1. A private Act of Congress which, after an award of
compensation for disability made by a deputy commissioner under the
Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act had become
final by expiration of the time for review, authorized and directed
the Employees' Compensation Commission to review the order and
issue a new one, whereupon there was awarded additional
compensation for disability continuing beyond the date as of which
by the prior order it was deemed to have terminated,
held,
as to the employer and insurance carrier, not violative of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp.
309 U. S. 374,
309 U. S.
378.
2. The Act was validly enacted by Congress to cure a defect in
administration developed in the handling of a claim compensable
under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. P.
309 U. S.
379.
3. The enactment by Congress of private Acts, except bills of
attainder and grants of nobility, is not forbidden by the Federal
Constitution. P.
309 U. S.
380.
4. The contention that the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment should be read into the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment, and that the Act denies equal protection, is
rejected. Pp.
309 U. S.
379-380.
Page 309 U. S. 371
5. The Act is not invalid as an encroachment by Congress on the
judicial function. P.
309 U. S.
381.
27 F. Supp. 823 affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of a District Court of three judges
upholding the constitutionality of a special Act of Congress and
dismissing libels in two cases consolidated for hearing.
Page 309 U. S. 374
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment is violated by a private act of Congress directing a
review of an order for compensation under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act [
Footnote 1] after there had been a final award by the
deputy commissioner and after the time for review of the award had
expired.
On January 17, 1931, the appellee Clark fell and fractured a rib
while working on the navigable waters of the United States as a
longshoreman for the appellant Paramino Lumber Company. The other
appellant, the Union Insurance Company of Canton, Ltd., is the
insurance
Page 309 U. S. 375
carrier of the Lumber Company under the Compensation Act. The
fall having disabled Clark, the appellants voluntarily paid him
compensation. Then, on Clark's application, hearings were had under
the Compensation Act which resulted in a determination on August
26, 1931, by the deputy commissioner that Clark had been wholly
disabled from the date of his fall to July 4, 1931, that, on the
latter date he had recovered from the disability, and that he had
been paid by appellants all the compensation due him. No
proceedings being brought to review this award, it became final in
thirty days. [
Footnote 2]
Almost five years later, the Congress passed a private act ordering
the Compensation Commission to review Clark's case and to issue a
new order, the provisions in the Compensation Act limiting time for
reviewing awards "to the contrary notwithstanding." [
Footnote 3] The information which led the
House and Senate Committees on Claims to recommend passage of the
act [
Footnote 4] indicated
that
Page 309 U. S. 376
Clark had first been treated by his employer's physician who
operated on his twelfth rib and reported that an examination of the
eleventh rib showed a firm union at the site of the fracture of
that rib. On the basis of this report, the deputy commissioner
concluded that Clark had recovered, and terminated his
compensation. But Clark's pain continued, and, within four months
of the deputy commissioner's order, x-rays taken by other
physicians disclosed that the fracture of the eleventh rib was
un-united, and, in order to give Clark relief, an operation fusing
the bone fragments had to be performed. After this the rib healed,
but in March, 1935, the physician who performed the second
operation reported that Clark was still experiencing pain in the
region of his injury. Since the deputy commissioner had no
jurisdiction over the case after he made his order, and since the
time for judicial review expired prior to the time of the operation
on the eleventh rib, Clark had no opportunity under the act to have
his compensation readjusted. [
Footnote 5]
After an unsuccessful attempt by appellants to enjoin a hearing
under the private act, [
Footnote
6] a hearing was had and
Page 309 U. S. 377
the deputy commissioner issued a new award granting Clark
compensation for total disability from the date of the prior award,
July 4, 1931, to January 5, 1939. Appellants brought two actions
against Clark and the deputy commissioner seeking injunctions
against the operation of the private act through prohibition of any
further steps under the new award. The first bill was framed as an
independent suit in equity; the second sought relief under the
section of the Compensation Act providing for "injunction
proceedings" to review awards made under the Act. [
Footnote 7] Under the Act of August 24, 1937,
[
Footnote 8] a three-judge
court was convened and the Attorney General duly notified. The
causes having been transferred to the admiralty side of the court
and consolidated for all purposes, the appellees filed exceptions
claiming that the appellants had failed to state a cause of action.
The court upheld the validity of the special act and sustained the
appellee's exceptions. [
Footnote
9]
By direct appeal, the appellants challenge the decree below,
contending that the private act violates the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The argument of appellants is that the
original award was an adjudication on which further review was
barred prior to the enactment of the private act; that thereby
rights and obligations were finally determined, the deprivation of
which took from appellants a substantive immunity from further
claims of Clark and created in Clark new substantive rights.
An award under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act determines the liability of
Page 309 U. S. 378
employer to employee. [
Footnote 10] But we do not agree that the immunity
obtained by the lapse of the time for review is the type of
immunity which protects its beneficiary from retroactive
legislation authorizing review of the claim. This private act does
not set aside a judgment, create a new right of action or direct
the entry of an award. The hearing provided for is subject to the
provisions of the general act for longshoremen's and harbor
workers' compensation. It does not operate to create new
obligations where none existed before. It is an act to cure a
defect in administration developed in the handling of a compensable
claim. If the continuing injury had been known during the period of
compensation, payments of the same amount due under the award
authorized by this act would have been due to the employee.
[
Footnote 11] In such
circumstances, we see no violation of the due process clause.
The principle underlying this conclusion is illustrated by
Graham & Foster v. Goodcell. [
Footnote 12] There, a retroactive act of the
Congress barred recovery by taxpayers of payments for taxes
properly owing but collection of which was barred by limitation. At
the time of the enactment of the controverted statute, the taxpayer
had a right to recover the payment. Limitation had been permitted
to run in favor of the taxpayer under a mistake of law. This Court
upheld the legislation as consistent with due process on the ground
that it was a curative act to remedy mistakes in administration
where the remedy "can be applied without injustice." [
Footnote 13]
Page 309 U. S. 379
Rights obtained by an attaching creditor were subjected to the
equity of a prior mortgage, invalid because improperly recorded by
a subsequent act in
McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel Company.
[
Footnote 14] This Court
refused to accept the argument that such a retroactive statute
deprived the holder of the attachment lien with notice of the prior
equity of property without due process. [
Footnote 15] Even more recently, in
Carpenter v.
Wabash Railway Company, [
Footnote 16] we upheld as valid and applicable an act
granting priority to railroad employees for damages for personal
injuries over other claimants in equity receiverships. The act
there in question was passed while certiorari was pending in this
Court from a contrary decision upon priority which we assumed to be
correct. This ruling resulted from the "superior equities" of the
employees. [
Footnote 17]
It is unimportant whether the claim persisted after the bar
[
Footnote 18] or ended with
the running of limitation. [
Footnote 19] To cure a fault of administration, Congress
may validly enact this act.
It is urged by appellant, however, that the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be
Page 309 U. S. 380
read into the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. If so
read, it is argued, this private act violates the rule of equal
protection. This conclusion, however, we find untenable. Private
acts, as such, are not forbidden by the Constitution. That
instrument contains no provision against private acts enacted by
the federal government except for a prohibition of bills of
attainder and grants of nobility. [
Footnote 20] It took an act of Congress to outlaw them in
the territories, [
Footnote
21] even though the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the
territories. [
Footnote 22]
The states have different situations as to the validity of private
acts. [
Footnote 23] The
constitutions of many of the states, unlike the federal, forbid
private legislation without regard to the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States. [
Footnote 24]
Page 309 U. S. 381
Nor can we say that this legislation is an excursion of the
Congress into the judicial function. [
Footnote 25]
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS dissents.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.
[
Footnote 2]
44 Stat. 1436, § 21, 33 U.S.C. § 921.
[
Footnote 3]
49 Stat., pt. 2, p. 2244. The act in full reads:
"That in the case of John T. Clark, of Seattle, Washington,
whose disability compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, was terminated as of
July 5, 1931, by a compensation order filed August 26, 1931, the
Employees' Compensation Commission be, and it is hereby, authorized
and directed to review such order in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in respect of such claims in section 19 of said Act, and
in accordance with such section to issue a new compensation order
which may terminate, continue, increase, or decrease such
compensation, the provisions of sections 21 and 22 of the said Act,
as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding:
Provided,
That such new order shall not affect any compensation paid under
authority of the prior order."
[
Footnote 4]
S.Rep. No. 1645, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R.Rep. No. 1892, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. The information before the Committees is attached
to both reports, and includes statements by the doctors who
examined, x-rayed, and operated on Clark after the deputy
commissioner's order; letters from the Compensation Commission
discussing the history of the case, and a letter from the deputy
commissioner to the sponsor of the act, Congressman Zioncheck,
relating the deputy commissioner's participation in the case.
[
Footnote 5]
[
Footnote 6]
95 F.2d 203.
[
Footnote 7]
44 Stat. 1436, § 21, 33 U.S.C. § 921.
[
Footnote 8]
50 Stat. 752, § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 380a.
[
Footnote 9]
Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 27 F. Supp. 823;
discussed in Comment, The Constitutionality of Private Acts of
Congress, 1940, 49 Yale L.J. 712.
[
Footnote 10]
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22.
[
Footnote 11]
See note 5
supra.
[
Footnote 12]
282 U. S. 282 U.S.
409.
[
Footnote 13]
See the cases cited to support the conclusion:
Forbes Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.
S. 338;
United States v. Heinszen & Co.,
206 U. S. 370;
Chuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549;
see also Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States,
300 U. S. 297,
300 U. S.
302.
[
Footnote 14]
185 U. S. 185 U.S.
505,
185 U. S.
511.
[
Footnote 15]
See Independent Pier Co. v. Norton, 12 F. Supp. 974,
where the amendment of May 26, 1934, 33 U.S.C. § 922, construed as
extending the time for review of an award under Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for one year retroactively as to a
final award, was held within due process.
See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421.
[
Footnote 16]
Ante, p.
309 U. S. 23.
[
Footnote 17]
Cf. Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 59
N.E. 1033;
Dunbar v. Boston & Providence Railroad, 181
Mass. 383, 386, 63 N.E. 916;
Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co., 238 N.Y. 271, 144 N.E. 579.
But see, for
criticism,
Woodward v. Central Vermont Ry., 180 Mass. 599,
603, 62 N.E. 1051;
Ziccardi's Case, 287 Mass. 588, 591,
192 N.E. 29;
Casieri's Case, 286 Mass. 50, 190 N.E.
118.
[
Footnote 18]
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620.
[
Footnote 19]
William Danzer Co. v. Gulf & S.I. R., Co.,
268 U. S. 633.
[
Footnote 20]
Art. I, § 9, cls. 3 and 8.
[
Footnote 21]
24 Stat. 170;
cf. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.
S. 190.
[
Footnote 22]
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.
S. 284,
273 U. S. 285,
273 U. S. 299.
[
Footnote 23]
State courts have dealt with this question as a matter of the
necessity of equality in due process before and after the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holden v. James, 11 Mass.
396;
State v. Industrial Accident Board, 94 Mont. 386, 23
P.2d 253;
Matter of Decker v. Pouvailsmith Corp., 252 N.Y.
1, 7, 168 N.E. 442;
Roles Shingle Co. v. Bergerson, 142
Or. 131, 19 P.2d 94;
Reiser v. William Tell Saving Fund
Assoc., 39 Pa. 137, 146;
State Bank v. Cooper, 2
Yerg. (Tenn.) 599, 605-606;
Tate's Ex'rs v. Bell, 4 Yerg.
(Tenn.) 202;
Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.)
119;
cf. 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.)
809.
[
Footnote 24]
There are restrictions against the enactment of special
legislation in the constitutions of all the states except
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont. The
following are typical provisions: (1) "The legislature shall not
pass local or special laws concerning any of the following
enumerated cases, . . . ;" followed by an enumeration of proscribed
subjects which is concluded with the catchall, "where a general law
can be made applicable."
See Cal.Const., art. IV, § 25;
Ky.Const., § 59. (2) "All laws, of a general nature, shall have a
uniform operation throughout the State. . . ."
See Ohio
Const., art. II, § 26. (3) "No special, private, or local law . . .
shall be enacted in any case which is provided for by a general
law. . . ."
See Ala.Const., 1901 art. IV, § 105. (4) "The
Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law for the
benefit of any particular individual. . . ."
See
Tenn.Const., art. XI, § 8. Often there will be more than one
provision in a constitution. The various provisions and decisions
under them are discussed in Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local
Legislation (1936) 24 Ky.L.J. 351, and Binney, Restrictions Upon
Local and Special Legislation, p. 127,
et seq.
[
Footnote 25]
Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.
S. 227,
225 U. S.
241.
The state cases cited by appellants upon the question of the
invasion of judicial authority involve statutes affecting judicial
judgments, rather than administrative orders, and are therefore
inapplicable:
Sanders v. Cabaniss, 43 Ala. 173;
Trustees Fund v.
Bailey, 10 Fla. 238;
Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64;
State ex rel. Flint v. Flint, 61 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. 1113;
Petition of Siblerud, 148 Minn. 347, 182 N.W. 168;
Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H.199;
Matter of
Greene, 166 N.Y. 485, 60 N.E. 183;
De Chastellux v.
Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18;
Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4
R.I. 324;
In re Handley's Estate, 15 Utah 212, 49 P. 829;
Ratcliffe v. Anderson, 31 Grat.Va. 105;
Marpole v.
Cather's Adm'r, 78 Va. 239;
Davis v. Menasha, 21 Wis.
491.
Compare Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S.
1;
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421;
Pocono Pines
Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct.Cls. 447.