1. When the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has refused appeal
from an order of the Superior Court affirming a rate order of the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, an appeal to this Court is
from the judgment of the Superior Court. P.
309 U. S.
31.
2. In the absence of other constitutional objections, it cannot
be said that a state court denies due process when, on appropriate
hearing, it determines that there is evidence to sustain a finding
of the violation of state law with respect to the conduct of local
affairs. P.
309 U. S.
32.
3. Where there is no claim of confiscation, the state authority
is competent to establish intrastate telephone rates, and, in so
doing, to decide what constitutes an unreasonable discrimination
with respect to intrastate traffic. P.
309 U. S.
32.
Appeal from 135 Pa.Super.Ct. 218; 5 A.2d 410, dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question.
Page 309 U. S. 31
PER CURIAM.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, by order of March
15, 1938, required appellant, The Bell Telephone Company of
Pennsylvania, to revise its intrastate toll rates for distances
exceeding 36 miles so as to conform to rates charged by the
American Telephone & Telegraph Company for comparable distances
for interstate services. The Commission found, after full hearing,
that the rates charged for long distance service in Pennsylvania
were higher than the interstate rates for the same facilities for a
like or greater distance, and constituted an unreasonable
discrimination against intrastate patrons in violation of section
304 of the Public Utility Law of Pennsylvania of May 28, 1937, P.L.
1053. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
order. 135 Pa.Super. 218, 5 A.2d 410. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania refused appeal. The case comes here on appeal from the
judgment of the Superior Court.
See Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 250 U.
S. 566.
Appellant expressly disclaimed below, and also here, raising the
question of confiscation. Its contentions are (1) that the
Commission's order is wholly without support in the evidence, and
thus constitutes a denial of due process contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment; (2) that the order based on discrimination only, and
prescribing rates not found to be reasonable and depriving
appellant of considerable revenue, is arbitrary, and hence a denial
of due process, and (3) that the order is a regulation of
Page 309 U. S. 32
interstate rates and imposes a direct burden upon interstate
commerce.
As to the first contention, it appears that the state court
heard the appeal judicially and decided that there was evidence
justifying the finding of the Commission of unreasonable
discrimination in the transaction of its intrastate business. In
the absence of other constitutional objections, it cannot be said
that a state court denies due process when, on appropriate hearing,
it determines that there is evidence to sustain a finding of the
violation of state law with respect to the conduct of local
affairs. The contention that such a decision is erroneous does not
present a federal question.
Arrowsmith v. Harmoning,
118 U. S. 194,
118 U. S. 196;
Bonner v. Gorman, 213 U. S. 86,
213 U. S. 91;
American Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U.
S. 269,
273 U. S.
273.
As to the second contention, where there is no claim of
confiscation, the state authority is competent to establish
intrastate rates, and, in so doing, to decide what constitutes an
unreasonable discrimination with respect to intrastate traffic.
See Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.
S. 307,
116 U. S. 325;
Portland Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 229 U. S. 397,
229 U. S. 410;
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad
Commission, 289 U. S. 287,
289 U. S. 304;
West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
294 U. S. 63,
294 U. S.
70.
Finally, it appears that the Commission's order related
exclusively to intrastate traffic, and that there was no attempt to
regulate interstate rates.
The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question.
Dismissed.