Section 5(4)(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act provides that the
Commission may authorize carriers to consolidate or lease their
properties where it finds that that action, subject to such
conditions and modifications as it shall find to be just and
reasonable, will be in harmony with and in furtherance of the plan
of consolidation of railway properties established pursuant to
paragraph (3) of that section, and will promote the public
interest. Upon an application to the Interstate Commerce Commission
for authority to lease the road and properties of one railroad to
another, with consequent large savings in the operating costs of
the road, the Commission found that the proposed lease would
promote the public interest, and authorized it upon conditions
which it found to be just and reasonable --
viz., that the
employees of the leased road be compensated for a limited time for
any reduction of salary, that dismissed employees be paid partial
compensation for the loss of their employment, and that transferred
employees be paid moving and traveling expenses, including losses
incurred through their being forced to sell their houses.
Held:
1. The term "public interest," as used in the statute, may be
understood for the purposes of this case as relating not to public
interest in general, but to public interest in the maintenance of
an adequate and efficient transportation service. P.
308 U. S.
230.
2. The policy of consolidating the railways is so intimately
related to the maintenance of an adequate and efficient rail
transportation system that the "public interest" in the one cannot
be dissociated from that in the other. P.
308 U. S.
232.
3. In determining whether conditions attached to an order
authorizing a lease will promote the public interest under §
5(4)(b), the Commission may consider their effect upon the national
policy of consolidation, as well as their more immediate effect
upon the adequacy and efficiency of the transportation system. P.
308 U. S.
232.
Page 308 U. S. 226
4. Interpreting the term "public interest" not in a general
sense, but as meaning public interest in maintaining an adequate
and efficient transportation system, an order of the Commission
authorizing a lease under § 5(4)(b) may affix reasonable conditions
for the compensation of railway employees who will be seriously
affected. Pp.
308 U. S. 228,
308 U. S.
238.
5. It cannot be said as a matter of law that the prescribed
conditions whose justice and reasonableness are not challenged will
not advance the public interest in the statutory sense by
facilitating the national policy of railroad consolidation and by
promoting the adequacy and efficiency of the railroad
transportation system by preventing interruption of interstate
commerce through labor disputes and by their effect on employee
morale. P.
308 U. S.
238.
6. The Act as so applied is within the commerce power. P.
308 U. S.
239.
7. The carrier is not deprived of property without due process
of law in being required to devote part of the savings resulting
from the exercise of the leasing privilege to compensate employees
for losses resulting from it. P.
308 U. S.
240.
29 F. Supp. 9 reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges which
set aside conditions attached by the Interstate Commerce Commission
to an order permitting one carrier to lease its railroad to
another.
Page 308 U. S. 227
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal raises the question whether the Interstate Commerce
Commission, in approving and authorizing a lease of a railroad by
one railroad company to another under § 5(4)(b) of the Interstate
Commerce Act as amended, 48 Stat. 217, 49 U.S.C. § 5(4)(b), enacted
in substance as § 407(5)(6) of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41
Stat. 481, has authority to prescribe, as a condition of its order,
that certain employees of the lessor shall receive partial
compensation for the loss which they may suffer by reason of their
discharge or transfer as a result of the lease.
Appellees are trustees of the Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf
Company and of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway
Company, both in bankruptcy for purposes of reorganization under §
77 of the Bankruptcy Act. They applied to the Interstate Commerce
Commission for authority under § 5(4)(b) to lease the railroad and
properties of the Gulf Company to themselves as trustees of the
Pacific Company at an annual rental equal to the net operating
income of the leased property. On the application, which was twice
heard by the Commission, evidence was submitted from which the
Commission found that the Gulf Company, whose entire capital stock
is owned by the Pacific Company, is owner of six hundred and
thirty-two miles of railroad in Texas which it operates separately
from the 8,138 miles of railroad of the Pacific Company; that the
purpose of the proposed lease was to combine the operation of the
two lines in order to effect savings in operating costs through the
elimination of the Texas accounting offices of the Gulf
Company.
The Commission found that the lease would not impose upon the
public any change in conditions affecting
Page 308 U. S. 228
train operation; that it would have no effect on rates or
routes, and would result in no change of service to the public. It
found that the elimination of the Texas accounting offices would
result in an annual saving of $100,000, six or seven thousand
dollars of which would accrue to the Gulf Company and the remainder
to the Pacific Company, to be effected through the ultimate
dismissal of forty-nine of the Gulf accounting employees and the
transfer of twenty others to the Chicago offices of the Pacific
Company. The Commission also found that the welfare of the
employees affected by the elimination of the accounting office is
one of the matters of public interest which the Commission must
consider in proceedings under § 5(4)(b).
It accordingly authorized the lease upon the conditions which it
found to be just and reasonable: that, for a period not exceeding
five years, each retained employee should be compensated for any
reduction in salary so long as he is unable, in the exercise of his
seniority rights under existing rules and practices, to obtain a
position with compensation equal to his compensation at the date of
the lease; that dismissed employees unable to obtain equivalent
employment be paid partial compensation for the loss of their
employment in specified amounts and for specified periods,
depending on the length of their service, and that the transferred
employees be paid their traveling and moving expenses, including
losses incurred through being forced to sell their homes. The
maximum cost of compliance with the conditions, it was found, would
be $290,000 spread over a period of five years, during which the
savings effected by the lease would be not less than $500,000. The
Commission found that the proposed lease, with the specified
conditions "will be in harmony with and in furtherance of our plan
for the consolidation of railroad properties, and will promote the
public interest."
Page 308 U. S. 229
In the present suit, brought by appellees, the district court of
three judges (Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat.
208, 219, 220, 28 U.S.C. §§ 45, 47a) granted the relief sought, and
decreed that the conditions of the Commission's order be set aside
and that the Commission be enjoined from enforcing them. The case
comes here on appeal under § 238 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §
345.
Appellees contend, as the district court held, that the
Commission was without the authority of any act of Congress to
attach the prescribed conditions to its order. Consequently, they
argue that the courts may appropriately set them aside as of no
effect, leaving the remainder of the order to stand as the
Commission's unqualified approval of the lease, although the
Commission gave no indication that it would have authorized the
lease without the conditions.
Section 5(4)(a) provides that
"it shall be lawful, with the approval . . . of the Commission,
as provided in subdivision (b), for two or more carriers to
consolidate or merge their properties . . . or for any carrier . .
. to . . . lease . . . the properties . . . of another. . . ."
Subdivision (b) provides that the Commission, on application by
the carrier or carriers concerned, may, after hearing, authorize
such a consolidation or lease, and directs that,
"if, after such hearing, the Commission finds that, subject to
such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find
to be just and reasonable, the proposed consolidation . . . [or]
lease . . . will be in harmony with and in furtherance of the plan
for the consolidation of railway properties established pursuant to
paragraph (3), and will promote the public interest, it may enter
an order approving such consolidation . . . [or] lease . . . upon
the terms and conditions and with the modifications so found to be
just and reasonable. "
Page 308 U. S. 230
In
New York Central Securities Co. v. United States,
287 U. S. 12, we
pointed out that the phrase "public interest" in this section does
not refer generally to matters of public concern apart from the
public interest in the maintenance of an adequate rail
transportation system; that it is used in a more restricted sense
defined by reference to the purposes of the Transportation Act of
1920, of which the section is a part and which, as had been
recognized in earlier opinions of this Court, sought through the
exercise of the new authority given to the Commission to secure a
more adequate and efficient transportation system.
See New
England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184;
Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.
S. 456;
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C.
& S.F. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266,
270 U. S. 277.
Thus restricted, the term public interest,
"as used in the statute, is not a mere general reference to
public welfare, but, as shown by the context and purpose of the
act, has direct relation to adequacy of transportation service, to
its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and to
appropriate provision and best use of transportation
facilities."
Texas v. United States, 292 U.
S. 522,
292 U. S.
531.
Appellees do not challenge the Commission's contention that the
conditions are germane to the transaction involved in the lease
because the purpose of the conditions is to mitigate the direct
effect of the lease upon the employees.
See United States v.
Chicago, M., St.P. & P. R. Co., 282 U.
S. 311,
282 U. S. 324,
282 U. S.
339-340. But they insist that the conditions which the
Commission is permitted by this section to attach to its order must
also conform to the standard of public interest which the statute
sets up to guide the Commission's action. From this premise, they
argue that the prescribed conditions are unauthorized, because
unrelated to the public interest in its statutory sense. They
maintain that a carrier's employees, as such, are
Page 308 U. S. 231
not part of the public whose interest is to be promoted by the
lease, and that their interest in keeping their employment without
loss of compensation is of private concern, and no part of that
public interest in the maintenance of an adequate and efficient
transportation system which the statute contemplates.
Accepting the premise, as we may for present purposes, without
considering the contention of the Commission that the conditions,
if just and reasonable, need not be related to the other statutory
standards, the issue is narrowed to a single question -- whether we
can say, as matter of law, that the granting or withholding of the
protection afforded to the employees by the prescribed conditions
can have no influence or effect upon the maintenance of an adequate
and efficient transportation system which the statute recognizes as
a matter of public concern.
Appellees do not attack the sufficiency of the evidence on which
the Commission's findings are based, and that evidence was not
submitted to the district court for review. Hence, we are free to
disturb the findings only if we can say that there can be no
rational basis for them.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v.
United States, 292 U. S. 282;
Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.
S. 297,
300 U. S. 304;
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.
S. 125,
307 U. S. 146.
Appellees do not deny that the use of part of the savings resulting
from the lease to compensate the employees for the loss which it
will occasion is just and reasonable so far as the interest and
relations of employer and employee are concerned, or that the lease
will be in harmony with and further the Commission's plan for
consolidation of the railroads, as the Commission found. They urge
only that the conditions imposed can have no relationship to the
maintenance of an adequate and efficient transportation system,
Page 308 U. S. 232
and, in consequence, cannot in any circumstances be said to
promote the public interest in the statutory sense.
The proposed lease, in its relation to the transfer or dismissal
of employees and to an adequate and efficient transportation
system, is not to be viewed as an isolated transaction or apart
from the Commission's plan for consolidation of the railroads. As a
result of the enactment of the Transportation Act in 1920,
consolidation of the railroads of the country, in the interest of
economy and efficiency, became an established national policy, and
the effective consolidation of the railroads in conformity to the
provisions of the Act and to the plan of consolidation which the
Commission was directed to prepare became a matter of public
interest. The policy of consolidation is so intimately related to
the maintenance of an adequate and efficient rail transportation
system that the "public interest" in the one cannot be dissociated
from that in the other. Hence, in considering whether the public
interest under § 5(4)(b) will be promoted by the conditions of an
order authorizing a consolidation or lease, the Commission is free
to consider their effect upon the national policy of consolidation,
as well as their more immediate effect on the adequacy and
efficiency of the transportation system.
Obedient to the mandate of § 5(2) of the Act, the Commission has
prepared and published a plan under which it is proposed that the
railroads of the country be consolidated into a limited number of
large systems. Consolidation of Railroads, 159 I.C.C. 522; 185
I.C.C. 403. By § 5 of the Act, the ban on consolidation of railway
carriers was removed, and, acting under it, the Commission has
granted authority for numerous consolidations and leases in
furtherance of the plan. In the preparation and execution of the
plan, it speedily became apparent that the great savings which
would result from consolidation could not be effected without
profoundly
Page 308 U. S. 233
affecting the private interests of those immediately concerned
in the maintenance of the existing nationwide railway system, the
railroad security holders and employee. The security holders are
usually, though not always, favorably affected by economics
resulting from consolidation. [
Footnote 1] But the Commission has estimated in its report
on unification of the railroads that 75% of the savings will be at
the expense of railroad labor. Not only must unification result in
wholesale dismissals and extensive transfers, involving expense to
transferred employees, but in the loss of seniority rights which,
by common practice of the railroads, are restricted in their
operation to those members of groups who are employed at specified
points or divisions. It is thus apparent that the steps involved in
carrying out the Congressional policy of railroad consolidation in
such manner as to secure the desired economy and efficiency will
unavoidably subject railroad labor relations to serious stress, and
its harsh consequences may so seriously affect employee morale as
to require their mitigation both in the interest of the successful
prosecution of the Congressional policy of consolidation and of the
efficient operation of the industry itself, [
Footnote 2] both of which are of public concern
within the meaning of the statute.
Page 308 U. S. 234
One must disregard the entire history of railroad labor
relations in the United States to be able to say that the just and
reasonable treatment of railroad employees in mitigation of the
hardship imposed on them in carrying out the national policy of
railway consolidation has no bearing on the successful prosecution
of that policy, and no relationship to the maintenance of an
adequate and efficient transportation system. As was pointed out by
Commissioner Eastman in his concurring opinion in this case, the
protection afforded to employees by the challenged conditions is
substantially that provided in event of consolidation by an
agreement entered into in May, 1936, between 219, the great
majority, of the railroad lines of the country, and 21 labor
organizations. [
Footnote 3] He
also directed attention to the fact that the Committee of Six,
three of whom were railroad executives, in their report to the
President of December 23, 1938, recommended that the federal agency
passing upon railroad consolidation "require as a prerequisite to
approval a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests
of . . . employees," [
Footnote
4] and that this report had been approved
Page 308 U. S. 235
by the directors of the Association of American Railroads.
We can hardly suppose that the railroads, in entering into this
agreement and endorsing this recommendation, left out of account
their own interest in the maintenance of transportation service, or
that their interest in this respect differs or is separable from
that of the public interest. In fact, before this action by the
railroads, the Commission itself had taken the view that the
welfare of dismissed employees must be considered in passing upon
proposed consolidations, [
Footnote
5] and, in its sixth annual report in 1892, it declared, in
recognition of the same principle, that "relations existing between
railway corporations and their employees are always of public
interest." [
Footnote 6] The
Federal Coordinator of Railroads, in his fourth annual report to
Congress in 1936, recommended the enactment of a comprehensive
system of dismissal compensation, stating that such a system "would
enhance the safety or efficiency of railroad service." H.Doc. No.
394, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 56. [
Footnote 7]
The now extensive history of legislation regulating the
relations of railroad employees and employers plainly evidences the
awareness of Congress that just and reasonable treatment of
railroad employees is not only an essential
Page 308 U. S. 236
aid to the maintenance of a service uninterrupted by labor
disputes, but that it promotes efficiency, which suffers through
loss of employee morale when the demands of justice are ignored.
Title 3 of the Transportation Act of 1920, [
Footnote 8] which was enacted at the same time as the
provisions reenacted in substance in § 5(4)(b), set up a "Labor
Board" to decide railroad labor disputes involving grievances,
rules, and working conditions, and declared in § 301,
"it shall be the duty of all carriers and their officers,
employees, and agents, to exert every reasonable effort and adopt
every available means to avoid any interruption to the operation of
any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the
employees or subordinate officials."
Congress has passed successive measures for arbitration of
railroad disputes between railroad employees and employers, all
aimed at the prevention of interruptions of railroad service
through such disputes, and culminating in the passage of the
Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, and in its amendments in
1934, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163;
Texas & New
Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks, 281 U. S. 548;
Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.
S. 515. By the Wagner Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49
Stat. 449,
Page 308 U. S. 237
29 U.S.C. 151
et seq., it recognized and sought to
prevent the interference with interstate commerce which may ensue
from labor disputes arising in industry not engaged in
transportation.
See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 42;
Labor Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.
S. 601,
306 U. S.
604.
The Safety Appliance Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 531,
see Southern
Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20, the Hours of Service Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 1415,
see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U. S. 612, and
the Federal Employers Liability Act of 1908, 35 Stat. 65,
see
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S. 51,
were designed mainly to insure the safety and welfare of railroad
employees, and the constitutionality of those measures was
sustained in part on the ground that they fostered the commerce in
which the employees were engaged. In passing the Adamson Act of
1916, 39 Stat. 721, fixing the wages of railroad employees,
Congress thought that it was safeguarding the railroads of the
country from interruption which might result from labor disputes,
and the constitutionality of the Act was sustained on that ground.
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332,
243 U. S. 351.
And, in the Act of 1934, as amended in 1937, 48 Stat. 1283; 50
Stat. 307, 45 U.S.C. §§ 201-214, 228a to 228r, providing for a
retirement and pension plan for railroad employees, Congress
declared in terms that the plan was adopted for the purpose of
"promoting efficiency and safety in interstate transportation."
In the last regular session of Congress, an act to amend the
Interstate Commerce Act was passed by the Senate, § 2009, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. The House passed a substitute bill embodying
extensive changes. H.Rept. 1217, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. Both bills
are now in conference. But both, as passed, contain a provision
carrying into effect the recommendation of the Committee of Six,
see
Page 308 U. S. 238
S.Rept. 433, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29, by directing the
Commission to require
"as a prerequisite to its approval of any proposed transaction
[consolidation or lease under § 5(4)(b)] a fair and equitable
arrangement to protect the interests of the employees
affected."
Both bills, as enacted, declare it
"to be the national transportation policy of Congress . . . to
encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions, all to the
end of developing, coordinating and preserving a national
transportation system . . . by . . . rail . . . adequate to meet
the needs of the commerce of the United States. . . ."
Congress has thus declared that fair and equitable provision for
the compensation of losses thrown upon employees as the result of
an authorized consolidation or lease promotes the national
transportation policy by developing, coordinating, and preserving
the railroad transportation system.
In the light of this record of practical experience and
Congressional legislation, we cannot say that the just and
reasonable conditions imposed on appellees in this case will not
promote the public interest in its statutory meaning by
facilitating the national policy of railroad consolidation; that it
will not tend to prevent interruption of interstate commerce
through labor disputes growing out of labor grievances, or that it
will not promote that efficiency of service which common experience
teaches is advanced by the just and reasonable treatment of those
who serve. In the light of that record, too, we do not doubt that
Congress, by its choice of the broad language of § 5(4)(b),
intended at least to permit the Commission, in authorizing railroad
consolidations and leases, to impose upon carriers conditions
related, as these are, to the public policy of the Transportation
Act to facilitate railroad consolidation and to promote the
adequacy and efficiency of the railroad transportation system.
Page 308 U. S. 239
The fact that a bill has recently been introduced in Congress
and approved by both its houses requiring as a matter of national
railway transportation policy the protection of employees such as
the Commission has given here does not militate against this
conclusion. Doubts which the Commission at one time entertained,
but later resolved in favor of its authority to impose the
conditions, were followed by the recommendation of the Committee of
Six that fair and equitable arrangements for the protection of
employees be "required." It was this recommendation which was
embodied in the new legislation. Sen.Rep. No. 433, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 29. We think the only effect of this action was to give
legislative emphasis to a policy and a practice already recognized
by § 5(4)(b) by making the practice mandatory, instead of
discretionary, as it had been under the earlier act.
It is said that the statute, as we have construed it, is
unconstitutional because not within the Congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce, and is a denial of due process. It is
true that, in
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co.,
295 U. S. 330, in
declaring the Railroad Retirement Act of June 27, 1934, 48 Stat.
1283, not to be a valid regulation of interstate commerce, it was
said, among other reasons advanced to support that conclusion, that
a compulsory retirement system for railroad employees can have no
relation to the promotion of efficiency, economy, or safety of
railroad operation. But, notwithstanding what was said there, and
even if we were doubtful whether the particular provisions made
here for the protection of employees could have the effect which we
have indicated upon railroad consolidation and upon the adequacy
and efficiency of the railroad transportation system, we could not
say that the Congressional judgment that those conditions have a
relation to
Page 308 U. S. 240
the public interest as defined by the statute is without
rational basis.
Cf. South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
303 U. S.
189-191;
United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144,
304 U. S. 147;
Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., ante, p.
308 U. S. 21.
If we are right in our conclusion that the statute is a
permissible regulation of interstate commerce, the exercise of that
power to foster, protect, and control the commerce with proper
regard for the welfare of those who are immediately concerned in
it, as well as the public at large, is undoubted.
Second
Employers' Liability Cases, supra, 223 U. S. 47;
Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.
S. 456,
263 U. S. 478;
United States v. Carolene Products Co., supra,
304 U. S. 147;
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38. Nor
do we perceive any basis for saying that there is a denial of due
process by a regulation otherwise permissible, which extends to the
carrier a privilege relieving it of the costs of performance of its
carrier duties, on condition that the savings be applied in part to
compensate the loss to employees occasioned by the exercise of the
privilege. That was decided in principle in
Dayton-Goose Creek
Ry. Co. v. United States, supra. There, it was held that the
Fifth Amendment does not forbid the compulsory application of
income, attributable to a privilege enjoyed by a railroad as a
result of Commission action, to specified purposes "in the
furtherance of the public interest in railway transportation." §
422(10), Transportation Act, 41 Stat. 490. Moreover we cannot say
that this limited and special application of the principle, fully
recognized in our cases sustaining workmen's compensation acts,
that a business may be required to carry the burden of employee
wastage incident to its operation, infringes due process.
Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra; New York Central R.
Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188;
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.
S. 219;
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Paramore,
263 U. S. 418.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
In several cases, the Commission has disapproved proposals for
consolidations and for acquisition of control because of a failure
to deal fairly with minority stockholders. Nickel Plate
Unification, 105 I.C.C. 425; Unification of Southwestern Lines, 124
I.C.C. 401. In others, it has approved the proposal on condition
that these objections be removed. Buffalo, Rochester &
Pittsburgh R. Control, 158 I.C.C. 779; Buffalo & Susquehanna R.
Corp. Control, 162 I.C.C. 656; Upper Coos R. Control, 166 I.C.C.
76; Springfield Terminal R. Co. Control, 166 I.C.C. 90; Denver
& Salt Lake R. Co. Control, 170 I.C.C. 4; Saint Louis
Southwestern R. Co. Control, 180 I.C.C. 175.
See United States
v. Chicago, M., St.P. & P. R. Co., 282 U.
S. 311,
282 U. S.
337.
[
Footnote 2]
On several occasions, strikes of railroad employees affected by
consolidations of plant facilities have threatened. To avoid
interruption of transportation service, an Emergency Board was
invoked in 1929 under the Railway Labor Act of 1926 to arbitrate
the dispute between the railroad and the employees of the Texas
& Pacific Railway Company. The Board awarded the employees
compensation for loss from depreciation of the value of their homes
(
cf. Clause 4 in the order here involved). The Board,
after extensive hearings, found that such a requirement was
reasonable in view of the fact that railroads themselves had, on
several prior occasions, compensated the employees affected. 28
Monthly Labor Review, 1191 (1929).
See also 43 Monthly
Labor Review, 867 (1936), where dismissal compensation was agreed
upon in similar circumstances under threat of a strike.
[
Footnote 3]
The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific System, represented here
by appellee, was a party to this agreement. 42 Monthly Labor Review
1503 (1936); 57 Traffic World 995 (1936).
[
Footnote 4]
Report of Committee appointed September 20, 1938, by the
President of the United States, to submit recommendations upon the
general transportation situation (December 23, 1938).
[
Footnote 5]
Consolidation of Railroads, 185 I.C.C. 403, 427; Unification of
Lines in Southern New Jersey, 193 I.C.C. 183, 198; St. Paul Bridge
& Terminal Railway Co. Control, 199 I.C.C. 588. For later cases
to the same effect,
see Associated Railways Company
Acquisition and Securities, 228 I.C.C. 277, 336; Louisiana &
Arkansas Ry. Co., Merger, 230 I.C.C. 156; Louisiana & Arkansas
Ry. Co., Merger, 233 I.C.C. 37; Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. Co.
Control, 233 I.C.C. 123.
[
Footnote 6]
Sixth Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1892), p.
323.
[
Footnote 7]
For a similar conclusion,
see J. Douglas Brown, et al.,
Railway Labor Survey, Social Science Research Council, Division of
Industry & Trade (1933), 1, 94; Robertson, The Stake of
Railroad Labor in the Transportation Problem, 187 Ann.Am.Acad. 88
(1936).
[
Footnote 8]
This Act resulted from the experiences of the Director General
in operating the railroads during the World War period. Sharfman,
The Interstate Commerce Commission, Vol. I, p. 181. The Director
General recognized the necessity of maintaining a loyal and devoted
personnel in the interest of uninterrupted service. Thirty-third
Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1919), p. 4.
In agreements executed by the Director General with several
railroad unions, provision was made for protection of seniority
rights and for free transportation for the employee, his family and
household goods (
cf. Clause 3 of order here involved),
when consolidations of facilities were ordered by the Director
General.
See Agreement between the Director General of
Railroads and the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (1920), Rule
77.