1. Consistently with the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Federal Constitution, when a State court, in probating a will and
issuing letter testamentary, in a proceeding to which all
distributees were parties, expressly finds that the domicile of the
testator at the time of his death was in that State, the
adjudication of domicile does not bind one who is subsequently
appointed as domiciliary administrator c.t.a. in a second State in
which he will be called upon to deal with the claims of local
creditors, including the claim of the State itself for taxes, and
who was not a party to the proceeding in the first State, and in
this situation, the courts of a third State, when disposing of
local assets claimed by both the personal representative, are free
to determine the question of domicile in accordance with their own
law. Pp.
315 U. S. 348
et seq.
2. In the absence of a contrary ruling by the courts of
Delaware,
held that, by the law of that State, cases cited
and relied on in an opinion of the highest court of another State
-- which opinion is properly in the record -- may be considered as
evidence of the law of such other State. P.
315 U. S.
351.
16 A.2d 772 affirmed.
Certiorari, 313 U.S. 555, to review a decree determining the
disposition of property belonging to an estate which was claimed by
each of two personal representatives appointed in other States.
Page 315 U. S. 345
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
Coca-Cola International Corporation, incorporated in Delaware,
filed a bill of interpleader in a Delaware Court of Chancery
against Julian Riley and Hughes Spalding, petitioners here, the
Executors of Mrs. Julia M. Hungerford, with letters testamentary
issued by the Court of Ordinary of Fulton County, Georgia, and
against The New York Trust Company, the respondent, a New York
corporation, as temporary administrator (afterward administrator
c.t.a.) of the same decedent, appointed by the Surrogate's Court
for New York County, New York.
The Georgia executors and the New York administrator each claim
the right to have transferred to them in their representative
capacity stock in the Coca-Cola corporation now on its books in the
name of the decedent. The outstanding certificates are in Georgia
in the hands of the Georgia executors. The parties are agreed, and
it
Page 315 U. S. 346
is therefore assumed that Delaware is the situs of the stock. In
accordance with the prayer of the bill, the Delaware court directed
the adversary claimants to interplead between themselves as to
their respective claims.
The Georgia executors assert that original domiciliary probate
of Mrs. Hungerford's will in solemn form was obtained by them in
Georgia with all beneficiaries and heirs at law of testatrix,
including her husband, Robert Hungerford, actual parties by
personal service. These, it is conceded, were all the parties under
the law of Georgia entitled to be heard on the probate of the will.
The respondent administrator c.t.a. was not a party. The record of
probate includes a determination by special finding, over the
objection of the caveator, the husband, that the testatrix was
domiciled in Georgia. The special finding was specifically approved
as an essential fact to determine the jurisdiction of the Court of
Ordinary by the highest court of Georgia in its affirmance of the
probate.
Hungerford v. Spalding, 183 Ga. 547, 189 S.E.
2.
These facts were alleged by petitioners in their statement of
claim to the stock filed below in response to the decree of
interpleader. Exemplified copies of the probate record of the
several Georgia courts were pleaded and proven, as were the
applicable Georgia statutes governing domiciliary probate. From the
facts alleged, petitioners inferred the conclusive establishment of
the place for domiciliary distribution against "all persons" and
prayed the issue to them of new certificates. An offer was made to
pay all Delaware taxes or charges on the stock. At the trial,
petitioners relied upon Article IV, Section 1, of the Federal
Constitution, [
Footnote 1] the
full faith and credit clause, as determinative of their right to
the new certificates. The
Page 315 U. S. 347
pleading and trial contention adequately raised the
Constitutional question.
Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S.
43,
207 U. S.
50.
Respondent admitted that all parties entitled under the law of
Georgia to be heard in opposition to probate were actually before
the Georgia courts. It denied that Mrs. Hungerford was domiciled in
Georgia. or that the Georgia judgment of domicile and probate was
binding on it, and averred testatrix' domicile at death was New
York. It further averred that there were New York creditors of the
estate interested in the proper and lawful administration of the
estate, and that New York had certain claims for inheritance and
estate taxes. Its own subsequent appointment by the Surrogate's
Court of New York County, New York, on the suggestion of testatrix'
husband and the State Tax Commission, was pleaded with applicable
provisions of New York probate and estate tax law. By stipulation,
it was established that petitioners and the heirs and beneficiaries
of testatrix, except her husband, who was an actual party, were
notified of the New York proceedings for probate only by
publication or substituted service of the citation in Georgia, and
did not appear. As a domiciliary administrator c.t.a., the
respondent prayed the issue to it of new certificates for the stock
in controversy.
The trial court concluded from the evidence adduced at the
hearings that the testatrix was domiciled in Georgia. It was
therefore, as the court stated, unnecessary for it to consider the
binding effect of the Georgia judgment. [
Footnote 2] The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed this
finding of fact, determined that New York was testatrix' domicile,
and denied petitioners' contention that Article IV, Section 1, of
the Constitution required the award of the certificates of stock to
the Georgia executors. The Coca-Cola
Page 315 U. S. 348
Corporation was directed to issue its stock certificate to the
respondent, the New York administrator c.t.a.
New York Trust
Co. v. Riley, 16 A.2d 772. Because of the importance of issues
previously undecided by this Court, certiorari was granted to
review the alleged error, to-wit, the asserted denial of full faith
and credit to the Georgia judgment. 313 U.S. 555.
The constitutional effect of the Georgia decree on a claim in
his own name in another state by a party to the Georgia proceedings
is not here involved. [
Footnote
3] The question we are to decide is whether this Georgia
judgment on domicile conclusively establishes the right of the
Georgia executors to demand delivery to them of personal assets of
their testatrix which another state is willing to surrender to the
domiciliary personal representative [
Footnote 4] when another representative, appointed by a
third state, asserts a similar domiciliary right. For the purpose
of this review, the conclusion of Delaware that the testatrix was
in fact domiciled in New York is accepted. The answer to the
question lies in the extent to which Article IV, section 1, of the
Constitution, as made applicable by R.S. § 905, [
Footnote 5] nevertheless controls Delaware's
action.
This clause of the Constitution brings to our Union a useful
means for ending litigation. Matters once decided between adverse
parties in any state or territory are at rest. Were it not for this
full faith and credit provision,
Page 315 U. S. 349
so far as the Constitution controls the matter, adversaries
could wage again their legal battles whenever they met in other
jurisdictions. Each state could control its own courts, but itself
could not project the effect of its decisions beyond its own
boundaries.
Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714,
95 U. S. 722.
That clause compels that controversies be stilled so that, where a
state court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, its
judgment controls in other states to the same extent as it does in
the state where rendered.
Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.
S. 449,
275 U. S. 451.
This is true even though the cause of action merged in the judgment
could not have been enforced in the state wherein the enforcement
of the judgment is sought.
Christmas v.
Russell, 5 Wall. 290,
72 U. S. 302;
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230,
210 U. S. 236.
[
Footnote 6] By the
Constitutional provision for full faith and credit, the local
doctrines of
res judicata, speaking generally, become a
part of national jurisprudence, and therefore federal questions
cognizable here.
The Constitution does not require,
McElmoyle
v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312,
38 U. S. 328;
Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.
S. 268,
296 U. S. 276,
nor does Delaware provide, that the judgments of Georgia have the
force of those of her own courts. A suit in Delaware must precede
any local remedy on the Georgia judgment. Subject to the
Constitutional requirements, Delaware's decisions are based on
Delaware jurisprudence. Her sovereignty determines personal and
property rights within her territory. Subject to Constitutional
limitations, it was her prerogative to distribute the property
located in Delaware or to direct its transmission to the
domiciliary representative of the deceased.
Iowa v.
Slimmer, 248 U. S. 115,
248 U. S. 121. The
full faith and credit clause allows Delaware, in disposing of local
assets, to determine the question of domicile anew for any
interested
Page 315 U. S. 350
party who is not bound by participation in the Georgia
proceeding.
Thormann v. Frame, 176 U.
S. 350,
176 U. S. 356;
Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214,
177 U. S. 227;
Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162;
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.
S. 394,
242 U. S. 400.
It must be admitted that this reexamination may result in
conflicting decisions upon domicile, but that is an inevitable
consequence of the existing federal system, which endows its
citizens with the freedom to choose the state or states within
which they desire to carry on business, enjoy their leisure, or
establish their residences.
Worcester County Co. v. Riley,
302 U. S. 292,
302 U. S. 299.
[
Footnote 7] But, while
allowing Delaware to determine domicile for itself, where any
interested party is not bound by the Georgia proceedings, the full
faith and credit clause and R.S. § 905,
note 5 supra, do require that Delaware shall give
Georgia judgments such faith and credit "as they have by law or
usage" in Georgia.
We note, but need not discuss at length, the respondent's
contention that our application of Georgia law is limited to the
statutes, decisions, and usages of that state pleaded or proven in
the Delaware proceedings, [
Footnote
8] and that
Page 315 U. S. 351
for such further rules of law as may be needed to reach a
conclusion here, we must necessarily, in reviewing a Delaware
judgment, rely upon the law which, in the absence of proof of other
Georgia law, properly guided the state courts -- that is the
Delaware law. [
Footnote 9] At
any rate, the cases relied upon by petitioners to establish the
Georgia law,
Tant v. Wigfall, 65 Ga. 412, and
Wash v.
Dickson, 147 Ga. 540, 94 S.E. 1009, are cited in the opinion
of the Supreme Court of Georgia pleaded in these proceedings. We
think they may be considered by us under the Delaware law. No
objection below was made by respondent to the citations. The
opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court was properly in the record
and, in the absence of a contrary ruling by Delaware, we are of the
view that they may be properly considered here. [
Footnote 10]
Page 315 U. S. 352
We find nothing in either of these cases, however, which would
lead to the conclusion that, in Georgia, the New York administrator
c.t.a. was in privity, so far as the sequestration of assets for
the payment of death taxes or indebtedness of decedent or her
estate is concerned, with any parties before the Georgia court, or
that the New York representative could not take steps in Georgia
courts which might result in its getting possession of any assets
which under the Georgia law of administration would be properly
deliverable to a foreign domiciliary administrator. In the
Tant case, Georgia refused to permit a collateral attack
on a judgment of probate allegedly entered without jurisdiction of
the subject matter. It was held that such attack must be made in
the court where judgment was rendered. The effect of a judgment
entered without jurisdiction of the persons whose rights were
purportedly affected was not discussed. In the
Wash case,
there was simply a ruling that a judgment of the court of ordinary
could not be collaterally attacked by parties or privies, unless
the record negatived the existence of necessary "jurisdictional
facts." Whom the court would classify as "privies" to a judgment
in personam does not appear, and the opinion of the court
below makes it amply plain that there was no privity under Delaware
law. Hence, if the Georgia judgment is to bind the New York
administrator, it can be considered to do so only
in
rem.
By Section 113-602, Georgia Code of 1933, set up by petitioner
as a basis for his contention as to the finality of the Georgia
judgment in Delaware, it is provided that the Court of Ordinary is
given exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills, and that
"such probate is conclusive upon
Page 315 U. S. 353
all the parties notified, and all the legatees under the will
who are represented in the executor." All the parties entitled to
be heard in opposition to the probate, including Mr. Hungerford,
were actually before the Court of Ordinary. It may be assumed that
the judgment of probate and domicile is a judgment
in rem,
and therefore as "an act of the sovereign power," "its effect
cannot be disputed" within the jurisdiction. [
Footnote 11] But this does not bar litigation
anew by a stranger of facts upon which the decree
in rem
is based. [
Footnote 12]
Hence, it cannot be said, we think, that, because respondent would
have no standing in Georgia to contest the probate of a will and,
we assume, the preliminary determination of domicile, held
necessary in
Hungerford v. Spalding, 183 Ga. 547, 550, 189
S.E. 2, 3, thereafter respondent could not file a claim in
Delaware, dependent upon domiciliary representation of testatrix,
for assets in the latter state. While the Georgia judgment is to
have the same faith and credit in Delaware as it does in Georgia,
that requirement does not give the Georgia judgment
extraterritorial effect upon assets in other states. So far as the
assets in Georgia are concerned, the Georgia judgment of probate is
in rem; so far as it affects personalty beyond the state,
it is
in personam, and can bind only parties thereto or
their privies. This is the result of the ruling in
Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394,
242 U. S. 400.
[
Footnote 13] Phrased
Page 315 U. S. 354
somewhat differently, if the effect of a probate decree in
Georgia
in personam was to bar a stranger to the decree
from later asserting his rights, such a holding would deny
procedural due process.
It seems quite obvious that the administrator c.t.a. appears in
Delaware as an agency of the New York, and not as the alter ego of
the beneficiaries of the Hungerford estate. In its answer to the
petitioners' statement of claim, it established its status by
alleging
Page 315 U. S. 355
that not merely the beneficiaries, but creditors residing in New
York and the State of New York were interested in the estate, that
its appointment as temporary administrator had been sought by the
New York Tax Commissioner "to protect the claim of the State of New
York to inheritance and succession taxes," that the State of New
York was asserting such claims in substantial amount on the theory
that the domicile was New York, and that, under New York law, as
evidenced by statutes likewise pleaded, an administrator was
"vested by law with the right to possession and control over and
to exercise all manner of dominion over all of the goods and
chattels and personal property of every kind and description of the
estate of a decedent."
A state is interested primarily not in the payment of particular
creditors, nor in the succession of heirs or beneficiaries, as
such, but in the administration of the property of its citizens,
wherever located, and that of strangers within its boundaries. In a
society where inheritance is an important social concept, the
managing of decedents' property is a sovereign right which may not
be readily frustrated.
Georgia and New York might each assert its right to administer
the estates of its domiciliaries to protect its sovereign
interests, and Delaware was free to decide for itself which
claimant is entitled to receive the portion of Mrs. Hungerford's
personalty within Delaware's borders.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."
[
Footnote 2]
Coca-Cola International Corp. v. New York Trust Co., 2
A.2d 290, 8 A.2d 511.
[
Footnote 3]
The Supreme Court of Delaware was of this opinion. It said: we
are not
"called upon to consider the operation of a judgment in a
probate proceeding in one jurisdiction as an estoppel against one
who, although a party to that proceeding, undertakes, in a
proceeding in another jurisdiction affecting the same decedent's
estate, to raise again the question of the decedent's
domicile."
16 A.2d 772, 788.
[
Footnote 4]
Cf. Page, Wills (3d Ed.) § 727.
[
Footnote 5]
"And the said records and judicial proceedings, so
authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in
every court within the United States as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the State from which they are taken."
28 U.S.C. § 687.
[
Footnote 6]
There are limitations on the generality of the statement.
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
306 U. S. 493,
306 U. S. 502,
and cases there cited.
[
Footnote 7]
A collection of cases dealing with this topic may be found in
121 A.L.R. 1200.
[
Footnote 8]
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59,
303 U. S. 62-63;
Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U. S. 367;
Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43,
207 U. S. 57;
Chicago and Alton R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co.,
119 U. S. 615,
119 U. S. 622;
Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1,
116 U. S. 6.
Del.Rev.Code (1935) § 4695 --
"Statutes of Other States -- Printed copies of Statutes of any
other of the United States, if purporting to be published under the
authority of their respective governments, or if commonly admitted
and read as evidence in their courts, shall be
prima facie
evidence of such law."
Del.Rev.Code (1935) § 4696 --
"Common Law of Other States -- The common, or unwritten, law of
any other of the United States, may be proved as facts by parole
evidence, and the reports of cases adjudged in their courts, and
published by authority, may also be admitted as evidence of such
law."
In 1899, the Superior Court clearly stated the rule:
"It is a general rule of law that, whenever a foreign statute is
relied upon, it must be pleaded, and this court will not take
judicial notice of the laws of our sister states or of a foreign
country."
Thomas v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 1 Pennewill, Del.,
593, 596, 42 A. 987, 988. This rule has been quite strictly applied
in subsequent cases.
Wolf v. Keagy, 3 W.W.Harr. 362, 136
A. 520;
Mackenzie Oil Co. v. Omar Oil & Gas Co., 4
W.W.Harr. 435, 154 A. 883;
Nye Odorless Incinerator Corp. v.
Felton, 5 W.W.Harr. 236, 162 A. 504;
Royal Ins. Co. v.
Simon, 20 Del.Ch. 297, 174 A. 444;
Holland v. Univ. Life
Co., 7 W.W.Harr. 39, 180 A. 328;
Silverman v. National
Assets Corp., 12 A.2d 389.
[
Footnote 9]
Bouree v. Trust Francais, 14 Del.Ch. 332, 127 A. 56. Of
this law we take judicial knowledge.
Owings v.
Hull, 9 Pet. 607,
34 U. S. 624;
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19,
306 U. S.
23.
[
Footnote 10]
Cf. Elsner v. United American Utilities, Inc., 21
Del.Ch. 73, 75, 180 A. 589, 590,
aff'd, 12 A.2d 389.
"On the brief filed by the solicitor for the claimant there are
quotations from sections 181, 208, and 209 of the New York Tax Law.
Whether these sections are a part of article 9 (section 180
et
seq.) or of article 9-A (section 208
et seq.) of the
statute referred to in the notice of claim, I do not know. No point
has been made by the solicitors for the receivers to the effect
that the New York statute has not been properly pleaded and
introduced in evidence. I shall assume then that the quotations in
the brief filed in behalf of the New York are correct extracts from
the New York statute, and that, by tacit agreement, they may be
considered as though they were properly in the record."
[
Footnote 11]
See Brighman v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411, 413, 5
N.E. 265, 266. The Georgia Supreme Court intimated in one of the
other cases cited in the
Hungerford opinion that, if a
person was not heard in probate because of a supposed lack of
interest, but was in fact interested, he would not be bound by the
probate decree.
Wetter v. Habersham, 60 Ga.193, 202;
cf. Young v. Holloway, [1895] P. 87;
Estate of
Seaman, 51 Cal. App. 409, 196 P. 928.
[
Footnote 12]
Cf. Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411, 413, 5 N.E.
265;
Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43,
207 U. S. 51-53;
Luke v. Hill, 137 Ga. 159, 161, 162, 73 S.E. 345, 346.
[
Footnote 13]
Illustrative state cases.
A will is admitted to original domiciliary probate in state
A. Thereafter, an ancillary proceeding is commenced in
state
B based upon the domiciliary determination of
A. At that point, a beneficiary, a stranger to the
proceeding in
A, appears and asserts that the decedent was
domiciled in
B. The determination of domicile by state
A will not be recognized by state
B, but state
B will take evidence and redetermine the issue of
domicile.
Estate of Clark, 148 Cal. 108, 82 P. 760;
Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke, 110 Me. 469, 87 A. 40
(
semble);
In re Mauldin's Estate, 69 Mont. 132,
220 P. 1102 (
semble);
Strathmann v. Kinkelaar,
105 Okl. 290, 233 P. 215 (
semble);
Richards v.
Huff, 146 Okl. 108, 293 P. 1028;
cf. Estate of
Reynolds, 217 Cal. 557, 20 P.2d 323;
In re Coppock's
Estate, 72 Mont. 431, 234 P. 258;
Matter of Gifford's
Will, 279 N.Y. 470, 18 N.E.2d 663;
McEwen v. McEwen,
50 N.D. 662, 197 N.W. 862.
Contra, Corrigan v. Jones, 14
Colo. 311, 23 P. 913;
Kurtz v. Stenger, 169 Md. 554, 182
A. 456.
If the objector was privy to the proceeding in state
A,
state
B will not redetermine the issue of domicile.
Willetts' Appeal, 50 Conn. 330;
Torrey v. Bruner,
60 Fla. 365, 53 So. 337;
Loewenthal v. Mandell, 125 Fla.
685, 170 So. 169;
Succession of Gaines, 45 La.Ann. 1237,
14 So. 233.
Where the proceeding in state
B is by a stranger to the
proceedings for original domiciliary probate in state
A
upon the theory that the domicile is actually
B, state
B will determine domicile for itself.
Scripps v. Wayne
Probate Judge, 131 Mich. 265, 90 N.W. 1061;
In re Crane's
Estate, 205 Mich. 673, 172 N.W. 584;
Pusey's Estate,
321 Pa. 248, 184 A. 844;
see Matter of Horton's Will, 217
N.Y. 363, 371, 111 N.E. 1066, 1068.
Where the person seeking to establish domicile in state
B, and to have original domiciliary probate there, was a
party to the proceeding in state
A, state
B will
not redetermine domicile.
Hopper v. Nicholas, 106 Ohio
292, 140 N.E. 186;
cf. Thomas, Jr. v. Morrisett, 76 Ga.
384;
In re Fischer's Estate, 118 N.J.Eq. 599, 180 A.
633.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE.
I concur upon the single ground that the New York administrator
was not bound by the Georgia judgment. He was not a party to the
Georgia proceedings, nor was he represented by any of those who
were parties. As administrator appointed under the New York
statutes, he
Page 315 U. S. 356
was charged with the duty of administering the estate of the
decedent and paying inheritance taxes upon it. His interest, so far
as he owes duties to the state, is therefore adverse to that of the
husband and the next of kin, who alone were parties to the Georgia
proceeding. To have bound him by representation of those so adverse
in interest would have been a denial of due process.
Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32. A
judgment so obtained is not entitled to full faith and credit with
respect to those not parties.
Pink v. A.A.A. Highway
Express, 314 U. S. 201;
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.
S. 394;
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S.
1,
277 U. S. 18. Any
other conclusion would foreclose New York from litigating its right
to collect taxes lawfully due by the simple expedient of a probate
by the next of kin of the will of the decedent as the domiciled
resident of another state, without notice to any representative of
New York or opportunity to be heard.
It is unnecessary to consider the other questions discussed by
the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON concur in this
opinion.