1. Section 94-b of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of New York, as
originally enacted, provides that one against whom a judgment is
rendered for injury resulting from the operation of a motor car and
who fails to pay it within a time designated, shall have his
license and registration suspended for three years, unless in the
meantime the judgment is satisfied or discharged, except by
discharge in bankruptcy, and that the suspension shall persist,
after the three years or the satisfaction of the judgment, and
until the licensee gives proof of his ability to respond in damages
by the procurement of insurance, the giving of a bond, or the
posting of a deposit.
Held consistent with due process of
law, and not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. P.
314 U. S.
36.
2. The amendment of § 94-b,
supra, by the Act of May 4,
1936, N.Y.Laws, c. 448, which provides that,
"if the creditor consents in writing, the debtor may be allowed
a license and registration for six months from the date of such
consent and thereafter until the consent is revoked in writing, if
proof of ability to respond to damages is furnished,"
is not inconsistent with due process of law. P.
314 U. S.
37.
3. Assuming that amendments of § 94-b,
supra, by
N.Y.Laws, 1936, c. 448,
id.1939, c. 618, are contrary to
the Bankruptcy Act because of the power they purport to give the
judgment creditor over the license of the debtor who has been
discharged in bankruptcy, the amendments are severable, and their
invalidity would not affect proceedings based entirely on the
original statute. P.
314 U. S.
38.
4. Under the law of New York, a statute, in itself
constitutional, is not affected by an unconstitutional amendment.
P.
314 U. S.
38.
5. Whether an amendment stands by itself as an independent
enactment, or is incorporated in the setting of the act which it
amends, by a provision that the act "shall read as follows:" is a
matter of draftsmanship or legislative mechanics. It does not touch
the substance of constitutionality. P.
314 U. S.
39.
34 F.
Supp. 532 affirmed.
Page 314 U. S. 34
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges
dismissing a bill to enjoin the above-named Commissioner from
suspending the plaintiff appellant's automobile driving license.
The hearing below was on bill and answer. The decree was affirmed
here by an equally divided Court, 313 U.S. 542; subsequently, a
petition for rehearing was granted, the judgment was vacated, and
the case was restored to the docket for reargument, 313 U.S.
597.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit to restrain the appellee from enforcing a
suspension of the appellant's driver's license. The complaint
alleges that the order suspending the license was issued May 29,
1940, pursuant to § 94-b of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of New
York, [
Footnote 1] upon receipt
by the appellee from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Albany
County of a transcript of a judgment, accompanied by evidence of
its finality and nonpayment, rendered against the appellant in the
sum of $5,138.25, in an action to recover damages for personal
injuries caused by appellant's operation of an automobile. It is
alleged that, on June 21, 1940, the appellant was adjudicated a
bankrupt and his cause referred to a referee; that the judgment was
scheduled as a debt, and although no discharge had been granted,
the judgment is a dischargeable debt. The complaint charges that §
94-b
Page 314 U. S. 35
violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment and is
rendered void by § 17 of the bankruptcy act. [
Footnote 2] A temporary and a permanent injunction
are prayed. A restraining order issued. The answer of the appellee
admits all of the relevant allegations except that the judgment was
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Upon the hearing of a motion for
injunction based upon the bill and answer, a court of three judges
denied the injunction and dismissed the bill. [
Footnote 3] At the argument before us, it was
admitted that a discharge has been granted and that the judgment
debt is thereby discharged.
Section 94-b provides for suspension of the operator's license
and registration certificate of any person if a judgment against
him for injury to person or property resulting from the operation
of a motor car be not paid within fifteen days, upon certification
of the judgment, its finality, and nonpayment, to the commissioner
by the county clerk. It directs the commissioner to suspend the
license for three years unless, in the meantime, the judgment is
satisfied or discharged, except by a discharge in bankruptcy. The
suspension persists after the expiration of the three years or
satisfaction of the judgment, until the licensee gives proof of his
ability to respond in damages by the procurement of insurance, the
giving of a bond, or the posting of a deposit. [
Footnote 4] The county clerk is required to
certify to the commissioner any such judgment unappealed and
unsatisfied for fifteen days after entry.
So the statute stood until May 4, 1936, when, by an amendatory
act, [
Footnote 5] a proviso was
added that, if the creditor consents in writing, the debtor may be
allowed a license and registration for six months from the date of
such consent and thereafter until the consent is revoked in
Page 314 U. S. 36
writing, if proof of ability to respond to damages is furnished.
A further amendment of May 31, 1939, [
Footnote 6] made it the duty of the county clerk to
certify the judgment only upon written demand of the creditor or
his attorney.
The purpose of the statute is clear. It is not a condition of
the grant of license that the applicant shall have insurance.
Instead, the policy of the State is that, if a driver has an
accident in respect of which a judgment convicts him of negligence,
his license will be suspended and so remain unless he furnishes
proof of his ability to respond for damage thereafter caused, and
that, in any event, it will be suspended for three years unless, in
the meantime, the judgment is satisfied or the creditor consents
that the license be reinstated and remain in force.
First. The statute, leaving out of consideration the
amendments, is not obnoxious to the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment. The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with
its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of
regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register
ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any
appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and
care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the
highway is consonant with due process. Some states require
insurance or its equivalent as a condition of the issue of a
license. New York chose to obtain the same end by providing for the
revocation or suspension of a license if the holder is adjudged
guilty of negligent driving. Section 94-b permits the restoration
of the license upon payment or satisfaction of the judgment. As the
court below has held, the effect of the statute as it stood prior
to the amendment of 1936 was to make the license privilege a form
of protection against damage to the public inflicted through the
licensee's carelessness. [
Footnote
7]
Page 314 U. S. 37
Second. Prior to the amendment of 1936, the license
could not be restored until three years had expired from its
suspension unless the judgment were paid or discharged, except by a
discharge in bankruptcy, and unless, also, the licensee furnished
proof of his ability to respond in damages for any future
accident.
If the statute went no further, we are clear that it would
constitute a valid exercise of the state's police power not
inconsistent with § 17 of the bankruptcy act. The penalty which §
94-b imposes for injury due to careless driving is not for the
protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy
that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to
injure their fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be
frustrated if the reckless driver were permitted to escape its
provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and,
accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in
bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute.
Such legislation is not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act.
Rather, it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching
highway safety.
Third. The appellant insists that the section as
amended, and as it was at the time the judgment was rendered
against him, violates the due process clause and runs afoul of the
bankruptcy act in virtue of the power given the creditor to have
the judgment certified to the commissioner of motor vehicles --
that is, the power to bring § 94-b into operation and the further
power to suspend the operation of the section.
The claim of deprivation of rights without due process of law is
frivolous. The State has seen fit to give the plaintiff an
additional means of enforcing the payment of a judgment for damages
inflicted in the operation of a motor vehicle by dealing with the
registration and license of the driver. The grant of this
additional remedy is not inconsistent with the concept of due
process.
Page 314 U. S. 38
A more serious question arises in connection with § 17 of the
bankruptcy act. The discharge of the debtor is a defense available
against a suit on the judgment and against execution process issued
upon it. And there is force in the argument that § 94-b, as
amended, in truth deprives the debtor of the immunity afforded by
his discharge, leaves out of view the public policy of the State or
makes that public policy subservient to the private interest of the
creditor by affording him the opportunity to initiate, remove, and
revive the suspension of the license upon terms as to payments on
account of his claim.
The District Court held that it need not consider the validity
of the amendment of 1939 which requires the county clerk to certify
the judgment only upon the request of the creditor. Under the old
law, it was the duty of the county clerk to certify every such
judgment which had become final and remained unsatisfied for
fifteen days. It is true that the bill alleges the judgment in this
case was certified at the request of the plaintiff's attorney. But,
if the amendment is void because it confers a power on the creditor
inconsistent with the effect of the debtor's discharge, and is
eliminated from the statute for that reason, it still remains that,
under the old law, the county clerk's duty to certify was
mandatory, and this judgment would have been certified if he had
performed his official duty.
The court also found it unnecessary to pass upon the validity of
the 1936 amendment. The power of the creditor to lift the
suspension and restore it during the period of three years does not
appear to have been invoked in the present case. If the creditor
attempts to exercise that power, the commissioner will have to
determine whether the amendment giving the creditor such power is
valid.
The court was of the view that, if the amendments are invalid as
inconsistent with § 17 of the bankruptcy act, they are severable,
and that the statute may stand as a complete act without them,
since, under the law of New
Page 314 U. S. 39
York, a statute in itself constitutional is not affected by an
unconstitutional amendment -- the amendment dropping out and the
original act remaining in force. Decisions of the highest court of
the State are cited to this effect. [
Footnote 8]
These decisions hold that, where the original and amending acts
were enacted by different legislatures, it cannot be thought that
the original act would not have been retained except for the
amendments, and this principle has been applied where the amending
act declares, as it does in this instance, that the original act is
"amended to read as follows," and then contains a redraft of the
entire act with the amendment inserted. Whether an amendment stands
by itself as an independent enactment or is incorporated in the
setting of the act which it amends by a provision that the act
"shall read as follows:" is a matter of draftsmanship or
legislative mechanics. It does not touch the substance of
constitutionality.
There is no evidence of intent that, if the amendments could not
stand, the legislation as a whole should fail. On the contrary, the
legislative history discloses a persistent purpose that such a
scheme for the control of motor drivers should remain. Successive
and frequent amendments have dealt with details, but have left
intact the major features of the legislation. [
Footnote 9] In any case, we should accord great
weight to the District Court's view of New York law. But an
examination of the authorities convinces that, in this case, any
contrary view is untenable. Since the judgment in this case would
or should have been
Page 314 U. S. 40
certified prior to the amendment of 1939, and, since the
creditor has not sought to invoke the amendment of 1936 which gives
him a control over the restoration of appellant's license and its
continued force during the three-year suspension period, we think
the court was right in abstaining from deciding whether the
amendments are annulled by § 17 of the bankruptcy act.
The decree is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Consolidated Laws ch. 71.
[
Footnote 2]
11 U.S.C. § 35.
[
Footnote 3]
34 F.
Supp. 532.
[
Footnote 4]
See § 94-c.
[
Footnote 5]
New York Laws, 1936, ch. 448.
[
Footnote 6]
New York Laws, 1939, ch. 618.
[
Footnote 7]
See also Munz v. Harnett, 6 F.
Supp. 158.
[
Footnote 8]
E.g., People v. Mensching, 187 N.Y. 8, 23, 79 N.E. 884;
Markland v. Scully, 203 N.Y. 158, 96 N.E. 427;
People
v. C. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N.Y. 121, 108 N.E. 278;
People v. Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 63, 129 N.E. 202.
[
Footnote 9]
See Laws 1930, ch. 398; Laws 1931, ch. 669; Laws 1934,
ch. 438; Laws 1936, ch. 293; Laws 1936, ch. 771; Laws 1937, ch.
114; Laws 1937, ch. 463; Laws 1939, ch. 618.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
Under the statute in question, it becomes the duty of the
commissioner of motor vehicles to suspend the operator's license of
one against whom the unsatisfied judgment has been rendered
(
Matter of Jones v. Harnett, 247 App.Div. 7, 286 N.Y.S.
220,
aff'd, 271 N.Y. 626, 3 N.E.2d 455) "upon receiving a
certified copy" of such final judgment from the court. McKinney's
Consol.Laws, Bk. 62-A, § 94-b. The statute further provides
that
"It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court, or of the
court, where it has no clerk, in which any such judgment is
rendered, to forward immediately,
upon written demand of the
judgment creditor or his attorney . . . to such commissioner a
certified copy of such judgment or a transcript thereof."
(Italics supplied.)
Id.
In this case, the judgment creditor invoked the power which the
New York legislature placed in his hands. At the request of his
attorney, the clerk of the court forwarded a transcript of the
judgment to the commissioner, who thereupon issued the order of
suspension.
The power thus granted the judgment creditor contravenes § 17 of
the Bankruptcy Act. Judgments on claims of the kind involved here
* are provable
(
Lewis v.
Roberts,
Page 314 U. S. 41
267 U. S. 467),
and do not fall within any of the categories of debts excepted from
discharge by § 17. Since they are dischargeable, a state cannot
supply a device for their collection which survives a discharge in
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy power is "unrestricted and paramount;"
the states "may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or
complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary
regulations."
International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,
278 U. S. 261,
278 U. S. 265.
The power which New York has placed in the hands of this judgment
creditor is such an interference, though the discharge in
bankruptcy be deemed to destroy only the remedy (
Zavelo v.
Reeves, 227 U. S. 625),
not the debt.
Under the New York scheme, a creditor whose claim has been
discharged still holds a club over his debtor's head. The state has
given him a remedy which survives bankruptcy. If the bankrupt
refuses to pay his discharged debt, the creditor will see to it
that his driver's license is suspended. If, however, the bankrupt
will pay up, the creditor will refrain.
The practical pressures of this collection device are apparent.
Where retention of the operator's license is essential to
livelihood, as here alleged, the bankrupt is at the creditor's
mercy. Bankruptcy is not then the sanctuary for hapless debtors
which Congress intended. The bankrupt, instead of receiving by
virtue of his discharge "a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt" (
Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U. S. 234,
292 U. S. 244)
finds himself still entangled with a former creditor.
In practical effect, the bankrupt may be in as bad, or even
worse, a position than if the state had made it possible for a
creditor to attach his future wages. Such a device
Page 314 U. S. 42
would clearly contravene the Bankruptcy Act.
Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, supra. The present one likewise runs afoul of the
Act.
But it is said that if this provision of the statute falls out,
the old one falls in, and, under the old one, it was the duty of
the clerk to certify the unsatisfied judgment to the commissioner.
The difficulty with that view is that this is not that case. This
bankrupt's license was suspended as a result of legal compulsion by
the creditor. Whether it would have been suspended had the
commissioner been advised that the amendment giving the creditor
that power contravened the Bankruptcy Act is wholly conjectural.
The question of whether a provision of a state statute survives an
invalid amendment is a question of state law.
See Meyer v.
Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298. We
do not know what the ruling of the New York courts would be under
this statute. Nor do we know whether as a matter of administrative
policy the clerk and the commissioner would have proceeded on the
basis of the old statute or would have awaited legislative
clarification. But, since we do know that the bankrupt was deprived
of his license by reason of a statute which conflicts with the
Bankruptcy Act, we should strike down the statutory provision which
in fact was invoked.
The constitutional objection to this statute, however, persists
even though we assume that the bankrupt's license would have been
suspended without the creditor's initiative. The act also provides
that,
"
if the judgment creditor consents in writing that the
judgment debtor be allowed license and registration, the same
may be allowed for six months from the date of such consent by the
commissioner and thereafter. . . ."
(Italics supplied.) I do not think we can pass over that
provision on the theory that the power of the creditor to lift the
suspension does not appear to have been invoked in this case and
that, if the creditor
Page 314 U. S. 43
attempts to exercise such power, the commissioner will have to
pass on the constitutional issue. Meanwhile, the provision in
question will give to the creditor enormous leverage. His
bargaining position will be greatly fortified. The bankrupt is at
his mercy where the means of livelihood are at stake. If the
bankrupt agrees to a settlement, makes arrangements for installment
payments, or the like, the creditor will see to it that the license
is restored. If the bankrupt rests on his rights, the creditor will
show no mercy. In the interim, there is no way by which the
bankrupt can rid himself of that pressure unless he makes peace
with the creditor; he cannot force the constitutional issue in any
way other than the present suit. If the creditor agrees to lift the
suspension, the bankrupt would be the last to object. In any event,
the provision by that time would have spent much of its force. In
short, this power which New York has given the creditor is a
powerful collection device which should not be allowed to survive
bankruptcy.
I agree that we should not meet a constitutional issue unless it
is unavoidable. But that issue cannot be escaped here unless we are
to overlook the realities of collection methods.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE BYRNES, and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON
join in this dissent.
* The appearance of judgments, arising out of automobile
accidents, among individual bankrupts' schedules of liabilities has
been common. Causes of Business Failures and Bankruptcies of
Individuals in New Jersey in 1929-30, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Don.
Comm'n Series No. 54, pp. 25, 26 (1931); Causes of Commercial
Bankruptcies,
id. No. 69, pp. 14, 16 (1932); Causes of
Bankruptcies Among Consumers,
id. No. 82, pp. 14, 15
(1933).