1. In
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U.
S. 224, this Court decided that the company, in support
of its claim that gas rates fixed by the Texas Railroad Commission
were confiscatory, was entitled to make proof of confiscation on
the basis of services rendered by an integrated system -- the basis
on which the Commission fixed the rates in question -- but did not
decide that the rates were confiscatory or in anywise foreclose a
trial of that issue in the state courts. Pp.
315 U. S.
12-13.
2. Leave to file a petition for a mandamus directed to the
Justices of the Supreme Court of a State, requiring them to conform
their judgment to a decision of this Court determining federal
questions earlier in the case, will not be granted where, by their
return to the order to show cause, they show that the judgment of
the state court was based not upon a misconception of this Court's
decision, as alleged and relied upon in the petition for mandamus,
but upon a construction and application of state law. P.
315 U. S. 14.
Motion denied.
Motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus
against the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of Texas, to bring a judgment of
Page 315 U. S. 9
that court in conformity with a controlling mandate of this
Court. The Lone Star Gas Company was here granted leave to
intervene, 314 U.S. 582.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a motion by the Attorney General and Railroad Commission
of the Texas for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus
against the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of Texas to bring a judgment of that Court into conformity
with the controlling mandate of this Court. The foundation of the
motion is the claim that, in the proceedings following the remand
by this Court to the Texas courts of the litigation in
Lone
Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U. S. 224, the
Supreme Court of Texas has misconceived the scope of our decision.
The history of the litigation must therefore be summarized.
In 1934, the Railroad Commission of Texas brought an action in
the District Court of Travis County, under Article 6059 of the
Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, to enforce its order of September
13, 1933, fixing the rate to be charged by the Lone Star Gas
Company, a Texas corporation operating pipelines located in Texas
and Oklahoma,
Page 315 U. S. 10
for gas delivered to distributing companies in Texas. The
Commission's order treated the Company's properties in both states
as an "integrated" system. In its answer, the Company attacked the
order under the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. A trial was held
before a jury, which found, from the evidence before it, that the
Commission's order was "unreasonable and unjust." Accordingly, the
District Court enjoined enforcement of the order. An appeal to the
Court of Civil Appeals followed. That court sustained the
Commission in treating the Company as an integrated enterprise, and
found against the Company upon the issue of confiscation. The
burden was put upon the Company
"to show by clear and satisfactory evidence a proper segregation
of interstate and intrastate properties and business, and to show
the value of the property employed in intrastate business or
commerce and the compensation it would receive under the rate
complained of upon such valuation. Having failed to make a proper
segregation of interstate and intrastate properties, appellee
[
i.e., the Company] did not adduce the quantum and
character of proof necessary to establish the invalidity of the
rate as being confiscatory, or unreasonable and unjust."
86 S.W.2d 484, 502. The Court therefore dissolved the injunction
of the District Court and declared the Commission's order to be
"just, reasonable, and valid in every particular." 86 S.W.2d 484,
506. The Supreme Court of Texas refused a writ of error, and the
case then came here.
We reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, and
remanded the cause "for further proceedings not inconsistent" with
the opinion.
304 U. S. 304 U.S.
224,
304 U. S. 242.
It was held: (1) The Commission's order did not offend the Commerce
Clause. The Commission was entitled to take into consideration the
Company's producing properties in Oklahoma and its transmission
lines to Texas, because
"the proved manner in which the gas from Oklahoma
Page 315 U. S. 11
was treated and handled in Texas made it an integral part of the
gas supplied to the Texas communities in appellant's intrastate
business."
304 U.S. at
304 U. S. 239.
(2) On the issue of confiscation, the Court of Civil Appeals had
erred. The Company
"could not be denied the right to introduce evidence as to its
property and business as an integrated system and to have the
sufficiency of its evidence ascertained by the criterion which the
Commission had properly used in the same manner in reaching its
conclusion as to the Texas rate."
304 U.S. at
304 U. S.
241-242.
When the case came back to the Court of Civil Appeals, it held
that, "when viewed in the light of the over-all or unsegregated
basis and evidence, the legislative rate order is valid as a matter
of law," and that the validity of the order was established
"factually from so overwhelming a weight and preponderance of the
evidence as to require a reversal in the interest of justice." And
so it again dissolved the injunction and reinstated the
Commission's order. 129 S.W.2d 1164, 1170, 1187. This time, the
Supreme Court of Texas granted a writ of error and sent the case
back to the District Court for a new trial. 153 S.W.2d 681.
In its extended opinion, the Supreme Court of Texas reviewed
these two rulings by the Court of Civil Appeals: (1) Since Article
6059 of the Revised Statutes of Texas
* governing judicial
review of the Commission's orders,
Page 315 U. S. 12
makes the Commission's findings of fact conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence, and since the findings were supported by
such evidence, the order was valid as a matter of law, and left no
question for the jury. (2) Even if Article 6059 required a trial
de novo of all issues of fact, "the Gas Company failed, as
a matter of law, to offer evidence sufficient to justify holding
this gas rate order confiscatory, or unreasonable and unjust." 153
S.W.2d at 687.
The Supreme Court of Texas held that Article 6059 does require a
trial
de novo in the District Court. It added that
"there is no escape from the conclusion that the United States
Supreme Court did consider and did pass upon the sufficiency of the
Gas Company's evidence, when considered from the viewpoint of the
Company's entire properties, and did hold such evidence legally
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury finding this rate
order confiscatory."
153 S.W.2d at 689. Later in its opinion, the Texas Supreme Court
stated
"that such opinion [of the Supreme Court of the United States]
decides that the evidence contained in this record is sufficient,
in law, to invoke the fact finding jurisdiction of the district
court. It follows that such matter has been foreclosed by the
United States Supreme Court, and is not open for decision by this
Court, and was not open for decision by the Court of Civil
Appeals."
153 S.W.2d at 695.
It agreed with the Court of Civil Appeals that the trial court,
to the prejudice of the Commission, had erroneously permitted the
testimony of a Company witness and refused to exclude various
Company exhibits. Immediately following this part of its opinion,
the Supreme Court of Texas wrote: "It is evident from our holdings
above that this case must be remanded to the district court for a
new trial." 153 S.W.2d at 699.
The petitioners read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas
to mean the the claim of confiscation could no
Page 315 U. S. 13
longer be contested in the Texas courts, because this Court
adjudicated that claim in the Company's favor. Such was not the
ruling of this Court. The merits of the claim of confiscation were
not reviewed. All that was decided here was that the Company was
entitled to make proof of confiscation on the same basis -- namely,
that of services rendered by an integrated system -- as that on
which the Commission fixed the rates. On their reading of the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas, the petitioners were
naturally eager for a prompt correction of the decision of that
Court, even though it was not final, without waiting for this rate
controversy, already eight years old, again to wind its measured
way through the Texas courts and then to be brought here on an
indubitably federal question, to-wit, the proper construction of a
mandate of this Court.
The petitioners claim that, but for a misapplication of our
mandate, the Texas Supreme Court might have sustained the Court of
Civil Appeals and the litigation could finally have come to an end.
Since the opinion of the Texas Supreme Court, on its face, appeared
to be susceptible of the construction given it by the petitioners,
we issued a rule to show cause. 314 U.S. 579.
In their return, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court of Texas state that that Court "would have rendered
the same judgment if it had based the same solely upon its
construction of the State statute, and not at all upon its
construction of the opinion of this Court." The return further
showed that, in remanding the cause to the District Court for a new
trial, the Supreme Court of Texas acted entirely pursuant to state
law:
"The Court of Civil Appeals in this State has full power to set
aside findings based on conflicting evidence and believed by it to
be against the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the
evidence and to remand the case for another trial, but it is
without power to set aside findings based on
Page 315 U. S. 14
conflicting evidence and then make its own findings and render
judgment thereon."
We read this return as a disclaimer by the judges of the Supreme
Court of Texas of the construction placed upon their opinion by the
petitioners insofar as it touches the scope of this Court's ruling
in
304 U. S. 304 U.S.
224 and the effect of that decision upon the future course of this
litigation. Specifically, we read the return as a disavowal by the
Supreme Court of Texas that its action in reversing the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals and ordering a new trial implied that our decision
adjudicated the claim of confiscation or in any wise forecloses
trial of that issue. Therefore, when the litigation goes back to
the District Court, it will not be imprisoned within an
adjudication to be attributed to this Court which this Court never
made. We must accept the return of the Texas judges regarding the
scope of judicial review of orders of the Texas Railroad
Commission, as well as their showing regarding the distribution of
judicial power within the Texas judicial system. These are matters
of local law.
The rule will therefore be discharged and the motion denied.
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS heard the argument and agreed to the above
disposition of the case, but, through absence, was unable to join
in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY
concur in the result.
* Article 6059 provides:
"If any gas utility or other party at interest be dissatisfied
with the decision of any rate, classification, rule, charge, order,
act or regulation adopted by the Commission, such dissatisfied
utility or party may file a petition setting forth the particular
cause of objection thereto in a court of competent jurisdiction in
Travis County against the Commission as defendant. Said action
shall have precedence over all other causes on the docket of a
different nature, and shall be tried and determined as other civil
causes in said court. . . . In all trials under this article, the
burden of proof shall rest upon the plaintiff, who must show by
clear and satisfactory evidence that the rates, regulations,
orders, classifications, acts or charges complained of are
unreasonable and unjust to it or them."