A railroad company, some of whose trains in Texas had each but
one Pullman sleeping car and that in charge of a colored porter
subject to the control of the train conductor, assailed in the
federal court, as unauthorized by Texas statutes and as violative
of the Federal Constitution, a regulation by a state commission
which would require that such cars be continuously in charge of an
employee "having the rank and position of a Pullman conductor."
Pullman porters, intervening, also attacked the order, adopting the
railroad's objections but urging mainly that it discriminated
against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pullman
porters being Negroes and the conductors white.
Held:
Page 312 U. S. 497
1. Decision of the issue of unconstitutional discrimination
should be withheld pending proceedings to be taken in the state
courts to secure a definitive construction of the state statute. P.
312 U. S.
498.
2. The federal courts, when asked for the extraordinary remedy
of injunction, will exercise a sound discretion in the public
interest to avoid needless friction with state policies that may
result from tentative constructions of state statutes and premature
adjudication on their constitutionality. P.
312 U. S.
500.
33 F. Supp.
675, reversed.
APPEAL from a decree of the District Court of three judges which
enjoined the enforcement of an order of the above-named Railroad
Commission.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In those sections of Texas where the local passenger traffic is
slight, trains carry but one sleeping car. These trains, unlike
trains having two or more sleepers, are without a Pullman
conductor; the sleeper is in charge of a porter, who is subject to
the train conductor's control. As is well known, porters on
Pullmans are colored, and conductors are white. Addressing itself
to this situation, the Texas Railroad Commission, after due
hearing, ordered that
"no sleeping car shall be operated on any line of railroad in
the State of Texas . . . unless such
Page 312 U. S. 498
cars are continuously in the charge of an employee . . . having
the rank and position of Pullman conductor."
Thereupon, the Pullman Company and the railroads affected
brought this action in a federal district court to enjoin the
Commission's order. Pullman porters were permitted to intervene as
complainants, and Pullman conductors entered the litigation in
support of the order. Three judges having been convened, Judicial
Code, § 266, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 380, the court enjoined
enforcement of the order. From this decree, the case came here
directly. Judicial Code, § 238, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 345.
The Pullman Company and the railroads assailed the order as
unauthorized by Texas law, as well as violative of the Equal
Protection, the Due Process, and the Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution. The intervening porters adopted these objections, but
mainly objected to the order as a discrimination against Negroes in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The complaint of the Pullman porters undoubtedly tendered a
substantial constitutional issue. It is more than substantial. It
touches a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal
courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication
is open. Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if
a definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the
controversy. It is therefore our duty to turn to a consideration of
questions under Texas law.
The Commission found justification for its order in a Texas
statute which we quote in the margin.
* It is common
Page 312 U. S. 499
ground that, if the order is within the Commission's authority,
its subject matter must be included in the Commission's power to
prevent "unjust discrimination . . . and to prevent any and all
other abuses" in the conduct of railroads. Whether arrangements
pertaining to the staffs of Pullman cars are covered by the Texas
concept of "discrimination" is far from clear. What practices of
the railroads may be deemed to be "abuses" subject to the
Commission's correction is equally doubtful. Reading the Texas
statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders without special
competence in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our
independent judgment regarding the application of that law to the
present situation. The lower court did deny that the Texas statutes
sustained the Commission's assertion of power. And this represents
the view of an able and experienced circuit judge of the circuit
which includes Texas and of two capable district judges trained in
Texas law. Had we or they no choice in the matter but to decide
what is the law of the state, we should hesitate long before
rejecting their forecast of Texas law. But no matter how seasoned
the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a
forecast, rather than a determination. The last word on the meaning
of Article 6445 of the
Page 312 U. S. 500
Texas Civil Statutes, and therefore the last word on the
statutory authority of the Railroad Commission in this case,
belongs neither to us nor to the district court, but to the supreme
court of Texas. In this situation, a federal court of equity is
asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be
displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication.
Glenn v. Field
Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177;
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415. The
reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a
federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a
state court. The resources of equity are equal to a adjustment that
will avoid the waste of a tentative decision, as well as the
friction of a premature constitutional adjudication.
An appeal to the chancellor, as we had occasion to recall only
the other day, is an appeal to the "exercise of the sound
discretion, which guides the determination of courts of equity."
Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., ante, p.
312 U. S. 45. The
history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of the
injunction. There have been as many and as variegated applications
of this supple principle as the situations that have brought it
into play.
See, for modern instances,
Beasley v. Texas
& Pacific Ry. Co., 191 U. S. 492;
Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.
S. 334;
United States v. Dern, 289 U.
S. 352. Few public interests have a higher claim upon
the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of
needless friction with state policies, whether the policy relates
to the enforcement of the criminal law,
Fenner v. Boykin,
271 U. S. 240;
Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S.
89; or the administration of a specialized scheme for
liquidating embarrassed business enterprises,
Pennsylvania v.
Williams, 294 U. S. 176; or
the final authority of a state court to interpret doubtful
regulatory laws of the state,
Gilchrist v. Interborough
Co., 279 U. S. 159;
Page 312 U. S. 501
cf. Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52,
288 U. S. 61.
These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our
federal system whereby the federal courts, "exercising a wise
discretion," restrain their authority because of "scrupulous regard
for the rightful independence of the state governments" and for the
smooth working of the federal judiciary.
See Cavanaugh v.
Looney, 248 U. S. 453,
248 U. S. 457;
Di Giovanni v. Camden Ins. Assn., 296 U. S.
64,
296 U. S. 73.
This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in
furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal
authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of
those powers.
Compare 37 Stat. 1013; Judicial Code, §
24(1), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1); 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§
101-15.
Regard for these important considerations of policy in the
administration of federal equity jurisdiction is decisive here. If
there was no warrant in state law for the Commission's assumption
of authority, there is an end of the litigation; the constitutional
issue does not arise. The law of Texas appears to furnish easy and
ample means for determining the Commission's authority. Article
6453 of the Texas Civil Statutes gives a review of such an order in
the state courts. Or, if there are difficulties in the way of this
procedure of which we have not been apprised, the issue of state
law may be settled by appropriate action on the part of the State
to enforce obedience to the order.
Beal v. Missouri Pacific
R.;Co., supra; Article 6476, Texas Civil Statutes. In the
absence of any showing that these obvious methods for securing a
definitive ruling in the state courts cannot be pursued with full
protection of the constitutional claim, the district court should
exercise its wise discretion by staying its hands.
Compare
Thompson v. Magnolia Co., 309 U. S. 478.
We therefore remand the cause to the district court, with
directions to retain the bill pending a determination
Page 312 U. S. 502
of proceedings, to be brought with reasonable promptness, in the
state court in conformity with this opinion.
Compare Atlas Ins.
Co. v. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563,
306 U. S. 573, and
cases cited.
Reversed.
* Vernon's Anno.Texas Civil Statutes, Article 6445:
"Power and authority are hereby conferred upon the Railroad
Commission of Texas over all railroads, and suburban, belt, and
terminal railroads, and over all public wharves, docks, piers,
elevators, warehouses, sheds, tracks, and other property used in
connection therewith in this State, and over all persons,
associations, and corporations, private or municipal, owning or
operating such railroad, wharf, dock, pier, elevator, warehouse,
shed, track or other property to fix, and it is hereby made the
duty of the said Commission to adopt all necessary rates, charges
and regulations, to govern and regulate such railroads, persons,
associations and corporations, and to correct abuses and prevent
unjust discrimination in the rates, charges and tolls of such
railroads, persons, associations and corporations, and to fix
division of rates, charges and regulations between railroads and
other utilities and common carriers where a division is proper and
correct, and to prevent any and all other abuses in the conduct of
their business and to do and perform such other duties and details
in connection therewith as may be provided by law."
