Upon the authority of
General Committee of Adjustment v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., ante, p.
320 U. S. 323, and
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, ante, p.
320 U. S. 297,
held, that the questions in this case -- arising out of a
so-called jurisdictional controversy between labor unions -- are
not justiciable issues under the Railway Labor Act, and the
District Court was without power to resolve them. P.
320 U. S.
343.
132 F.2d 194 reversed.
Certiorari, 319 U.S. 736, on cross-petitions to review a
judgment which modified and affirmed a decree determining on the
merits a suit for a declaratory judgment.
Page 320 U. S. 339
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are companion cases to
General Committee of Adjustment
v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., ante, p.
320 U. S. 323, and
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, ante, p.
320 U. S. 297,
decided this day. They are here on a petition and on a
cross-petition for writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No. 41, the cross-petition, involves
a dispute between the collective bargaining representatives of the
locomotive engineers and of the locomotive firemen on the Pacific
lines of the Southern Pacific Co. The controversy involves the same
basic question as is present in the
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co. case. The committee for the engineers (hereinafter called
the Engineers) brought this action for a declaratory judgment that
provisions of a June, 1939, agreement between the carrier and the
committee for the firemen (hereinafter called the Firemen)
concerning the demotion of engineers to firemen and the calling of
firemen for service as emergency
Page 320 U. S. 340
engineers were invalid under the Railway Labor Act. The courts
below undertook to resolve the controversy.
See 132 F.2d
194, 202-206. For the reasons stated in the
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. case, we think that the
questions are not justiciable issues under the Railway Labor
Act.
The question presented in No. 27 is related to the questions in
the other two cases. In the suit brought by the Engineers (No. 41),
a declaratory judgment was also asked that Article 51, § 1, of the
collective bargaining agreement between the carrier and the Firemen
was invalid under the Railway Labor Act. That section provides:
"The right of any
engineer, fireman, hostler, or
hostler helper to have the regularly constituted committee of his
organization represent him in the handling of his grievances, in
accordance with the laws of his organization and under the
recognized interpretation of the General Committee making the
schedule involved, is conceded."
The question whether the Engineers were the exclusive
representatives of engineers in the handling of their individual
grievances was the subject of dispute by the Engineers with this
carrier, and also with the Firemen. It was one of several subjects
on which the Firemen had a strike ballot taken in 1937. Following
the vote to strike, the President appointed an Emergency Board
[
Footnote 1] under § 10 of the
Act to investigate and report on this and other disputes. The Board
reported in 1937. The dispute has continued to date.
The Engineers and the Firemen are the majority representatives
of their respective crafts under the Act. The Engineers contend
that the Firemen have no right to represent men working as
engineers in the handling of individual grievances involving an
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement which the
Engineers negotiated.
Page 320 U. S. 341
Their position is that, under the Act, they are the exclusive
representative of the individual engineer in that class of disputes
which he has with the carrier, as well as the exclusive
representative of the craft for purposes of collective bargaining.
The District Court refused to declare that the inclusion of the
word "engineer" in Article 51, § 1, of the agreement was unlawful
under the Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
132 F.2d 194-202.
The Engineers place their chief reliance on those provisions of
§ 2, Fourth, which states: (1) that employees "shall have the right
to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing," and (2) that the
"majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the
right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or
class for the purposes of this Act."
And it is pointed out that, by reason of § 2, Eighth, the
provisions of § 2, Fourth, become a part of each contract of
employment. Some support is also sought from § 2, Second and Sixth.
The former provides that "all disputes" between a carrier and its
employees shall be considered in conference between representatives
of the parties. The latter provision says that, in case of a
dispute as to grievances, "it shall be the duty of the designated
representative" of the carrier and of the employees to specify a
time and place for a conference. From these provisions, it is
argued that the collective bargaining representative of a craft
becomes the exclusive representative for all purposes of the Act --
the protection of the individual's, as well as the craft's,
interests. On the other hand, the carrier and the Firemen contend
that the Act limits the exclusive representation of the collective
bargaining agent to the interests of the craft. They contend that
this is the true meaning of § 2, Fourth. They also rely on § 3,
First (i), which states that, prior to a reference of disputes
between employees and carriers to the Adjustment Board, they "shall
be handled
Page 320 U. S. 342
in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating
officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes." They
claim that "usual manner" means the prior practice, and that that
shows a uniform acceptance of the right of the aggrieved employee
to select his own representative. They point out that § 2, Third
and Fourth, prohibit the carrier from influencing employees in
their choice of representatives. The argument is that a contract by
the carrier with the Engineers giving the latter the exclusive
right to represent engineers in the presentation of their
individual claims would in effect coerce all engineers into joining
that union in violation of § 2, Third and Fourth.
The parties base their respective arguments not only on the
language of the Act and its legislative history, but also on
various trade union practices and analogous problems arising under
the National Labor Relations Act. From these various materials,
each seeks to prove that Congress has fashioned a federal rule
(enforceable in the courts) concerning the authority of collective
bargaining agents to represent various classes of employees on
their individual grievances. [
Footnote 2] All of these would be relevant data for
construction
Page 320 U. S. 343
of the Act if the courts had been entrusted with the task of
resolving this type of controversy. But we do not think they
were.
We have here no question involving the representation of
individual employees before the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
[
Footnote 3] We are concerned
only with a problem of representation of employees before the
carriers on certain types of grievances [
Footnote 4] which, though affecting individuals,
present a dispute like the one at issue in the
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. case. It involves, that is to
say, a jurisdictional controversy between two unions. It raises the
question whether one collective bargaining agent or the other is
the proper representative for the presentation of certain claims to
the employer. It involves a determination of the point where the
exclusive jurisdiction of one craft ends and where the authority of
another craft begins. For the reasons stated in our opinions in the
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. case and in the
Page 320 U. S. 344
Switchmen's case, we believe that Congress left the
so-called jurisdictional controversies between unions to agencies
or tribunals other than the courts. We see no reason for
differentiating this jurisdictional dispute from the others.
Whether different considerations would be applicable in case an
employee were asserting that the Act gave him the privilege of
choosing his own representative for the prosecution of his claims
is not before us.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and MR. JUSTICE REED are of the view that
the Court should entertain jurisdiction of the present
controversies for the reasons set out in the dissent in
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, ante, p.
320 U. S.
307.
* Together with No. 41,
General Grievance Committee of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. General
Committee of Adjustment of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
for the Pacific Lines of Southern Pacific Co. et al., also on
certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
The Board was appointed April 14, 1937, and was composed of G.
Stanleigh Arnold, Charles Kerr, and Dexter M. Keezer.
[
Footnote 2]
Reference is also made to certain informal rulings by the
National Mediation Board that the individual employee has the right
under the Act to select his own representative in such a case. And
considerable stress is given to the following statement of the
Emergency Board,
supra, note 1 appointed in 1937:
"This legislation was enacted for the purpose of protecting
national transportation against the consequences of labor disputes
between carriers and their employees. It was devised by
representatives of management, the employees, and the public. It
secured the benefits of unhampered collective bargaining to the
several crafts or classes engaged in the work of railway
transportation. When a craft or class, through representatives
chosen by a majority, negotiates a contract with a carrier, all
members of the craft or class share in the rights secured by the
contract, regardless of their affiliations with any organization of
employees. It is clearly provided that these rights may be
protected by negotiation or by the several methods of adjustment
established by the Act. It is true that the representatives of the
majority represent the whole craft or class in the making of an
agreement for the benefit of all, but it is equally true that
nothing in the Act denies the right to any employee, or group of
employees to enforce, through representatives of his or their own
choosing, his or their rights under any such agreement. The whole
spirit and intention of the Act is contrary to the use of any
coercion or influence against the exercise of an individual's
liberty in his choice of representatives in protecting his
individual rights secured by law or contract."
[
Footnote 3]
The Act provides for proceedings before the Adjustment Board in
disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions. § 3, First (i). In such cases, the parties "may
be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives,
as they may respectively elect." § 3, First (j).
[
Footnote 4]
These do no include personal injury claims and the like. They
embrace claims which, though strictly personal, arise out of, and
involve, an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
which the Engineers negotiated and under which the individual
engineer is working.