Under the National Labor Relations Act, the authority to apply
to the Circuit Court of Appeals to have an employer adjudged in
contempt for failure to obey a decree enforcing an order of the
National Labor Relations Board lies exclusively in the Board
itself, acting as a public agency. A labor organization has no
standing to make such an application in virtue of having filed the
charges upon which the Board's proceedings were initiated. P.
309 U. S.
269.
106 F.2d 991 affirmed.
Certiorari, 308 U.S. 541, to review the denial of an application
for a contempt order.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Labor Relations Board ordered the Consolidated
Edison Company of New York and its affiliated companies to desist
from certain labor practices
Page 309 U. S. 262
found to be unfair and to take certain affirmative action. The
Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Board's petition for
enforcement of the order, and its decree, as modified, was affirmed
by this Court.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board,
305 U. S. 197.
Petitioner, Amalgamated Utility Workers, brought the present
proceeding before the Circuit Court of Appeals to have the
Consolidated Edison Company and its affiliated companies adjudged
in contempt for failure to comply with certain requirements of the
decree.
The Board, in response to the motion, asserted its willingness
to participate in an investigation to ascertain whether acts in
violation of the decree had been committed, and suggested that the
court direct such investigation as might be deemed appropriate.
The Court of Appeals denied the application upon the ground that
petitioner had "no standing to press a charge of civil contempt, if
contempt has been committed." The court held that, under the
National Labor Relations Act,
"the Board is the proper party to apply to the court for an
order of enforcement and to present to the court charges that the
court's order has not been obeyed."
106 F.2d 991. In view of the importance of the question in
relation to the proper administration of the National Labor
Relations Act, we granted certiorari. 308 U.S. 541.
Petitioner contends that the National Labor Relations Act
[
Footnote 1] "creates private
rights;" that the Act recognizes the rights of labor organizations,
and that it gives the parties upon whom these rights are conferred
status in the courts for their vindication. In support of its
alleged standing, petitioner urges that, under its former name
(United Electrical and Radio Workers of America), it filed with the
National Labor Relations Board charges against the respondent
companies, and that it was upon
Page 309 U. S. 263
these charges that the Board issued its complaint and held the
hearing which resulted in the order in question. Also, that
petitioner was permitted to intervene in the proceedings before the
Circuit Court of Appeals where the companies had moved to set aside
the Board's order, and the Board had moved to enforce it, and that
the petitioner had also been heard in this Court in the certiorari
proceedings for review of the decree of enforcement.
Petitioner invokes the statement in Section 1 of the Act of
"findings and policy," with respect to the effect of the denial by
employers of the right of employees to organize and to bargain
collectively, and in particular the provision of § 7 [
Footnote 2] that
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection."
Neither this provision nor any other provision of the Act can
properly be said to have "created" the right of self-organization
or of collective bargaining through representatives of the
employees' own choosing. In
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 33-34,
we observed that this right is a fundamental one; that employees
"have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives
for lawful purposes" as the employer has "to organize its business
and select its own officers and agents;" that discrimination and
coercion "to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to
self-organization and representation" was a proper subject for
condemnation by competent legislative authority. We noted that
"long ago"
Page 309 U. S. 264
we had stated the reason for labor organizations -- that,
through united action, employees might have "opportunity to deal on
an equality with their employer," referring to what we had said in
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U. S. 184,
257 U. S. 209.
And, in recognition of this right, we concluded that Congress could
safeguard it in the interest of interstate commerce and seek to
make appropriate collective action "an instrument of peace, rather
than of strife." To that end, Congress enacted the National Labor
Relations Act.
To attain its object, Congress created a particular agency, the
National Labor Relations Board, and established a special
procedure. The aim, character, and scope of that special procedure
are determinative of the question now before us. Within the range
of its constitutional power, Congress was entitled to determine
what remedy it would provide, the way that remedy should be sought,
the extent to which it should be afforded, and the means by which
it should be made effective.
Congress declared that certain labor practices should be unfair,
but it prescribed a particular method by which such practices
should be ascertained and prevented. By the express terms of the
Act, the Board was made the exclusive agency for that purpose.
Section 10(a) provides: [
Footnote
3]
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall be exclusive, and
shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, code,
law, or otherwise."
The Act then sets forth a definite and restricted course of
procedure. A charge of an unfair labor practice may
Page 309 U. S. 265
be presented to the Board, but the person or group making the
charge does not become the actor in the proceeding. It is the
Board, and the Board alone or its designated agent, which has power
to issue its complaint against the person charged with the unfair
labor practice. If complaint is issued, there must be a hearing
before the Board or a member thereof or its agent. The person
against whom the complaint is issued may answer and produce
testimony. Other persons may be allowed to intervene and present
testimony, but only in the discretion of the Board, or its member
or agent conducting the hearing. § 10(b). [
Footnote 4] The hearing is under the control of the
Board. The determination whether or not the person named in the
complaint has engaged or is engaging in the unfair labor practice
rests with the Board. If the Board is of the opinion that the
unfair labor practice has been shown, the Board must state its
findings of fact and issue its "cease and desist" order with such
affirmative requirements as will effectuate the policy of the Act.
§ 10(c). [
Footnote 5]
So far, it is apparent that Congress has entrusted to the Board
exclusively the prosecution of the proceeding by its own complaint,
the conduct of the hearing, the adjudication, and the granting of
appropriate relief. The Board as a public agency acting in the
public interest, not any private person or group, not any employee
or group of employees, is chosen as the instrument to assure
protection from the described unfair conduct in order to remove
obstructions to interstate commerce.
When the Board has made its order, the Board alone is authorized
to take proceedings to enforce it. For that purpose, the Board is
empowered to petition the Circuit Court of Appeals for a decree of
enforcement. The court
Page 309 U. S. 266
is to proceed upon notice to those against whom the order runs
and with appropriate hearing. If the court, upon application by
either party, is satisfied that additional evidence should be
taken, it may order the Board, its member or agent, to take it. The
Board may then modify its findings of fact and make new findings.
The jurisdiction conferred upon the court is exclusive, and its
decree is final save as it may be reviewed in the customary manner.
§ 10(e). [
Footnote 6] Again,
the Act gives no authority for any proceeding by a private person
or group, or by any employee or group of employees, to secure
enforcement of the Board's order. The vindication of the desired
freedom of employees is thus confided by the Act, by reason of the
recognized public interest, to the public agency the Act creates.
Petitioner emphasizes the opportunity afforded to private persons
by § 10(f). [
Footnote 7] But
that opportunity is given to a person aggrieved by a final order of
the Board which has granted or denied in whole or in part the
relief sought. That is, it is an opportunity afforded to contest a
final order of the Board, not to enforce it. The procedure on such
a contest before the Circuit Court of Appeals is assimilated to
that provided in § 10(e) when the Board seeks an enforcement of its
order. But that assimilation does not change the nature of the
proceeding under § 10(f), which seeks not to require compliance
with the Board's order but to overturn it.
What Congress said at the outset, that the power of the Board to
prevent any unfair practice as defined in the Act is exclusive, is
thus fully carried out at every stage of the proceeding. The text
of the Act is so clear in this respect that there is no need to
comment upon its legislative history. But this puts in a strong
light the
Page 309 U. S. 267
legislative intent. In the Senate, the Committee on Education
and Labor, in its report on the bill, said: [
Footnote 8]
"Section 10(a) gives the National Labor Relations Board
exclusive jurisdiction to prevent and redress unfair labor
practices, and, taken in conjunction with section 14, establishes
clearly that this bill is paramount over other laws that might
touch upon similar subject matters. Thus, it is intended to dispel
the confusion resulting from dispersion of authority and to
establish a single paramount administrative or
quasi-judicial authority in connection with the
development of the Federal American law regarding collective
bargaining."
And the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives, in
its report, stated: [
Footnote
9]
"The Board is empowered, according to the procedure provided in
section 10, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice listed in section 8 'affecting commerce' as that term is
defined in section 2(7). This power is vested exclusively in the
Board, and is not to be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention. The Board is thus made the paramount agency for
dealing with the unfair labor practices described in the bill."
After referring to the suitable adaptation of the Board's orders
to the needs of particular cases, and especially to the power to
reinstate employees with or without back pay, the Committee
continued:
"No private right of action is contemplated. Essentially, the
unfair labor practices listed are matters of public concern, by
their nature and consequences, present or potential; the proceeding
is in the name of the Board, upon the Board's formal complaint. The
form of injunctive
Page 309 U. S. 268
and affirmative order is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the bill to remove obstructions to interstate commerce which are by
the law declared to be detrimental to the public weal."
In both Houses of Congress, the Committees were careful to say
that the procedure provided by the bill was analogous to that set
up by the Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, [
Footnote 10] which was deemed to be "familiar to
all students of administrative law." That procedure, which was
found to be prescribed in the public interest, as distinguished
from provisions intended to afford remedies to private persons, was
fully discussed by this Court in
Federal Trade Commission v.
Klesner, 280 U. S. 19,
280 U. S. 25,
where it was said:
"Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not provide
private persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs.
The formal complaint is brought in the Commission's name; the
prosecution is wholly that of the government, and it bears the
entire expense of the prosecution. A person who deems himself
aggrieved by the use of an unfair method of competition is not
given the right to institute before the Commission a complaint
against the alleged wrongdoer. Nor may the Commission authorize him
to do so. He may, of course, bring the matter to the Commission's
attention and request it to file a complaint. But a denial of his
request is final. And if the request is granted and a proceeding is
instituted, he does not become a party to it or have any control
over it."
That sort of procedure concerning unfair competition was
contrasted with that provided by the Interstate Commerce Act in
relation to unjust discrimination. We said that, "in their bearing
upon private rights," they are "wholly dissimilar." The Interstate
Commerce Act imposes
Page 309 U. S. 269
upon the carrier many duties and creates in the individual
corresponding rights. For the violation of the private right, it
affords "a private administrative remedy." The interested person
can file as of right a complaint before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the carrier is required to make answer. We said
that the Federal Trade Commission Act "contains no such features."
Id., p.
280 U. S. 26.
The present Act, drawn in analogy to the Federal Trade Commission
Act, contains no such features.
As Congress has in this instance created a public agency
entrusted by the terms of its creation with the exclusive authority
for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act, decisions dealing
with the legal obligations arising under the Railway Labor Act
[
Footnote 11] cannot be
regarded as apposite.
Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of
Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548,
281 U. S.
569-570;
Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation
No. 40, 300 U. S. 515,
300 U. S.
543-544.
We think that the provision of the National Labor Relations Act
conferring exclusive power upon the Board to prevent any unfair
labor practice, as defined -- a power not affected by any other
means of "prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, code, law, or otherwise," necessarily embraces exclusive
authority to institute proceedings for the violation of the court's
decree directing enforcement. The decree in no way alters, but
confirms, the position of the Board as the enforcing authority. It
is the Board's order on behalf of the public that the court
enforces. It is the Board's right to make that order that the court
sustains. The Board seeks enforcement as a public agent, not to
give effect to a "private administrative remedy." Both the order
and the decree are aimed at the prevention of the
Page 309 U. S. 270
unfair labor practice. If the decree of enforcement is
disobeyed, the unfair labor practice is still not prevented. The
Board still remains as the sole authority to secure that
prevention. The appropriate procedure to that end is to ask the
court to punish the violation of its decree as a contempt. As the
court has no jurisdiction to enforce the order at the suit of any
private person or group of persons, we think it is clear that the
court cannot entertain a petition for violation of its decree of
enforcement save as the Board presents it. As the Conference Report
upon the bill stated, [
Footnote
12] in case the unfair labor practice is resumed, "there will
be immediately available to the Board an existing court decree to
serve as a basis for contempt proceedings."
The order of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner's motion
is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration and
decision of this cause.
[
Footnote 1]
49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151,
et seq.
[
Footnote 2]
29 U.S.C. § 157.
[
Footnote 3]
29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
[
Footnote 4]
29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
[
Footnote 5]
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
[
Footnote 6]
29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
[
Footnote 7]
29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
[
Footnote 8]
Sen.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15.
[
Footnote 9]
H.R.Rep. No. 972, 71th Cong., 1st sess., p. 21.
[
Footnote 10]
38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
[
Footnote 11]
45 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. See 50 Harvard Law
Review 1089, 1090.
[
Footnote 12]
Conference Report, Cong.Rec. 74th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 9, p.
10,299.