Pursuant to a plan made by indenture bondholders of an insolvent
corporation, a new corporation was formed which acquired more than
one-half of the bond issue in exchange for shares of its stock
issued to bondholder creditors, but none of which was issued to any
present or former stockholder of the old corportion for any right
of his
qua stockholder, and the properties of the old
corporation were bought in and acquired by the new corporation at
trustee's foreclosure sale.
Held, a "reorganization"
within the meaning of § 112(i)(1)(A) of the Revenue Act of 1932.
Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., ante p.
315 U. S. 179. P.
315 U. S.
188.
119 F.2d 846 reversed.
Certiorari,
314 U. S. 8, to
review a judgment sustaining a deficiency assessment which had been
sustained in part by the Board of Tax Appeals.
Page 315 U. S. 186
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is a companion case to
Helvering v. Alabama
Asphaltic Limestone Co., ante, p.
315 U. S. 179.
This, too, was an insolvency reorganization, though a different
procedure was employed to consummate it. The old corporation had
outstanding about $300,000 face amount of first mortgage bonds,
secured by a lien on its realty. The property, which was a hotel,
was leased to an operating company. In 1931, as a result of
transactions not relevant here, one Pinney became the sole
stockholder of the old corporation and of the operating company.
The furniture and fixtures in the hotel were owned by the operating
company. They were covered by a chattel mortgage which, together
with the lease on the hotel, were assigned and pledged as part of
the security for the bond issue. In 1931, both companies were in
financial difficulties, and insolvent at least in the equity sense.
A bondholders' committee was formed which received deposits of more
than half of the face amount of the bonds. Petitioner was formed in
1932. Pursuant to the plan of reorganization, six shares of
petitioner's preferred stock and four shares of its common stock
were issued to assenting bondholders for each $1000 bond. In
addition, all of petitioner's remaining common stock was issued to
one Lacoe in return for his agreement to pay the costs of
incorporating petitioner up to $1,000, and for his agreement to
lend money to petitioner. Before the actual issuance of
Page 315 U. S. 187
any of the shares, Lacoe agreed to transfer 1,000 shares of the
common stock to Pinney, the sole stockholder of the two companies,
for his services in the reorganization and as an inducement to him
to continue as manager of the hotel. None of the stock of
petitioner, however, was issued to any stockholder or former
stockholder of either of the companies for any rights any of them
had as stockholders. In May, 1932, the indenture trustee declared
the principal of the bonds due and payable. Pursuant to the terms
of the indenture, the trustee sold all of the properties of the old
corporation, including the lease and chattel mortgage, to
petitioner, the highest bidder. The bid price was $61,800. It was
satisfied by the payment of about $18,700 in cash and by the
delivery to the trustee of bonds of a face amount of $292,000 for
the balance. Foreclosure proceedings against the old corporation
and the operating company were then instituted. At the foreclosure
sale, the furniture and fixtures, comprising all of the property of
the operating company, were bought in by petitioner.
The Commissioner, in determining a deficiency in petitioner's
income and excess profits tax for the fiscal year ended May 31,
1936, disallowed depreciation deductions on both the realty and
personal property on the basis of cost to the old corporation and
operating company.
*
Page 315 U. S. 188
He used as the basis the cost of the assets to petitioner plus
the cost of additions. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the
Commissioner's determination with respect to the personal property
but rejected it with respect to the realty. The Circuit Court of
Appeals sustained the Commissioner on both points. 119 F.2d
846.
Though the petition for certiorari raised the question,
petitioner now concedes that the acquisition of the furniture and
fixtures from the operating company was not a "reorganization"
within the meaning of § 112(i)(1)(A) of the Revenue Act of 1932. So
we do not reach that issue. As respects the assets acquired from
the old corporation, we think there was a "reorganization" within
the meaning of § 112(i)(1)(A) of the 1932 Act. That provision is
the same in the 1932 Act as in the 1928 Act, which was involved in
Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., supra. That
case is determinative of this controversy. The transaction fits the
literal language of the statute. The new corporation acquired the
assets directly at the trustee's and the foreclosure sales. The
legal procedure employed by the creditors is not material. The
critical facts are that the old corporation was insolvent, and that
its creditors took steps to obtain effective command
Page 315 U. S. 189
over its property. For the reasons stated in
Helvering v.
Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., supra, the creditors at that
time acquired the equivalent of the proprietary interest of the old
equity owner. Accordingly, the continuity of interest test is
satisfied.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
* Sec. 113(a)(7) of the 1932 Act, 47 Stat. 169, 198, provides in
part:
"(a) BASIS (UNADJUSTED) OF PROPERTY. -- The basis of property
shall be the cost of such property, except that --"
"
* * * *"
"(7) TRANSFERS TO CORPORATION WHERE CONTROL OF PROPERTY REMAINS
IN SAME PERSONS. -- If the property was acquired after December 31,
1917, by a corporation in connection with a reorganization, and
immediately after the transfer an interest or control in such
property of 50 percentum or more remained in the same persons or
any of them, then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the
hands of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain or
decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the transferor upon
such transfer under the law applicable to the year in which the
transfer was made."
That provision is applicable here.
See § 114(a), §
113(b), 113(a)(12) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680. The
property here involved was acquired after February 28, 1913, in a
taxable year prior to January 1, 1934, as required by § 113(a)(12).
Respondent argues that this transaction was not a "reorganization"
within the meaning of § 113(a)(7). And he points out that "control"
was not in the participating creditors, since the majority of the
new common stock had been distributed, for a consideration other
than an exchange of bonds, to Lacoe and Pinney. But he does not
contend that, assuming there was a "reorganization," an "interest"
in the property of 50 percent or more did not remain in the same
persons (the bondholders) immediately after the transfer.