same time preserving the owner's
preexisting right to question the validity of the taking as not
being for a purpose authorized by the statute under which the main
proceeding is brought. That result may be reached if the statute is
construed to confer upon the Government, upon occurrence of the
events specified, only a defeasible title in cases where an issue
concerning the validity of the taking arises. So to construe the
act would accomplish fully the purposes for which it was adopted in
the large number of cases where no such issue is made. In others,
this would go far toward doing so, for not all such issues will be
followed through to final decision or, if so followed, will turn
out adversely to the Government. The alternative construction, that
title passes irrevocably, leaving the owner no opportunity to
question the taking's validity or one for which the only remedy
would be to accept the compensation which would be just if the
taking were valid, would raise serious question concerning the
statute's validity. In any event, we think it would run counter to
what reasonable construction requires.
Some stress is placed upon the provisions of §§ 3 and 5 relating
to irrevocable commitment of the United States to pay the amount
ultimately to be awarded, [
Footnote 17] together
Page 324 U. S. 242
with the provision of § 1 authorizing award of more than the
amount deposited as estimated compensation, as indicating a purpose
to make the transfer of title irrevocable upon the filing of the
declaration and the making of the deposit. [
Footnote 18] From the fact that the Government
may become irrevocably committed to pay, it does not follow that
the owner is irrevocably committed to submit to the taking, since
the statute's terms are not
in pari materia in this
respect. Neither § 3 nor § 5 purports to bind the owner
irrevocably. On the contrary, § 5 deals only with authority to
expend appropriated funds for demolition of existing structures and
construction of new ones, and the concluding proviso, requiring the
opinion of the Attorney General that
"title has been vested in the United States or all persons
having an interest therein have been made parties to such
proceeding and will be bound
by the final judgment
therein"
(emphasis added) before the funds are expended, seems clearly to
contemplate that title is not indefeasibly vested in the United
States merely by following the administrative procedure. Final
judgment
Page 324 U. S. 243
in "such proceeding," that is, the main condemnation suit, is
necessary for that purpose. The operation of §§ 3 and 5 is to cut
off the Government's right to abandon the proceedings. It is not to
compel the owner to submit to unauthorized takings.
Accordingly, in our opinion, the right of the owner to challenge
the validity of the taking for nonconformity with the prescribed
statutory purposes was not destroyed by the 1931 act. Nor was the
right to do this upon appeal, existing before that act was adopted,
affected. No such "severance" was made as the court deciding the
Puerto Rico case thought was created. No new right of
separate appeal was given. The preexisting right of appeal,
including appeal on grounds relating to validity of the taking,
remained in force to be exercised when, and only when, final
judgment disposing of the cause in its entirety has been rendered.
The statute makes no other explicit provision. Nor is one so
clearly implied that we can make it. The weightier implications are
the other way.
We have not discussed other issues presented or suggested in the
briefs or argument, since that has not been necessary to the
disposition of this cause. These include the question whether, when
possession has been taken and damage has been done to the premises
in the course of proceedings not authorized, the remedy by appeal
is adequate. That issue has not been made in this case, since the
grounds urged rest upon the provisions of the 1931 act relating to
title and their effect, through the proceedings had, upon the
petitioners' right. They do not relate simply to the taking of
possession, the right to take it or damages resulting from exercise
of that right, apart from the question of title. Possession in this
case had been taken, pursuant to the terms of the 1917 act, prior
to the time of the purported transfer of title. It will be time
enough to consider
Page 324 U. S. 244
the question concerning adequacy of the appeal or possible
existence of other remedy affecting such a case when it arises.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concur in the
result.
[
Footnote 1]
Act of August 18, 1890, 26 Stat. 316, as amended by the Acts of
July 2, 1917, 40 Stat. 241, and April 11, 1918, 40 Stat. 518, 50
U.S.C. § 171. The Act provides:
"That hereafter, the Secretary of War may cause proceedings to
be instituted in the name of the United States, in any court having
jurisdiction of such proceedings for the acquirement by
condemnation of any land, temporary use thereof, or other interest
therein, or right pertaining thereto,
needed for the site,
location, construction, or prosecution of works for fortifications,
coast defenses, military training camps, and for the construction
and operation of plants for the production of nitrate and other
compounds and the manufacture of explosives and other munitions of
war and for the development and transmission of power for the
operations of such plants, such proceedings to be prosecuted
in accordance with the laws relating to suits for the condemnation
of property of the States wherein the proceedings may be
instituted. . . . And provided further, That when such property is
acquired in time of war, or the imminence thereof, upon the filing
of the petition for the condemnation of any land, temporary use
thereof, or other interest therein or right pertaining thereto to
be acquired for any of the purposes aforesaid,
immediate
possession thereof may be taken to the extent of the interest
to be acquired and the
lands may be occupied and used for
military purposes. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 2]
Section 128 is in part as follows:
"The circuit courts of appeal shall have appellate jurisdiction
to review by appeal final decisions --"
"First. In the district courts, in all cases save where a direct
review of the decision may be had in the Supreme Court under
section 345 of this title."
[
Footnote 3]
46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-258e. Material portions of the
statute are set forth in the text of this opinion and the
notes.
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioners attacked the original petition for failure to set
forth (1) the purpose of the acquisition, or that it was for any
purpose authorized by the act; (2) that the Secretary of War had
found that the land was needed, or (3) had requested the Attorney
General to institute the proceeding to acquire it for such a
purpose. Considering these objections jurisdictional, petitioners
regard "all further proceedings based upon the said petition" as
"ineffective," including the filing of the first declaration of
taking and the "judgment" entered pursuant to it.
The amendment added a new paragraph to the petition stating the
lands were being taken for purposes described in the language of
the statute and incorporated in the petition the letter of the
Secretary of War requesting the Attorney General to institute the
proceedings to acquire the land "for use in the establishment of
the Granite City Engineer Branch Depot." This is the specific
purpose which petitioners say does not come within any set forth in
the statute, for which
see note 1
[
Footnote 5]
The amended motion urged that the amendment of the petition, by
incorporating the Secretary's statement of intended use for an
engineer depot, caused the petition to show on its face that the
use was not within those authorized by the act. Petitioners assert
the amendment "came too late to validate" the "judgment."
[
Footnote 6]
Dade County v. United States, 142 F.2d 230, accords
with the decision in this case. Contrary decisions were rendered in
City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F.2d 959,
cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 679;
United States v. 243.22 Acres of
Land, 129 F.2d 678,
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 698;
Puerto Rico R. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 131
F.2d 491.
Under the comparable provision of the 1929 act applicable in the
District of Columbia, where special appeal may be allowed upon
interlocutory orders, D.C.Code 1940, § 17-101,
compare Lee v.
United States, 61 App.D.C. 153, 58 F.2d 879,
with Keyes v.
United States, 73 App.D.C. 273, 119 F.2d 444.
[
Footnote 7]
See notes
1
4 and 5
[
Footnote 8]
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U.
S. 337,
147 U. S. 341;
Southern R. v. Postal Telegraph Co., 179 U.
S. 641,
179 U. S. 643;
Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co.,
243 U. S. 251,
243 U. S. 256;
Washington ex rel. McPherson Bros. Co. v. Superior Court,
274 U.S. 726;
Ornstein v. Chesapeake & Ohio R., 284
U.S. 572;
cf. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.
S. 364,
252 U. S. 370;
United States v. Florian, 312 U.S. 656.
[
Footnote 9]
No case has been found in which appeal was taken, or attempted
to be taken, under the 1890 and 1917 acts from an order other than
the final judgment disposing of all issues raised in the
proceeding, including compensation. The uniform practice under
those acts appears to have been, therefore, to confine appeals to
such orders. Only three cases appear to have sought to raise, in
appeals from final judgments, the question of the right to condemn.
See Forbes v. United States, 268 F. 273;
Chappell v.
United States, 81 F. 764,
160 U. S. 160
U.S. 499;
Henry v. United States, 46 F.2d 640. Numerous
other cases involved appeals on questions affecting compensation
without raising question concerning title or authority to
condemn.
[
Footnote 10]
Cf. note 6 and text
beginning with the paragraph following |
note 6 and text beginning with the paragraph
following S. 229fn12|>note 12.
[
Footnote 11]
"In proceedings for condemnation of property under the power of
eminent domain, these rules govern appeals, but are not otherwise
applicable." Rule 81(a)(7).
[
Footnote 12]
See United States v. Carey, 143 F.2d 445;
United
States v. Marin, 136 F.2d 388.
[
Footnote 13]
Because of its importance, the Section is set forth here in
full, except for the concluding paragraph, which is quoted in
324
U.S. 229fn14|>note 14:
"An Act
To expedite the construction of public buildings and
works outside of the District of Columbia
by enabling
possession and title of sites to be taken in advance of final
judgment in proceedings for the acquisition thereof under the
power of eminent domain."
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That
in any
proceeding in any court of the United States outside of the
District of Columbia which has been or may be
instituted
by and in the name of and under the authority of the United States
for the acquisition of any land or easement or right of
way in land for the public use,
the petitioner may file in the
cause, with the petition or at any time before judgment,
a
declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law
to acquire the lands described in the petition,
declaring that
said lands are thereby taken for the use of the United States.
Said declaration of taking shall contain or have annexed thereto
--"
"(1) A statement of the authority under which and the public use
for which said lands are taken."
"(2) A description of the lands taken sufficient for the
identification thereof."
"(3) A statement of the estate or interest in said lands taken
for said public use."
"(4) A plan showing the lands taken."
"(5) A statement of the sum of money estimated by said acquiring
authority to be just compensation for the land taken."
"
Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the
deposit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled
thereto,
of the amount of the estimated compensation
stated in said declaration,
title to the said lands in fee
simple absolute, or such less estate or interest therein as is
specified in said declaration,
shall vest in the United States
of America, and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and
taken for the use of the United States,
and the right to just
compensation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled
thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and
awarded in said proceeding and established by judgment therein, and
the said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation
awarded, interest at the rate of 6 percentum per annum on the
amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date
of taking, from said date to the date of payment; but interest
shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid
into the court. No sum so paid into the court shall be charged with
commissions or poundage."
"Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court may
order that the money deposited in the court, or any part thereof,
be paid forthwith for or on account of the just compensation to be
awarded in said proceeding. If the compensation finally awarded in
respect of said lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the
amount of the money so received by any person entitled, the court
shall enter judgment against the United States for the amount of
the deficiency."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 14]
This was authorized by the Act of 1917,
cf. note 1 above as well as by the Act of
1931 in the concluding paragraph of § 1, which is as follows:
"Upon the filing of a declaration of taking, the court shall
have power to fix the time within which and the terms upon which
the parties in possession shall be required to surrender possession
to the petitioner. The court shall have power to make such orders
in respect of encumbrances, liens, rents, taxes, assessments,
insurance, and other charges, if any, as shall be just and
equitable."
[
Footnote 15]
See note 9
[
Footnote 16]
See note 13 for the
complete text
[
Footnote 17]
Section 3 is set forth in note 18. Section 5 is as follows:
"In any case in which the United States has taken or may take
possession of any real property during the course of condemnation
proceedings and in advance of final judgment therein and the United
States has become irrevocably committed to pay the amount
ultimately to be awarded as compensation, it shall be lawful to
expend moneys duly appropriated for that purpose in demolishing
existing structures on said land and in erecting public buildings
or public works thereon, notwithstanding the provisions of section
355 of the Revised Statutes of the United States:
Provided, That in the opinion of the Attorney General, the
title has been vested in the United States or all persons having an
interest therein have been made parties to such proceeding and will
be bound by the final judgment therein."
[
Footnote 18]
Including or following the finding required by § 3, which
provides:
"Action under this statute irrevocably committing the United
States to the payment of the ultimate award shall not be taken
unless the chief of the executive department or agency or bureau of
the Government empowered to acquire the land shall be of the
opinion that the ultimate award probably will be within any limits
prescribed by Congress on the price to be paid."