Evidence, in a railway accident case,
held insufficient
to sustain a finding on the issue whether the coupling mechanism
between two freight cars was such as to comply with the Federal
Safety Appliance Act. P.
315 U. S.
286.
119 F.2d 85, reversed.
Certiorari, 314 U.S. 591, to review a judgment which reversed a
recovery by the administrator of a deceased railway employee in an
action against the railway company for personal injuries and death.
See also 115 F.2d 85.
Page 315 U. S. 284
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought by the administratrix of Stewart's
estate to recover for his death in consequence of a violation of
the Safety Appliance Act. [
Footnote
1] The crew of which the intestate was a member was engaged in
coupling freight cars. Stewart was on the engineer's side of the
train. He gave a backup signal with which the engineer complied,
and then a stop signal which was obeyed. The engineer saw him go
between the ends of the last car of the train and the car that was
to be coupled to it. While the train was stationary, this car
drifted into collision with the end car of the train. Persons who
responded to Stewart's cries found him with his arm crushed between
the couplers, both of which were closed. His arm was amputated, and
a few days later he died.
The administratrix, pursuant to leave of a state probate court,
executed a release in consideration of $5,000 paid her.
Subsequently she alleged in that court that she had been
fraudulently induced to settle the case, and sought authority to
rescind the release. The court decided against her after full
hearing.
In the present action, the plaintiff offered testimony as to the
circumstances of the accident. The respondent relied upon the
release; offered evidence to prove death was due to causes other
than the injury, but introduced no testimony as to what occurred at
the time of Stewart's
Page 315 U. S. 285
injury, or as to the condition of the couplers. The trial court
ruled that the decision of the probate court on the issue of fraud
in procuring the release was not
res judicata, and
submitted to the jury all issues, including that of the validity of
the release. A verdict was rendered for petitioner for $17,500. It
does not appear whether this sum was intended to be in addition to
the $5,000 theretofore received by the administratrix. The judgment
entered was for the amount of the verdict without credit for that
sum.
The respondent appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The
petitioner was substituted for the administratrix, who had died.
Judgment
non obstante veredicto was denied, but the
judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, for
errors in the charge to the jury. [
Footnote 2] On motion of both parties, a rehearing was
accorded. The court then held there was no substantial evidence to
sustain the verdict, and reversed and remanded with directions to
enter a judgment for the respondent. [
Footnote 3] This Court granted certiorari. 314 U.S.
591.
The record contains no direct evidence as to any defect in the
coupler mechanisms of the cars involved in the accident. Each was
equipped with an automatic coupler having a "pin lifter," whereby
the pin in the coupler can be lifted so as to allow the jaw of the
coupler to swing into the open position. The purpose of the device
is to permit a switchman to open the coupler into the position
where it will engage with the coupler of the other car upon impact
without the operator going between the ends of the cars. The
engineer, a witness for petitioner, testified that he did not see
the intestate attempt to use the pin lifter, but did see him go
between the cars. The foreman of the crew, also a witness for the
petitioner, testified
Page 315 U. S. 286
that when he arrived, the jaws of both couplers were closed, and
decedent's arm had been crushed between them. He testified that,
after the accident, he coupled the cars in question by going
between the cars and opening the jaw of the coupler by hand. He
stated that he tried to use the pin lifter on the car at the end of
the train, which would be the one available on the side of the
train on which he was working. He also testified that, if the
coupler was in working order, it could be set by the use of the pin
lifter. He was not asked, and did not state, what effort he made to
operate the pin lifter. Neither party asked him any further
questions as to the working condition of the pin lifter or
coupler.
The petitioner insists that, in the absence of evidence on
behalf of the respondent as to the condition of the coupler, the
jury were entitled to infer that the pin lifter was not in working
order; otherwise the foreman, an experienced man, would not have
gone between the cars and opened the coupler jaw by hand. The court
below held the jury was not entitled to draw this inference in the
absence of testimony by the foreman with respect to his efforts to
use the pin lifter and as to its condition.
We hold that, on this record, neither party is entitled to
prevail. If the issue as to the condition of the coupler mechanism
was determinative, a new trial should have been ordered so that
this issue might have been resolved in the light of a full
examination of the foreman, the witness who could have given
further testimony on the subject.
The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to the
court below for further proceedings. We express no opinion on other
errors assigned in the Circuit Court of Appeals which may affect
the disposition of the cause by that court.
Reversed.
Page 315 U. S. 287
* On petition for rehearing, it appearing that the parties had
settled the case, the judgment of the Court in this case was
vacated, that of the Court of Appeals reversed, and the case
remanded to the District Court with directions that it be dismissed
as moot,
post, p. 784.
[
Footnote 1]
45 U.S.C. § 2.
[
Footnote 2]
115 F.2d 317.
[
Footnote 3]
119 F.2d 85.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
The jury found from the evidence before it that the railroad
had, contrary to the Federal Safety Appliance Act, used cars
"not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact,
and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going
between the ends of the cars."
45 U.S.C. § 2. The trial judge, who alone of the judges in the
several proceedings below had the opportunity to see and hear the
witnesses as well as to observe a coupling apparatus brought into
the court room as an exhibit, made it clear that he regarded the
evidence as sufficient to support the jury's verdict both by
submitting the issues to it and by denying a new trial. The Circuit
Court of Appeals took the same position in its first opinion. 115
F.2d 317. Solicitude for the right to trial by jury on issues of
fact prompted the adoption of the Seventh Amendment as part of the
Bill of Rights. [
Footnote 2/1]
Respect for the institution of trial by jury should, in my
judgment, prompt us to leave undisturbed the jury's finding in this
case that the coupler was defective.
Because it must rely on the written page, rather than living
words, an appellate court can never fully appreciate the effect of
testimony heard by a jury of local citizens. Even in the written
record, however, I can find support for the jury's finding which
convinces me that it should stand. The transcript shows the
following:
If a pin lifter functions properly, there will be automatic
coupling of the cars, making it unnecessary for a workman to go
between them. Stewart was an experienced
Page 315 U. S. 288
workman. Besides being his duty, it was conductive to his safety
for him to use the pin lifter to bring about coupling. On the day
he was found with his arm crushed between the couplers, he had
successfully handled the coupling of other cars.
The crew foreman who shortly after the accident undertook the
coupling of the particular cars between which Stewart was crushed
testified as follows:
"Q. Now, after this accident, when you coupled the cars, which I
presume you did, did you couple the cars after the accident?"
"A. I did."
"Q. How did you open the knuckle?"
"A. I opened it with my hand."
"Q. Let me ask you, Mr. Stogner, if the coupler is working
automatically, or the pin lifter, is it necessary to go in between
the cars to open with your hands then?"
"A. No. sir."
And in the course of cross-examination by the company's attorney
whose questions indicated he accepted the fact that Stogner had
tried without success to use the pin lifter, Stogner was asked:
"Now, which knuckle did you try to open, or which pin lifter did
you try to use?" His reply "The one on the north side" --
designated the one connected with the coupler which had caused
Stewart's death.
Had Stogner's attempts with the pin lifter been successful, he
would not have had to go between the cars to couple them. But that
was what he testified he did after trying to raise the pin lifter.
True, Stogner did not say how many attempts he made, nor how much
force he applied in the effort. But the jury could reasonably have
inferred that the company's foreman, a worker of many years of
experience, applied such force as would have raised a pin lifter
which was not defective. Moreover, since there was a statutory duty
not to continue using
Page 315 U. S. 289
this particular pin lifter if it was defective, we can
reasonably assume that the railroad's inspectors made some
examination of it. Yet no inspector nor anyone else was called by
the railroad to give testimony on the condition of the pin lifter
immediately after the accident. [
Footnote 2/2] Under these circumstances, reasonable
jurors are not to be denied the right to make inferences which
other reasonable people would make: that Stogner tried in the usual
way to couple the cars; that his efforts were unsuccessful, and
that he was therefore compelled to go between the cars to effect a
coupling. And they could therefore have concluded that the pin
lifter was defective. The jury's finding of this fact should not
have been disturbed.
MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY
join in this dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Amendment VII:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law."
[
Footnote 2/2]
Cf. Ridge v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 167 N.C. 510,
521, 83 S.E. 762;
Kirby v. Tallmadge, 160 U.
S. 379,
160 U. S. 383;
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.
S. 208,
306 U. S.
225-226.