1. In an action by a carrier to recover the difference between
the charges collected on a shipment and the charges which should
have been collected under the tariff, where the question is merely
whether the goods were of such character as to come within one
tariff category allowing the rate paid by the shipper or another
category exacting a higher rate, an opinion of the Interstate
Commerce Commission on the same question of classification in
another case may properly be admitted by the District Court as
evidence of the meaning and application of the tariff. P.
315 U. S.
634.
2. In such an action, it is not incumbent upon the court to
await the outcome of a proceeding before the Commission between the
same parties putting in question the reasonableness of the rates
charged but not the classification of the goods. P.
315 U. S.
635.
3. A shipper who is obliged in an action by the carrier to pay
charges which conform to the tariff but are unreasonable has the
remedy of reparation if the Interstate Commerce Commission finds
the rate unreasonable and requires that the tariff be modified
accordingly. P.
315 U. S.
636.
121 F.2d 645 affirmed.
Certiorari, 314 U.S. 595, to review the affirmance of a judgment
recovered by the respondents against the petitioners in an action
based on undercharges for transportation of freight by a
railway.
Page 315 U. S. 632
MR. JUSTICE BYRNES delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
respondents brought this suit to recover certain freight charges
from petitioners. The case was tried without a jury, and judgment
rendered in favor of respondents in the sum of $2,263.47. On
appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, 121 F.2d 645.
We brought the case here because of the claim that the courts
below sustained the jurisdiction of the District Court although the
matter concerned called for the exercise of the administrative
discretion of the Interstate Commerce Commission under the
established rule first announced in
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, as
explained in
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elev.
Co., 259 U. S. 285.
The shipments, amounting to seven carloads, moved from points in
several states, the cars being billed by petitioners to themselves
at St. Louis, Missouri. The petitioners billed the contents of the
cars as scrap iron, and paid the tariff charge applicable to that
classification. When the cars arrived at St. Louis, the respondents
caused the Western Weighing and Inspection Bureau to inspect their
contents. As a result of that inspection, respondents claimed that
the articles were actually "pipe thread protecting rings" and that
they belonged in the classification of "pipe fittings." The tariff
rates on pipe fittings being higher than the rate on scrap iron,
demand was made upon petitioners for the difference in freight
charges. The demand was refused, and this suit followed.
The trial court found that the articles in question were
governed by the tariff for "pipe fittings" and not by that for
"scrap iron." The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this finding.
In the light of certain proceedings
Page 315 U. S. 633
before the Interstate Commerce Commission affecting the articles
in question and their relation to the tariffs in controversy, we
hold that the lower courts were right.
The only questions of any moment presented by this case arise in
connection with these proceedings before the Interstate Commerce
Commission. In 1937, petitioners filed with the Commission a
complaint against a number of railroads in which they asserted that
certain shipments of iron or steel pipe thread protecting rings
should have been classified under the freight tariffs as scrap iron
or steel, and not as pipe fittings. They also urged as an
alternative contention that, even though the shipments were classed
as pipe fittings, rather than scrap, the rate was unreasonably
high. On August 6, 1937 the Commission dismissed the complaint,
holding both that the pipe thread protecting rings fell within the
classification of pipe fittings, and that the rates so imposed were
not unreasonable. Crancer and Fleischman
et al. v. Abilene
& Southern Railway Company
et al., 223 I.C.C. 375.
In their answer and in a motion to stay proceedings filed in the
District Court in the present case, petitioners asserted that, on
or about March 16, 1939 (the date on which respondents brought this
suit) they had instituted a second action before the Commission. In
their complaint in this 1939 action, petitioners alleged that the
freight charges demanded by the respondents on the shipments
involved in the suit now before us were "unjust and unreasonable .
. . to the extent that they exceeded or exceed rates applicable on
scrap iron and scrap steel." It is not clear from this language
whether petitioners intended to raise anew the question of
classification or whether they were simply requesting the
Commission to pass again on the reasonableness of the rate. But, in
its opinion dated February 18, 1941, the Commission stated:
"While complainants
Page 315 U. S. 634
admit for the purpose of this proceeding that the rates on scrap
iron are not applicable, they contend that reasonable rates on
thread protectors should bear some definite relation to the scrap
iron rates."
Valley Steel Products Company
et al. v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company
et al., 243 I.C.C.
509, 512. We conclude that the classification question is not
involved in the 1939 I.C.C. proceeding. This proceeding is still
pending. The effective date of the February 18, 1941, opinion and
order has been indefinitely postponed, a further hearing has been
held, but no subsequent opinion or order has been issued.
*
Petitioners raise two contentions with respect to these I.C.C.
proceedings and their bearing upon the present suit. First, they
contend that it was reversible error for the District Court to
admit in evidence a copy of the 1937 opinion of the Commission. At
the trial, petitioners objected to its admission on the ground that
the opinion has "absolutely no probative value in this case at
all," that it is not "determinative" or "conclusive" and "not even
persuasive" in this case, and that there was no pleading that "this
opinion . . . is
res adjudicata of the issues before your
Honor." With respect to this point, we can only say that
petitioners have made a bold attempt to transform their weakness
into strength. The present case turns upon whether these iron pipe
thread protecting rings are to be classified under the freight
tariffs as pipe fittings or scrap. That was the very question
decided by the Commission in its 1937 opinion, and it was decided
adversely to petitioners. It is true that the shipments in the two
cases are not the same, and that no evidence was introduced to
prove that their contents were identical.
Page 315 U. S. 635
Consequently, the issues in the present suit are not
res
adjudicata. But the Commission's 1937 opinion could hardly
have been more relevant to the question before the District Court.
As the Circuit Court observed:
"Since the case was tried without a jury, we can see no possible
prejudice to appellants by the consideration of the opinion of the
Commission by the Court as evidence, rather than by an examination
of the same opinion in his library. There is no suggestion that the
latter course would have been improper. The trial court did not
treat the opinion as being
res adjudicata."
121 F.2d 645, 650. We think this is the least that could be
said, and that the District Court properly admitted and considered
the administrative determination of virtually the same question as
that, before it.
Second, petitioners contend that the District Court erred in
denying their motion to stay proceedings in this case pending
action by the I.C.C. in the second proceeding before the
Commission. As we have said, the classification question alone was
involved in the case before the District Court. The Commission had
passed upon that question almost two years earlier. In their newly
instituted proceeding, petitioners did not resurrect that dispute,
but confined themselves to the contention that the rates on pipe
fittings were unreasonable as applied to their pipe thread
protecting rings. The issue of the reasonableness of the rates was
not open to the District Court. The meaning of the tariff had been
determined by the Commission. It remained to the railroad only to
collect the rates for which the tariff called and for the District
Court only to see that the railroad did collect them.
"Until changed, tariffs bind both carriers and shippers with the
force of law. Under Section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, the
carrier cannot deviate from the rate specified in the tariff for
any service in connection
Page 315 U. S. 636
with the transportation of property. That section forbids the
carrier from giving a voluntary rebate in any shape or form. This
Court has had occasion recently to sustain action of the Commission
aimed at carriers' practices resulting in collection of less than
the tariff rate. It is equally important to aid the efforts of a
carrier in collecting published charges in full. Involuntary
rebates from tariff rates should be viewed with the same
disapproval as voluntary rebates."
Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co.,
306 U. S. 516,
306 U. S.
520-521. Nothing involved in the pending administrative
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission was essential
to the determination of the issue in this suit. If the trial judge
had, in the exercise of his discretion, continued the trial of the
cause until such time as the Commission had passed upon the
reasonableness of the rate, the delay might have made it impossible
for the carrier to produce the witnesses who had made the
inspection of the shipments. On the other hand, the petitioners
suffered no hardship as a result of the trial court's insistence on
proceeding with the trial. If petitioners pay the judgment in this
case and the Commission should, in the still pending proceeding,
decide to modify the tariffs, petitioners can obtain a complete
remedy by way of reparation.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.
S. 184,
230 U. S. 197.
The form of the Circuit Court's judgment specifically preserved
petitioners' right to such reparation. We hold that, under the
circumstances there was no abuse of discretion by the trial
judge.
Judgment affirmed.
* Order of the Commission in No. 28215, dated April 19, 1941;
Order in No. 28215, dated May 23, 1941; Order in No. 28215, dated
June 2, 1941; Order in No. 28215, dated June 20, 1941; Order in No.
28215, dated July 22, 1941.