1. A citizen of the United States who willfully and knowingly
uses a United States passport which was secured by a false
statement, is guilty of an offense under § 2 of the Passport Title
of the Act of June 15, 1917, when the use was for the purpose of
establishing his identity and citizenship and consequent right to
reenter this country from abroad.
Browder v. United States,
ante, p.
312 U. S. 335. P.
312 U. S.
343.
2. Evidence consisting of a ship's manifest of incoming United
States citizens with their names and the numbers of their
respective passports, and the testimony of an immigration inspector
as to his practice of examining the passports in such cases,
checking their numbers with those on the manifest,
held
sufficient to go to the jury on the question whether the prisoner
presented his passport on entering the country. P.
312 U. S.
344.
3. Statements that were made by an accused before the commission
of the crime charged and which are inconsistent with his innocence
are admissible in evidence without corroborative proof. P.
312 U. S. 347.
113 F.2d 100, affirmed.
Page 312 U. S. 343
Certiorari, 311 U.S. 631, to review the affirmance of a sentence
under an indictment.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is similar to
Browder v. United States, ante,
p.
312 U. S. 335.
This petitioner also was indicted for the use of a passport for the
purpose of entering the United States, which passport had been
secured by false statements in the application for its issue. We
granted certiorari, 311 U.S. 631, because of the contention that
this use of the passport was not prohibited by section 2, Title IX
of the Act of June 15, 1917, and because of a conflict on a rule of
evidence, referred to by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The false statements charged were with respect to petitioner's
name, citizenship, place of birth, and residence abroad, and the
use relied upon was the presentation of the passport to an
immigration inspector. A jury convicted petitioner, a sentence of
two years was imposed, and that judgment was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals. [
Footnote
1]
As grounds for reversal, petitioner urges (1) that the
presentation of a wrongfully held passport to an immigration
officer upon landing is not a use within the statute; (2) that the
evidence of the use was insufficient to justify the submission of
the case to the jury, and (3) that conviction was obtained by the
use of admissions
Page 312 U. S. 344
before the crime, without corroboration, to establish necessary
elements of the charge.
Nothing need be added to the discussion in the
Browder
case of the illegality of this use. There are no marks of
differentiation.
Proof of Presentation. -- Petitioner's argument that
the proof of presentation of the passport was insufficient rests
upon the testimony of the inspector, which was based on the
manifest of United States citizens arriving on the S.S.
Normandie on September 30, 1937. The manifest contains a
list of names, accompanied by passport numbers and other
information. Next to each name appears a check mark by the
inspector. The list includes "Robert Wiener," the holder of
passport No. 332207, which is the passport issued to petitioner.
The inspector testified that he had no independent recollection of
the arrival of this Robert Wiener, but that, from looking at the
manifest, he could say that the passport had been presented to him,
because
"it is my invariable practice when the number of the passport
appears on the manifest to ask for that passport and have it shown
to me . . . by the passenger."
On cross-examination, the inspector stated that he himself did
not make any writing on the manifest as to what the people showed
him. This colloquy then occurred:
"THE COURT: . . . do you make any entry on the manifest when a
man identifies himself as an American citizen?"
"THE WITNESS: The whole manifest is of American citizens."
"THE COURT: And when the man presented his passport, what did
you do?"
"THE WITNESS: That check mark shows he was admitted as a United
States citizen."
"THE COURT: On a passport?"
"THE WITNESS: Not necessarily."
"THE COURT: Can you tell us whether he had a passport? "
Page 312 U. S. 345
"THE WITNESS: From the fact the number of the passport appears
there."
"Q. And you checked --"
"Mr. Fowler: That is objected to."
"Q. Did you check the information on the manifest with
information in the passport?"
"A. That is correct."
The petitioner asks reversal because of the answer "Not
necessarily," contending this shows that the check mark did not
inescapably indicate the presentation of a passport. The Government
argues that the check mark was intended merely to show admission as
a citizen, and that the language does not nullify or indeed impugn
the direct assertions of the inspector. We are clear that this
testimony as a whole justified the submission to the jury, at any
rate, and its conclusion that petitioner actually used his passport
in securing admission to this country.
Corroboration of Admissions. -- The prosecution had the
burden of proving that the passport was obtained by the use of
false statements. As the trial court instructed the jury it might
convict if any one of the statements charged in the indictment to
be false was found false, it is necessary before affirmance is
justified to decide whether there was adequate evidence to support
the charge of falsity as to each of the statements. Petitioner
contends that, as to the allegedly false statements of American
citizenship and no prior residence outside the United States, there
was no proof of falsity except admissions to the contrary made by
petitioner prior to the use of the passport. Such admissions, it is
urged, require corroboration. This argument is drawn from the
requirement of corroboration as to confessions after the crime.
[
Footnote 2]
Page 312 U. S. 346
As a corollary, it is said that the corroboration must reach to
each element of the
corpus delicti. [
Footnote 3]
To establish that petitioner was not a citizen of the United
States and that he had resided abroad, the Government relied on the
following proof: the manifest of alien passengers of the S.S.
Haverford, which arrived at Philadelphia on March 27,
1914, stated that Welwel Warszower, age 21, was a citizen or
subject of Russia whose last permanent residence was in Vikolsk,
Russia, where his father lived; that he had never been in the
United States before, and that he had been born in Radajenko,
Russia. Although the officer who had examined Warszower on this
occasion was dead, the boarding officer testified it was the
practice to check all answers on the manifest with the alien
personally before allowing him to enter. Three years later, on June
5, 1917, petitioner registered for the draft under the name
"William Weiner;" he stated he was an alien born in Russia on
September 5, 1893, and a citizen or subject of Russia. Petitioner
furnished the same information in a draft questionnaire returned on
December 31, 1917, where he also stated that he spoke Russian, that
he arrived in this country at Philadelphia on March 28, 1914, on
the S.S.
Haverford, that his parents had not been
naturalized, that he had not taken out first papers, and that he
was willing to return to Russia and enter its military service. In
1932, preparatory to traveling abroad, petitioner applied for a
reentry permit, which is required only of aliens. To support his
application, he showed the inspection card issued to him in 1914
upon his arrival in Philadelphia, and stated that he was born on
September 5, 1893, at Kiev, Russia, which was his last permanent
residence before his arrival in Philadelphia. The Government also
showed that petitioner had never applied
Page 312 U. S. 347
for naturalization under his own name, or the names "Weiner" or
"Wiener," which he on occasion used. In his 1936 application for a
passport in the name of Robert William Wiener, petitioner submitted
a certified transcript of an entry in the Atlantic City birth
records that a person of that name was born there September 5,
1896, but, at the trial, the Government proved the entry a
forgery.
The rule requiring corroboration of confessions protects the
administration of the criminal law against errors in convictions
based upon untrue confessions alone. Where the inconsistent
statement was made prior to the crime, this danger does not exist.
[
Footnote 4] Therefore, we are
of the view that such admissions do not need to be corroborated.
They contain none of the inherent weaknesses of confessions or
admissions after the fact. Cases in the circuits are cited by
petitioner to the contrary. In
Gulotta v. United States,
[
Footnote 5] the decision
turned on the similarity of confessions and admissions, rather than
upon any differences between admissions before and after the fact.
In
Duncan v. United States [
Footnote 6] and in
Gordnier v. United States,
[
Footnote 7] the conclusion was
reached without any comment upon this difference. Our consideration
of the effect of admissions prior to the crime leads us to the
other conclusion. [
Footnote
8]
The law requires that a jury be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt. An uncorroborated confession or
evidence of perjury, given by one witness only, [
Footnote 9] does not, as a matter of law,
establish beyond
Page 312 U. S. 348
a reasonable doubt the commission of a crime, but these are
exceptions to the normal requirement that disputed questions of
fact are to be submitted to the jury under appropriate
instructions. In this case, the earlier statements of birth, and
therefore necessarily of residence outside of the United States, if
believed by the jury, prove the falsity of the statements to the
contrary in the application. Where the crime charged is a false
statement, and where it finds its only proof in admissions to the
contrary prior to the act set out in the indictment, it may be
unlikely that a jury will conclude that the falsity of the later
statement is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but such evidence
justifies submission of the question to them.
In this present case, there was other evidence of the falsity of
the disputed statements in the application. The manifest of the
S.S.
Haverford showed petitioner's arrival and
classification as an alien at Philadelphia in 1914. The forged
birth certificate adds to the proof of foreign birth by showing an
effort to establish American nativity by false means and the
Government's proof of the absence of any attempt at naturalization
supports the allegation of false statement as to citizenship.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
113 F.2d 100.
[
Footnote 2]
Wharton, Criminal Law, 12th Ed., §§ 357, 359;
Daeche v.
United States, 250 F. 566; Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., §§
2070-71; Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence § 1598; Underhill,
Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 42.
[
Footnote 3]
Cf. Forte v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 111, 94 F.2d
236.
[
Footnote 4]
Wigmore,
supra.
[
Footnote 5]
113 F.2d 683.
[
Footnote 6]
68 F.2d 136.
[
Footnote 7]
261 F. 910.
[
Footnote 8]
Cf. Miles v. United States, 103 U.
S. 304.
[
Footnote 9]
Phair v. United States, 60 F.2d 953.
Cf. United
States v. Harris, 311 U. S. 292.