Boardman v. Lessees of Reed and Ford
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31 U.S. 328 (1832)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Boardman v. Lessees of Reed and Ford, 31 U.S. 6 Pet. 328 328 (1832)
Boardman v. Lessees of Reed and Ford
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 328
In an ejectment, a witness was called to prove that a peon who was dead had, at a former trial between the plaintiff and some the defendants to recover the land in controversy, sworn that an anciently marked corner tree was found by him at a particular point of a different kind of timber from that called for in a patent to one Young. No part of the survey of Young was involved in the controversy in this suit, and with several other surveys it was only laid down by the surveyor as by showing certain connections, it might conduce to identify the land claimed by the plaintiffs. As the evidence was not given between the same parties, this testimony could only be received as hearsay, and was not admissible.
That boundaries may be proved by hearsay testimony is a rule well settled and the necessity or propriety of which is not now questioned. Some difference of opinion may exist as to the application of this rule, but there is none as to its legal force.
Landmarks are frequently found of perishable materials which pass away with the generation in which they are made. By the improvement of the country and from other causes, they are often destroyed. It is therefore important in many cases that hearsay or reputation should be received to establish ancient boundaries. But such testimony must be pertinent and material to the issue between the parties. If it have no relation to the subject or if it refer to a fact which is immaterial to the point of inquiry, it ought not to be admitted.
In an ejectment for land in the State of Virginia, the District Court for the Western District of Virginia instructed the jury
"That the grant to the plaintiffs which was given in evidence was a complete appropriation of the land therein described, and vested in the patentee the title, and that any defects in the preliminary steps by which it was acquired were cured by the grant."
By the court:
"There can be no doubt of the correctness of this instruction. This Court has repeatedly decided that no facts behind the patent can be investigated. A court of law has concurrent jurisdiction with a court of equity in matters of fraud, but the defect of an entry or survey cannot be taken advantage of at law. The patent appropriates the land and gives the legal title to the patentee. "
Titles acquired under sales for taxes depend upon different principles: where an individual claims land under a tax sale, he must show that the substantial requisites of the law have been observed. But this is never necessary where the claim rests on a patent from the commonwealth. The preliminary steps may be investigated in chancery when an elder equitable right is asserted, but this cannot be done at law.
If the grant appropriates the land, it is only necessary for the person who claims under it to identify the land called for. Whether the entry was made in legal form or the survey was executed agreeably to the calls of the entry are not matters which can be examined at law. When, from the evidence, the existence of a certain fact may be doubtful, either from want of certainty in the
proof or by reason of conflicting evidence, a court may be called upon to give instructions in reference to supposable facts. But this a court is never bound to do where the facts are clear and uncontradicted.
That certain calls in a patent may be explained, or controlled by other calls was settled by this Court in the case of Stringer's Lessee v. Young, 3 Pet. 320. If the point had not been so adjudged, it would he too clear on general principles to admit of serious doubt.
The entire description of the patent must be taken and the identity of the land ascertained by a reasonable construction of the language used. If there be a repugnant call which by the other calls of the patent clearly appears to have been made through mistake, that does not make void the patent. But if the land granted be so inaccurately described as to render its identity wholly uncertain, it is admitted that the grant is void.
The meaning of the parties to written instruments must be ascertained by the tenor of the writing, and not by looking at a part of it, and if a latent ambiguity arises from the language used, it may be explained by parol.
An entry of land in a county which is afterwards divided does not, after the division, authorize a survey in the original county if the land falls within the new county.
This was an ejectment brought in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia by the defendants in error against the plaintiffs in error for the recovery of eight thousand acres of land in the now County of Lewis, within the said district. The premises in question are parcel of a large connection of surveys made together for Reed and Ford for Thomas Laidley and John Young and others -- some in the name of one and some in the names of others of the owners. The whole connection of surveys is represented by the connected diagram made out and reported by the surveyor of Harrison County pursuant to an order made in the cause and appearing in the record. On that diagram the premises in question are particularly represented.
The plaintiffs below counted on a number of separate demises from the defendants in error; all of which were stated on the record as having been made by citizens of Pennsylvania, on 1 January, 1820.
On the trial, the defendants below tendered the following bill of exceptions:
"Upon the trial of this cause, a draft and report returned by a surveyor in obedience to an order of survey made in this cause, was given in evidence to the jury, which draft and
report are in the words following, viz., [setting out the same]. The plaintiff, in order to show the title of the lessors to the land in controversy, represented by the red lines on said draft, gave in evidence the patent under which they claim, in these words, viz., [setting out the same]. This patent is dated 9 May, 1786. It was issued to Messrs 'Reed and Ford,' and describes the lands thus, i.e.,"
"a certain tract or parcel of land containing eight thousand acres, by survey bearing date 23 December, 1784, lying and being in the County of Monongalia, near a large branch of French Creek adjoining lands of George Jackson on the south side and bounded as follows, to-wit: beginning at a maple, and running thence S. 10 E. one thousand poles to a poplar; S. 80 W. one thousand two hundred and eighty poles to a W. oak; No. 10 E. one thousand poles to two white oaks; N. 80 S. one thousand two hundred and eighty poles to the beginning."
The bill of exceptions then states that the plaintiffs, for the purpose of showing the identity of the land in controversy with the land granted by said patent, gave in evidence a copy of the plat and certificate of survey on which the said patent is founded, and the plats and certificates of survey of the various other tracts represented on said draft. After the plat and certificates had been given in evidence, the copies of the entries on which the said surveys were founded, were also given in evidence.
It appeared from the parol evidence introduced in order to identify the land in controversy that the same, at the date of the patent under which the lessors claim, and at the date of the said plat and certificate of survey on which the said patent is founded, was situate in the County of Harrison, and not in the County of Monongalia, as stated in the patent and certificate of survey, but that the said land, at the date of the entry on which the survey was founded, was in the County of Monongalia, and became part of the County of Harrison by virtue of the act of assembly establishing the County of Harrison. The act of assembly is dated 8 May, 1784, and took effect 20 July of the same year.
The bill of exceptions further states that evidence was relied on on the part of the defendants for the purpose of proving that the various marked lines represented by the said draft and report of the surveyor and claimed by the plaintiff to be lines
of the land in controversy and of various other tracts designated on the said draft were not actually run or marked as lines of the land in controversy, and of the other tracts aforesaid, but had been run and marked by Henry Fink, a deputy surveyor of Monongalia, but who then resided in the County of Harrison, with a view of laying off the greater part of the country represented on said draft into surveys of about one thousand acres each; that he was employed and paid for that purpose by the persons for whom the said plats and certificates of survey were afterwards made; that after said lines had been so marked and run, the said plats and certificates were made out by protraction, not by the said Henry Fink, but by some other person or persons not authorized by law; that said plats and certificates of survey were never recorded in the surveyor's office of Monongalia County nor there filed, but were surreptitiously returned to the register's office and patents obtained thereon. It was contended on the part of the defendants that the marked lines represented on said draft as lines of the lands in controversy were not the lines thereof, and that the evidence in the cause did not justify the jury in regarding them as such in preference to other marked lines represented on said draft. Evidence was given on the part of the plaintiffs that the marked lines aforesaid were actually run and marked by said Fink as lines of the said eight thousand acres and of the various other tracts represented upon said draft, and that plats and certificates of survey were made out by him in conformity with the lines so run and marked and were by him delivered to the agent of the patentees, who gave them to the principal surveyor to be recorded, who afterwards delivered the same to the patentees, who returned them to the land office, on which plats and certificates so returned patents issued, and copies of which are before recited. It was further contended on the part of the defendants that the land in controversy was not embraced within the calls of the patent under which the lessors claim; that the natural objects, lines, and adjacent lands called for in said patent were not those represented on said draft, in designating thereupon the land in controversy, and that the marked lines represented on said draft as the lines, of the land in controversy, were, in fact, the lines, not of the plat and certificate of survey on which the plaintiffs' patent issued, but of other plats and
certificates of survey, and that there are no calls in said patent justifying the locating said patent on the lands in controversy, as contended for by the plaintiffs. For the purpose of identifying the said land in controversy with that granted by the said patent, parol and other evidence was introduced by the plaintiffs, in order to establish several marked trees as corners of other tracts represented on said draft -- the boundaries of which tracts, it was contended, tended to establish the identity of the lands in controversy, with that granted by said patent. For the purpose of showing that one of said marked trees was not a corner of one of said tracts; that is to say, was not the corner on the said draft represented by the letter A, as a corner of John Young's four thousand acres; the counsel of the defendants offered to introduce a witness to prove, that on the trial of a former action of ejectment, brought by the present lessors of the plaintiff against some of the present defendants, to recover the lands now in controversy, a witness, who is since dead, swore that an ancient marked corner tree was found by him at said point A, of a different kind of timber form that called for in Young's patent, but the evidence aforesaid was rejected by the court as inadmissible.
After the evidence had been closed and the cause had been argued before the jury, the plaintiffs' counsel moved the court to give the following instructions to the jury, to-wit, that the grant aforesaid was a complete appropriation of the land therein described, and vested in the patentee the title; and that any defects in the preliminary steps by which it was acquired, were cured by the emanation of the said patent. The said counsel further moved the court to instruct the jury that the said grant is a title from its date, and is conclusive against all the world, except those deriving title under a previous grant; and further, that it does not affect the validity of the patent, if it should appear that the entry on which the plaintiffs' survey was made, contained other or different lands from that actually surveyed.
After the above instructions had been moved for by the plaintiffs' counsel, the counsel for the defendants moved the court to give to the jury the following instructions, to-wit:
"1. The name of the county being mentioned in the plaintiffs' patent, as that in which the lands thereby granted were
situated, the plaintiff is not at liberty to prove by parol that the land was, in fact, in a different county."
"2. As the patent states the lands to lie in the County of Monongalia, the patentees and those claiming title under them, can only recover lands in that county, and cannot, by force of the other terms of description contained in the patent, recover lands lying in the County of Harrison at the date of the patent."
"3. It appearing from the plat and certificate of survey on which the patent is founded, that the survey thereby evidenced was made in the County of Monongalia, and it appearing, from the evidence introduced on the part of the plaintiffs to identify the said land, that it was situated, at the time of the survey, in the County of Harrison; the patent is void because the survey was made without lawful authority."
"4. If various marked lines are found corresponding with the same calls in the patent, the mere coincidence of anyone of those marked lines with the calls of the patent, does not establish that line as one of the lines called for in the patent."
"5. If there are no calls in the patent, justifying the location of the land granted, as contended for by the plaintiffs, they cannot succeed in establishing their claim by relying upon extrinsic evidence."
"6. Proof that the land claimed in this action was surveyed for the patentees, by evidence contradicting the calls of the patent, does not establish the right of the patentees and of those claiming under them to the lands claimed as aforesaid."
"7. An entry in a county which is afterwards divided, does not, after the division, authorize a survey in the original county, if the land falls into the new county."
The parties respectively objected to the instructions moved for. The instructions moved for by the plaintiffs, were given by the court. All those required by the defendants were refused, except the first, which was modified by the court and delivered to the jury in the following terms:
"If a land warrant be entered in the office of the surveyor of a particular county, and before the same be surveyed, the territory in which the land located lies, shall be erected into a new county, and the survey and grant afterwards affected, describe the lands to be situated in the former county, the grant is not void and the plaintiffs may show by parol evidence extrinsic of the grant,
and not inconsistent with its other descriptive calls, that the land lies within the new county."
The exceptions were taken to the rejection of the testimony offered respecting the corner at A, and to the instructions given as moved for by the plaintiffs, and the rejection of those moved for the defendants.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, for the lands in the declaration mentioned and described in the plat and report of Thomas Haymond, made in pursuance of an order of court made in the cause. On this verdict, judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs below, defendants in error, and this writ of error is brought to reverse that judgment.