1. Section 51 of the Judicial Code, as amended, which provides
that
"no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against
any person by any original process or proceeding in any other
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but, where the
jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between
citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the
district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the
defendant,"
merely accords to the defendant a personal privilege of
objecting to the venue of suits brought against him in districts
wherein, under the section, he may not be compelled to answer. P.
308 U. S.
168.
Page 308 U. S. 166
2. The privilege accorded by § 51 may be lost by failure to
assert it seasonably, by formal submission in a cause, or by
submission through conduct. P.
308 U. S.
168.
3. Such surrender of the privilege may be regarded negatively as
a waiver or positively as a consent to be sued. P.
308 U. S.
168.
4. A designation by a foreign corporation, in conformity with a
valid statute of a State and as a condition of doing business
within it, of an agent upon whom service of process may be made,
held an effective consent to be sued in the federal courts
of that State. Pp.
308 U. S. 170,
308 U. S.
174.
5. Prior to the amendment of 1887, the provision was that
"no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts
against any person by any original process or proceeding in any
other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant or
in
which he shall be found. . . ."
Held, the omission by that amendment of the words "in
which he shall be found" was not intended to affect the
implications of a consent to be sued, and was not directed toward
any change in the status of a corporate litigant.
Ex parte
Schollberger, 96 U. S. 369, and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U.
S. 202, reconciled. P.
308 U. S.
171.
6. A State constitutionally may require a foreign corporation,
as a condition of doing a local business, to designate an agent
upon whom service of process may be made. P.
308 U. S.
175.
7. The finding in this case that the foreign corporation, by its
designation under the state law of an agent for the service of
process, had consented to be sued in the courts of the State,
federal as well as state, is not a subjection of federal procedure
to the requirements of state law, but a recognition that state
legislation and consent of parties may bring about a state of facts
which will authorize the federal courts to take cognizance of a
case. P.
308 U. S.
175.
103 F.2d 765 reversed.
Certiorari, 307 U.S. 619, to review the affirmance of an order
of the district court quashing service of process on the respondent
corporation and dismissing as to it the petitioners' bill.
Page 308 U. S. 167
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case is here to review the affirmance by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit of an order of the District Court
for the Southern District of New York setting aside service of
process upon Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd. (hereafter
called Bethlehem) and dismissing as to it petitioners' bill, 103
F.2d 765. The suit was based on diversity of citizenship, and was
not brought "in the district of the residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant." (§ 51 of the Judicial Code, Act of
March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, as corrected by Act of August 13,
1888, 25 Stat. 433, 28 U.S.C. § 112). [
Footnote 1] We took the case, 307 U.S. 619, because of the
uncertainties in application of § 51, emphasized by conflict
between the views below and those of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit.
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas
& Elec. Co., 100 F.2d 770. The sole question in the case
is whether § 51 is satisfied by the designation by a foreign
corporation of an agent for service of process in conformity with
the law of a state in which suit is brought against it in one of
the federal courts for that state.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts -- their power to
adjudicate -- is a grant of authority to them by Congress, and thus
beyond the scope of litigants to confer. But
Page 308 U. S. 168
the locality of a lawsuit -- the place where judicial authority
may be exercised -- though defined by legislation, relates to the
convenience of litigants, and, as such, is subject to their
disposition. This basic difference between the court's power and
the litigant's convenience is historic in the federal courts. After
a period of confusing deviation, it was firmly reestablished in
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U.
S. 261, and
Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,
260 U. S. 653,
overruling
Ex parte Wisner, 203 U.
S. 449, and qualifying
In re Moore,
209 U. S. 490. All
the parties may be nonresidents of the district where suit is
brought.
Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., supra. Section
51 "merely accords to the defendant a personal privilege respecting
the venue, or place of suit, which he may assert, or may waive, at
his election."
Commercial Ins. Co. v. Stone Co.,
278 U. S. 177,
278 U. S.
179.
Being a privilege, it may be lost. It may be lost by failure to
assert it seasonably, by formal submission in a cause, or by
submission through conduct.
Commercial Ins. Co. v. Stone Co.,
supra. Whether such surrender of a personal immunity be
conceived negatively as a waiver or positively as a consent to be
sued, is merely an expression of literary preference. The essence
of the matter is that courts affix to conduct consequences as to
place of suit consistent with the policy behind § 51, which is "to
save defendants from inconveniences to which they might be
subjected if they could be compelled to answer in any district, or
wherever found."
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry.,
supra, 260 U.S. at
260 U. S.
275.
When the litigants are natural persons, the conceptions
underlying venue present relatively few problems in application.
But, in the case of corporate litigants, these procedural problems
are enmeshed in the wider intricacies touching the status of a
corporation in our law. The
Page 308 U. S. 169
corporate device is one form of associated enterprise, and what
the law in effect has done is to enforce rights and duties
appropriate for collective activity.
Cf. United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344;
Puerto Rico v. Russell, 288 U. S. 476. It
has done so largely by assimilating corporations to natural
persons. The long, tortuous evolution of the methods whereby
foreign corporations gained access to courts or could be brought
there is the history of judicial groping for a reconciliation
between the practical position achieved by the corporation in
society and a natural desire to confine the powers of these
artificial creations. [
Footnote
2]
It took half a century of litigation in this Court finally to
confer on a corporation, through the use of a fiction, [
Footnote 3] citizenship in the
chartering state for jurisdictional purposes.
Compare
59 U. S. Co. v.
French, 18 How. 404,
with 9 U. S. Co. v.
Boardman, 5 Cranch 57. Throughout, the mode of thought was
metaphorical. The classic doctrine was that a corporation "must
dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another
sovereignty."
Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 13 Pet. 519,
38 U. S. 588.
Logically applied, this theory of nonmigration prevented suit in a
nonchartering state, for the corporation could not be there.
[
Footnote 4] And such was the
practice of the circuit courts [
Footnote 5] until the opinion of Chief Justice Waite in
Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369,
displaced metaphor with common sense. The essential difference
Page 308 U. S. 170
between the practice which Mr. Justice Nelson [
Footnote 6] initiated at circuit and the
decision in
Schollenberger's case was not a matter of
technical legal construction, but a way of looking at corporations.
Men's minds had become habituated to corporate activities which
crossed state lines. The fact that corporations did do business
outside their originating bounds made intolerable their immunity
from suit in the states of their activities. And so they were
required by legislatures to designate agents for service of process
in return for the privilege of doing local business. That service
upon such an agent, in conformity with a valid state statute,
constituted consent to be sued in the federal court, and thereby
supplanted the immunity as to venue, was the rationale of
Schollenberger's case.
To be sure, that case arose under the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18
Stat. 470, the language of which differed from the Act of 1887, now
§ 51 of the Judicial Code. The earlier provision was as
follows:
"And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts
against any person by any original process or proceeding in any
other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which
he shall be found. . . ."
The Act of 1887 omitted the words "in which he shall be found."
But, of course, the Phoenix and the Clinton Insurance Company in
Ex parte Schollenberger, supra, were not geographically
"found" in Pennsylvania, and Chief Justice Waite so recognized.
They were "found" in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania only in a
metaphorical sense, because they had consented to be sued there by
complying with the Pennsylvania law for designating an agent to
accept service. Not less than three times does the opinion
point
Page 308 U. S. 171
out that the corporation gave "consent" to be sued, and, because
of this consent, the Chief Justice added that the corporation was
"found" there. But the crux of the decision is its reliance upon
two earlier cases,
Railroad Company v.
Harris, 12 Wall. 65, and
Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, recognizing that
"consent" may give "venue." The Phoenix and the Clinton Insurance
Company consented not to be "found." but to be sued. Since the
corporation had consented to be sued in the courts of the state,
this Court held that the consent extended to the federal courts
sitting in that state. As to diversity cases, Congress has given
the federal courts "cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States." Jud.Code § 24. The consent therefore extends to
any court sitting in the state which applies the laws of the state.
[
Footnote 7]
The notion that the 1887 amendment, by eliminating the right to
sue a defendant in the district "in which he shall be found," was
meant to affect the implications of a consent to be sued --
implications which were the basis of the
Schollenberger
decision -- derives from a misapplication of the purpose of
Congress to contract diversity jurisdiction, based upon a
misunderstanding of the legislative history of the 1887 amendment.
[
Footnote 8] The deletion of
"in which he shall be found" was not directed toward any change in
the status of a corporate litigant. The restriction was designed to
shut the door against service of process upon a natural person in
any place where he might be caught. It confined suability, except
with the
Page 308 U. S. 172
defendant's consent, to the district of his physical habitation.
Insofar as the 1887 legislation sheds any light upon the status of
a corporate litigant in diversity suits, its significance lies
outside the omission of the "he shall be found" clause. The form in
which that Act passed the House of Representatives contained a
provision, wholly distinct from the general venue section,
restricting the growing volume of litigation drawn to the federal
courts by the fiction of corporate citizenship. [
Footnote 9] It prohibited resort to the
federal courts by foreign corporations authorized to do a local
business. The Senate rejected, as it had done upon three previous
occasions, this House proposal. [
Footnote 10] But the bill, as it left the House, also
contained the venue provision, with its omission of the "found"
clause. It would be strange indeed if the House in § 1 had dealt
with the "venue" of suits against corporate litigants who, like
those involved in the
Schollenberger case, by § 3 of the
same bill were completely barred from the federal courts. It would
be stranger still if, after passing a drastic measure curtailing
resort by foreign corporations to the federal courts, the House had
only succeeded in giving discriminatory freedom to foreign
corporations discriminatory in that, by nullifying the significance
of consent through obedience to state law to be sued in the federal
courts, it would allow a
Page 308 U. S. 173
foreign corporate defendant freedom either to remain in the
state courts or to remove to a federal court.
And so, after the Act of 1887 and despite its elimination of "in
which he shall be found" from the Act of 1875, lower federal courts
continued to apply the doctrine of
Schollenberger's case
by considering the designation of an agent for service of process
an effective consent to be sued in the federal courts. [
Footnote 11] This practice in the
lower federal courts continued until 1892, when
Southern
Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, was
decided. But that case involved an entirely different situation.
The Court was there concerned with a Texas statute which not merely
regulated procedure for suit, but sought to deny foreign
corporations access to the federal courts. This Court held the act
unconstitutional, as the Texas court had, in fact, already done.
[
Footnote 12] Inasmuch as
the Texas act was found to be void, it "could give no validity or
effect to any agreement or action of the corporation in obedience
to its provisions." [
Footnote
13] To be sure, the Court went on to interpret the agreement,
"if valid," [
Footnote 14]
and to suggest that, had it been valid, the agreement might have
subjected the corporation to jurisdiction "so long as the Judiciary
Acts of the United States allowed it to be sued in the district in
which it was
found.'" [Footnote 15] Such, as we
Page 308 U. S.
174
have seen, was not the true basis of the decision in
Schollenberger's case. As decisions, the two cases are
wholly consistent. But, disregarding the situation before the Court
in the Denton case -- the absence of any valid consent to
be sued because of the invalidity of the statute by which the
alleged "consent" was obtained -- several of the lower courts have
taken language from the Denton opinion and have made it
govern situations where valid consent did exist, because given in
conformity with the provisions of a valid statute. [Footnote 16] Other courts have adhered to
the practice established by Schollenberger's case.
[Footnote 17] We deem this
practice sound, and it controls the present case.
In conformity with what is now § 210 of the General Corporation
Law of New York, [
Footnote
18] Bethlehem designated
Page 308 U. S. 175
"William J. Brown as the person upon whom a summons may be
served within the New York." The scope and meaning of such a
designation as part of the bargain by which Bethlehem enjoys the
business freedom of the New York, have been authoritatively
determined by the Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge
Cardozo:
"The stipulation is therefore a true contract. The person
designated is a true agent. The consent that he shall represent the
corporation is a real consent. He is made the person 'upon whom
process against the corporation may be served.' . . . The contract
deals with jurisdiction of the person. It does not enlarge or
diminish jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means that,
whenever jurisdiction of the subject matter is present, service on
the agent shall give jurisdiction of the person."
Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading C. & I. Co.,
217 N.Y. 432, 436, 437, 111 N.E. 1075, 1076. A statute calling for
such a designation is constitutional, and the designation of the
agent "a voluntary act."
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold
Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93.
In finding an actual consent by Bethlehem to be sued in the
courts of New York, federal as well as state, we are not subjecting
federal procedure to the requirements of New York law. We are
recognizing that "state legislation and consent of parties may
bring about a state of facts which will authorize the courts of the
United States to take cognizance of a case."
Ex parte
Schollenberger, supra, at
96 U. S. 377.
The judgment below is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 112(a) reads as follows:
"Except as provided in sections 113 to 117 of this title, no
person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another in
any civil action before a district court; and, except as provided
in sections 113 to 118 of this title, no civil suit shall be
brought in any district court against any person by any original
process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is
an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the
fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit
shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either
the plaintiff or the defendant."
[
Footnote 2]
See Henderson, "The Position of Foreign Corporations in
American Constitutional Law,"
passim, and especially the
illuminating analysis pp. 163-194.
[
Footnote 3]
See Gray, "The Nature and Sources of the Law," 184, and
Henderson,
op. cit. supra, note 2 pp. 50-76.
[
Footnote 4]
See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350,
106 U. S.
355.
[
Footnote 5]
"We are aware that the practice in the circuit courts generally
has been to decline jurisdiction in this class of suits."
96 U. S. 369,
96 U. S.
378.
[
Footnote 6]
Day v. Newark India Rubber Mfg. Co., 1 Blatchf. 628,
Fed.Cas. No. 3685;
Pomeroy v. New York, N.H. & H. R.
Co., 4 Blatchf. 120, Fed.Cas. No. 11261. Both these cases were
decided by Mr. Justice Nelson on circuit.
[
Footnote 7]
"While the Circuit Court may not be technically a court of the
Commonwealth, it is a court within it, and that, as we think, is
all the Legislature intended to provide for."
96 U. S. 96 U.S.
369,
96 U. S. 377.
See Madisonville Traction Co. v. Mining Co., 196 U.
S. 239,
196 U. S. 255,
256.
Cf. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chatters,
279 U. S. 320,
279 U. S.
329.
[
Footnote 8]
A cognate misconception as to the purpose of the Act of 1887-88
in contracting the jurisdiction of the circuit courts underlay the
decision in
Ex parte Wisner, 203 U.
S. 449, overruled in
Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 653,
260 U. S.
659.
[
Footnote 9]
The Culberson Bill, which passed the House in 1887, was H.R.
2441, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. It provided in its original form that
the lower federal courts should not take "cognizance of any suit"
between
"a corporation created or organized by or under the laws of any
State and a citizen of any State in which such corporation at the
time the cause of action accrued may have been carrying on any
business authorized by the law creating it. . . ."
There were likewise provisions forbidding removal of such suits
to the lower Federal courts.
See 17 Cong.Rec. 614; H.Rep.
No. 1078, 49th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 10]
10 Cong.Rec. 1304-1305; 14 Cong.Rec. 1270; 15 Cong.Rec.
4909.
[
Footnote 11]
Riddle v. New York R. Co., 39 F. 290;
Consolidated
Store-Service Co. v. Lamson Consol. Store-Service Co., 41 F.
833, approvingly cited in
Haight & Freese Co. v.
Weiss, 156 F. 328.
[
Footnote 12]
Texas Land & Mortgage Co. v. Worsham, 76 Tex.
556.
[
Footnote 13]
146 U.S.
202 U. S.
207.
[
Footnote 14]
146 U.S.
202 U. S.
207.
[
Footnote 15]
146 U.S.
202 U. S. 207.
The
Denton case was based on
Shaw v. Quincy Mining
Co., 145 U. S. 444, in
which there was no consent derivable from the designation of an
agent for service. Both opinions were written by Mr. Justice Gray,
who later accurately delimited the scope of the holdings in both
the
Shaw and the
Denton cases.
In re Keasbey
& Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221,
160 U. S. 229.
The decisive difference between the present case and
In re
Keasbey & Mattison Co., supra, is that, in the latter
case, the designation under state law which is the basis of consent
had in fact not been made. But the requirement of "residence" in
the Act of 1887 is as much satisfied by a consent to be sued as was
the requirement "to be found" in the 1875 Act satisfied by such a
consent.
[
Footnote 16]
Platt v. Mass. Real Estate Co., 103 F. 705;
Hagstoz
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 179 F. 569;
Beech-Nut Packing Co.
v. P. Lorillard Co., 287 F. 271;
Jones v. Consolidated
Wagon Co., 31 F.2d 383, 384;
Kerfoot v. United Dairy
Co., 38 F.2d 671;
Standard Stoker Co. v.
Lower, 46 F.2d
678;
McLean v. Mississippi, 96 F.2d 741;
Gray v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 24 F. Supp. 144;
Hamilton Watch Co. v.
George W. Borg Co., 27 F. Supp. 215;
Toulmin v. James Mfg.
Co., 27 F. Supp.
512.
Cf. Heine Chimney Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 12
F.2d 596.
[
Footnote 17]
Shainwald v. Davids, 69 F. 704;
Patten v. Dodge
Mfg. Co., 23 F.2d 852,
aff'd, 1932, 60 F.2d 676;
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 100
F.2d 770.
[
Footnote 18]
Originally enacted as c. 687, Laws of 1892, pp. 1805, 1806.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS, dissenting.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in a careful and discriminating
opinion, [
Footnote 2/1] has held
that to deny the respondent's motion to dismiss it from the suit
would be to disregard
Page 308 U. S. 176
the long settled construction of Sec. 51 of the Judicial Code
and the equally well settled application of that section. I think
its judgment should be affirmed.
Whatever may be said in support of the original adoption of a
different rule, it has been the law for a century that, as respects
the jurisdiction of the federal courts over a corporation in
diversity of citizenship cases, the corporation is a citizen and
resident of the state of incorporation, and of no other state. I do
not understand the court's opinion to repudiate the rule.
The statute which is now § 51 of the Judicial Code took its
present form in 1888. In 1892, the Court held, in
Shaw v.
Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444,
145 U. S. 453,
that, under the statute,
"a corporation, incorporated in one state only, cannot be
compelled to answer, in a circuit court of the United States held
in another state in which it has a usual place of business, to a
civil suit at law or in equity, brought by a citizen of a different
state."
This construction has been followed in this court without
deviation and with practical unanimity by the lower federal courts.
[
Footnote 2/2]
At the next term, in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton,
146 U. S. 202,
146 U. S.
205-207, the ruling was reaffirmed in a case where the
defendant had registered as a foreign corporation under a state law
and, as a condition of registration, had agreed that service of
process might be made upon a designated agent.
Page 308 U. S. 177
The earlier Act of 1875 provided that no civil suit could be
brought against a defendant in a United States court "in any other
district than that, whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he
shall be found at the time of serving such process. . . ."
Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S.
369, applied that earlier statute. The court held that a
foreign corporation which had registered and consented to the
service of process upon a designated agent had thereby agreed "to
be found" within the state, and might therefore be impleaded in a
federal court sitting in the state although it was not a citizen or
a resident of the state. The case was cited in the opinions in both
the
Shaw and the
Southern Pacific cases. In the
latter, the court said, referring to the foreign corporation's
agreement as to service, 146 U.S. at
146 U. S.
207-208:
"It might likewise have subjected the corporation to the
jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the United States held within
the state, so long as the judiciary acts of the United States
allowed it to be sued in the district in which it was found. . . .
But such an agreement could not, since congress (as held in
Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., above cited) has made
citizenship of the state, with residence in the district, the sole
test of jurisdiction in this class of cases, estop the corporation
to set up noncompliance with that test, when sued in a circuit
court of the United States."
In
In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.
S. 221, the Court held, p.
160 U. S.
228:
"Under the provision of that act [the earlier act of 1875],
which allowed a defendant to be sued in the district of which he
was an inhabitant, or in that in which he was found, a corporation
could doubtless have been sued either in the district in which it
was incorporated or in any district in which it carried on business
and had a general agent."
For this statement, the Court cited
Ex parte Schollenberger,
Shaw v. Quincy
Page 308 U. S. 178
Mining Company, and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton,
supra. The opinions in the last two, and that in the
Keasbey case, were written for the court by Mr. Justice
Gray, who summed up their effect by saying:
"And it is established by the decisions of this Court that,
within the meaning of this act, a corporation cannot be considered
a citizen, an inhabitant, or a resident of a state in which it has
not been incorporated, and, consequently, that a corporation
incorporated in a state of the Union cannot be compelled to answer
to a civil suit at law or in equity in a circuit court of the
United States held in another state, even if the corporation has a
usual place of business in that state."
This interpretation of § 51 has since remained unchanged.
Congress must have known of and acquiesced in the courts'
construction of the section, particularly as there have been
efforts to amend it, and no alteration has been adopted.
Upon principle, and under the authorities, the mere fact that
service of process valid under state law can be had on an officer
or agent of a foreign corporation doing business within the state
is irrelevant; for, although the corporation may be served in
conformity to local law, it cannot be compelled to try its case in
a federal court sitting in the state. I do not understand the
opinion of the Court to hold to the contrary.
But it is said that registration and designation of an agent
upon whom service may be made under compulsion of state law amounts
to a waiver of the requirements of § 51 as to venue, or to a
consent to be sued in a federal court sitting within the state.
As has been shown by quotation from the opinion, this contention
was made in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, supra, and was
overruled. The holding was one of the alternative grounds of
decision. The
Southern Pacific
Page 308 U. S. 179
case settled the application of § 51, in the circumstances here
disclosed, and the decision has never been qualified or overruled.
The lower federal courts have understood and applied that decision
with practical uniformity to enable the foreign corporation to
contest the venue of suits against it. [
Footnote 2/3]
I see no reason at this late day to attribute a new effect to
the statute when Congress has not seen fit to express a view
contrary to that embodied in this Court's construction of the law;
though this might at any time be done. The principle of
stare
decisis seems to me to make against such a change.
The court below has analyzed the applicable New York statute,
and has satisfactorily demonstrated that it deals with service of
process on foreign corporations in the courts of New York. The
state could not, by its laws, affect the jurisdiction of federal
courts or the venue of suits therein -- a matter solely within the
control of Congress.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS join in this
opinion.
[
Footnote 2/1]
103 F.2d 765.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.
S. 221;
Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 215 U. S. 501;
Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U.
S. 357;
Male v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Co., 240 U. S. 97;
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry. Co., 260 U.
S. 261,
260 U. S. 271;
Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.
Co., 270 U. S. 363;
Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.
S. 496;
Burnrite Coal Co. v. Riggs,
274 U. S. 208,
274 U. S. 211.
The decisions in the federal courts are cited and discussed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, 103 F.2d 765, 767.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Some of the cases are cited by the Circuit Court of Appeals in
its opinion. 103 F.2d 765, 769.