A municipal ordinance making it unlawful for any person to carry
or display any sign, banner or badge in the vicinity of any place
of business for the purpose of inducing others to refrain from
buying or working there, or for any person to "loiter" or "picket"
in the vicinity of any place of business for such purpose
held unconstitutional upon the authority of
Thornhill
v. Alabama, ante, p.
310 U. S. 88.
Reversed.
Page 310 U. S. 107
Appeal from the affirmance of a conviction and sentence under an
anti-picketing ordinance.
Page 310 U. S. 109
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether regulations embodied in
a municipal ordinance abridge the freedom of speech or of the press
secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 2 of an ordinance of Shasta County, California,
provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, in or upon any public
street, highway, sidewalk, alley or other public place in the
County of Shasta, California, to loiter in front of, or in the
vicinity of, or to picket in front of, or in the vicinity of, or to
carry, show or display any banner, transparency, badge or sign in
front of, or in the vicinity of, any works, or factory, or any
place of business or employment, for the purpose of inducing or
influencing, or attempting to induce or influence, any person to
refrain from entering any such works, or factory, or place of
business, or employment, or for the purpose of inducing or
influencing, or attempting to induce or influence, any person to
refrain from purchasing or using any goods, wares, merchandise, or
other articles, manufactured, made or kept for sale therein, or for
the purpose of inducing or influencing, or attempting to induce or
influence, any person to refrain from doing or performing any
service or labor in any works, factory, place of business or
employment, or for the purpose of intimidating, threatening or
coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten or coerce any
person who is performing, seeking or obtaining service or labor in
any such works, factory, place of business or employment. [
Footnote 2] "
Page 310 U. S. 110
Appellant was one of a group of twenty-nine men engaged in
"picketing" on U.S. Highway 99 in front of the Delta Tunnel Project
in Shasta County.
"The picketing consisted of walking (on the edge of the highway
nearest the project) a distance of 50 to 100 feet in a general
northerly direction, then turning around and retracing steps and
continuing as before . . . ; all of the walking in connection with
the picketing . . . was done off the paved portion of the highway
and on the graveled portion of the right-of-way -- that is, on
public property."
Some of the pickets carried signs, similar to those described in
the margin, [
Footnote 3] in
such a manner that workers on the project and persons going along
the highway in either direction could read them. The sign carried
by appellant bore the legend: "This job is unfair to CIO." These
activities occurred between the hours of 7:30 and 9:00 a.m. During
this period, vehicles and persons passed freely without any
molestation or interference through the picket line from the
highway to the project and from the project to the highway, and the
traffic of persons and automobiles along the highway was not
obstructed. Appellant did not threaten or intimidate or coerce
anyone, did not make any loud noises at any time, and was peaceful
and orderly in his demeanor. The
Page 310 U. S. 111
pickets committed no acts of violence, and there was no breach
of the peace.
The County officers arrested appellant and charged that he
did
"loiter, picket, and display signs and banners in a public place
and in and upon a public highway in front of, and in the vicinity
of the Delta Tunnel Project . . . for the purpose of inducing and
influencing persons to refrain from doing and performing services
and labor"
at the project in violation of the ordinance. The Justice's
Court of Township Number Nine found him "guilty of violating the
Shasta County Anti-Picketing Law," rendered judgment accordingly,
and imposed sentence. The Superior Court of Shasta County affirmed
the judgment. That court upheld the ordinance, over appellant's
claim of unconstitutionality, on the authority of a prior decision.
[
Footnote 4] The case comes
here on appeal. [
Footnote
5]
Our decision in
Thornhill v. Alabama, ante, p.
310 U. S. 88, goes
far toward settling the issues presented here. Under that decision,
Section 2 of the ordinance in question is to be judged upon its
face. [
Footnote 6]
Section 2, on its face, declares it unlawful for any person to
carry or display any sign or banner or badge in the vicinity of any
place of business for the purpose of inducing or attempting to
induce any person to refrain from purchasing merchandise or
performing services or labor. It likewise makes it unlawful for any
person to loiter or
Page 310 U. S. 112
picket in the vicinity of any place of business for a similar
purpose. The terms "loiter" and "picket" are not defined either in
the ordinance or in authoritative State decisions. Therefore, they
must be judged as covering all the activities embraced by the
prohibition against the carrying of signs in the vicinity of a
labor dispute for the purpose mentioned. [
Footnote 7] The ordinance does not proscribe the
carrying of signs in other places or for the purpose of inducing or
attempting to induce others to adopt courses of action not related
to labor disputes. It contains no exceptions with respect to the
truthfulness and restraint of the information conveyed or the
number of persons engaged in the activity. It is true that the
ordinance requires proof of a purpose to persuade others not to buy
merchandise or perform services. Such a purpose could be found in
the case of nearly every person engaged in publicizing the facts of
a labor dispute; every employee or member of a union who engaged in
such activity in the vicinity of a place of business could be found
desirous of accomplishing such objectives; disinterested persons
(who might be hired to carry signs) appear to be a possible, but
unlikely, exception. [
Footnote
8] In brief, the ordinance does not regulate all carrying of
signs, but, on the contrary, proscribes the carrying of signs only
if by persons directly interested who approach the vicinity of a
labor dispute to convey information about the dispute.
The sweeping and inexact terms of the ordinance disclose the
threat to freedom of speech inherent in its existence. It cannot be
thought to differ in any material respect from the statute held
void in
Thornhill's case. The carrying of signs and
banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a natural and
appropriate means of conveying
Page 310 U. S. 113
information on matters of public concern.
Stromberg v.
California, 283 U. S. 359. For
the reasons set forth in our opinion in
Thornhill v. Alabama,
supra, publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful
way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of
mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of
communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgment by a state.
The power and duty of the State to take adequate steps to
preserve the peace and protect the privacy, the lives, and the
property of its residents cannot be doubted. But the ordinance in
question here abridges liberty of discussion under circumstances
presenting no clear and present danger of substantive evils within
the allowable area of State control.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS is of opinion that the judgment below
should be affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"It is also well settled that municipal ordinances adopted under
state authority constitute state action, and are within the
prohibition of the amendment."
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444,
303 U. S. 450;
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 1 declares that it shall be unlawful for any person
"to make any loud or unusual noise, or to speak in a loud or
unusual tone, or to cry out or proclaim, for the purposes of
inducing or influencing, or attempting to induce or influence, any
person"
to refrain from entering, or purchasing merchandise from, or
performing any service in, any place of business. The State did not
charge that this section was violated.
[
Footnote 3]
Four signs were admitted in evidence as typical. They were of
white cardboard, approximately 14 x 22 inches in size, and were
tacked upon a stick some 34 inches long, 1 1/2 inches wide and 1/4
inch thick. Black painted letters, ranging in size from 1 1/2
inches to 5 inches in height, spelled out one of the following
legends on each sign: "Don't be a scab," "Shasta Tunnel and
Construction Workers Local #260," "CIO Picket Line," "This job
unfair to CIO."
[
Footnote 4]
Appellant, prior to trial, moved to dismiss the complaint upon a
number of grounds, among which was the contention that § 2 of the
ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment in abridging his
"freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly." The
same objections were raised by demurrer, by further motions to
dismiss the complaint, and by motion in arrest of judgment.
[
Footnote 5]
There is no further appeal allowed in the State courts.
[
Footnote 6]
We do not decide whether, in view of the separability provision
(§ 3), the State courts might cull out from § 2 particular clauses
which, standing alone, could be sustained.
[
Footnote 7]
See Thornhill v. Alabama, ante, p.
310 U. S. 88, n.
18.
[
Footnote 8]
Even they would be covered under a construction making purpose
synonymous with intent.
See Thornhill v. Alabama, ante, p.
310 U. S. 100,
n. 17.