1. One does not acquire a domicile in the District of Columbia,
within the meaning of the District of Columbia Income Tax Act,
merely by coming to the District to live for an indefinite period
while in the Government service. P.
314 U. S.
453.
2. The Act does not intend that one living in the District of
Columbia indefinitely, while in the Government service, shall be
held domiciled there simply because he does not maintain a domestic
establishment at the place from which he came. P.
314 U. S.
454.
3. Persons are domiciled in the District of Columbia, within the
meaning of the Act, who live there and have no fixed and definite
intent to return to their former domiciles and make their homes
there. P.
314 U. S.
454.
4. The place where a man lives is,
prima facie, his
domicile. P.
314 U. S.
455.
5. The taxing authority is warranted in treating as
prima
facie taxable any person quartered in the District of Columbia
on tax day whose status it deems doubtful. P.
314 U. S.
455.
6. In applying this Act, the taxing authority need not find the
exact time when the attitude and relationship of person to place
which constitute domicile were formed. It is enough that they were
formed before the tax day. P.
314 U. S.
455.
7. If one has at any time become domiciled in the District of
Columbia, it is his burden to establish any change of status upon
which he relies to escape the tax. P.
314 U. S.
456.
8. In order to retain his former domicile, one who comes to the
District to perform Government service must always have a fixed and
definite intent to return and to take up his home there when
separated from the service. A mere sentimental attachment will not
hold the old domicile. P.
314 U. S.
456.
9. Whether or not one votes where he claims domicile is highly
relevant, but not controlling. P.
314 U. S.
456.
Page 314 U. S. 442
10. Of great significance to the question of domicile in the
District of Columbia is the nature of the position which brings one
to or keeps him in the service of the Government. P.
314 U. S.
457.
11. Manner of living in the District and many other
considerations touching relationships, soc;al connections, and
activities of the person concerned are suggested in the opinion as
among the considerations which are relevant to a determination of
the question of domicile. P.
314 U. S.
457.
73 App.D.C. 345, 347, 119 F.2d 449, 451, reversed.
Certiorari, 313 U.S. 556, to review judgments sustaining, on
petitions for review, decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals for the
District of Columbia holding that collections of income taxes from
two individuals by the District of Columbia were erroneous.
Page 314 U. S. 445
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases, which have been argued together, differ somewhat in
facts, but each involves a controversy as to whether respondent was
domiciled within the District of Columbia on December 31, 1939,
within the meaning of Sec. 2(a) of the District of Columbia Income
Tax Act, [
Footnote 1] which
lays a tax on "the taxable income of every individual domiciled in
the District of Columbia on the last day of the taxable year." The
following facts appear from proceedings before the Board of Tax
Appeals for the District of Columbia:
The respondent in No. 58, a single man, first came to the
District of Columbia in 1935 to work as an economist in the
Treasury Department, and was blanketed into Civil Service in that
position in July, 1938. He came here from Detroit, Michigan, and
has ever since continued to
Page 314 U. S. 446
be a registered voter and has voted in the elections and
primaries in Wayne County, Michigan. He was born in New London,
Connecticut, in 1905, and when five years old moved with his
parents to Los Angeles, California, where he resided until 1926,
when he removed to Berkeley, California. His parents live in
California. In 1929, he completed his studies at Brown University,
and immediately thereafter accepted employment in a trust company
in Detroit, Michigan, of which one of his former professors at
Brown was vice-president. While in Detroit, respondent lived first
in a rooming house and later in an apartment. He owns no property
there. In the District of Columbia, he lives in an apartment which
he has furnished himself. His present employment pays him $6,500 a
year, while that which he left in Detroit paid but $6,000. He
testified before the Board of Tax Appeals that he does not think he
would improve his condition by returning to Detroit, but that "[i]t
is the place to which I will return if I ever become disemployed by
the Government, which I hope will not happen. . . ." Although he
has no present connection with the trust company, he believes that
he could go back with it if he should return to Detroit. If a
better position than he now has should be offered in a city other
than Detroit, he "very likely would" accept it, despite a
"preference for Detroit" based on a belief that he "would fit in
more easily" there.
Respondent claimed that Detroit was his "legal residence" and
that he was not domiciled in the District of Columbia. The Board of
Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia found "as a fact" that,
when he came to Washington in 1935, he
"had an intention to remain and make his home in the District of
Columbia for an indefinite period of time, and that such intention
has ever since and still does remain with him, and that, if he has
any intention to return and make his home in Detroit, it is a
floating intention."
The Board held, however, "as
Page 314 U. S. 447
matter of law," that, on December 31, 1939, the last day of the
taxable year, petitioner was not domiciled in the District of
Columbia, believing that it was compelled to do so by the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in
Sweeney v. District of Columbia, 72 App.D.C. 30, 113
F.2d 25,
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 631.
The respondent in No. 59 lived in the District of Columbia for
twenty-six years after coming here from Pennsylvania in 1914 to
accept a clerical position of indefinite tenure under Civil Service
in the Patent Office. He was then on a year's leave of absence from
a railroad by which he was employed, but continued in the Civil
Service to the time of hearing, becoming Chief Clerk of the
Personnel and Organization Division of the National Guard Bureau,
War Department, with offices in Washington. Single when he came, in
1917 he married a native of Washington, who died in 1935 without
children. Shortly after their marriage, the couple purchased as a
home, premises at 1426 Massachusetts Avenue, S.E., in the District
of Columbia, in which respondent still lives. In about 1925, he
purchased a lot at "Selby on the Bay" in nearby Maryland, and,
before his wife's death, he bought a building lot in the District
of Columbia, acting on his wife's pleas for a summer place and a
better residence. He agreed with his wife that, on his retirement,
six months would be spent at Selby. He testified that he never
desired to purchase the lot in the District of Columbia, but did so
at the insistence of his wife. He put a "For Sale" sign on it when
she died, and both lots, which he still owns, are up for sale. He
has deposits in three Washington financial institutions, and owns
first trust notes on property located in Maryland and Virginia.
In 1915, respondent became a member of a Lutheran church in
Washington, and has ever since been an active member, at one time
serving as president of its Christian
Page 314 U. S. 448
Endeavor Society. He is a contributor to Washington charities, a
member of the Motor Club of Washington, and of the Washington units
of "Tall Cedars of Lebanon" and the "Mystic Shrine," both
identified with freemasonry. He has filed his federal income tax
returns with the Collector of Internal Revenue at Baltimore, and
always paid to the District of Columbia an intangible property tax
while that tax was in effect.
Respondent had resided in Pennsylvania from birth until he left
for Washington. He claimed as his "legal residence" the residence
of his parents in Harrisburg, where they still keep intact his room
in which are kept some of his clothes and childhood toys. Though
paying nothing as rent or for lodging, he has from time to time
made presents of money to his parents. He has visited his parents'
home in Harrisburg over weekends at least eight times a year, and
has been there annually between Christmas and the New Year. A
registered voter in Pennsylvania, he has voted in all its general
elections since he became of age. He paid the Pennsylvania poll tax
until it was superseded by an occupational tax, which he has also
paid. Payment of such taxes was a prerequisite to voting.
In 1912, respondent became a life member of the Robert Burns
Lodge No. 464, Free and Accepted Masons, and of the Harrisburg
Consistory, Scottish Rite, both Masonic bodies. While he resided in
Harrisburg, he was a member of the Bible Class of the Pine Street
Presbyterian Church, which he still attends on visits there, and to
which he made substantial contributions in 1939. He owns jointly
with his father a note secured by a mortgage on Pennsylvania real
estate. Respondent testified that he expected to retire from Civil
Service in four years, and intended then to sell his house and
"leave Washington."
The Board found "as a fact" that, at the end of one year after
he came to the District in 1914, respondent
"had an
Page 314 U. S. 449
intention to remain and make his home in the District of
Columbia for an indefinite period of time, and that intention
remained with him at least until the death of his wife."
As in No. 58, it considered itself bound by the
Sweeney
case,
supra, and accordingly held "as a matter of law"
that the petitioner was not domiciled in the District on December
31, 1939, and never had been.
The decisions in both cases were affirmed on review by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 73
App.D.C. 345, 119 F.2d 449; 73 App.D.C. 347, 119 F.2d 451. The
cases were brought here on writs of certiorari because of the
importance of the questions involved. 313 U.S. 556.
Although the District of Columbia Income Tax Act made "domicile"
the fulcrum of the income tax, the first ever imposed in the
District, it set forth no definition of that word. To ascertain its
meaning, we therefore consider the Congressional history of the
Act, the situation with reference to which it was enacted, and the
existing judicial precedents, with which Congress may be taken to
have been familiar in at least a general way.
United States v.
Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554,
310 U. S.
562.
As introduced into and passed by the House of Representatives,
the bill which, with amendments, became the Act laid a tax upon
income of residents from whatever source derived, and upon income
of nonresidents from sources within the District, with a provision
for credit for the payment of income taxes elsewhere. H.R. 6577,
76th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2(a), 4(a), 9(a), (b), D.C.Code Supp. V,
T. 20, §§ 980a(a), 980c(a), 980h(a, b). The bill was amended on the
floor of the House to except "Senators, Representatives, Delegates,
Resident Commissioners, officers and employees of the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States." 84 Cong.Rec. 7036.
It was unacceptable to the Senate in this form, and it was agreed
in conference that the tax should be levied "upon every individual
domiciled in the District of Columbia
Page 314 U. S. 450
on the last day of the taxable year," with no provision for
credit for income taxes paid elsewhere. H.R. Rep. Nos. 1093, 1206,
76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3; Sen.Doc. No. 92, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 3. This was agreed to by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives, and became part of the Act under
consideration.
The conference agreement was presented to the Senate by Senator
Overton, chairman of the Senate conferees, with the following
explanation:
"Mr. President, I now call attention to the fact that the
individual income tax is imposed only on those domiciled in the
District of Columbia. It therefore necessarily excludes from its
imposition all Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the President of the United States, all Cabinet
officers, and Federal employees who have been brought into the
District from the various States of the Union to serve their
country in the National Capital, provided such employees have not,
of their own volition, surrendered their domiciles in the States
and have voluntarily acquired domiciles within the District of
Columbia."
84 Cong.Rec. 8824. Senator Overton also stated:
"I took the position before the District of Columbia Committee
and in conference that I would not support any legislation which
would exempt Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
and their official force from an income tax in the District of
Columbia, but would impose it on all others. I then took the
position in conference that, if we imposed an income tax only on
those domiciled within the District, then we would be imposing it
only on those who, of their own volition, had abandoned their
domiciles in the States of their origin and had elected to make
their permanent home or domicile here in the District of Columbia.
Such persons, it may be justly contended, have no cause to complain
against an income tax that is imposed upon them only because they
have
Page 314 U. S. 451
chosen to establish within the District of Columbia their
permanent [
Footnote 2] places
of abode and to abandon their domiciles within the States."
84 Cong.Rec. 8825.
In the House, Representative Nichols, chairman of the House
conferees, and also chairman of the House District Committee in
charge of fiscal affairs, submitted the conference report and
stated:
"Since the question of the effect of the word 'domicile' in this
act has been raised, I think the House would probably like to have
the legal definition read:"
"Domicile is the place where one has his true, fixed, permanent
home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is
absent, he has the intention of returning, and where he exercises
his political rights. [
Footnote
3] . . . There must exist in combination the fact of residence
and
animus manendi --"
"which means residence and his intention to return
[
sic], so that, under this definition, he could certainly
live in the District of Columbia and have his legal domicile in any
other State in the United States."
84 Cong.Rec. 8974.
Representative Bates, another of the House conferees, stated in
response to a question regarding the possibility of triple
taxation,
"We raised that particular point [in conference] because we are
much concerned about how those who come from our States would be
affected by the income tax provisions of the new law, and it was
distinctly
Page 314 U. S. 452
understood that in this bill there should be no triple taxation.
. . ."
84 Cong.Rec. 8973.
The unusual character of the National Capital, making the income
tax a "very explosive and controversial item," [
Footnote 4] was vividly before the Congress, and
must also be considered in construing the statute imposing the
tax.
The District of Columbia is an exceptional community. It is not
a local municipal authority, but was established under the
Constitution as the seat of the National Government. Those in
Government service here are not engaged in local enterprise,
although their service may be localized. Their work is that of the
nation, and their pay comes not from local sources, but from the
whole country. Because of its character as a federal city, there is
no local political constituency with whose activities those living
in it may identify themselves as a symbol of their acceptance of a
local domicile.
Not all who flock here are birds of a feather. Some enter the
Civil Service, finding tenure and pay there more secure than in
private enterprise. Political ties are of no consequence in
obtaining or maintaining their positions. At the other extreme are
those who hold appointive office at the pleasure of the appointing
officer. These latter, as well as appointive officers with definite
but unprotected tenure, and all elective officers, usually owe
their presence here to the intimate and influential part they have
played in community life in one of the States.
Relatively few persons here in any branch of the Government
service can truthfully and accurately lay claim to an intention to
sever themselves from the service on any exact date. Persons in all
branches usually desire, quite naturally and properly, to continue
family life and to have the comforts of a domestic establishment
for whatever may be the term of their stay here. This is true
of
Page 314 U. S. 453
many Senators and Congressmen, cited by Senator Overton as
typical of those whom the limitation of the statute to persons
"domiciled" here "necessarily excludes."
Turning to the judicial precedents for further guidance in
construing "domicile" as used in the statute, we find it generally
recognized that one who comes to Washington to enter the Government
service and to live here for its duration does not thereby acquire
a new domicile. More than a century ago, Justice Parker of New
Hampshire observed that
"It has generally been considered that persons appointed to
public office under the authority of the United States, and taking
up their residence in Washington for the purpose of executing the
duties of such office, do not thereby, while engaged in the service
of the government, lose their domicil in the place where they
before resided unless they intend on removing there to make
Washington their permanent [
Footnote 5] residence."
See Atherton v. Thornton, 8 N.H. 178, 180. By and
large, subsequent cases have taken a like view. [
Footnote 6] It should also be observed
Page 314 U. S. 454
that a policy against loss of domicile by sojourn in Washington
is expressed in the constitutions and statutes of many states.
[
Footnote 7] Of course, no
individual case, constitution, or statute is controlling, but the
general trend of these authorities is a significant recognition
that the distinctive character of Washington habitation for federal
service is meaningful to those who are served as well as to those
in the service.
From these various data on Congressional intent, it is apparent
that the present cases are not governed by the tests usually
employed in cases where the element of federal service in the
Federal City is not present. [
Footnote 8] We hold that a man does not acquire a domicile
in the District simply by coming here to live for an indefinite
period of time while in the Government service. A contrary decision
would disregard the statements made on the floor of Congress as to
the meaning of the statute, fail to give proper weight to the trend
of judicial decisions, with which Congress should be taken to have
been cognizant, and result in a wholesale finding of domicile on
the part of Government servants quite obviously at variance with
Congressional policy. Further, Congress did not intend that one
living here indefinitely while in the Government service be held
domiciled here simply because he does not maintain a domestic
establishment at the place he hails from. Such a rule would result
in taxing those unable to maintain two establishments, and
exempting those able to meet such a burden -- thus reversing the
usual philosophy of income tax as one based on ability to pay.
On the other hand, we hold that persons are domiciled here who
live here and have no fixed and definite intent to return and make
their homes where they were formerly
Page 314 U. S. 455
domiciled. [
Footnote 9] A
decision that the statute lays a tax only on those with an
affirmative intent to remain here the rest of their days would be
at odds with the prevailing concept of domicile, and would give the
statute scope far narrower than the Congress must have
intended.
Cases falling clearly within such broad rules aside, the
question of domicile is a difficult one of fact to be settled only
by a realistic and conscientious review of the many relevant (and
frequently conflicting) indicia of where a man's home [
Footnote 10] is and according to the
established modes of proof.
The place where a man lives is properly taken to be his domicile
until facts adduced establish the contrary.
Ennis v.
Smith, 14 How. 400,
55 U. S. 423;
Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694,
138 U. S. 706.
The taxing authority is warranted in treating as
prima
facie taxable any person quartered in the District on tax day
whose status it deems doubtful. It is not an unreasonable burden
upon the individual, who knows best whence he came, what he left
behind, and his own attitudes, to require him to establish domicile
elsewhere if he is to escape the tax.
To hold taxable one who contends that he is not domiciled here,
the Board need not find the exact time when the "attitude and
relationship of person to place" which constitute domicile,
Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398,
306 U. S. 411,
were
Page 314 U. S. 456
formed, so long as it finds they were formed before the tax day.
What was at first a firm intent to return may have withered
gradually in consequence of dissolving associations elsewhere and
growing interests in the District. It is common experience that
this process usually is unmarked by any dramatic or even sharply
defined episode. The taxing authority need not find just when the
intent was finally dissipated; it is enough that it finds that this
has happened before the tax day.
If one has at any time become domiciled here, it is his burden
to establish any change of status upon which he relies to escape
the tax.
Anderson v. Watt, supra, at p.
138 U. S.
706.
In order to retain his former domicile, one who comes to the
District to enter Government service must always have a fixed and
definite intent to return and take up his home there when separated
from the service. A mere sentimental attachment will not hold the
old domicile. And residence in the District with a nearly equal
readiness to go back where one came from or to any other community
offering advantages upon the termination of service is not
enough.
One's testimony with regard to his intention is, of course, to
be given full and fair consideration, but is subject to the
infirmity of any self-serving declaration, and may frequently lack
persuasiveness or even be contradicted or negatived by other
declarations and inconsistent acts.
Whether or not one votes where he claims domicile is highly
relevant, but by no means controlling. [
Footnote 11] Each state prescribes for itself the
qualifications of its voters, and each has its own machinery for
determining compliance with such qualifications. A vote cast
without challenge and adjudication may indicate only laxity of
the
Page 314 U. S. 457
state officials, and even an adjudication of the right to vote
cannot preclude the levy of a tax by an arm of the Federal
Government. On the other hand, failure to vote elsewhere is, of
course, not conclusive that domicile is here.
Also of great significance is the nature of the position which
brings one to or keeps him in the service of the Government:
whether continuous or emergency, special or war-time in character;
whether requiring fixed residence in the District or only
intermittent stays; whether entailing monetary sacrifices or
betterment, and whether political or nonpolitical. Those dependent
upon the action of a local constituency on the first Tuesday after
the first Monday in November are, of course, loath to leave their
local identifications behind when taking up Government duties in
Washington.
Of course, the manner of living here, taken in connection with
one's station in life, is relevant. Did he hire a furnished room or
establish himself by the purchase of a house? Or did he rent a
house or apartment? Has he brought his family and dependents here?
Has he brought his goods? What relations has he to churches, clubs,
lodges, and investments that identify him with the District?
All facts which go to show the relations retained to one's
former place of abode are relevant in determining domicile. What
bridges have been kept and what have been burned? Does he retain a
place of abode there, or is there a family home with which he
retains identity? Does he have investments in local property or
enterprise which attach him to the community? What are his
affiliations with the professional, religious, and fraternal life
of the community, and what other associations does he cling to? How
permanent was his domicile in the community from which he came? Had
it long been a family seat, or was he there a bird of passage?
Would a return to
Page 314 U. S. 458
the old community pick up threads of close association? Or has
he so severed his relations that his old community is as strange as
another? Did he pay taxes in the old community because of his
retention of domicile which he could have avoided by giving it up?
Were they nominal or substantial? In view of the legislative
history showing that Congress was concerned lest there be "triple
taxation" -- Federal, State and District -- the Board should
consider whether taxes similar in character to those laid by this
Act have been paid elsewhere.
See statement of
Representative Bates, quoted
supra, p. 6.
Our mention of these considerations as being relevant must not
be taken as an indication of the relative weights to be attached to
them, as an implied negation of the relevance of others, or as an
effort to suggest a formula to handle all cases that may arise, or
the possibility of devising one.
In view of what we have said, it is clear that the present cases
did not call for rulings of nontaxability "as a matter of law." On
the other hand, we do not consider whether taxability follows as a
matter of law, as petitioner contends it does, for the factual
inquiries and findings of the Board, made under a view of the law
not our own, are quite likely not in all respects those which the
Board would have made had it proceeded with knowledge of our
opinion, and are, in some respects, ambiguous for the purpose of
decision in accordance with it. Accordingly, we reverse the
decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, and remand these cases to that Court with directions to
remand to the Board for further proceedings in conformity with this
opinion.
Reversed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS, and MR. JUSTICE REED,
took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
* Together with No. 59,
District of Columbia v. DeHart,
also on writ of certiorari, 313 U.S. 556, to the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.
[
Footnote 1]
53 Stat. 1087; 20 D.C.Code (Supp. V, 1939) § 980a(a).
[
Footnote 2]
We do not understand "permanent" to have been used in a literal
sense. Of course, it cannot be known without the gift of prophecy
whether a given abode is "permanent" in the strictest sense. But,
beyond this, it is frequently used in the authorities on domicile
to describe that which is not merely "temporary," or to describe a
dwelling for the time being which there is no presently existing
intent to give up. And further,
compare a statement by
Representative Dirksen on the floor of the House, 84 Cong.Rec.
8973.
[
Footnote 3]
Exercise of political rights elsewhere cannot be considered as
meant to be conclusive on the issue of taxability in the District.
See statement by Representative Dirksen on the floor of
the House.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 4]
84 Cong.Rec. 8972.
[
Footnote 5]
See note 2
supra.
[
Footnote 6]
Walden v. Canfield, 2 Rob. (La.) 466;
Lesh v.
Lesh, 13 Pa.Dist.R. 537;
see Woodworth v. St. Paul, M.
& M. Ry. Co., 18 F. 282, 284;
Commonwealth v.
Jones, 12 Pa. 365, 371;
cf. Newman v. United States,
43 App.D.C. 53, 70,
reversed on another ground,
238 U. S. 238 U.S.
537;
Deming v. United States, 59 App.D.C. 188, 37 F.2d
818;
Campbell v. Ramsey, 150 Kan. 368, 388, 92 P.2d 819;
Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N.C. 115.
But cf. Bradstreet v.
Bradstreet, 18 D.C. 229, 7 Mackey 229;
Sparks v.
Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666, 88 S.W. 173.
Professor Beale has summarized the cases as follows:
"Presence for the purpose of performing the duties of a civil
office will not, of itself, effect a change of domicil; there is no
inference of
animus manendi from the fact of the new
residence, since it is explained by the fact of officeholding. It
makes no difference whether the office is elective or appointive;
nor is it material whether the appointment is in its nature merely
temporary or has a degree of permanence, though the permanence of
the appointment is an element to be considered in determining the
domicil."
I Beale, Conflict of Laws § 22.6.
See also Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, pp. 42, 43.
[
Footnote 7]
1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, p. 172, note 2.
[
Footnote 8]
Cf. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.
S. 619,
232 U. S. 624;
Gilbert v. David, 235 U. S. 561.
[
Footnote 9]
This is not inconsistent with our holding that domicile here
does not follow from more indefiniteness of the period of one's
stay. While the intention to return must be fixed, the date need
not be; while the intention to return must be unconditional, the
time may be, and in most cases of necessity, is, contingent. The
intention must not waver before the uncertainties of time, but one
may not be visited with unwelcome domicile for lacking the gift of
prophecy.
[
Footnote 10]
Of course, this term does not have the magic qualities of a
divining rod in locating domicile. In fact, the search for the
domicile of any person capable of acquiring a domicile of choice is
but a search for his "home."
See Beale, Social Justice and
Business Costs, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 593, 596; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws,
§ 19.1.
[
Footnote 11]
See statements of Representative Dirksen, 84 Cong.Rec.
8973.