The case of
Patton's Lessee v.
Easton, 1 Wheat. 276, and
Powell's Lessee v.
Green, 2 Pet. 240, as to the statutes of
limitations of Tennessee overruled.
In the case of
Patton's Lessee v. Easton, this Court,
after examining the provisions of the statute of limitations of
Tennessee in reference to a peaceable possession of land for seven
years by virtue of a grant or deed of conveyance founded upon a
grant and no legal claim by suit set up to the lands, say "this
question, too, has at length been decided in the Supreme Court for
the State of Tennessee, which have settled the construction of the
act of 1797." It has been decided that a possession of seven years
is a bar only when held "under a grant or a deed founded on a
grant." "The deed must be connected with the grant. This Court
concurs in that opinion." The two cases to which the court referred
were decided in 1805, and the court considered that they settled
the construction of the act of 1797. But it is now made to appear
that these decisions were made under such circumstances that they
were never considered in the State of Tennessee as fully settling
the construction of the act. The question was frequently raised
before the Supreme Court of Tennessee, but the construction of the
two statutes of limitations was never considered as finally settled
until 1828, when the case of
Gray and Reeder v. Darby's
Lessee was decided. In that case it has been adjudged that it
is not necessary to entitle an individual to the benefit of the
statutes that he should show a connected
title, either legal or equitable. That if he prove an adverse
possession, under a deed, of seven years before suit is brought,
and show that the land has been granted, he brings himself within
the statutes. Since this decision, the law has been considered!
settled in Tennessee, and there has been so general an acquiescence
in all the courts of the state, that the point is not now raised or
discussed. As it appears to this Court, that the construction of
the statutes of limitations of Tennessee is now well settled,
different from what was supposed to be the rule at the time this
Court decided the case of
Patton's Lessee v. Easton, and
the case of
Powell's Lessee v. Green, and as the
instructions of the circuit court of Tennessee were governed by
these decisions, and not by the settled law of the state, the
judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further
proceedings.
This Court has uniformly adopted the decisions of the state
tribunals, respectively, in the construction of their statutes.
This has been done as a matter of principle in all cases where the
decision of a state court has become a rule of property.
In a great majority of the causes brought before the federal
tribunals, they are called on to enforce the laws of the states.
The rights of parties are determined under these laws, and it would
be strange perversion of principle if the judicial exposition of
these laws by the state tribunals should be disregarded. These
expositions constitute the law, and fix the rule of property.
Rights are acquired under this rule, and it regulates all the
transactions which come within its scope.
On all questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the
Union, this
Page 31 U. S. 292
Court may exercise a revising power, and its decisions are final
and obligatory, on all other judicial tribunals, state as well as
federal. A state tribunal has a right to examine any such
questions, and to determine thereon, but its decision must conform
to that of the Supreme Court, or the corrective power may be
exercised. But the case is very different when the question arises
under a local law. The decision of this question by the highest
tribunal of a state should be considered as final by this Court,
not because the state tribunal in such a case has any power to bind
this Court, but because, in the language of the Court in the case
of
Shelby v. Guy,
11 Wheat. 361, "a fixed and received construction by a state in its
own courts makes a part of the statute law."
If the construction of the highest judicial tribunal of a state
forms a part of the statute law, as much as an enactment by the
legislature, how can this Court make a distinction between them?
There could be no hesitation in so modifying our decisions as to
conform to any legislative alteration in a statute; and why should
not the same rule apply where the judicial branch of the state
government, in the exercise of its acknowledged functions, should,
by construction, give a different effect to a statute from what had
at first been given to it. The charge of inconsistency might be
made with more force and propriety against the federal tribunals
for a disregard of this rule, than by conforming to it. They
profess to be bound by the local law, and yet they reject the
exposition of that law which forms apart of it. It is no answer to
this objection that a different exposition was formerly given to
the act which was adopted by the federal court. The inquiry is what
is the settled law of the state, at the time the decision is made.
This constitutes the rule of property within the state, by which
the rights of litigant parties must be determined.
As the federal tribunals profess to be governed by this rule,
they cannot act inconsistently by enforcing it. If they change
their decision, it is because the rule on which the decision was
founded has been changed.
The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the
Court, delivered by
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN.
This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse a judgment of the
Circuit Court for West Tennessee. An action of ejectment was
prosecuted by Neal in that court, to recover the possession of six
hundred and forty acres of land. The issue was joined, and at the
trial the defendant relied upon the statute of limitations, and
prayed certain instructions of the court to the jury. Instructions
were given, as stated in the following bill of exceptions.
"In the trial, the plaintiff introduced in evidence a grant from
the State of North Carolina, dated _____, to
Page 31 U. S. 293
Willoughby Williams, for the land in controversy, and deduced a
regular chain of conveyances to plaintiff's lessor, and proved
defendant in possession of the land in question at the time suit
was brought; defendant introduced a deed from Andrew Jackson to
Edward Dillon and proved that the defendant held by a lease from
Dillon, and also in support of Dillon's title, introduced evidence
tending to prove that persons claiming under and for Dillon had
been more than seven years in possession of the premises in
dispute, adverse to the plaintiffs, upon which the court charged
the jury that according to the present state of decision in the
Supreme Court of the United States, they could not charge that
defendant's title was made good by the statute of limitations."
The decision of the point raised by the bill of exceptions in
this case, is one of great importance, both as it respects the
amount of property which may be affected by it, and the principle
which it involves.
In the case of
Patton's Lessee v. Easton, which was
brought to this Court by writ of error in 1816, the same question,
which was raised by the bill of exceptions, was then decided. But
it is contended that under the peculiar circumstances of the case
now before the Court, they ought not to feel themselves bound by
their former decision. This Court, in the case of
Powell's Lessee v.
Green, 2 Pet. 240, gave another decision, under the
authority of the one just named, but the question was not argued
before the Court.
The question involves, in the first place, the construction of
the statutes of limitations passed in 1715 and in 1797. The former
was adopted by the State of Tennessee from North Carolina, the
third section of which provides
"That no person or persons or their heirs which hereafter shall
have any right or title to any lands, tenements, or hereditaments
shall thereunto enter or make claim, but within seven years after
his, her, or their right or title shall descend or accrue, and in
default thereof, such person or persons, so not entering or making
default, shall be utterly excluded and disabled from any entry or
claim thereafter to be made."
The fourth section provides, after enumerating certain
disabilities and the time within which suit must be brought after
they shall cease, that
"All possessions held without suing such claim as aforesaid
shall
Page 31 U. S. 294
be a perpetual bar against all, and all manner of persons
whatever, that the expectation of heirs may not, in a short time,
leave much land unpossessed, and titles so perplexed that no man
will know from whom to take or buy land."
In the year 1797, the legislature, in order to settle the "true
construction of the existing laws respecting seven years'
possession," enact
"That in all cases, wherever any person or persons shall have
had seven years' peaceable possession of any land, by virtue of a
grant or deed of conveyance founded upon a grant, and no legal
claim by suit in law, by such, set up to said land, within the
above term, that then, and in that case, the person or persons so
holding possession as aforesaid, shall be entitled to hold
possession in preference to all other claimants, such quantity of
land as shall be specified in his, her or their said grant or deed
of conveyance, founded on a grant as aforesaid."
This act further provides, that those who neglect, for the term
of seven years, to assert their claim, shall be barred.
This Court, in the conclusion of its opinion in the case of
Patton's Lessee v. Easton, said "This question, too, has
at length been decided in the supreme court of the state."
Subsequent to the division of opinion on this question in the
circuit court, two cases have been decided in the Supreme Court for
the State of Tennessee, which have settled the construction of the
act of 1797. It has been decided that a possession of seven years
is a bar only when held "under a grant, or a deed founded on a
grant." The deed must be connected with the grant. This Court
concurs in that opinion. A deed cannot be "founded on a grant"
which gives a title not derived in law or equity from that grant,
and the words "founded on a grant" are too important to be
discarded.
The two decided cases to which reference is made above are
Lillard v. Elliot and
Douglass v. Bledsoe's
Heirs. These cases were decided in the year 1815, and this
Court considered that they settled the construction of the statute
of 1797. But it is now made to appear that these decisions were
made under such circumstances that they were never considered, in
the State of Tennessee, as fully settling the construction of the
act.
In the case of
Lillard v. Elliot, it seems but two
judges concurred on the point, the court being composed of four,
and in
Page 31 U. S. 295
the case of
Weatherhead v. Douglass there was great
contrariety of opinion among the judges on the point of either
legal or equitable connection. The question was frequently raised
before the Supreme Court of Tennessee, but the construction of the
two statutes of limitations was never considered as finally settled
until 1825, when the case of
Gray and Reeder v. Darby's
Lessee was decided.
In this cause, an elaborate review of the cases which had arisen
under the statute is taken, and the construction of both statutes
was given that it is not necessary, to entitle an individual to the
benefits of the statutes, that he should show a connected title,
either legal or equitable. That if he prove an adverse possession
of seven years under a deed, before suit is brought, and show that
the land has been granted, he brings himself within the
statutes.
Since this decision, the law has been considered as settled in
Tennessee, and there has been so general an acquiescence in all the
courts of the state, that the point is not now raised or discussed.
This construction has become a rule of property in the state, and
numerous suits involving title have been settled by it.
Had this been the settled construction of these statutes when
the decision was made by this Court in the case of
Patton's
Lessee v. Easton, there can be no doubt that that opinion
would have conformed to it. But the question is now raised whether
this Court will adhere to its own decision, made under the
circumstances stated, or yield to that of the judicial tribunals of
Tennessee. This point has never before been directly decided by
this Court on a question of general importance. The cases are
numerous where the court have adopted the constructions given to
the statute of a state by its supreme judicial tribunal, but it has
never been decided that this Court will overrule its own
adjudication establishing an important rule of property where it
has been founded on the construction of a statute made in
conformity to the decisions of the state at the time, so as to
conform to a different construction adopted afterwards by the
state.
This is a question of grave import, and should be approached
with great deliberation. It is deeply interesting in every point of
view in which it may be considered. As a rule of
Page 31 U. S. 296
property, it is important, and equally so as it regards the
system under which the powers of this tribunal are exercised.
It may be proper to examine in what light the decisions of the
state courts, in giving a construction to their own statutes, have
been considered by this Court.
In the case of
McKeen v. Delancy's
Lessee, reported in 5 Cranch 22, this Court held
that the acknowledgement of a deed before a justice of the supreme
court, under a statute which required the acknowledgement to be
made before a justice of the peace, having been long practiced in
Pennsylvania and sanctioned by her tribunals, must be considered as
within the statute.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in giving the opinion of the court in the
case of
Bodley v.
Taylor, 5 Cranch 221, says in reference to the
jurisdiction of a court of equity,
"Had this been a case of the first impression, some contrariety
of opinion would perhaps have existed on this point. But it has
been sufficiently shown that the practice of resorting to a court
of chancery in order to set up an equitable against the legal
title, received in its origin the sanction of the Court of Appeals
while Kentucky remained a part of Virginia, and has been so
confirmed by an uninterrupted series of decisions, as to be
incorporated into their system, and to be taken into view in the
consideration of every title to lands in that country. Such a
principle cannot now be shaken."
In the case of
Taylor v.
Brown, 5 Cranch 255, the Court said in reference to
its decision in the case of
Bodley v. Taylor,
"This opinion is still thought perfectly correct in itself. Its
application to particular cases, and indeed its being considered as
a rule of decision on Kentucky titles, will depend very much on the
decisions of that country. For in questions respecting title to
real estate especially, the same rule ought certainly to prevail in
both courts."
This Court, in laying down the requisites of a valid entry in
the case of
Massie v.
Watts, 6 Cranch 165, said
"These principles have been laid down by the courts, and must be
considered as expositions of the statute. A great proportion of the
landed property of the country depends on adhering to them."
In
13 U. S. 9 Cranch
87, the Court said that
"In cases depending
Page 31 U. S. 297
on the statute of a state, and more especially in those
respecting titles to lands, the federal courts adopt the
construction of the state where that construction is settled and
can be ascertained."
And in
18 U. S. 5
Wheat. 279 it is stated that "The Supreme Court uniformly acts
under a desire to conform its decisions to those of the state
courts on their local laws."
The Supreme Court holds in the highest respect decisions of
state courts upon local laws forming rules of property,
15 U. S. 2 Wheat.
316. In construing local statutes respecting real property, the
courts of the Union are governed by the decisions of the state
tribunals,
19 U. S. 6 Wheat.
119. The Court said, in the case of
Elmandorf
v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152,
"that the courts of the United States, in cases depending on the
laws of a particular state, will in general adopt the construction
which the courts of the state have given to those laws. . . . This
course is founded upon the principle, supposed to be universally
recognized, that the judicial department of every government, where
such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the
legislative acts of that government."
In
20 U. S. 7
Wheat. 361, the Court again declares that
"The statute laws of the states must furnish the rule of
decision to the federal courts, as far as they comport with the
Constitution of the United States, in all cases arising within the
respective states, and a fixed and received construction of their
respective statute laws, in their own courts, makes a part of such
statute law."
The Court again said, in
25 U. S. 12 Wheat.
153,
"That this Court adopts the local law of real property as
ascertained by the decisions of the state courts, whether these
decisions are grounded on the construction of the statutes of the
state or form a part of the unwritten law of the state which has
become a fixed rule of property."
Quotations might be multiplied, but the above will show that
this Court has uniformly adopted the decisions of the state
tribunals respectively in the construction of their statutes. That
this has been done as a matter of principle in all cases where the
decision of a state court has become a rule of property.
In a great majority of the causes brought before the federal
tribunals, they are called to enforce the laws of the states.
Page 31 U. S. 298
The rights of parties are determined under those laws, and it
would be a strange perversion of principle, if the judicial
exposition of those laws, by the state tribunals, should be
disregarded. These expositions constitute the law, and fix the rule
of property. Rights are acquired under this rule, and it regulates
all the transactions which come within its scope.
It is admitted in the argument that this Court, in giving a
construction to a local law, will be influenced by the decisions of
the local tribunals, but it is contended that when such a
construction shall be given in conformity to those decisions, it
must be considered final. That if the state shall change the rule,
it does not comport either with the consistency or dignity of this
tribunal to adopt the change. Such a course, it is insisted, would
recognize in the state courts a power to revise the decisions of
this Court, and fix the rule of property differently from its
solemn adjudications. That the federal court when sitting within a
state, is the court of that state, being so constituted by the
Constitution and laws of the Union, and as such has an equal right
with the state courts to fix the construction of the local law.
On all questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the
Union, this Court may exercise a revising power, and its decisions
are final and obligatory on all other judicial tribunals, state as
well as federal. A state tribunal has a right to examine any such
questions and to determine them, but its decision must conform to
that of the Supreme Court, or the corrective power may be
exercised. But the case is very different where a question arises
under a local law. The decision of this question by the highest
judicial tribunal of a state should be considered as final by this
Court, not because the state tribunal in such a case has any power
to bind this Court, but because, in the language of the Court in
the case of
Shelby v. Guy,
11 Wheat. 361, "a fixed and received construction by a state in its
own courts, makes a part of the statute law."
The same reason which influences this Court to adopt the
construction given to the local law in the first instance is not
less strong in favor of following it in the second if the state
tribunals should change the construction. A reference is here made
not to a single adjudication, but to a series of decisions
Page 31 U. S. 299
which shall settle the rule. Are not the injurious effects on
the interests of the citizens of a state as great in refusing to
adopt the change of construction as in refusing to adopt the first
construction. A refusal in the one case as well as in the other has
the effect to establish in the state two rules of property.
Would not a change in the construction of a law of the United
States by this tribunal be obligatory on the state courts? The
statute as last expounded would be the law of the Union, and why
may not the same effect be given to the last exposition of a local
law by the state court? The exposition forms a part of the local
law, and is binding on all the people of the state and its inferior
judicial tribunals. It is emphatically the law of the state, which
the federal court, while sitting within the state, and this Court,
when a case is brought before it, are called to enforce. If the
rule as settled should prove inconvenient or injurious to the
public interests, the Legislature of the state may modify the law
or repeal it.
If the construction of the highest judicial tribunal of a state
forms a part of its statute law as much as an enactment by the
legislature, how can this Court make a distinction between them?
There could be no hesitation in so modifying our decisions as to
conform to any legislative alteration in a statute, and why should
not the same rule apply where the judicial branch of the state
government, in the exercise of its acknowledged functions, should
by construction give a different effect to a statute from what had
at first been given to it. The charge of inconsistency might be
made with more force and propriety against the federal tribunals
for a disregard of this rule than by conforming to it. They profess
to be bound by the local law, and yet they reject the exposition of
that law, which forms a part of it. It is no answer to this
objection that a different exposition was formerly given to the act
which was adopted by the federal court. The inquiry is what is the
settled law of the state at the time the decision is made. This
constitutes the rule of property within the state, by which the
rights of litigant parties must be determined.
As the federal tribunals profess to be governed by this rule,
they can never act inconsistently by enforcing it. If they
Page 31 U. S. 300
change their decision, it is because the rule on which that
decision was founded has been changed.
The case under consideration illustrates the propriety and
necessity of this rule. It is now the settled law of Tennessee that
an adverse possession of seven years under a deed for land that has
been granted will give a valid title. But by the decision of this
Court, such a possession under such evidence of right will not give
a valid title. In addition to the above requisites, this Court has
decided that the tenant must connect his deed with a grant. It
therefore follows that the occupant whose title is protected under
the statutes before a state tribunal is unprotected by them before
the federal court. The plaintiff in ejectment, after being defeated
in his action before a state court on the above construction, to
insure success has only to bring an action in the federal court.
This may be easily done by a change of his residence or a
bona
fide conveyance of the land.
Here is a judicial conflict, arising from two rules of property
in the same state, and the consequences are not only deeply
injurious to the citizens of the state, but calculated to engender
the most lasting discontents. It is therefore essential to the
interests of the country and to the harmony of the judicial action
of the federal and state governments that there should be but one
rule of property in a state.
In several of the states, the English statute of limitations has
been adopted, with various modifications, but in the saving clause,
the expression "beyond the seas" is retained. These words in some
of the states are construed to mean "out of the state" and in
others a literal construction has been given to them.
In the case of
Murray's Lessee v.
Baker, 3 Wheat. 540, this Court decided that the
expressions "beyond seas" and "out of the state" are analogous, and
are to have the same construction. But suppose the same question
should be brought before this Court from a state where the
construction of the same words had been long settled to mean
literally beyond seas, would not this Court conform to it? And
might not the same arguments be used in such a case as are now
urged against conforming to the local construction of the law of
Tennessee? Apparent inconsistencies in the construction
Page 31 U. S. 301
of the statute laws of the states may be expected to arise from
the organization of our judicial systems, but an adherence by the
federal courts to the exposition of the local law as given by the
courts of the state will greatly tend to preserve harmony in the
exercise of the judicial power in the state and federal tribunals.
This rule is not only recommended by strong considerations of
propriety growing out of our system of jurisprudence, but it is
sustained by principle and authority.
As it appears to this Court that the construction of the
statutes of limitations is now well settled differently from what
was supposed to be the rule at the time this Court decided the case
of
Patton's Lessee v. Easton and the case of
Powell's
Lessee v. Green, and as the instructions of the circuit court
were governed by these decisions and not by the settled law of the
state, the judgment must be
Reversed and the cause remanded for further
proceedings.
MR. JUSTICE BALDWIN dissented.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
West Tennessee and was argued by counsel, on consideration whereof
it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the
said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby remanded
to the said circuit court with directions to award a
venire
facias de novo.