The decisions of the Court in the case of
Carver v.
Astor, 4 Pet. 1, and in
Crane v. Morris,
ante, 31 U. S. 598,
affirmed.
No court is bound, at the mere instance of the party, to repeat
over to the jury the same substantial proposition of law in every
variety of form which the ingenuity of counsel may suggest. It is
sufficient if it is once laid down in an intelligible and
unexceptionable manner.
Prima facie evidence of a fact is such evidence as in
judgment of law is sufficient to establish the fact and if not
rebutted remains sufficient for the purpose. The jury is bound to
consider it in that light unless it is invested with authority to
disregard the rules of evidence by which the liberty and estate of
every citizen are guarded and supported. No judge would hesitate to
set aside its verdict and grant a new trial if, under such
circumstances, without any rebutting evidence, it disregards it. It
would be error on its part which would require the remedial
interposition of the court. In a legal sense, then, such
prima
facie evidence, in the absence of all controlling evidence or
discrediting circumstances, becomes conclusive of the fact -- that
is, it should operate upon the minds of the jury as decisive to
found their verdict as to the fact. Such are understood to be the
clear principles of law on this subject.
The pleadings and the facts in this case, with the addition of
those particularly noticed in the opinion of the Court, were the
same with those in the preceding case of
Crane v.
Jackson.
On the trial in the circuit court, after both parties had closed
their proofs, the counsel for the defendant submitted to the
circuit court the following points in writing on the question of a
delivery of the settlement deed, upon which points the said counsel
prayed the circuit court to charge and instruct the jury as matters
of law arising upon the proofs and allegations of the parties.
I. It was necessary to the validity of the deed that it
should
Page 31 U. S. 623
have passed into the hands of the trustees or some person for
them, with intent that it should take effect as a conveyance.
2. Roger Morris was a grantor, or stood in the character of a
grantor in that deed.
3. The possession by Morris of one part of the deed does not in
itself furnish any evidence of a delivery.
II. The fact the Morris and wife were in possession of the land
before the Revolution, taking the rents and profits, is not in
itself any evidence either for or against the validity of the deed,
because they were entitled to the possession, whether the deed was
delivered or not.
(2) The holding from the marriage to the attainder cannot be
said to have been under the settlement deed until it is first
ascertained that the deed had been delivered.
III. The evidence arising from the proof of the deed by William
Livingston is no more conclusive upon the question of a delivery of
the deed than that arising from proof of the handwriting and death
of the subscribing witnesses.
(2) In either case, it is only
prima facie evidence, or
evidence from which a delivery may be presumed, and may be rebutted
by direct or circumstantial evidence which raises a contrary
presumption.
(3) The evidence of a delivery, arising from the proof of the
deed by William Livingston and the proof of the handwriting and
death of the subscribing witnesses is only presumptive evidence,
and may be rebutted by evidence of the same character.
IV. In the absence of any direct evidence that the trustees or
any other person for them ever had the deed, and the possession
being equivocal in its character, the fact that the deed came out
of the hands of Morris in 1787 is sufficient of itself to rebut any
presumption of a delivery arising from the proof of the deed by
William Livingston or the proof of the handwriting and death of the
subscribing witnesses.
(2) If not sufficient of itself to destroy any presumption of a
delivery, it is, at the least, evidence against a delivery, to be
considered and weighed by the jury.
V. If the jury, from the evidence, believe that the deed was
signed and sealed on the day of its date, and that all William
Livingston and Sarah Williams witnessed was what took
Page 31 U. S. 624
place at that time, and that the deed was not delivered before
the execution of the Beekman deed on 18 January, 1758, then there
is no evidence of a delivery.
(2) If the jury, from the evidence, believe that the deed was
signed, sealed, and witnessed on the day of its date, and that it
was not delivered before 18 January, 1758, then there is no
evidence of a delivery.
VI. The acts and omissions of Morris and wife, so far as they go
to induce the belief that the deed was not perfected by a delivery,
are of the same force and effect against the children and their
grantee as they would be against Morris and wife themselves.
VII. Although the deeds to Hill, Merrit, and Rhodes would in law
be a good execution of the power contained in the settlement deed,
supposing it to have been duly delivered, yet upon the question
whether that deed was or was not perfected by a delivery, those
deeds are competent evidence from which the jury are to judge
whether Morris and wife acted as tenants for life or as the owners
of the land in fee.
VIII. The evidence upon the one side or the other should not be
submitted to the jury as
prima facie or presumptive
evidence either for or against a delivery, but the jury should
consider and weigh the whole evidence together, and from the whole
determine whether or not the deed was delivered. And thereupon,
after the said cause had been summed up to the jury by the counsel
for both parties, the opinion and decision of the said circuit
court upon the said several points was delivered in substance as
follows, to-wit:
Upon the first point, the circuit court gave the instruction
therein prayed for to the jury.
Upon the second branch of the first point, the circuit court
refused to give the instruction as prayed, saying that, strictly
speaking, Morris could neither be considered as grantor or grantee
in the settlement deed, and therefore the mere possession of the
deed by him was no affirmative proof on either side as to the fact
of delivery, to which decision of the circuit court the counsel for
the defendant then and there on the trial also excepted.
Upon the second point, the circuit court gave the instruction
therein prayed for to the jury.
Page 31 U. S. 625
Upon the second branch of the said second point, the circuit
court overruled and refused to give the instruction therein prayed
for to the jury, to which said decision and opinion of the circuit
court, the counsel for the defendant then and there on the said
trial also excepted.
Upon the third point and the second and third branches of the
same, the circuit court gave the instruction therein prayed for to
the jury.
Upon the fourth point, the circuit court overruled and refused
to give the instruction therein prayed for to the jury, to which
said opinion and decision of the said circuit court the counsel for
the defendant then and there on the said trial also excepted.
Upon the second branch of the said fourth point, the circuit
court overruled and refused to give the instruction therein prayed
for to the jury, the court considering Morris technically neither
grantor nor grantee, and therefore the mere possession of the deed
by Morris was no affirmative evidence either for or against the
fact of delivery, to which said decision and opinion of the said
circuit court the counsel for the defendant then and there on the
said trial also excepted.
Upon the fifth point, the said circuit court overruled and
refused to give the instruction therein prayed for to the jury, to
which said decision and opinion of the said circuit court, the
counsel for the defendant, then and there, on the said trial, also
excepted.
Upon the second branch of the said fifth point, the said circuit
court overruled and refused to give the instruction therein prayed
for to the jury, to which said decision and opinion of the said
circuit court the counsel for the defendant then and there on the
said trial also excepted.
Upon the sixth point, the said circuit court gave the
instruction therein prayed for to the jury.
Upon the seventh point, the said circuit court gave the
instruction following:
"Although the deeds to Hill, Merritt, and Rhodes would in law be
a good execution of the power contained in the settlement deed,
supposing it to have been duly delivered, yet, upon the question
whether that deed was or was not perfected by a delivery, those
deeds are competent evidence from which the jury are to judge
whether Morris and
Page 31 U. S. 626
his wife acted under the settlement deed or as the owners of the
land in fee, independent of the settlement deed, to which said
decision and opinion of the said circuit court the counsel for the
defendant then and there on the said trial also excepted."
Upon the eighth point, the said circuit court overruled and
refused to give the instruction therein prayed for to the jury and
refused to submit the question of a delivery of the deed to the
jury in the manner or upon the principles stated in the eighth
point, and said that the plaintiff had given
prima facie
evidence in support of his case, and such as was conclusive if
uncontradicted, and that this must be contradicted or disproved by
controlling evidence on the part of the defendant, or the plaintiff
was entitled to recover, to which said opinion and decision of the
said circuit court the counsel for the defendant then and there on
the said trial also excepted.
Page 31 U. S. 628
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Many of the questions arising in this case have been disposed of
in the judgment already pronounced in the case of
Crane v.
Jackson upon the demise of the same parties, the
title and evidence being in each case substantially the same. It
will be necessary, therefore, to examine into those objections only
to the ruling of the circuit court at the trial which are presented
by the bill of exceptions taken by the defendant (now plaintiff in
error), and which have not been decided in the other case.
The first objection is to the refusal of the court to instruct
the jury that "Roger Morris was a grantor, or stood in the
character of a grantor in that [the settlement] deed." This is but
a slight variation in form from the point presented in the case of
Crane v. Jackson, and the instruction given by the court,
"that the mere possession of the deed by Morris was no affirmative
proof on either side of the fact of delivery" has been already
fully considered.
The next objection is to the refusal of the court to instruct
the jury that
"The holding from the marriage settlement to the attainder,
cannot be said to have been under the settlement deed until it was
first ascertained that the deed had been delivered."
This instruction was certainly proper in itself to have been
given if it had not been already substantially given in the other
instructions, and if the court had given this reason for the
refusal, there would not have been the slightest difficulty in
maintaining it, for no court is bound at the mere instance of the
party to repeat over to the jury the same substantial proportion of
law in every variety of form which the ingenuity of counsel may
suggest. It is sufficient if it is once laid down in an
intelligible and unexceptionable manner. The instruction here asked
and refused was but a branch of the next preceding instruction
prayed for (which covered the whole ground), and is so put by the
defendant. The latter asserted that
"the fact that Morris and wife were in possession of the land
before the Revolution, taking the rents and profits, is not of
itself any evidence for or against the validity
Page 31 U. S. 629
of the deed, because they were entitled to the possession,
whether the deed was delivered or not."
This instruction was given by the court, and the jury had been
previously instructed that it was necessary to the validity of the
deed that it should have passed into the hands of the trustees, or
of some person for them, with intent that it should take effect as
a conveyance. Indeed, the whole controversy between the parties
turned upon the question of the delivery of the settlement deed, as
the tenor of every instruction asked abundantly shows, and
therefore it was necessarily implied in every step that there could
be no holding or possession under the deed, if it was never
delivered. It appears to us, then, that no injustice has been done
to the defendant by refusing to give the instruction prayed, since,
in a more general form, it had been already given.
The next objection is to the refusal of the court to instruct
the jury first that
"In the absence of any direct evidence that the trustees, or any
other person for them, ever had the settlement deed, and the
possession being equivocal in its character, the fact that it came
out of the hands of Morris in 1787 is sufficient of itself to rebut
any presumption of a delivery arising from the proof of the deed by
William Livingston, or the proof of the handwriting and death of
the subscribing witnesses,"
and
"secondly, that if not sufficient of itself to destroy any
presumption of a delivery, it is at least evidence against a
delivery to be considered and weighed by the jury."
The court gave as a reason for refusing this second branch that
Morris was
"technically neither grantor nor grantee, and therefore the mere
possession of the deed by Morris was no affirmative evidence either
for or against the fact of delivery."
This instruction has been already disposed of. The other
instruction varies from that in the case of
Crane v.
Jackson merely in substituting the words "direct evidence" for
"all proof," and the words "and the possession being equivocal in
its character" for "and there being no proof of a holding under
it." It is obnoxious to the same objection which was relied upon in
that case, for it called upon the court to express an opinion upon
the nature, weight, and effect of the evidence before the jury,
which was no part of its duty. And the whole evidence being before
the jury, it was
Page 31 U. S. 630
their exclusive right to decide for themselves upon its credit
and cogency.
The next objection is to the admission of an extract from the
journal of the Assembly of the State of New York for the year 1787,
as follows. February 24, 1787.
"Mr. Hamilton, from the committee to whom was referred the
petition of Johanna Morris, on behalf of herself and the other
children of Roger Morris and Mary his wife, setting forth that the
said Roger and Mary had been attainted, and their estates sold and
conveyed in fee simple; that by a settlement made previous to their
intermarriage, the real estate of the said Mary was vested in
Johanna Philipse and Beverley Robinson in fee to certain uses,
among others, after the decease of the said Roger and Mary, to the
use of such child or children as they should have between them and
their heirs and assigns, and praying a law to restore to them the
remainder of the said estate in fee, reported that if the facts
stated in such petition are true, the ordinary course of law is
competent to the relief of the petitioners, and that it is
unnecessary for the legislature to interfere. Resolved, that the
house do concur with the committee in the said report."
It was objected first that the journal of the proceedings in
question was not legal or competent evidence against the defendant,
and secondly not so without producing the petition mentioned in the
journal. But the objections were overruled and the evidence
admitted.
Now if the evidence was admissible for any purpose, the
objections were rightly overruled. It did not appear to have been
offered as proof of any of the facts stated in the petition, but
simply of the public legislative proceedings on the very claim and
title now set up by the children of Morris at the early period of
1787. There were two points of view in which the evidence might be
important in the actual posture of the case before the jury. In the
first place, it might be important to repel the notion that the
claim of the children of Morris asserted in the present suit was
stale, and founded upon a dormant deed, never brought forward until
a very great lapse of time after its pretended execution, a
circumstance which might essentially bear upon the fact of its
having ever been delivered and acted upon as a valid instrument. In
the
Page 31 U. S. 631
next place, it might add strength to the probate of the deed by
governor Livingston, as his attention could scarcely fail of being
called to such public proceedings, occurring at so short a period
as within two months before the time of that probate. If his
attention was called to these proceedings, the circumstance that
the title was about to become a
lis mota would naturally
produce an increased caution and a more anxious desire to recall
with perfect accuracy every fact essential to the probate of the
deed. It has been asserted at the bar that these were the very
objects for which the extract from the journal was offered, and we
cannot say that for such purposes it was not properly admissible.
If any improper use as evidence was attempted to be made of it, it
might have easily been restrained to its appropriate use by an
application to the court. The objections, then, to its admission
being general, and it being already admissible for some purposes,
the decision of the court was unexceptionable.
The next objection is that the court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury that
"The evidence upon the one side or the other should not be
submitted to the jury as
prima facie or presumptive
evidence, either for or against a delivery, but the jury should
consider and weigh the whole evidence together, and from the whole
determine whether or not the deed was delivered,"
and in instructing the jury upon that prayer
"That the plaintiff had given
prima facie evidence in
support of his case, and such as was conclusive if uncontradicted,
and that this must be contradicted or disproved by controlling
evidence on the part of the defendant, or the plaintiff is entitled
to recover."
The instruction prayed for and refused is precisely the same as
exists in the case of
Crane v. Jackson, and it is
unnecessary to do more than to refer to the opinion there given for
the reasons why this Court deems the refusal entirely correct. In
regard to the instruction actually given, we do not perceive any
solid ground upon which it can be adjudged erroneous. It was given
as a response to the instruction asked by the defendant on the
great hinge of the controversy, the question as to the delivery of
the settlement deed. In a preceding instruction which the court had
given to the jury upon the application of the defendant himself,
the probate of the deed by Governor Livingston before Judge
Page 31 U. S. 632
Hobart was treated as
prima facie evidence of a
delivery. It was there stated that the probate was
"only
prima facie evidence, or evidence from which a
delivery may be presumed, and may be rebutted by direct or
circumstantial evidence, which raises a contrary presumption."
Is it not plain, then, that if not so rebutted, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover? What is
prima facie evidence of a
fact? It is such as, in judgment of law, is sufficient to establish
the fact, and if not rebutted, remains sufficient for the purpose.
The jury is bound to consider it in that light unless they are
invested with authority to disregard the rules of evidence, by
which the liberty and estate of every citizen are guarded and
supported. No judge would hesitate to set aside its verdict and
grant a new trial if, under such circumstances, without any
rebutting evidence, it disregards it. It would be error on its part
which would require the remedial interposition of the court. In a
legal sense, then, such
prima facie evidence, in the
absence of all controlling evidence or discrediting circumstances,
becomes conclusive of the fact -- that is, it should operate upon
the minds of the jury as decisive to found its verdict as to the
fact. Such we understand to be the clear principles of law on this
subject. The very point in this very aspect occurred in the case of
Carver v.
Jackson, 4 Pet. 1, where the Court, speaking of the
probate of this very deed, used the following language (p.
29 U. S. 82).
"We are of opinion that under these circumstances, and according
to the laws of New York, there was sufficient
prima facie
evidence of the due execution of the indenture, by which we mean
not merely the signing and sealing, but the delivery also, to
justify the court in admitting it to be read to the jury, and that
in the absence of all controlling evidence, the jury would have
been bound to find that it was only executed. We understand such to
be the uniform construction of the laws of New York in all cases
where the execution of any deed has been so proved, and has been
subsequently recorded. The oath of a subscribing witness before the
proper magistrate, and the subsequent registration are deemed
sufficient
prima facie evidence to establish its delivery
as a deed. The objection was not indeed seriously pressed at the
argument."
We have seen no reason, upon the present argument, to be
Page 31 U. S. 633
dissatisfied with the opinion thus expressed. It appears to us
to be founded in principles of law which cannot be shaken without
undermining the great securities of titles to estates. The circuit
court, in its instruction, did no more than express the same
opinion in language of the same substantial import.
Upon the whole, upon a careful review of the case, we are of
opinion that the judgment of the circuit court ought to be
Affirmed with costs.
MR. JUSTICE BALDWIN dissented in writing.
The opinion of MR. JUSTICE BALDWIN was not delivered to the
reporter.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
for the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York and was argued by counsel, on consideration
whereof it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment
of the said circuit court be and the same is hereby affirmed with
costs.
