Under a Minnesota statute, a person may be subjected to a
proceeding akin to lunacy proceedings with a view to his restraint
if proven to be of a "psychopathic personality." In a prohibition
proceeding, the State Supreme Court construed the statute as
intended to include those persons who, by a habitual course of
misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power
to control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely
to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil
Page 309 U. S. 271
on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire,
and upheld the statute and quashed the alternative writ. Upon
appeal here,
held:
1. This Court must accept the state court's construction. P.
309 U. S.
273.
2. The word "include" as used in that court's opinion, will be
taken as defining the entire class of persons to whom the statute
applies, and not as describing merely a portion of a larger class.
Pp.
309 U. S.
273-274.
3. The statute, so construed, is not too vague and indefinite to
constitute valid legislation. P.
309 U. S.
274.
4. The objection that it denies the equal protection of the laws
because of unreasonable classification is untenable. P.
309 U. S.
274.
The legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and may
confine it restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is
deemed to be clearest.
5. In its procedural aspect, the statute is not invalid on its
face. P.
309 U. S.
275.
6. Procedural objections that are based upon possible
applications of the statute in the progress of the cause which have
not as yet been passed upon by the state court are premature. P.
309 U. S. 277.
205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297, affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment quashing an alternative writ of
prohibition.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant, Charles Edwin Pearson, petitioned the Supreme Court
of Minnesota for a writ of prohibition commanding the Probate Court
of Ramsey County, and its Judge, to desist from proceeding against
him as a "psychopathic personality" under Chapter 369 of the Laws
of Minnesota of 1939. A proceeding under the statute had been
brought in the Probate Court for the
Page 309 U. S. 272
commitment of appellant and an order for his production and
examination had been issued.
Appellant contended that the statute violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. After hearing upon an alternative writ, the
Supreme Court overruled these contentions and quashed the writ. 205
Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297. The case comes here on appeal. Jud.Code §
237(a).
The statute, in §, 1, defines the term "psychopathic
personality" as meaning
"the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional
instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary
standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the
consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions,
as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect
to sexual matters, and thereby dangerous to other persons."
Section 2 provides that, except as otherwise therein or
thereafter provided, the laws relating to insane persons, or those
alleged to be insane, shall apply with like force to persons
having, or alleged to have, a psychopathic personality. There is a
proviso that, before proceedings are instituted, the facts shall
first be submitted to the county attorney, who, if he is satisfied
that good cause exists, shall prepare a petition to be executed by
a person having knowledge of the facts and shall file it with the
judge of the probate court of the county in which the "patient" has
his "settlement or is present." The probate judge shall set the
matter down for hearing and for examination of the "patient." The
judge may exclude the general public from attendance. The "patient"
may be represented by counsel, and the court may appoint counsel
for him if he is financially unable to obtain such assistance. The
"patient" is entitled to compulsory process for the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf.
Page 309 U. S. 273
The court must appoint two duly licensed doctors of medicine to
assist in the examination. The proceedings are to be reduced to
writing and made parts of the court's records. From a finding of
the existence of psychopathic personality, the "patient" may appeal
to the district court.
After setting forth the general principles which governed its
determination, the state court construed the statute in these
words:
"Applying these principles to the case before us, it can
reasonably be said that the language of § 1 of the act is intended
to include those persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control
their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or
otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil on the objects
of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire. It would not be
reasonable to apply the provisions of the statute to every person
guilty of sexual misconduct, nor even to persons having strong
sexual propensities. Such a definition would not only make the act
impracticable of enforcement and, perhaps, unconstitutional in its
application, but would also be an unwarranted departure from the
accepted meaning of the words defined."
This construction is binding upon us. Any contention that the
construction is contrary to the terms of the Act is unavailing
here. For the purpose of deciding the constitutional questions
appellant raises, we must take the statute as though it read
precisely as the highest court of the State has interpreted it.
Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U. S.
30,
265 U. S. 32;
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U.
S. 509,
287 U. S. 513;
Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169,
290 U. S. 172;
Georgia Railway & Electric Co. v. Decatur,
295 U. S. 165,
295 U. S. 170.
Moreover, as it was the manifest purpose of the court to determine
definitely the meaning of the Act, we accept the view presented by
the Attorney General of
Page 309 U. S. 274
the State at this bar, that the court used the word "include" as
defining the entire class of persons to whom the statute applies,
and not as describing merely a portion of a larger class. In
advance of a decision by the statute court applying the statute to
persons outside that definition, we should not adopt a construction
of the provision which might render it of doubtful validity.
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251,
287 U. S.
277.
This construction of the statute destroys the contention that it
is too vague and indefinite to constitute valid legislation. There
must be proof of a "habitual course of misconduct in sexual
matters" on the part of the persons against whom a proceeding under
the statute is directed, which has shown "an utter lack of power to
control their sexual impulses," and hence that they "are likely to
attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the
objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire." These
underlying conditions, calling for evidence of past conduct
pointing to probable consequences, are as susceptible of proof as
many of the criteria constantly applied in prosecutions for crime.
Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373,
229 U. S. 377;
Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273,
236 U. S.
277-278;
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.
S. 343,
246 U. S. 348;
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.
S. 396,
280 U. S. 399.
Appellant's criticisms are drawn from his interpretation of the
statute, and find no warrant in the statute as the state court has
construed it.
Equally unavailing is the contention that the statute denies
appellant the equal protection of the laws. The argument proceeds
on the view that the statute has selected a group which is a part
of a larger class. The question, however, is whether the
legislature could constitutionally make a class of the group it did
select. That is, whether there is any rational basis for such a
selection. We see no reason for doubt upon this point. Whether the
legislature could have gone farther is not
Page 309 U. S. 275
the question. The class it did select is identified by the state
court in terms which clearly show that the persons within that
class constitute a dangerous element in the community which the
legislature in its discretion could put under appropriate control.
As we have often said, the legislature is free to recognize degrees
of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of
cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. If the law
"presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied."
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.
S. 373,
236 U. S. 384;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 78-79;
Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.
S. 608,
294 U. S.
610-611;
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U. S. 379,
300 U. S.
400.
There remains the question whether, apart from definition and
classification, the procedure authorized by the statute adequately
safeguards the fundamental rights embraced in the conception of due
process. In this relation, it is important to note that appellant
has challenged the proceeding
in limine by seeking to
prevent the probate judge from entertaining it. To support such a
challenge, the statute, in its procedural aspect, must be found to
be invalid on its face, and not by reason of some particular
application inconsistent with due process. In that light, the
argument on this branch of the case also fails.
As we have seen, the facts must first be submitted to the county
attorney, who must be satisfied that good cause exists. He then
draws a petition which must be "executed by a person having
knowledge of the facts." The probate judge must set the matter for
hearing and for examination of the person proceeded against.
Provision is made for his representation by counsel and for
compelling the production of witnesses in his behalf. The court
must appoint two licensed doctors of medicine to assist in the
Page 309 U. S. 276
examination. The argument that these doctors may not be
sufficiently expert in this type of cases merely invites
conjecture. There is no reason to doubt that qualified medical men
are usually available. Laws as to proceedings where persons are
alleged to be insane are made applicable. Appellant says that the
patient cannot be released on bail. The State contests this,
insisting that he may be so released pending hearing or on appeal,
pointing to Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1938 Supplement, §
8992-178. Appellant contends that, if the court finds the patient
to be within the statute, he must be committed "for the rest of his
life to an asylum for the dangerously insane." Mason's Minn.Stat.,
1938 Supp., § 8992-176. The State also contests this conclusion,
maintaining that the commitment is without term and subject to the
right of the patient, or any one interested in him, to petition the
committing court for release at any time. Mason's Minn.Stat., 1938
Supp., § 8992-143; Laws of 1935, Chap. 72, § 143, as amended by
Laws of 1939, Chap. 270, § 8. The statute gives a right of appeal
from the finding of the probate judge upon compliance with certain
specified provisions of the Minnesota laws. Appellant contends that
this excludes other provisions of laws relating to appeals in
insanity cases. Again, appellant's position is contested by the
State upon the ground that there is no express limitation or
exclusion in the language of the statute, and that other provisions
governing appellate procedure apply. These various procedural
questions and others suggested by appellant do not appear to have
been passed upon by the state court.
We fully recognize the danger of a deprivation of due process in
proceedings dealing with persons charged with insanity or, as here,
with a psychopathic personality as defined in the statute, and the
special importance of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in
a class of
Page 309 U. S. 277
cases where the law, though "fair on its face and impartial in
appearance," may be open to serious abuses in administration, and
courts may be imposed upon if the substantial rights of the persons
charged are not adequately safeguarded at every stage of the
proceedings. But we have no occasion to consider such abuses here,
for none has occurred. The applicable statutes are not patently
defective in any vital respect, and we should not assume, in
advance of a decision by the state court, that they should be
construed so as to deprive appellant of the due process to which he
is entitled under the Federal Constitution.
Plymouth Coal Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531,
232 U. S. 546;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.
S. 165,
286 U. S.
186-187;
Stephenson v. Binford, supra. On the
contrary, we must assume that the Minnesota courts will protect
appellant in every constitutional right he possesses. His
procedural objections are premature.
The judgment is
Affirmed.