The Public Vessels Act provides that "a libel
in
personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States
. . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States .
. ."
Held:
1. The remedy afforded by the Act is not confined to cases where
the public vessel is the "physical instrument" by which the
"physical damage" is done. P.
324 U. S.
222.
2. Damage "caused by a public vessel" embraces damage resulting
from negligence of personnel in the operation of the vessel. P.
324 U. S.
224.
3.
The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158;
The Vera Cruz, No. 2, 9 L.R., Prob.Div. 96 [1884];
Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807, and
O'Neal v.
United States, 11 F.2d
869, distinguished. P.
324 U. S. 225.
4. The Act authorizes the courts to apply principles of
in
rem, as well as
in personam, liability in admiralty,
even though it denies a maritime lien, which is in accord with the
broad purpose of the Act as evidenced in its legislative history.
P.
324 U. S.
227.
5. A complaint alleging that, while following directly astern of
a public vessel as ordered by Naval authorities, complainant's
vessel was damaged when it struck a submerged wreck, and that the
accident resulted solely from the negligence of the public vessel
and its crew, stated a cause of action under the Act. P.
324 U. S.
228.
142 F.2d 709 reversed.
Certiorari, 323 U.S. 688, to review a judgment affirming the
dismissal of a libel, 52 F. Supp. 211, under the Public Vessels
Act.
Page 324 U. S. 216
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ brings here for review a libel filed by the
petitioner, a Canadian corporation and owner of the steamship
Cavelier, against the respondent, the United States
Government, to recover, under the provisions of the Public Vessels
Act, 1925, 43 Stat. 1112, [
Footnote
1] damages alleged to have been suffered by the
Cavelier due to the negligent operation of a public vessel
of the United States. The United States District Court dismissed
the libel on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action
within the Public Vessels Act, 1925, for which the United States
had consented to be sued. [
Footnote
2] The Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed
the District Court. [
Footnote
3]
The jurisdiction of the United States District Court is based on
§ 24 of the Judicial Code. The petition for certiorari was granted,
323 U.S. 688, because the Circuit Court of Appeals decided a
question of general importance relating to the construction of a
federal statute. Jurisdiction of this Court rests on § 240(a) of
the Judicial Code.
On August 4, 1942, the petitioner, the owners of the steamship
Cavelier, filed a libel
in personam in admiralty
in a federal district court against the United States to recover
for damages to its ship, the
Cavelier, alleged to have
been caused by the negligent operation of the United States Naval
patrol boat, YP 249, a public vessel of the United States. The
libel averred that, on July 7, 1942, the
Cavelier, while
en route from Canada to Jamaica, was ordered by United States Naval
authorities to enter Delaware
Page 324 U. S. 217
Bay. Upon approaching the Bay, the
Cavelier received
further instructions from the naval authorities that, in her
transit of the waters constituting the entrance to the bay, the
Cavelier was to follow directly astern of the patrol boat,
YP 249, a public vessel of the United States. While following
directly astern of the YP 249, as ordered, the
Cavelier
struck a submerged wreck and sustained serious damages. It was
further alleged that the collision with the wreck was due "solely
to the fault and negligence of the United States vessel YP 249 and
those in charge of her." [
Footnote
4] The libel also stated that petitioner, a Canadian
corporation, elected to have its suit proceed in accordance with
principles of libels
in personam and
in rem;
that, in similar circumstances, the Government of the Dominion of
Canada allows nationals of the United States to sue in its
courts.
The respondent, United States, appeared specially and sought to
have the libel dismissed because it failed to state a cause of
action for which the United States had consented to be sued.
Petitioner, the libellant, opposed this action, relying on § 1 of
the Public Vessels Act, 1925, which provided that a "libel
in
personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States
. . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States. .
. ." [
Footnote 5] The federal
district court dismissed the libel on the ground that the accident
alleged in the libel was not caused by the "negligent operation of
the vessel," that the vessel was
Page 324 U. S. 218
not the "efficient cause" of the accident, but that the accident
arose from the "
personal and independent negligence of its
officers." The court held that the Act authorized suit only
where the public vessel was the proximate cause of the damage.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the district
court on the theory that the phrase in the Act "caused by a public
vessel" meant caused by those in charge of the vessel, with the
vessel as the "noxious instrument," the "physical instrument," by
which the physical damage was done; that, in the instant case, the
physical cause was the submerged wreck. The Circuit Court also held
that the Act did not authorize recovery on the admiralty principles
of
in rem liability.
The dismissal by the lower court of petitioner's libel raises
three questions for consideration by this Court: does the Public
Vessels Act, 1925, authorize suit against the United States where
the public vessel is not the physical cause, the "physical
instrument" by which the damage is done; that is, is the Act
confined to cases involving the collision situation? If not, does
the Act, which authorizes the filing of a libel
in
personam against the United States, authorize recovery in such
suit on admiralty principles of
in rem as well as
in
personam liability? Finally, if the Act authorizes recovery on
admiralty principles
in rem and
in personam, does
petitioner's libel state a cause of action under those principles
of admiralty law?
The Public Vessels Act, 1925, was the last in a series of
statutes directed generally at affording private vessel owners an
adequate and efficient remedy for damages arising from negligent
operation of ships owned by the United States. [
Footnote 6] Prior to 1916, a private owner whose
ship was
Page 324 U. S. 219
damaged by negligent operation of a vessel owned or operated by
the United States could not recover from the United States for
damages suffered, due to the United States' immunity from suit. On
the other hand, the United States could sue private owners for
damages arising from their negligence. Recognizing the inequities
of this situation, Congress passed numerous private acts granting
relief in a particular case where a private vessel was damaged by
negligent operation of a government ship. The delays, coupled with
the inconvenience to Congress of handling each claim by separate
bill, led Congress to provide in the Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat.
728, that Shipping Board vessels, while employed as merchant
vessels, were subject to "all laws, regulations, and liabilities
governing merchant vessels" regardless of the fact that the United
States owned or had an interest in them. [
Footnote 7]
In
The Lake Monroe, 250 U. S. 246,
this Court held that this statutory waiver of sovereign immunity
from suit subjected Shipping Board merchant vessels to proceedings
in rem in admiralty. Since the arrest and seizure of a
vessel incident to an admiralty proceeding
in rem proved
embarrassing, Congress, in 1920, adopted the Suits in Admiralty
Act, 41 Stat. 525, [
Footnote 8]
which provided
Page 324 U. S. 220
generally that a "libel
in personam" for damages could
be filed against the government in any case where, if the
government merchant vessel were privately owned or operated, a
"proceeding in admiralty" could be maintained, § 2, but that
vessels subject to suit under the Act should not be subject to
seizure or arrest, § 1. Although § 2 of the Act limited suit to the
filing of "a libel
in personam," this Court interpreted
the provisions of § 3 of the Act to authorize recovery in such suit
on admiralty principles of
in rem as well as
in
personam liability. [
Footnote
9]
Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States,
272 U. S. 675. The
Act also provided that the United States should be entitled to the
benefits of all exemptions and of all limitations of liability
accorded by law to owners, charterers, operators or agents of
vessels, § 6. [
Footnote
10]
At the time the Suits in Admiralty Act was being considered by
Congress, it was proposed to extend its coverage
Page 324 U. S. 221
to include "public vessels" as well as merchant vessels of the
United States. Apparently fearing that such an extension of the
scope of the bill would delay passage, the Suits in Admiralty Act
was adopted, its provisions being confined to "merchant vessels."
[
Footnote 11]
After the introduction of several bills [
Footnote 12] dealing with suits against public
vessels, Congress, in 1925, adopted the Public Vessels Act, 43
Stat. 1112. It provided that a "libel in personam in admiralty may
be brought against the United States . . . for damages caused by a
public vessel of the United States." § 1. [
Footnote 13] Venue of such suits is laid in the
district court for the district "in which the vessel or cargo
charged with creating the liability is found within the United
States." [
Footnote 14] § 2.
It was also provided that suits under the Act
"shall be subject to and proceed in accordance with the
provisions of [Suits in Admiralty Act, 1920, 41 Stat. 525] or any
amendment thereof, insofar as the same are not inconsistent
herewith. . . . [
Footnote
15]
Page 324 U. S. 222
The Act also specified that no suit may be brought by a national
of a foreign government unless said foreign government, under
similar circumstances allows nationals of the United States to sue
in its courts, § 5; §§ 8 and 9 of the Act contain provisions
similar to those in the Suits in Admiralty Act, providing that the
statute should not be construed to recognize the existence of a
lien against a public vessel and conferring on the United States
all exemptions and limitations of liability accorded by law to
owners of private vessels. [
Footnote 16]"
First: Respondent contends that § 1 of the Public
Vessels Act authorizing suits against the United States "for
damages caused by a public vessel" should be construed to apply
only in cases where the public vessel is the "physical instrument"
by which the "physical damage" is done --
e.g., collision;
that therefore petitioner's libel does not lie under the Act. Such
a construction narrowly limits the Act's relief. We conclude that
such a narrow interpretation of the Act is not justifiable. While
the general history of the Act as outlined above does not establish
that the statute necessarily extends to the noncollision cases in
view of the rule of strict construction of statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity,
United States v. Sherwood,
312 U. S. 584,
312 U. S. 586;
Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, supra, we
think Congressional adoption of broad statutory language
authorizing suit was deliberate, and is not to be thwarted by an
unduly restrictive interpretation.
See The Lake Monroe,
250 U. S. 246;
Page 324 U. S. 223
Nahmeh v. United States, 267 U.
S. 122,
267 U. S.
125-126;
Eastern Transportation Co. v. United
States, supra; Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy,
295 U. S. 229,
295 U. S.
231.
In 1924, H.R. 6989 was introduced in the House of
Representatives, its provisions being similar [
Footnote 17] to those of the Public Vessels Act
as adopted, with this material difference: § 1 of that bill
authorized suit against the United States "for damages caused
by collision by a public vessel." (Italics added.) On
reference to the House Committee on Claims, a substitute bill, H.R.
9535, was reported to the House. [
Footnote 18] This bill provided for suits "for damages
caused by a public vessel of the United States." This bill, with
the latter phrase included, subsequently became the Public Vessels
Act. This change in the language of the Act prior to its adoption
convinces us that Congress intended to authorize suits in other
than collision cases. The sponsors of the bill in both houses of
Congress understood that it extended to cases where damage was done
"by collision, or other fault of Government vessels and Government
agents." [
Footnote 19]
Moreover, Congressional
Page 324 U. S. 224
reports on this bill and the course of discussion in the
numerous hearings held on predecessor measures to the present bill
indicate that authority to sue was not to be limited to cases where
the vessel was the physical instrument that caused the physical
damage. [
Footnote 20]
The use of the phase "caused by a public vessel" constitutes an
adoption by Congress of the customary legal terminology of the
admiralty law which refers to the vessel as causing the harm,
although the actual cause is the negligence of the personnel in the
operation of the ship. Such personification of the vessel, treating
it as a juristic person whose acts and omissions, although brought
about by her personnel, are personal acts of the ship for which, as
a juristic person, she is legally responsible, has long been
recognized by this Court.
United States v. The Malek
Adhel, 2 How. 210,
43 U. S.
233-234;
The China, 7
Wall. 53,
74 U. S. 68;
Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386,
157 U. S.
402-403;
The John G. Stevens, 170 U.
S. 113,
170 U. S. 120;
The Barnstable, 181 U. S. 464,
181 U. S. 467.
That such was the meaning attributed to this phrase is further
evidenced by § 2 of the Act, relating to venue, which provides that
venue shall lie in the district "in which the vessel or cargo
charged with creating the liability is found." 43 Stat. 1112. The
consent to suit embodied in the Act thus extends to cases where the
negligence of the personnel of a public vessel in the operation of
the vessel causes damage to other ships, their cargoes, and
Page 324 U. S. 225
personnel, regardless of physical contact between the two ships,
[
Footnote 21] and where
principles of admiralty law imposed liability on private parties.
There seems no logical reason for allowing recovery for collision
and refusing recovery for damages caused by other movements of the
offending vessel.
The fact that the Committee reports on the bill state that the
"chief purpose" of the Act is to authorize recovery in collision
cases, that the departmental letters attached to the report
consider principally the "collision" situation, does not require
that the statute should be so limited. [
Footnote 22] Respondent relies on
The
Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, in
which it was held that a Wisconsin statute imposing liability "for
all damages . . . done to persons or property by such ship,"
Rev.St.Wis.1898, § 3348, did not apply to injuries suffered by a
member of a ship's crew arising from the negligence of the master
of the vessel, since the damage was not "done by the ship herself,
as the offending thing. . . ."
189 U. S. 158,
189 U. S. 176.
Since that case involved a suit by a member of the crew against his
employer owner of the vessel, the holding in that decision on its
facts is clearly inapplicable to the instant case. Moreover, the
language in the Wisconsin statute is narrower in scope than that in
the Public Vessels Act, 1925, which refers generally to "damages
caused by a public vessel." Furthermore, the legislative history of
the Public Vessels Act requires a different result insofar as the
Osceola case interprets the Wisconsin statute to apply
only to cases where the vessel is itself the physical cause of the
damage. These latter two considerations serve also to distinguish
The Vera Cruz, No. 2, 1884, 9 L.R., Prob.Div. 96.
Respondent also relies on
Page 324 U. S. 226
Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807, and
O'Neal v.
United States, 11 F.2d
869. These cases are not apposite on the question under
consideration, since they also involved suits for damages, for
personal injuries sustained by a seaman employee aboard his own
ship, against the United States as employer.
Second: Petitioner, evidently relying on § 2 of the
Act, states in its libel that it elects to have the action proceed
on principles of
in rem, as well as
in personam,
liability. [
Footnote 23] As
the Circuit Court of Appeals apparently holds that the Act does not
authorize recovery on principles of
in rem liability
because of the statutory denial of a maritime lien, we turn to a
consideration of this holding. Does the Public Vessels Act which
authorizes filing of a "libel
in personam," authorize the
courts to apply principles of
in rem, as well as
in
personam, liability in admiralty? [
Footnote 24] As was indicated
supra, this
Court held that the Suits in Admiralty Act, which also authorizes
filing of a "libel
in personam," authorizes the courts to
grant judgment on
in rem, as well as
in personam,
principles, except that the government vessel was not subject to
seizure or arrest.
Page 324 U. S. 227
Section 3 of that Act, "Procedure in cases of libel in
personam," [
Footnote 25]
specifically authorizes a libelant, if he so elects, to proceed in
accordance with principles of libels
in rem if it appears
that had the vessel been privately owned a libel
in rem
might be maintained; election to so proceed is not to preclude the
libelant from seeking relief
in personam in the same suit.
Although the Public Vessels Act does not have a similar provision,
§ 2 of the Public Vessels Act expressly provides that "suits shall
be subject to and proceed in accordance with the provisions" of the
Suits in Admiralty Act, "insofar as the same are not inconsistent"
with the provisions of the Public Vessels Act. [
Footnote 26] Since there is nothing in the
Public Vessels Act that is inconsistent with this provision of the
Suits in Admiralty Act, we hold that the incorporation clause
applies. Other provisions of the Public Vessels Act support such
incorporation. Authority is given to sue generally "in admiralty;"
this broad generic term implies a right to invoke principles of
in rem and
in personam liability. Furthermore, in
Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, supra, we
held that authority to resort to both types of principles of
admiralty liability was borne out by the fact that the Suits in
Admiralty Act provided that the United States should be entitled to
all the exemptions accorded to private persons under admiralty law.
We there held:
"The necessary implication is that, if, under the Harter Act . .
. or the Limitation of Liability Act, . . . the United States, as
owner of a merchant vessel, should not be able to show performance
of the conditions upon which such statutory limitations of
liability are granted, it must assume the personal liability for
negligence in such cases exactly as a private owner would."
272 U.S.
675,
272 U. S.
690-691.
Page 324 U. S. 228
The Public Vessels Act contains the same exemption provision as
that in the Suits in Admiralty Act. [
Footnote 27] This interpretation of the Act accords with
the broad purpose expressed in the Congressional hearings and
reports on the Act. [
Footnote
28] In addition, such an interpretation accomplishes Congress'
purpose to grant foreign nationals the same rights as would be
accorded our nationals in foreign courts in a similar situation; a
narrower interpretation would limit the reciprocal effect of this
Act. [
Footnote 29]
Third: Since we hold that the Public Vessels Act was
intended to impose on the United States the same liability (apart
from seizure or arrest under a libel
in rem) as is imposed
by the admiralty law on the private shipowner, it remains to be
considered whether petitioner states a valid cause of action under
general principles of admiralty law,
in rem and
in
personam. Petitioner alleges that the respondent's vessel,
having undertaken to guide petitioner's boat, the
Cavelier, through the waters at the entrance of the bay,
did so in a negligent fashion, causing petitioner to strike a
submerged wreck, that the accident was caused solely by the
negligence of YP 249 and its crew. It needs no extended citation of
authority to show that, where a tug negligently grounds its tow,
the tug and its owner are liable for the damages resulting
therefrom.
The Quickstep,
9 Wall. 665;
The John G. Stevens, 170 U.
S. 113;
The Temple Emery, 122 F. 180;
The
W. G. Mason, 142 F. 913;
see The Caspian, 14 F.2d
1013;
The Murrell, 200 F. 826;
The Sally McDevitt v.
The J. W. Paxon, 24 F. 302;
The Rescue, 74 F. 847.
[
Footnote 30] The fact that
the
Cavelier was not fastened to the YP 249 by a tow rope
is irrelevant. [
Footnote 31]
The libel avers that she was under
Page 324 U. S. 229
orders by the naval authorities to proceed directly astern of
the YP 249; for all practical purposes, she was as firmly fastened
to the stern of the YP 249 as if she had been in tow.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause
remanded to the district court with direction to proceed with
consideration of the case on the merits.
[
Footnote 1]
43 Stat. 1112. Section 1 provides:
"That a libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against
the United States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of
the United States, and for compensation for towage and salvage
services, including contract salvage, rendered to a public vessel
of the United States. . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 52 F. Supp.
211.
[
Footnote 3]
Canadian Aviator v. United States, 142 F.2d 709.
[
Footnote 4]
The petitioner's libel alleged the following specific acts of
negligence:
"1. She was not in charge of a competent person."
"2. She failed to keep a good look-out."
"3. She failed to guide the
Cavelier safely through the
waters constituting the entrance to Delaware Bay."
"4. She led the
Cavelier directly over a submerged
wreck."
"5. She failed to give the
Cavelier proper or adequate
guidance as to making a safe entrance into Delaware Bay."
[
Footnote 5]
See note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 6]
Benedict, Admiralty, 6th Ed., vol. 1, 437; Robinson, Admiralty,
266; Lord, Admiralty Claims Against the Government, 19 Columbia
L.Rev. 467; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1,
35-41; 39 Yale L.J. 1189.
[
Footnote 7]
Section 9 provides, in part, 39 Stat. 730, 731:
"Every vessel purchased, chartered, or leased from the board . .
. while employed solely as merchant vessels shall be subject to all
laws, regulations, and liabilities governing merchant vessels,
whether the United States be interested therein as owner, in whole
or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien, or other interest
therein."
[
Footnote 8]
41 Stat. 525, 526:
"SEC. 1. That no vessel owned by the United States . . . or in
the possession of the United States . . . and no cargo owned or
possessed by the United States . . . shall hereafter, in view of
the provision herein made for a libel in personam, be subject to
arrest or seizure by judicial process in the United States or its
possessions. . . ."
"SEC. 2. That, in cases where if such vessel were privately
owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned and
possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained at the
time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a libel
in personam may be brought against the United States or against
such corporation, as the case may be, provided that such vessel is
employed as a merchant vessel or is a tug boat operated by such
corporation. Such suits shall be brought in the district court of
the United States for the district in which the parties so suing,
or any of them, reside or have their principal place of business in
the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo charged with
liability is found. . . ."
[
Footnote 9]
41 Stat. 526:
"That such suits shall proceed and shall be heard and determined
according to the principles of law and to the rules of practice
obtaining in like cases between private parties. . . . If the
libelant so elects in his libel, the suit may proceed in accordance
with the principles of libels
in rem wherever it shall
appear that had the vessel or cargo been privately owned and
possessed a libel
in rem might have been maintained.
Election so to proceed shall not preclude the libelant in any
proper case from seeking relief in personam in the same suit. . .
."
[
Footnote 10]
41 Stat. 527:
"SEC. 6. That the United States or such corporation shall be
entitled to the benefits of all exemptions and of all limitations
of liability accorded by law to the owners, charterers, operators,
or agents of vessels."
[
Footnote 11]
Hearings of the House Committee on Judiciary, S. 3076 and H.R.
7124, Nov. 13, 1919, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. at p. 7.
[
Footnote 12]
H.R. 13591, April 13, 1920, 66th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6989,
February 14, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 9075, May 5, 1924,
68th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 9535, May 29, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess.
[
Footnote 13]
See note 1
[
Footnote 14]
The Act also contained a special venue provision for cases where
the vessel was outside the territorial waters of the United States.
43 Stat. 1112.
[
Footnote 15]
43 Stat. 1112:
"SEC. 2. That such suit shall be brought in the district court
of the United States for the district in which the vessel or cargo
charged with creating the liability is found within the United
States. . . . Such suits shall be subject to and proceed in
accordance with the provisions of an Act entitled 'An Act
authorizing suits against the United States in admiralty, suits for
salvage services, and providing for the release of merchant vessels
belonging to the United States from arrest and attachment in
foreign jurisdictions, and for other purposes,' approved March 9,
1920, or any amendment thereof, insofar as the same are not
inconsistent herewith, except that no interest shall be allowed on
any claim up to the time of the rendition of judgment unless upon a
contract expressly stipulating for the payment of interest."
[
Footnote 16]
43 Stat. 1113:
"SEC. 8. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to
recognize the existence of or as creating a lien against any public
vessel of the United States."
"SEC. 9. The United States shall be entitled to the benefits of
all exemptions and of all limitations of liability accorded by law
to the owners, charterers, operators or agents of vessels."
[
Footnote 17]
H.R. 6989, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., provided:
"That a libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against
the United States, . . . for damages caused by collision by a
public vessel of the United States. . . ."
This bill was highly similar to the Public Vessels Act, 1925, 43
Stat. 1112, as finally adopted. A material variance, other than the
one mentioned above, was a provision making the consent of the
Attorney General a condition precedent to suit under the bill.
[
Footnote 18]
H.Rep. No. 913, May 31, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 19]
66 Cong.Rec. 2087. Representative Underhill, the sponsor of the
bill stated:
"The bill I have introduced simply allows suits in admiralty to
be brought by owners of vessels whose property has been damaged by
collision or other fault of Government vessels and Government
agents."
Similarly, Senator Bayard, in discussing the measure in the
Senate, said, 66 Cong.Rec. 3560:
"It would give a person aggrieved because of an accident by
reason of the shortcomings of a United States ship the right to go
into a district court and prosecute his action. It provides for the
appearance of the Attorney General of the United States, and all
maritime accidents of any kind resulting from collision, and so on,
are taken care of. A great deal of money would be saved to the
Government."
[
Footnote 20]
H.Rep. No. 913, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. at p. 3; S.Rep. No. 941,
68th Cong., 2d Sess. at p. 3;
see also H.Rep. No. 1301,
66th Cong., 3rd Sess., Feb. 7, 1921,
see especially letter
of the Acting Secretary of the Navy, p. 8; Hearings before
Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives, on H.R.
9075, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., May 21, 1924, pp. 6, 19, 21, 23, 28,
30.
[
Footnote 21]
See Coastwise Transportation Corp. v. United States, 43
F.2d 401;
The Harding Highway, 53 F.2d 938.
[
Footnote 22]
H.Rep. 913, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1, 6; S.Rep. No. 941,
68th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1, 6.
[
Footnote 23]
See Admiralty Rules, Supreme Court, Rule 14:
"In all suits for pilotage or damage by collision, the libellant
may proceed in rem against the ship and/or in personam against the
master and/or the owner."
[
Footnote 24]
See note 1
supra. At the time of the Committee reports of H.R. 9535
(which when adopted became the Public Vessels Act), the courts had
not yet interpreted the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, to
authorize recovery on admiralty principles of both
in rem
and
in personam liability.
See Eastern Transportation
Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675. We
find no discussion of whether § 2 of the Public Vessels Act
imported both principles into its text. The problem had been
adverted to in the Attorney General's letters of opinion to the
committees considering the problem. H.Rep. No. 913, p. 12, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No. 941, p. 12, 68th Cong., 2d Sess.;
Hearings before the Committee on Judiciary of the House of
Representatives on H.R. 9075, May 21, 1924, pp. 30, 31 and 34.
[
Footnote 25]
46 U.S.C. § 743;
see note 9 supra.
[
Footnote 26]
See note 15
supra.
[
Footnote 27]
See note 16
supra.
[
Footnote 28]
See note 20
supra.
[
Footnote 29]
See note 16
supra.
[
Footnote 30]
Benedict, Admiralty, 6th Ed., vol. 1, pp. 363-365, 367-369.
[
Footnote 31]
It is clear that tort liability in admiralty does not require
physical contact between the offending vessel and its victim.
See Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.
S. 626,
105 U. S. 630:
"Nor is the term 'tort,' when used in reference to admiralty
jurisdiction, confined to wrongs or injuries committed by direct
force, but it includes wrongs suffered in consequence of the
negligence or malfeasance of others where the remedy at common law
is by an action on the case."
See also Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States,
272 U. S. 675;
Ex parte Fassett, 142 U. S. 479,
142 U. S. 485;
Philadelphia, W. & B.R.
Co. v. Philadelphia & H. de G. Towboat Co., 23
How. 209,
64 U. S.
215-216;
The Lyndhurst, 92 F. 681;
The
Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 192 F. 27;
The Campania, 203
F. 855;
The Washington Irving, 250 F. 797;
The
Luke, 19 F.2d 923,
aff'd, 19 F.2d
925;
Coastwise Transportation Corp. v. United States,
43 F.2d 401;
The J. C. Hart, 43 F.2d 566;
The
Favorita, 43 F.2d 569.