1. The record in this case does not warrant setting aside the
conclusion of the court below that, when merchandise coming from
other States was unloaded at the place of business of the
wholesaler here (selling intrastate exclusively), its interstate
movement had ended, and that an employee whose activities related
to the goods thereafter was not covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., ante, p.
317 U. S. 564,
distinguished. P.
317 U. S.
574.
2. That a wholesaler whose business is exclusively intrastate is
in competition with wholesalers doing interstate business is of no
significance in determining the applicability of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, since that Act does not extend to activities
"affecting" commerce, but only to such as are "in" commerce. P.
317 U. S.
574.
26 A.2d 214 affirmed.
Page 317 U. S. 573
Certiorari, 316 U.S. 658, to review the affirmance of a judgment
denying recovery of alleged unpaid wages and for damages, in a suit
brought by an employee against his employer, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper
Co., ante, p.
317 U. S. 564, and
is here on certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Higgins claims minimum wages and overtime compensation alleged to
be due him under §§ 6(a) and 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
between January, 1939, and July, 1940. Prior to that time,
respondent, which conducts a wholesale fruit, grocery, and produce
business in Portland, Maine, had been selling and delivering its
merchandise not only to the local trade in Maine, but also to
retailers in New Hampshire. For the period here in question, the
New Hampshire trade had been discontinued, and all sales and
deliveries were solely to retailers in Maine. The only additional
facts which we know about respondent's course of business are
accurately summarized in the following excerpt from the opinion of
the Supreme Judicial Court:
"It buys its merchandise from local producers and from dealers
in other states, has it delivered by truck and rail, unloaded into
its store and warehouse and from there sells and distributes it to
the retail trade. While some of the produce
Page 317 U. S. 574
and fruit is processed, much of it is sold in the condition in
which it is received. The corporation owns all of its merchandise,
and makes its own deliveries. It makes no sales on commission nor
on order with shipments direct from the dealer or producer to the
retail purchaser."
Higgins' employment involved work as night shipper putting up
orders and loading trucks for delivery to retail dealers in Maine
or driving a truck distributing merchandise to the local trade.
Petitioner, in his brief, describes the business in somewhat
greater detail, and seeks to show an actual or practical continuity
of movement of merchandise from without the state to respondent's
regular customers within the state. But here, unlike
Walling v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., there is nothing in the record before
us to support those statements, nor to impeach the accuracy of the
conclusion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine that, when the
merchandise coming from without the state was unloaded at
respondent's place of business, its "interstate movement had
ended." Some effort is made to show that the court below applied an
incorrect rule of law in the sense that it gave the Act too narrow
a construction. In that connection, it is argued that respondent is
in competition with wholesalers doing an interstate business, and
that it can, by underselling, affect those businesses and their
interstate activities. As we indicated in
Walling v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., that argument would be relevant if
this Act had followed the pattern of other federal legislation,
such as the National Labor Relations Act (
see 29 U.S.C. §
152(7), § 160(a)) and extended federal control to business
"affecting commerce." But, as we pointed out in
Kirschbaum Co.
v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517,
this Act did not go so far, but was more narrowly confined.
Thus, petitioner has not maintained the burden of showing error
in the judgment which he asks us to set aside.
Affirmed.
