A judgment of a District Court, ruled by the state law and
correctly applying that law as interpreted by the state supreme
court when the judgment was rendered, must be reversed on appeal
if, in the meantime, the state court ha disapproved of its former
rulings and adopted a contrary interpretation. P.
311 U. S.
541.
110 F.2d 310 reversed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 635, to review the affirmance of
judgment dismissing an action for damages on account of personal
injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
defendant.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This certiorari brings before us for review the determination of
the Circuit Court of Appeals that cases at law sounding in tort,
brought in the federal courts on the ground of diversity of
citizenship, are ruled by the state law as declared by the state's
highest court when the judgment of the trial court is entered, and
not by the state law as so declared at the time of entry of the
appellate court's order of affirmance or reversal. We granted the
certiorari because of the uncertainty of the law upon this question
as contained in this Court's former decisions.
Page 311 U. S. 539
The petitioner here, Virginia Vandenbark, the plaintiff below,
is a citizen of Arizona. The defendant, respondent here, the
Owens-Illinois Glass Company, is a corporation of Ohio. Petitioner
brought an action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio alleging that, as an employee of
respondent, she had contracted various occupational diseases,
including silicosis, through the negligence of respondent. The
trial court sustained a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
petition failed to state a cause of action. This ruling was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals with the statement that,
under the law of Ohio, no recovery was permitted, at the time of
the judgment in the trial court, for the type of occupational
disease alleged by the petitioner to have been contracted by her as
the result of respondent's negligence. [
Footnote 1]
It is conceded that, at the time the motion to dismiss was
sustained, neither the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act [
Footnote 2] nor the common law, as
interpreted by the supreme court of that state, gave a right of
recovery to petitioner. The Constitution of Ohio [
Footnote 3] authorized the passing of laws
establishing a state fund out of which compensation for death
injuries or occupational diseases was to paid employees in lieu of
all other rights to compensation or damages from any employer who
complied with the law. At the time of the dismissal of the petition
by the trial court, no provision had been made by statute for any
of the occupational diseases included in petitioner's complaint.
Respondent had fully complied with the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Ohio Constitution and compensation statutes passed pursuant to
its authority had been consistently construed by the Ohio courts
as
Page 311 U. S. 540
withdrawing the common law right and as denying any statutory
right to recovery for petitioner's occupational diseases. [
Footnote 4] After the action of the
trial court in dismissing the petition, the Ohio supreme court
reversed its former decisions and, in an opinion expressly
overruling them, declared occupational diseases such as complained
of by petitioner compensable under Ohio common law. [
Footnote 5]
While
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins [
Footnote 6] made the law of the state, as declared
by its highest court, effective to govern tort cases cognizable in
federal courts on the sole ground of diversity, there was no
necessity there for discussing at what step in the cause the state
law would be finally determined. In that case, no change occurred
in the state decisions between the accident and our judgment. There
is nothing in the Rules of Decision section to point the way to a
solution. [
Footnote 7]
During the period when
Swift v. Tyson [
Footnote 8] (1842-1938) ruled the decisions
of the federal courts, its theory of their freedom in matters of
general law from the authority of state courts pervaded opinions of
this Court involving even state statutes or local law. As a
consequence, some decisions hold that a different interpretation of
state law by state courts after a decision in a federal
Page 311 U. S. 541
trial court does not require the federal reviewing court to
reverse the trial court. [
Footnote
9]
In
Burgess v. Seligman, cited in the
preceding note a statute of Missouri relating
to the liability of stockholders of a Missouri corporation was
interpreted by the state supreme court contrary to the prior
decision of the federal trial court. This Court affirmed the trial
court, saying,
"So, when contracts and transactions have been entered into, and
rights have accrued thereon under a particular state of the
decisions, or when there has been no decision of the state
tribunals, the federal courts properly claim the right to adopt
their own interpretation of the law applicable to the case,
although a different interpretation may be adopted by the state
courts after such rights have accrued. [
Footnote 10]"
What we conceive, however, to be the true rule to guide a
federal appellate court where there has been a change of decision
in state courts subsequent to the judgment of the district court
was stated, before any of the opinions just cited, in
United
States v. Schooner Peggy. [
Footnote 11] The Court there said,
"It is in the general true that the province of an appellate
court is only to enquire whether a judgment when rendered was
erroneous or not. But if, subsequent to the judgment and before the
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed or its
obligation denied. "
Page 311 U. S. 542
It is true this Court was speaking of the intervention of a
treaty, and also that it expressed a caution against retrospective
operation between private parties, but the principle quoted has
found acceptance in a variety of situations.
Kibbe v.
Ditto [
Footnote 12] and
Moores v. Citizens' National Bank [
Footnote 13] hold that subsequent decisions as
to married women's rights control review.
Sioux County v.
National Surety Company [
Footnote 14] gives effect to a later decision on a
statute as to surety bonds. In
Oklahoma Packing Company v.
Oklahoma Gas Company, [
Footnote 15] we applied as determinative a state
decision, clarifying the local law, handed down after the decree
then under consideration here.
While cases were pending here on review, this Court has acted to
give opportunity for the application by the lower courts of
statutes enacted after their judgments or decrees. [
Footnote 16] It has vacated judgments of
state courts because of contrary intervening decisions, [
Footnote 17] and has accepted
jurisdiction by virtue of statutes enacted after cases were pending
before it. [
Footnote 18]
Where, after judgment below, a declaration of war changed the
standing of one litigant from an alien belligerent to an enemy,
this Court took cognizance of the change and modified the action
below because of the new status. [
Footnote 19] Similarly, repeal of criminal laws or of a
constitutional provision without a saving clause deprives appellate
courts of jurisdiction to
Page 311 U. S. 543
entertain further proceedings under their sanctions. [
Footnote 20] These instances
indicate that the dominant principle is that
nisi prius
and appellate tribunals alike should conform their orders to the
state law as of the time of the entry. Intervening and conflicting
decisions will thus cause the reversal of judgments which were
correct when entered.
Respondent earnestly presses upon us the desirability of
applying the rule that appellate courts will review a judgment only
to determine whether it was correct when made; that any other
review would make the federal courts subordinate to state courts,
and their judgments subject to changes of attitude or membership of
state courts, whether that change was normal or induced for the
purpose of affecting former federal rulings. While not insensible
to possible complications, we are of the view that, until such time
as a case is no longer
sub judice, the duty rests upon
federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision
statute in accordance with the then controlling decision of the
highest state court. [
Footnote
21] Any other conclusion would but perpetuate the confusion and
injustices arising from inconsistent federal and state
interpretations of state law.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE STONE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 110 F.2d 310,
312.
[
Footnote 2]
Ohio Gen.Code (Page, 1937) § 1465-70.
[
Footnote 3]
Art. 2, § 35.
[
Footnote 4]
Zajachuck v. Willard Storage Battery Co., 106 Ohio St.
538, 140 N.E. 405;
Mabley & Carew Co. v. Lee, 129 Ohio
St. 69, 73, 193 N.E. 745.
[
Footnote 5]
Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co.,
135 Ohio St.191, 205, 20 N.E.2d 232.
[
Footnote 6]
304 U. S. 304 U.S.
64.
[
Footnote 7]
U.S.Code, Title 28, § 725.
"
Laws of States as rules of decision. The laws of the
several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
[
Footnote 8]
41 U. S. 16 Pet.
1.
[
Footnote 9]
Pease v. Peck,
18 How. 595,
59 U. S. 599;
Morgan v.
Courtenius, 20 How. 1;
Burgess v.
Seligman, 107 U. S. 20,
107 U. S. 33;
Concordia Insurance Co. v. School District, 282 U.
S. 545,
282 U. S.
553.
[
Footnote 10]
Cf. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.
S. 349,
215 U. S.
356.
[
Footnote 11]
5 U. S. 1 Cranch
103,
5 U. S. 110.
[
Footnote 12]
93 U. S. 93 U.S.
674;
see discussion of this case in
Bauserman v.
Blunt, 147 U. S. 647,
147 U. S.
655-656.
[
Footnote 13]
104 U. S. 104 U.S.
625,
104 U. S.
629.
[
Footnote 14]
276 U. S. 276 U.S.
238,
276 U. S.
240.
[
Footnote 15]
309 U. S. 309 U.S.
4,
309 U. S. 7-8.
[
Footnote 16]
Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co., 183 U.
S. 115;
Missouri ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 273 U. S. 126,
273 U. S. 130;
Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U. S.
23,
309 U. S.
26.
[
Footnote 17]
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dennis,
224 U. S. 503;
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286,
264 U. S. 291;
Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600,
294 U. S.
607.
[
Footnote 18]
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.
S. 445,
174 U. S. 478;
Freeborn v.
Smith, 2 Wall. 160,
69 U. S.
174.
[
Footnote 19]
Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca,
248 U. S. 9,
248 U. S. 21.
[
Footnote 20]
United States v. Chambers, 291 U.
S. 217,
291 U. S.
222.
[
Footnote 21]
We have applied the rule enunciated in the case of
Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, that
state law, as determined by the state's highest court, is to be
followed as a rule of decision in the federal courts, to
determinations by state intermediate appellate courts.
West v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., ante, p.
311 U. S. 223;
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, ante, p.
311 U. S. 169;
Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District,
ante, p.
311 U. S. 180;
Stoner v. New York Life Insurance Co., ante, p.
311 U. S. 464.